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1. Het onderscheid tussen economische en politieke rationaliteit maakt politiek funda-
mentele antwoorden op de duurzaamheidsproblematiek mogelijk. 
2. Politiek gezien zijn economische inzichten belangrijker dan economische instru-
menten. 
3. Wetenschappelijke onpartijdigheid impliceert geen wetenschappelijke neutraliteit. 
4. Een vertaling van duurzaamheid in termen van een ecologisch verantwoorde eco-
nomische orde is politiek gezien aantrekkelijker en wetenschappelijk gezien haal-
baarder dan een vertaling in termen van allocatieve efficientie. 
5. Allocatieve efficientie kan geen maatstaf zijn voor het duurzaamheidsgehalte van 
een gegeven economie. Een gegeven economie is immers maatstaf voor de con-
crete betekenis van allocatieve efficientie. 
6. Internalisering van negatieve externe ecologische effecten leidt niet noodzakelijk tot 
sociaal aanvaardbare en politiek wenseiijke oplossingen van ecologische Proble-
men. 
7. Zelfs de meest objectieve wetenschap laat veel te denken over. 
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onzichtbaar te maken zonder dat iemand het merkt. De meeste vrouwelijke weten-
schappers worden goochelaars. 
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Voorwoord 
Een proefschrift is het resultaat van een persoonlijk gevecht met in hoofdzaak 
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zichtbare, maar niettemin benarde situaties moreel te ondersteunen. Weer anderen 
deelden met mij hun piek- en dalervaringen als een-vrouws-leger en moedigden mijn 
aanpak aan op momenten dat ik meende te falen. Ik dank de hele leerstoelgroep voor de 
veelzijdigheid van haar bijdragen. 
Ik dank mijn promotor Michiel Korthals. Hij verstand de kunst mij op tijd de 
nodige mimte te bieden. Hij wist mij op cruciale punten vooruit te helpen. 
Ik dank mijn cc-promotor Bart Gremmen voor zijn niet aflatende inhoudelijke en 
morele ondersteuning. 
Ik ben veel dank verschuldigd aan Dr. Jan van der Straaten. Ik bewonder de 
manier waarop hij de Woof tussen disciplines weet te overbruggen. Hij is mijn steun en 
toeverlaat geweest vanuit het land der economische wetenschap. 
Ik dank Prof. Wouter Achterberg. Hij voorzag mij vanaf het begin met kritisch 
en stimulerend commentaar. 
Meer dan mijn dank wil ik mijn genegenheid uitdrukken voor mijn man Laurens 
en mijn kinderen Flore en Ward. Hen hoef ik niet te verteilen wat het betekent een 
promovendus als huisgenoot te hebben. 2 j hebben mijn gevecht met glans doorstaan. 
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Laurens wist zijn hoofd koel en mijn hart kloppend te houden. Flore en Ward hebben 
zieh met kinderlijke dapperheid gevoegd naar de eisen van een promoverende moeder. 
En alle drie hebben zij nooit nagelaten om mij elke dag weer enthousiast te begroeten. 
Ten slotte dank ik mijn ouders. Hun bijdrage gaat vele jaren terug. Zij hebben 
mij geleerd te volharden en hebben mijn taak in huis overgenomen op ogenblikken dat 
mijn volharding te ver dreigde te gaan. 
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Chapter 1 
Economics and ecological policy 
1 Economics and the problem of sustainability 
In a certain respect, industrial economies are performing very well nowadays. Economic 
growth is in many Western countries about 3 %. Despite this (monetary) success story, 
the ecological performance of our economies is worrisome. Pezzey recapitulated the 
general ecological (and social) tendencies of ongoing industrialisation as follows: 
'a) rapid depletion of renewable natural resources (e.g. forests, fish, land and sea 
mammals); 
b) rapid depletion of known reserves of non-renewable energy and minerals, although 
new discoveries and new extraction techniques have so far avoided any decline in 
availability; 
c) rapid depletion of non-renewable stocks of genetic diversity (see Wilson 1988) and 
soil; 
d) severe problems of local, transient pollution in industrialising countries; 
e) steadily growing problems of cumulative pollution, both regional and global, 
principally acid rain, ozone depletion, and the f) accumulation of greenhouse gases 
such as COa which are likely to cause global warming (Cline 1991); 
g) wide, and recently growing, inequalities between rich and poor nations (UNDP 1992); 
and greatly increased rates of change in most areas of life [...]' (Pezzey 1992,330-
331). 
A growing concern about these ecological tendencies found expression in the 
concept "sustainability". The concept came into existence in the eighties. It cropped up 
for the first time in the document World Conservation Strategy; Living Resource 
Conservation for Sustainable Development that was published by a group of private 
environmental organisations, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
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Natural Resources (Nelissen ef at. 1997, 261-263). It got great political power of 
expression on a national and global level since its incorporation in the Brundtland report 
Our Common Future (1987). In this report the concept "sustainable developmenf is 
defined as development that 'meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. 
Since its introduction in the Brundtland report, many discussions have taken 
place concerning the precise meaning of sustainable development. In the report itself 
development is understood as a linear process of economic growth. 'We see [...] the 
possibility for a new era of economic growth, one that must be based on policies that 
sustain and expand the environmental resource base. And we believe such growth to be 
absolutely essential to relieve the great poverty that is deepening in much of the 
developing world' (WCED 1987,1). This interpretation dominates prevailing discourse. 
Critics have labelled this interpretation as an illustration that the Western world 
succeeded once again in presenting its cultural paradigm as a model for the whole world 
(Peeters 1997, 53). In this book, I start from an interpretation of sustainability that is 
more abstract than the Brundtland interpretation. I interpret sustainability as a "guiding 
idea" reflecting our striving for intergenerational justice in the way we go about with the 
ecological dimensions of earthly life. The concept "guiding idea" refers to an ideal that 
guides our political actions, but that remains without concrete, static content. Its ever 
provisional, concrete meaning takes shape in historical, political processes. The concept 
of intergenerational justice refers to our responsibility with regard to future generations. 
We are responsible for the ecological impacts of our present economic activities on the 
lives of future generations. We should make sure that these ecological impacts are 
compatible with the idea of intergenerational justice1. 
1 This more abstract interpretation resembles the concept "sustainable future" 
proposed by the Dutch Committee for Long-Term Environmental Policy in its 
publication The environment; Towards a Sustainable Future. Consider the 
following quotation: ' [...] a sustainable future is a basic principle; a guiding 
idea concerning a desirable future; a notion to describe the will of existing 
people to take care for the future of new generations. The concept of sustainable 
future has ethic aspects; it emphasizes the need for responsibility of the present 
generation for the world of future generations' (DCLTEP 1994). 
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Sustainability as responsibility towards future generations presumes that we are able to 
manage the ecological performance of our economies. This interpretation of 
sustainability as "responsibility presupposing manageability" offers those who prefer to 
forget about sustainability as soon as possible an easy shot. They can argue that if the 
ecological performance of our economies shows to be unmanageable, there is no further 
reason to feel responsible about it. I consider this as too easy a way of reasoning. 
Present-day ecological problems are no natural problems, as are (some) earthquakes or 
impacts of meteorites. Present-day ecological problems are caused by humans. This 
human origin suffices for justifying human responsibility. And if we experience the 
ecological performance of our economies as unmanageable, our first task as responsible 
humans then consists of trying to make it manageable again. 
The list of general ecological tendencies mentioned above does not show much 
evidence of the ecological manageability of our economies. On the contrary, the tension 
between these general tendencies and the idea of sustainability is growing, despite 
increasing political and technological efforts to avert these tendencies. This latter 
conclusion gets reaffirmed again and again. Consider, for instance, the results of the 
Earth Summit in Rio (1992) and of the Kyoto Summit (1997) 
(www.oneworld.org/guides/kyoto/front.html). In Rio, rich industrial countries agreed in 
principle to stabilise emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2010. 
This agreement - though insufficient according to the best scientific understanding -
was, however, non-binding. In the period between the Earth Summit and the Kyoto 
Summit the level of greenhouse gas emissions has actually risen in most of the rich 
nations, in Kyoto, a division emerged between the US and the EU. The US stated that it 
would be more effective for rich nations to invest in new technology in developing 
countries in order to cut overall global emission. The Europeans accused the US of 
trying to wriggle out of its responsibility to put its own house in order. Finally, the North 
has committed itself to some real reductions. If we compare this commitment to the 
results mentioned in the Environmental Balance Sheet 1998 of the Netherlands' National 
Institute of Public Health and the Environment, possible hope soon gets lost 
(www.milieubalans.rivm.nl/inl_samen/sheet.html). 'Growth in production and 
consumption has led to higher energy use, greater mobility and more waste.[...] CO2 
emissions increased by about 2% in 1997. [...] The reduction targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions, acidification and eutrophication will not be met even after implementation of 
the measures contained in the National Environmental Policy Plan 3 (NEPP3). These 
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measures cannot fully compensate for the increasing environmental burden of the 
growing economy. [...]' This conclusion, namely that we turn out not to be able to 
manage the ecological performance of our economies so far, burdens economic science 
with a special task. Economics, as the science that has economies as its domain of 
research, should investigate reasons for the unmanageably of the ecological 
performance of present economies. A science that is not able to provide reasons, cannot 
be expected to inspire fundamental solutions. It can at most contribute to solutions by 
accident. 
We can recapitulate the ecological performance of our economies as showing a 
growing use of energy, a decrease in bio-diversity and a growing appeal on the 
assimilative capacity of ecological systems. Such performance causes problems that are 
often global in space, long-term in time and characterised by many uncertainties and 
possible irreversibilities. This performance turns out to be characteristic of our industrial 
era. Ongoing industrialisation involves an ever more roundabout production structure 
and an ever growing circulation velocity of commodities. The former implies that the 
means by which final demand requirements are met become more indirect, that the scale 
of the production chain of all kinds of commodities increases (Common 1988,25). It also 
implies that through the expansion of intercontinental trade (and developments in 
information technology; MD) production chains combine (resource, knowledge and 
capital) inputs of all over the world (Pezzey 1992, 328-329). Economic activities 
represent global rather than local dimensions. The latter implies that the life time of many 
commodities becomes ever shorter. Both tendencies of ongoing industrialisation ask for 
ever increasing inputs of material and energetic resources and for continuous 
technological innovation in order to overcome problems of exhaustion and pollution (as, 
for example, the replacement of coal for wood, of gas for oil, and of nuclear energy for 
gas, oil or coal). Given this statement, namely that typical characteristics of present-day 
ecological problems relate to industrial (and industrialising) economies, the conclusion of 
the previous paragraph can be made more concrete. Economics should investigate 
reasons for the unmanageability of the ecological performance of our industrial 
economies. 
To conclude, present-day general ecological tendencies incite the concept 
"sustainability" as a guiding idea for economic policy. In this book, I propose to consider 
of the concept in a way that is more abstract than the Brundtland interpretation. I 
propose to interpret "sustainability" as responsibility towards future generations with 
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regard to the ecological performance of our present day industrial economies. This 
responsibility presupposes manageability. The general ecological tendencies mentioned 
show that it is far from evident that we are able to manage the ecological performance of 
our economies. Therefore, I consider it as a primary task of economics to investigate 
reasons for this unmanageability. 
2 Which course to take? 
In economic literature one can roughly discern two reactions to the growing tension 
between our striving for sustainability on the one hand and the continuing ecological 
evolution of our economies on the other. The first reaction originated from economists' 
common complaints that the failing ecological performance of present-day economies is 
due to - a kind of - "government failure". Economists blame public authorities for 
neglecting too often their recommendations with respect to ecological policy. This first 
reaction consists of a trial to ameliorate economists' political impact. The second reaction 
emerged as a critique on conventional, neo-classically inspired economics. According to 
its critics, conventional "environmental economics" is not equipped to tackle problems of 
sustainability adequately. These critics, therefore, propose "ecological economics" as a 
generic term for a set of alternative economic approaches. 
I consider both reactions as worthy trials to cope with the problem of 
sustainability. In this book, however, I will examine a third possible course. I will 
investigate the norms to which economics should respond in order to contribute in a 
successful way to political solutions for the problem of sustainability. In this section, I will 
present (in subsection 2.1 and 2.2) the two former reactions. This presentation will help 
me to clarify, in section 3, the special issue of the third course that I propose. 
2. 1 Economists' political role 
One can find plenty illustrations of economists' discomfort about their meagre political 
impact in the field of ecological policy2.1 will restrict myself to two illustrations. Robert 
2 Ecological policy does not necessarily happen from a sustainability 
perspective. Some ecological problems can be solved in a way that is acceptable 
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Nelson, for instance, records that, despite wide agreement among (American) 
economists in the 1970s that pollution taxes or fees were the most efficient way to 
achieve protection of air and water quality, this advice has been almost entirely ignored 
(Nelson 1987, 68-69). Command and Control regulation proved to be politically more 
acceptable. Frank Dietz and Jan van der Straaten agree with this general consideration 
(Dietz etal. 1992,27). They state that economists' recommendations to impose charges 
on polluting and natural resources-depleting activities are almost fully neglected, as in 
almost all OECD countries only physical regulations - rates for emission reduction, 
standards regarding emissions and discharges, product and process requirements - are 
used to decrease pollution and depletion of natural resources. This experience urged 
some authors to investigate possible reasons for this discrepancy between economists' 
recommendations and ecological policy. 
Hanley, Hallett and Moffatt consider three possible explanations: a) ignorance 
of law makers and/or administrators, b) theoretical and/or practical problems with 
incentive-based schemes, and c) institutional or cultural barriers, including the attitudes 
and behaviours of economists (Hanley et al. 1990). With respect to the latter kind of 
explanation, they point to economists' focus on efficiency. Efficiency is not necessarily 
legislators' and pressure groups' main or only measuring stick for ecological control 
policy (Hanley et al. 1990,1421; 1426). Both Nelson and Hanley suggest that lack of 
consensus between economists can partly explain why success over ecological 
legislation was not forthcoming (Nelson 1987, 67; Hanley ef al. 1990,1422). Dietz and 
Van der Straaten stress the role of vested economic interests in the political arena (Dietz 
ef al. 1992, 34-39). The existing imbalance of power in society causes that political 
objectives are heavily influenced by the individual and short-term interests of vested 
economic interests. These interests are at odds with environmental economists' interest 
in a sustainable society. Nelson further notes the ideological content of alternative 
to present generations, but not acceptable - according to present values - to 
future generations. Other ecological problems can be so local in time (and in 
place), that they lack an intergenerational dimension. They are ecological 
problems, but not problems of sustainability. In this book, the problem of 
sustainability is the structuring problem. For that reason, when I refer to 
ecological policy, I refer to ecological problems that have an intergenerational 
dimension and that should be considered from a perspective of intergenerational 
justice. 
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economic instruments to achieve economic efficiency as a possible reason for the 
discrepancy between economists' recommendations and environmental legislation 
(Nelson 1987,68-71). In the years before 1970, economists, in their effort to encourage 
the use of market mechanisms, put by far the greatest part of their support behind 
proposals for pollution emissions fees. By comparison, they almost fully neglected the 
competing idea of creating a system of marketable pollution permits. This latter idea was 
a similarly efficient but politically more promising means of manipulating market 
incentives to achieve environmental protection. According to Nelson, it is likely that 
professional economists did not simply pick the wrong horse. Many of them were aware 
of at least some of the practical advantages of a market permit system, but could not 
accept its ideological implications (e.g. distributional effects, public versus private 
ownership of pollution rights, future flexibility to alter pollution levels). Finally, Dietz and 
Van der Straaten point to complications related to the paradigm used in mainstream 
(environmental) economics (Dietz ef at. 1992,29-34). I will deal separately with this latter 
explanation of Dietz and Van der Straaten in the following paragraph. 
Environmental economics can be roughly characterised as an extension and 
application of neo-classical economic theory to ecological problems. This implies that the 
use of natural resources available is described as an optimisation problem. Ecological 
quality is considered the result of the aggregated decisions of all individual economic 
agents, weighing the benefits derived from increasing production and consumption 
against the benefits enjoyed when the ecological quality is improved. The first 
complicating factor is that ecological quality can only partly be expressed in exchange 
relations on the market. Ecological problems are problems of externalities. In order to 
correct markets for these externalities, economists have to define shadow prices. A 
second complicating factor then arises: monetary assessment of the benefits of avoided 
ecological damage poses considerable problems. A third complicating factor is the 
problem of how to aggregate individual preferences into a collective statement on the 
value of specific natural resources. A fourth complicating (and unsolvable) problem is 
that the preferences of future generations are simply unknown. Further complications 
relate to the nature of ecological problems. Ecological problems are so complex that we 
often lack necessary insights into ecological relations. Thresholds, synergetic effects and 
delayed reactions prevent an 'optimal" use of natural resources. 
The observation of the discrepancy between economists' recommendations 
and ecological policy gave rise to a renewed reflection on economists' role in public 
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policy. Nelson's article The Economics Profession and the Making of Public Policy" is 
exemplary in this respect (Nelson 1987). In this article Nelson analyses on a theoretical 
level - and from an American perspective - how the discrepancy came about. In the 
history of the twentieth century, he discerns three different interpretations of economists' 
role in government. Each interpretation implies a particular political theory and a 
particular conception of the nature of economics. 
The first role (typical for the period between 1885 and 1920) is that of the 
Progressive Neutral Expert (Nelson 1987,52-54). Progressive Neutral Experts sought to 
make (American) government serve the public interest". They were representatives of 
the public confidence in human progress through science. They defended the 
introduction of scientific methods and techniques into government. The political theory 
underlying this first role distinguished between two government functions, those that 
involve questions of basic policy and social value and those that are administrative or 
instrumental in nature. Decisions of the former type belong to the realm of politics, 
decisions of the latter to the separate realm of administration. Administration was the 
domain reserved for the appropriate experts. Experts were expected to provide 
government with efficient means, not with political ends. These experts' stress on 
efficiency gave rise to an interpretation of (economic) science as empirical, verified by 
the facts. Extensive gathering of data and measurement of social phenomena became 
crucial. 
The second role is that of the Entrepreneur for Efficiency. Experiences of the 
twentieth century - a series of wars, mass murders, threats of nuclear destruction, and 
so on - challenged the progressive vision fundamentally. On the one hand, the political 
theory underlying this second role was more realistic. Government was considered to be 
actually driven by continual competition among interest groups, rather than by "the public 
interesf. Public policies were determined by the political bargaining among the affected 
interests. Political leaders and interest groups did not respect progressive boundaries 
between the properly political and the properly expert. Instead, interest-group bargaining 
often figured prominently in administrative and other technical decisions. The simple 
division of labour between politicians who achieve consensus on a set of objectives and 
experts who design and evaluate from efficiency and effectiveness criteria alternative 
means of achieving those objectives turned out not to exist. This political theory gave 
rise to an interpretation of economists' role as active advocates of efficiency. Only as 
advocates of efficiency could they continue to regard themselves as spokesmen for the 
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diffuse and weakly represented intereste of the general citizenry, acting as a 
counterweight to special interests pressures. This new role as entrepreneurs of efficiency 
was considered to demand some skills in political tactics. A politically successful 
economist was deemed to have a thorough command of both his scientific and technical 
knowledge and his political and tactical skills. 
The third role is that of the Ideological Combatant. Progressive Neutral Experts 
still believed that an increase in - neutral - scientific knowledge concerning ever wider 
areas of social concern would result in a decrease of the (typically political rather than 
administrative) domain of social conflict. The experiences of the twentieth century, 
however, challenged the idea of a declining strength of ideology and of a declining 
degree of concomitant destructive conflict. Finally, scientific rationality turned out to be 
itself an ideology. The recognition of the ideological dimension of scientific theories 
compelled political theorists not only to take the importance of interest-group power in 
political processes into consideration, but also of ideology. Compatible with this third 
political theory, economists' role is that of proponents of their particular framework of 
thinking. According to Nelson, economists indeed have had the greatest success in 
government as proponents for markets, for efficiency-related values, and generally for 
their framework for viewing the world, rather than as technical analysts of particular 
policy details. This role as ideological combatant calls in its turn for particular types of 
skills, especially for the ability to penetrate and criticise the philosophical underpinnings 
of social and political values and theories. 
According to Nelson, most members of the economics profession today still see 
their policy-making role fundamentally in the progressive vein. They consider themselves 
as professionals who advise government in technical and scientific matters and take 
social values and political preferences as given. Once these values and preferences 
have been expressed by politicians, economic expertise can be brought into action to 
help realise them as efficiently and as effectively as possible. Nelson adds, however, that 
the original progressive dichotomy of politics and administration is replaced by a 
trichotomy. Democratic politics is seen as sandwiched between professional experts. 
First, économiste define options and lay out the technically feasible menu for political 
choice. Then, the political process is considered to weigh social values against these 
options and to make the socially preferred choice. After this, it is again professional 
experts who are responsible for carrying out the implementation of the political decisions 
reached. In this trichotomy the central thrust of the progressive vision, namely that the 
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arenas of politics and technical expertise can and should be kept separate, remains 
preserved. Mainstream economists are uncomfortable with or simply reject outright the 
notion that at bottom their scientific views constitute an ideology. 
From Nelson's theoretical analysis we can derive some conclusions that are 
helpful to position my own research project. To start with, his analysis shows that some 
internal connections exist between interpretations of politics, of economists' political role 
and of the nature of economic science. An interpretation of economics as neutral 
conforms to an interpretation of politics as separated in "subjective" decision-making 
concerning political objectives and "objective" scientific administration. An interpretation 
of politics as a bargaining process between more or less powerful interests urges 
economists to become advocates of the "general interest" through their pleading for 
economic efficiency. An interpretation of economics as a kind of ideology transforms 
economists' political task into that of active proponents of a typically economic 
worldview. 
My own research project takes this idea of internal connections between 
interpretations of politics and interpretations of the nature of economic theory as a 
thread. In chapter 2, I will argue for a particular interpretation of politics, namely 
deliberative democracy. In chapter 4, I will propose four norms for the nature of a 
politically relevant economics. Some of these norms relate directly to this interpretation 
of politics as deliberative democracy. 
Nelson's theoretical analysis leads him, further, to provide economists with 
recommendations to ameliorate their political impact. Economists' participation in public 
policy will be more successful in case they have a realistic interpretation of politics and, 
hence, are able to develop the skills required to successfully participate in it. They should 
regard themselves as entrepreneurs and advocates for specific economic policies, rather 
than as neutral technical analysts. The skills needed - political awareness, knowledge of 
legal processes and reasoning, writing skills, facility in reasoning by analogy, ideological 
sensitivity, philosophical knowledge, the ability to "tell a story" that makes sense and that 
succeeds in organising an overwhelming amount of information and data in some 
meaningful way - are the skills of a craftsman rather than of a scientist. These skills are, 
according to Nelson, most in demand in professional roles in government (Nelson 1987, 
86). In my research project, on the contrary, stress is on the characteristics of a politically 
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successful economics, rather than economists (though I feel no need to deny the 
relevance of Nelson's recommendations). 
Nelson's theoretical analysis of the political sphere is, finally, intended 
descriptively. His recommendations for policy economists mainly arise from a particular 
description of real-world politics. My analysis is, on the contrary, intended normatively. 
Accepting "sustainability" - possibly in opposition with vested economic interests - as a 
guiding idea in economic policy, starting from "deliberative democracy" as a guiding idea 
for politics and taking philosophical considerations concerning the nature of economic 
science seriously, my research question sounds: which economics do we need in order 
to contribute successfully to ecological policy. 
2.2 Economic practice within a political context 
The second reaction to the discrepancy noticed between general ecological tendencies 
and the aim of sustainability stems from dissatisfaction with the conventional, i.e., neo-
classical paradigmatic approach. "Ecological economics" is a generic term for a variety of 
endeavours to deal more adequately with environmental problems on a scientific level. 
Giuseppe Munda characterises "ecological economics" in opposition to "environmental 
economics" (Munda 1997). He describes environmental economics as a particular 
specialisation of neo-classical economics. This neo-classical origin explains its ethical 
commitments and epistemological self-understanding. Environmental economics is 
devoted to "sustainable development". Here "development" means Ihe set of changes in 
the economic, social, institutional and political structure needed to implement the 
transition from a pre-capitalistic economy based on agriculture, to an industrial 
capitalistic economy" (Bresso, cited in Munda 1997, 215). This interpretation of 
development implies a) that the changes needed are not only quantitative, but also 
qualitative (social, institutional and political), and b) that the development of western 
industrialised countries is considered the only possible model, the model with the best 
knowledge, the best set of values, the best organisation and the best set of technologies. 
"Sustainability" in its turn means "weak sustainability": an economy is weakly sustainable 
if it saves more than the combined depreciation of natural and man-made capital, 
expressed in monetary terms. This concept of weak sustainability is based on the 
assumption of perfect substitutability between these different forms of capital. 
Intergenerational justice is interpreted as leaving future generations with a total stock of 
21 
capital not smaller than the one enjoyed by the present generation. Correct, i.e., 
"rational" management of natural resources means "optimal inter-generational 
allocation". Environmental economists further regard, according to Munda, their 
recommendations as a matter of "scientific" arguments: value neutral and objective. 
Ecological economics, on the contrary, has different epistemological 
foundations and ethical commitments. It adopts, to start with, a co-evolutionary 
paradigm. Economic development is considered a process of adaptation to a changing 
environment while itself being a source of environmental change. There is, however, 
neither unique nor predictable direction of change. Ecological economics has some 
points in common with institutional economics: its recognition of the impossibility of a 
value free science, emphasis on the importance of the distribution of property rights, and 
strong criticism of monetary reductionism. It takes, further, "strong sustainability" as its 
guiding idea. It is based on the assumption that certain sorts of natural capital are 
deemed critical and not readily substitutable by man-made capital. This "strong 
sustainability" criterion of non-negative change over time in stocks of specified natural 
capital asks for non-monetary, bio-physical indicators. It originates from the idea -
especially tackled by Herman Daly - of an "optimal scale", i.e. a maximum physical scale 
of human presence in the ecosystem defined either by the regenerative or absorptive 
capacity of the ecosystem. Finally, ecological economics takes Funtowicz" and Ravetz' 
"post-normal science" as its epistemological framework. This framework is developed to 
tackle policy issues where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent1 (Funtowicz and Ravetz cited in Munda 1997, 221). Ecological 
economics understands present-day ecological problems as such typical issues. 
Especially the concept of "post-normal science" is helpful to make me clarify 
the issue of my research project. For that reason, I will examine this concept a bit further. 
The concept is developed as a framework for dealing with contradictions in "emergent 
complex systems" (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994a;1994b). The concept "emergent 
complex system" is used as a heuristic term to indicate systems that cannot be fully 
explained mechanistically and functionally, because, in them some at least of the 
elements of the system possess individuality, along with some degree of intentionality, 
consciousness, foresight, purpose, symbolic representations and morality (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1994b, 569-570). Continuous novelty thus is a characteristic property of 
emergent complexity. Human societies are typical examples of such systems. The 
contradictions in emergent complex systems can be contradictions of destructive conflict 
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or - to use a concept borrowed from Schumpeter - of "creative destruction" (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1994b, 573; 581 note 3). (The concepts are, again, meant heuristjcaliy.) 
Fisheries offer one example of the former: the livelihood of fishermen and their 
communities from week to week depends on an exploitation of the resource that 
regularly leads to damage or even destruction of the stock of fish. The concept of 
"sustainable developmenf offers, according to the authors, a second example: 
development as achievement of a (global) consumer society - justified on the 
humanitarian ideal of equality for all humankind - is ecologically impossible. For that 
reason an enriched interpretation of "sustainability" is needed: an interpretation implying 
a qualitative transformation of economic and political structures, a creative destruction of 
existing non-sustainable structures. Nobody further knows what kind of economic and 
political structures should emerge out of this creative destruction, but Funtowicz' and 
Ravetz' ethical starting points are that sustainability is not a matter of mere human 
survival, but a matter of human lives worth living, and that ongoing industrial process as 
an "accident-generating system" is something rather to be avoided than to be managed 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994b, 576;581). 
This latter ethical intuition of Funtowicz and Ravetz - that probably gets a 
stronger stress in my representation than the authors themselves have in mind - is to 
some extent at odds with Munda's interpretation of sustainability. Munda interprets 
(strong) sustainability in terms of "managing" - i.e. monitoring, controlling - critical natural 
resources so that they remain within an optimal scale. I doubt the feasibility of this 
endeavour if it remains devoid of an active search for qualitatively different economic and 
political structures. Funtowicz and Ravetz understand sustainability as an idea guiding 
our search for economic and political structures in which environmental problems remain 
"manageable". This interpretation is closer to mine. In the previous section, I proposed to 
interpret sustainability as responsibility towards future generations and such 
responsibility implies manageability indeed. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz consider post-normal science as an intellectual tool for 
policy-making (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994a, 206). They defend "quality" rather than "truth" 
as its organising principle. This defence partly results from the adventures of science in 
our past century: scientific "truth" proved to be relative and fragmented. At the same time 
it is meant as an answer to the kind of irreducible uncertainty" related to emergent 
complexity (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994b, 578). "Quality" entails both a démocratisation of 
knowledge by an extension of the peer-community (not only experts, but also 
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laypersons) and a recognition of diversity in commitments and perspectives. The former 
expresses a positive evaluation of stakeholders' - non-expert - knowledge. The latter 
expresses a recognition of conflicting interests and of power relationships (often reflected 
in scientific paradigms). "Quality" is meant as a non-relativistic answer to the 
fragmentation in scientific knowledge. It is meant to deal as good as can be hoped for 
with scientific uncertainties and ethical complexities in emergent complex systems. 
To recapitulate the idea of post-normal science in my own words, it is first and 
foremost an interpretation of a desirable use of science in politics (or, better perhaps, an 
interpretation of a desirable scientific practice within a political context (Gremmen 1999). 
This scientific practice should - as science itself should - respond to criteria of quality 
that presuppose specific ethical principles. The idea thus presents norms for acting 
scientifically in a political context, rather than for science itself. The remarkable thing 
about these norms is that they reflect an interpretation of scientific practice as a kind of 
politics (knowledge resulting from a democratic dialogue between various value-laden 
perspectives). This interpretation contrasts with a (rather common, positivistic - or, what 
Nelson called, Progressive -) interpretation of politics as a kind of science (politics as 
resolving or avoiding value-laden conflicts through objective science). To conclude, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz present post-normal science as a new interpretation of scientific 
practice (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994b, 577). Consequently, post-normal science does not 
fully respond to ecological economists' original intent to look for a substantive alternative 
for neo-classically inspired environmental economics. 
The issue of my research project relates to the previous conclusion. My 
hypothesis is that, if we really aim for a "creative destruction" leading to economic and 
political structures compatible with the idea of sustainability as presented by Funtowicz 
and Ravetz (rather than by Munda), it does not suffice to present norms for scientific 
practice within a political context. We also need norms for science itself m order to let it 
be politically useful. For, taking Dietz' and Van der Straaten's conclusion serious that the 
conventional, neo-classical economic paradigm is not straightforwardly applicable to 
problems of sustainability (see section 2.1), it is conceivable that an extension of the 
peer community, a plurality of existing disciplinary methodologies and trans-disciplinarity 
are not sufficient to allow for an acceptable - in terms of sustainability - "creative 
destruction". My research project is, therefore, meant as an initial impetus to define 
norms for a politically useful economic science. Or to express my intention in a rather 
slogan-like way (inspired by the title of Funtowicz' and Ravetz' paper (1994a)): rather 
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than looking for a qualitatively satisfactory political definition of the worth of a songbird 
with the help of post-normal science, I am looking for a qualitatively satisfactory 
economic theory that can help us to organise our economies so that the need to 
politically define the worth of a songbird disappears (because the bird's life is not 
threatened any longer). 
3 An ecologically successful economics 
My research project is meant to develop norms not for economists as political actors 
(see Nelson), nor for economic practice within a political context (see Funtowicz and 
Ravetz), but for an ecologically successful economics. What does an ecologically 
successful economics mean, however? And what are the sources from which I will 
develop these norms? In the following subsections, I will briefly answer these two 
questions. 
3.1 Two standards for an ecologically successful economics 
I propose two standards to evaluate economic contributions to ecological policy. The first 
standard is the one noticed by Nelson, namely the impact of economic knowledge on 
final policy results. (Whether this Impact" should be understood in a direct way -
economics as a political toolbox - or not is another topic to be dealt with in chapter 4.) 
This standard is a measure from which to develop norms - in chapter 4 - for the nature 
of a politically relevant economics. Given the growing tension between general 
ecological tendencies and the ideal of sustainability, this standard can at most be 
necessary, but not sufficient. A second standard, therefore, relates to the capacity of 
economic knowledge to offer insights into possible ways to reduce this tension or, to 
express the same in terms of Funtowicz' and Ravetz' concepts, to allow for 
transformations of economic structures that make ecological problems manageable 
again. This second standard is a measure to evaluate the content- or subject matter-
of economics. I will sketch the contours of this content in chapter 3. 
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3.2 A confrontation between David Pearce and Daniel Bromley 
A confrontation between two exemplary economic theories will be the initial source for 
my investigation. These economic theories are David Pearce's on the one hand and 
Daniel Bromley's on the other. Both authors have done pioneering work. Pearce was 
among the first economists - consider the Blueprint books of which he was one of the 
authors - to warn that the problem of sustainabilfty cannot be reduced to the conventional 
economic problem of optimal allocation. He stressed, at an early stage, the need to keep 
the level of some critical natural resources intact, independent of considerations of 
economic efficiency. Bromley's fame especially relates to his questioning of Hardin's 
article The Tragedy of the Commons. He points out that Hardin's critique does not regard 
so much common property regimes, but open access regimes. This correction gave a 
new shot to the discussion between advocates and opponents of private property as a 
solution to all kinds of ecological problems. 
The positions of both authors are so divergent - Pearce's economics is neo-
classically inspired, while Bromley's is in the tradition of institutional economics - that 
they allow for a fruitful confrontation. Since both Pearce and Bromley are, in the first 
instance, economists, I will enlist the help of both Weber's and Neurath's (contrasting) 
ideas to clarify Both Pearce's and Bromley's aims and assumptions. Both Neurath's and 
Weber's professional activities date from the beginning of the twentieth century. Both 
Neurath and Weber are economists who reflect on the philosophical aspects of the 
methodology of the social sciences. Within the community of ecological economists they 
are, moreover, deemed precursors (Martinez-Alier 1990). Weber is a precursor in the 
sense that he rejects the idea that "pure" economics, i.e, an economics based on the 
theory of marginal utility, can contribute to ecological problems. Neurath, on the contrary, 
is a precursor in the sense that he pleads for a kind of economics suitable to contribute 
to this topic. 
4 Outline of the book 
The first part of this book - consisting of chapters 2, 3 and 4 - is a philosophical 
exploration of the characteristics of an economics that intends to be relevant for the 
problem of sustainability. In chapter 2,1 will analyse economic and political theories as 
conceptual constructs referring to the economic and political sphere respectively. I will 
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argue that such conceptual constructs inevitably are value-laden and that, hence, 
different conceptual constructs of the same sphere can exist. I will argue, moreover, that 
and why it is important to distinguish between the economic and the political sphere. I 
will derive the latter arguments from a confrontation between Buchanan's and Arendf s 
political theory. 
In chapter 3, I will discuss an economy as consisting of two dimensions, a 
symbolic or institutional one and an ecological one. Such interpretation will allow us to 
understand the ecological performance of an economy as the counterpart of its 
institutional organisation. I will further argue that, in order to get insights into the internal 
relationships between an economy and its ecological performance, we need insights into 
the institutional whole of an economy. And I will elaborate on what I mean by "an 
institutional whole". I will suggest that it is a matter of conceptually analysing different 
types of economic institutions and different hierarchies of institutions. Chapter 3 will thus 
offer us some substantive norms for an economics that aims at contributing successfully 
to the political objective of "sustainability". 
In chapter 4,1 will derive four norms for the nature, rather than the content, of a 
politically successful economics. I will suggest that a politically successful economics 
should, to start with, be objective in the sense that it should aim at intersubjective 
consensus among economists. Objectivity as intersubjective consensus does, however, 
not imply neutrality. I will suggest, further, that economics should provide economic 
policy with insights, rather than instruments. This means that economics should aim at 
(non-neutral) description and explanation, not at (non-neutral) prescription and 
prediction. I will assert, finally, that economics should be rather impartial than partial. It 
should explain economic sources of political inequality and contribute to political 
freedom. Both Arendfs interpretation of politics as a deliberative democracy and 
Weber's and Neurath's philosophical reflections on the nature of the social sciences will 
function as the breeding ground for these norms. 
In the second part of this book, i.e., chapters 5,6,7 and 8,1 will confront the 
norms developed concerning both the content and the nature of an ecologically 
successful economics with the writings of David Pearce and Daniel Bromley. Chapters 5 
and 7 are a substantive reconstruction of Pearce's and Bromley's theoretical work 
respectively. Chapters 6 and 8 are an analysis of the nature of their economics. 
Chapters 5 and 7 will make clear to what extent their writings comply with the 
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substantive norm I propose in chapter 3. Chapters 6 and 8 will illuminate to what extent 
their writings meet the four norms suggested , in chapter 4, for the nature of an 
ecologically successful economics. 
Part I and II will be closed by chapter 9, in which I will give an overview of the 
main conclusions of this research project. 
5 Conclusion 
For the sake of sustainability, economists should improve their political influence. I 
assume that many ecological activists would greet the former provocative statement with 
disdain. For economists' impact in ecological policy is commonly believed to be already 
too much of a good thing. Ecological activists (and many other citizens) suspect political 
translations of problems of sustainability into economic terms - i.e. into terms of 
(monetary) costs and benefits - because these translations do not respect and overrule 
people's value-laden interpretation of these problems. I support their objections. 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that economists should improve their political impact in 
order to help us to face up to present-day intergenerational ecological problems more 
adequately than we used to do in the past. The key question is, however, what kind of 
economics is needed to allow for successful contributions to ecological policy. 
This book will not offer its readers a finished and well-designed new economic 
paradigm (for developing a new paradigm is a historical event emerging from the 
collaboration between many economic scientists). My research project is meant as a first 
step, an initial impetus to discuss the need for and the outlook of an economics that 
contributes to politically defined solutions for the problem of sustainability. In the first 
part, I will develop the contours of such an economics from philosophical considerations 
(concerning the nature of the problem of sustainability, the nature of the economic and 
political sphere, deliberative democracy as a normative ideal of politics, and the nature of 
economic theories). In the second part, I will confront the writings of two exemplary 
economic scientists with these philosophical contours. This confrontation will help us, to 
begin with, to make these contours more concrete. It will learn us, moreover, in which 
direction further research should be done in order to fill remaining gaps. 
28 
Chapter 2 
The economic and 
the political sphere 
In this book I intend to develop norms for an ecologically successful economics. By an 
ecologically successful economics I mean a theory that has our economies as its 
domain of research and that is influential in the political arena in the sense that it helps 
political actors to find effective solutions for the problem of sustainability. My research 
project thus implicitly makes a distinction between the economic and the political 
sphere. The economic sphere is the domain about which economics is meant to 
provide us with knowledge. The political sphere is the domain in which economics is 
meant to be an influential factor. In the course of my research project I noticed that, 
within the community of economists, there is some disagreement about whether it is 
useful to distinguish between the political and the economic sphere or, in other words, 
to distinguish between economic and political (aspects of) human actions. In this 
chapter I will argue that this distinction can and should be made. 
In order to explain that this distinction can be made, I will reflect, in section 1, 
on economic and political theories as conceptual constructs. Considering economic 
and political theories as conceptual constructs implies that they are perspective 
(i.e., value-laden) descriptions of human reality, a multiplicity of theories is possible, 
and it depends on the conceptual construct used whether the distinction between the 
economic and the political sphere is deemed significant. In section 2,1 will present four 
possible conceptual constructs of the economic sphere. These conceptual constructs 
can be discerned in the history of economic theory. (I count both Weber's and 
Neurath's economic writings as being part of this history.) 
In order to defend that this distinction should be made, I will start with a 
presentation of Buchanan's Public Choice theory (section 3). Public Choice theory is a 
political theory originating from an extension of economics to the political sphere. This 
implies that Buchanan recognises the existence of both a political and an economic 
sphere, but considers the rationality of actions occurring in both spheres as similar. In 
other words, Buchanan's conceptual construct of the political sphere is based on the 
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opinion that it is not very significant to make a distinction between the rationality of 
human interactions within the political and the economic sphere. This opinion gives, 
however, rise to a redefinition of typically economic and typically political phenomena. 
The former are, henceforth, interpreted as voluntary and the latter as involuntary 
interactions. In section 4, I will present deliberative democracy as an alternative 
political theory. In section 5,1 will argue that an interpretation of the political sphere in 
terms of a deliberative democracy is better equipped to deal with the political objective 
of "sustainability" than is Buchanan's Public Choice theory. 
1 Economic and political theories as conceptual 
constructs 
In this section, I will argue that economic and political theories are conceptual 
constructs. This statement implies that we cannot conceptually circumvent the gap 
between spheres in reality on the one hand and economic or political theories on the 
other, economic and political theories are not and cannot be neutral, and different 
economic or political theories referring to the same economic or political sphere are 
possible. Max Weber and Otto Neurath inspired my thinking over the nature of 
economic and political theories as social constructs. They both provided us with a 
thorough analysis of the methodologies of the (social) sciences1. Despite the 
differences with respect to their position in the philosophy of science tradition (and 
their political temper), they agree that social theories cannot be but conceptual 
constructs. 
1.1 Weber: social sciences as ideal-typical conceptual 
constructs 
Weber is both a social scientist and a methodologist of the social sciences. As a 
methodologist, he strongly objects to Comte's positivist idea that the social sciences 
do not differ fundamentally from the natural sciences. In his view, the fact that the 
domain of the social sciences consists of cultural phenomena urges the social scientist 
to fall back on a different methodology. The term Ideal type" is an essential concept 
for this methodology. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly explain Weber's basic 
ideas. 
Within the community of economists, there turns out to exist some 
disagreement about whether economics is a social science or not I consider 
economics as one of the social sciences. 
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To start with, Weber states that it is the specificity of the domain of 
investigation of the social sciences that urges us to understand social sciences as 
social constructs. According to Weber, the subject matter of the social sciences is 
always part of a cultural reality (MSS 76). Cultural reality consists of cultural 
phenomena, i.e. meaningful phenomena or phenomena that are related to value ideas. 
Following Rickert, Weber understands this cultural reality as endlessly complex2. It 
'presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and 
disappearing events, both "within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of 
this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on 
a single "object", for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously 
attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this Individual 
phenomenon", to say nothing of explaining it causally" (MSS 72). The finite human 
mind cannot tackle this infinite reality without carving a finite portion out of it. The 
criterion which is used in the social sciences to select this segment is a particular 
value idea. Whether a phenomenon is of a certain social science type does not 
depend so much on its objective characteristics, but on its value-relevance. This 
implies that the meaningfulness of certain empirical data is always presupposed. 'We 
cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a 
"presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its 
meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation' 
(MSS 76). 
To recapitulate, a specific value idea makes us perceive some phenomena 
as meaningful. The set of phenomena that take their meaning from this particular 
value makes up the subject matter of a social science. Our value ideas thus construct 
the domain of a social science. Social-sciences are value-laden perspectives on 
human reality. Whether we distinguish economic from political science depends on 
whether distinct value ideas are deemed significant to constitute a political and an 
economic sphere respectively. 
Values do, further, not only define the subject-matter of the social sciences, 
but also the concepts and laws that become the instruments of scientific research, and 
of whole theories. To express the value-relatedness of these theoretical instruments, 
Weber introduces the term Ideal type". 'An ideal type is formed by the one-sided 
accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many 
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
For a more extensive comparison between the thoughts of Rickert and 
Weber, see Rein de Wilde (1989,114-124). 
31 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild)' (MSS 90). Since ideal-
types are arrived at by the accentuation of certain elements of reality which seem 
important with respect to a specific point of view, they cannot be understood as a 
reflection of reality (MSS 90-93). They are not true: they do not simply correspond to 
particular empirical phenomena. They are a logical ideal, i.e., a well defined analytical 
construct, a limiting concept which allows us to compare reality with it. Ideal-types 
have a heuristic and expository function. Comparison between the ideal-type and 
reality, the estimation of similarities and discrepancies, can make the characteristic 
features of empirical phenomena clear and understandable. An ideal-type is not a 
description of reality but 'aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a 
description. [...] It is no hypothesis but it offers guidance to the construction of 
hypotheses' (MSS 90). 
To recapitulate, social-scientific concepts and laws or, in short, social-
scientific theories are ideal-typical. This implies that they are not neutral. Not only 
science - in the sense of a particular, for instance, economic or political disci-pline -, 
but particular scientific theories - in the sense of particular disciplinary paradigms (to 
use Kuhn's terminology) - are non-neutral social constructs. Economic and political 
theories result from particular points of view. For that reason, they cannot simply be 
understood in terms of truth, i.e., correspondence with reality. 
Since ideal types depend on the perspective of their constructor, Weber 
admits, moreover, that a multiplicity of ideal-types, of which none resembles another, 
none of which can be observed in reality as actually existing, but each of which 
pretends to be a useful theoretical construct, is possible. 'For those phenomena which 
interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us with respect to very different 
kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them. Inasmuch as the "points of view" 
from which they can become significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria 
can be applied to the selection of the traits which are to enter into the construction of 
an ideal-typical view of a particular culture' (MSS 91). Ideal types can thus take 
different forms. They are not necessarily "rational", i.e., empirically and logically 
correct and consistent constructs (MSS 42-43). In many cases people do not act 
rational: there are whole spheres of action (the sphere of the Irrational") where the 
simplicity offered by isolating abstraction is more convenient than an ideal-type of 
optimal logical rationality'. Ideal-types do not have to be normatively correctly 
constructed either. 'It is true that, in practice, the investigator frequently uses 
normatively "correctly" constructed Ideal-types". From the logical point of view, 
however, the normative "correctness" of these types is not essential. For the purpose 
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of characterizing a specific type of attitude, the investigator may construct either an 
ideal type which is identical with his own personal ethical norms, and in this sense 
objectively "correct", or one which ethically is thoroughly in conflict with his own 
normative attitudes; and he may then compare the behavior of the people being 
investigated with it. Or else he may construct an ideal-typical attitude of which he has 
neither positive nor negative evaluations' (MSS 43). Weber's view that ideal types can 
take many forms implies, among other things, that a multiplicity of economic and 
political theories is possible. 
Finally, which values must underlie a scientific investigation is, according to 
Weber, a question that cannot be answered scientifically. The values which 
consciously or unconsciously direct scientific endeavours are the result of ultimate 
decisions through which the scientist's '[soul] chooses its own fate' (MSS 18). Weber, 
however, stresses that a lot of scientists are mistaken concerning the kind of values 
they deem acceptable as a starting point of scientific research. Firstly, he opposes the 
view that scientific validity is achieved by weighing the various evaluations against one 
another and making a compromise among them. In his view, the "middle way" is just 
as undemonstrable scientifically (with the means of the empirical sciences) as the 
"most extreme" evaluations (MSS 10). 'Scientifically the "middle course" is not truer 
even by a hair's breadth, than the most extreme party ideals of the right or left" (MSS 
57). Secondly, Weber strongly contests the conviction that a scientist may be 
contented with the 'conventional seif-evidentness of very widely accepted value-
judgments' (MSS 13). On the contrary, he considers the questioning of those things 
which convention makes self-evident as a specific function of science. To recapitulate, 
in Weber's opinion, we have no scientific reasons to prefer one economic or political 
theory to another. 
1.2 Neurath: sciences as historically contingent conceptual 
constructs 
Neurath was a remarkable member of the Vienna Circle, a group of mainly natural 
scientists with a philosophical interest in scientific methodology. As a member of this 
group, Neurath is a defender of logical empiricism (Neurath 1929, 305-310). Logical 
empiricists reject the idea that the methodologies of the natural and the social 
sciences differ. They only discern practical differences - due to greater complexity of 
social reality - between both kinds of sciences. Contrary to the received view of logical 
empiricism ( a view that is heavily influenced by Hempel's work), Neurath does not 
state that either social-scientific or natural-scientific theories can be considered true. 
On the contrary, in his view, not only social-scientific, but also natural-scientific 
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theories are conceptually constructed. They are conceptual constructs because they 
both originate from historical human language and because they are the result of 
many decisions. In the following paragraphs, I will deal more extensively with 
Neurath's explanation of the meaning and implications of conceptually constructed 
theories. 
Logical empiricism is, as the term indicates, a combination of logic and 
empiricism. Empiricism comprises three elements: empirical theories consist of 1) 
spatio-temporal statements that are 2) expressed in purified language and 3) testable. 
According to Neurath, scientific theories should be built upon positive - or observation 
or protocol - statements (Neurath 1931a, 48; 1931b, 53; 1932,93; 1934,101; 1936c, 
151-153; 1941,220-221)3. These statements are always spatio-temporal formulations 
(Neurath 1931b, 53-54). They are expressed in a unified language (Neurath 1931d, 
59,62; 1932,96-97; 1934,101; 1936a, 133; 1936b, 139; 1937a, 173; 1937e, 202-203; 
1938, 837; 1941, 214, 221). This unified language can, with slight alterations, be 
derived from everyday language. Everyday language has to be purified from 
metaphysics and it has to be made intersubjective and intersensual. 'It connects the 
statements of a man talking to himself today with his statements of yesterday; the 
statements he makes with his ears closed, with those he makes with his ear open' 
(Neurath 1931d, 62). Neurath calls this purified everyday language a physicalist 
language4. 
By induction of these statements, scientists formulate laws - laws are a kind 
of non-protocol statements -, which are directives for finding predictions - expressed in 
protocol statements - of individual courses of events (Neurath 1931b, 53; 1932, 94). 
Protocol statements can be controlled. They are, therefore, meaningful sentences 
which make the testing of those predictions possible (Neurath 1931a, 48; 1931b, 53). 
Testing means comparing one protocol statement with another. Testing does certainly 
not mean comparing it with "reality" or with "things" (Neurath 1931b, 53; 1931d, 61,67; 
1934, 102, 107-110). According to Neurath, logical empiricism leaves no room for 
comparing statements with things or reality. "Das Ding an sich" - to speak with Kant-
Neurath wrote more than 400 articles, pamphlets and monographs, which, 
according to Cartwright as., are discursively and repetitively written and 
loosely structured (Cartwright et al. 1996, 4). That is why I should, with 
respect to a single topic, refer to many places in Neurath's work in order to be 
more or less complete. 
4 Neurath describes this purified everyday language as a physicalist language. 
The meaning of the term "physicalism" shifts from "the language of physics" 
(Neurath 1931c, 62) to "universal jargon" or "universal slang" (Neurath 
1936c, 155; 1937a, 180). See also Reisch (1994,160). 
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or "reality" are metaphysical concepts. Empirical scientists can only compare 
statements with other statements. Oppositions such as statement/reality, 
language/reality, thinking/being, knowledge/reality, subject/object, logical 
form/experience all lead to pseudo-problems (Neurath 1936d, 754). Scientific "truth" 
cannot be a sake of correspondence between a statement and reality. The only 
possible concept of "truth" is one of coherence or consistency between a statement 
and the totality of existing scientific statements (Neurath 1913a, 3; 1931b, 53; 1931d, 
61,66; 1934,102). 'if ft agrees with them, it is joined to them; if it does not agree, it is 
called "untrue" and rejected; or the existing complex of statements of science is 
modified so that the new statement can be incorporated; the latter decision is mostly 
taken with hesitation' (Neurath 1931b, 53). Neurath thus explicitly states that the gap 
between the reality that humans experience and the statements about this reality 
cannot be bridged conceptually. 
In Neurath's view, coherence or consistency is a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition for scientific truth". The physicalist program lacks an unambiguous criterion 
of truth (Neurath 1934,105-107). The history of optics, for instance, demonstrates that 
several groups of statements that are without contradictions in themselves but exclude 
each other still remain. One cannot distinguish logically between these groups. Only 
the practice of living - the restricted views of our environment, the limited powers of 
individual scientists - reduces the multiplicity. For that reason one cannot speak of a 
true system of statements, not even as a conceptual boundary (Neurath 1931d, 61). 
Finally, Neurath proposes to drop the concepts "true" and "false" statements or 
theories altogether and to replace them with "accepted" and "unaccepted" or more or 
less "plausible" ones (Neurath 1941, 221-222). To conclude, Neurath's refusal to 
interpret theories in terms of truth, i.e. correspondence between theory and reality, 
opens room for a multiplicity of coherent theories about reality. 
In addition to empiricism, Neurath's conception of science is characterised by 
logical analysis, based on modern symbolic logic (Neurath 1929, 306-309; 1937a, 
175). Logical analysis is used to reduce random statements and concepts to precise 
statements and concepts about the given and to formalise the intuitive process of 
inference of ordinary thought. Moreover, logical analysis is needed to avoid 
metaphysical aberration. Metaphysics results from two basic logical mistakes: 
mistakes related to the use of unpurified traditional language and to confusions about 
the logical achievements of thought (pseudo-rationalism, see chapter 4). 
Unfortunately, Neurath is not clear about the criterion with which to decide whether 
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language is purified from metaphysical terms or not3. Anyhow, his falling back on logic 
to purify language suggests that he considers scientific language as a neutral 
language. This conviction is, however, at odds with his analysis - see the following 
paragraphs - of everyday language as consisting of a more or less coherent set of 
historically contingent concepts and of purified scientific concepts as originating from 
everyday language as a result of (ever preliminary) decisions. 
In The lost wanderers of Descartes and the auxiliary motive' Neurath 
describes theoretical thinking as a kind of action (Neurath 1913a). A characteristic of 
"action" (and of "non-action"), whether practical or theoretical, is that, since the agent 
lacks complete insight, it is unavoidably based on a decision. Science, as a kind of 
action, is itself the result of many decisions. The limits of scientific insight crop up each 
time a scientific concept, law or system of hypotheses is accepted. First, the 
acceptance of scientific concepts is the result of a decision, since the unified language 
of physicalism is obtained from a purification of a historically given ordinary language. 
This purification results in a 'physicalist ordinary language' which is at most 
unequivocal, but never completely determinate (Neurath 1932,91; 1936c, 147; 1941, 
215; 1944, 931-933). Their indefiniteness is inevitable, since each concept is linked 
with other ones. 'Even if we wish to free ourselves as far as we can from assumptions 
and interpretations we cannot start from a tabula rasa as Descartes thought we could. 
We have to make do with words and concepts that we find when our reflections begin. 
Indeed all changes of concepts and names again require the help of concepts, names, 
definitions and connections that determine our thinking' (Neurath 1921, 198). The 
historical contingency of language hampers the existence of evidences, of "primitive" 
or "atomic" statements which need no verification (Neurath 1932). It hampers, 
moreover, a methodological solipsism: the use of a private (phenomenal) language. 
Every language is necessarily inter-subjective. It impedes, finally, a definitely finished 
unified language. Unified language will always be in the making 'just as our life and our 
sciences' (Neurath 1941, 214). It will be achieved by successive adaptations and 
compromises, not mainly by deliberate conventions, nor by a test. Unified language 
results, dixit Neurath, from a decision (Neurath 1946a, 235). 
Second, the acceptance of a scientific law cannot happen without a decision. 
Laws are derived from observation statements through induction. Induction cannot be 
5 For another critique on Neurath's unified language project, see O'Neill (1995,33). 
O'Neill argues that Neurath's programme to eliminate all intentional, ethical and 
metaphysical terms from the (social) sciences - which is clearly the most posMvistic 
element in his work - is at odds with the "non-purified" vocabulary Neurath himself 
uses in bis papers. 
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logically obtained. One can at most test the induced law by comparing its predictions 
with protocol statements. No general method of induction exists. And what is more, 
even a general method of testing is lacking, since definitely established protocol 
statements are missing (Neurath 1935b, 122-123). An "experimentum crucis", which 
can definitely falsify a particular hypothesis, does not exist (Neurath 1944, 954). For 
that reason, Neurath does not agree with Popper, who presents falsification as a 
logical method (Neurath 1935b, 123-124). Just as Popper replaces "verification'' by 
"confirmation" of a theory, Neurath replaces "falsification" by "shaking". 'Negative 
results can shake [a scientist's] confidence in an encyclopedia, but not reduce it 
automatically to zero so to speak through the application of certain rules' (Neurath 
1935b, 124). 
Finally, the acceptance of a system of hypotheses results from a decision. 
The choice for a particular system of hypotheses depends on a specific selection of 
facts, on the use of specific analogies and on certain driving ideas which reflect a 
scientist's world view (Neurath 1916,23-28). Different systems of hypotheses that are 
free from contradictions can exist. Among these systems, one can only make a 
selection on the basis of extra-logical factors (Neurath 1934, 106). Moreover, a 
completely axiomatised system that reveals possible remaining contradictions hardly 
occurs in practice, in practice 'one proceeds much more clumsily and is mostly glad to 
have some contradiction pointed out or a greater number of conformities. It is precisely 
the history of physics that shows that our procedures are often quite consciously 
defective. It happens that occasionally two contradictory hypotheses about the same 
subject are used at two places with some degree of success. And still, one knows that 
in a more complete system only one hypothesis should be used throughout. We just 
resign ourselves to a moderate clarification in order to delete or accept statements 
later" (Neurath 1934,109). 
To recapitulate, according to Neurath science cannot be founded on 
something "absolute", "evident" or "a priori", be it primitive or atomic statements, 
absolute laws or systems of hypotheses, an indubitable method for inducting or testing 
or certain auxiliary tools such as logic, mathematics and an adequate unified 
language. It is the many decisions involved in scientific practice that urge us to see 
scientific theories as conceptual constructs. In Neurath's work, however, a tension 
exists between the posrtjvistic idea that the concepts used are neutral (since purified 
from metaphysics) on the one hand and the idea that they are historically contingent 
and based on many decisions on the other. In this respect, Weber's analysis of the 
(social) sciences as ideal-typical and thus non-neutral is much more explicit and 
convincing. Since Neurath explains, moreover, that scientific "truth" cannot be a matter 
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of correspondence, but at most a matter of coherence or consistency, we lack a 
scientific criterion to prefer one theory to another. The gap between conceptual 
constructs on the one hand and human reality on the other cannot (conceptually) be 
circumvented. Consequently, Neurath pleads for tolerance and pluralism within the 
community of scientists and for a multiplicity of scientific communities and, hence, 
theories. 
1.3 Conclusion 
Despite their different philosophical position, both Weber and Neurath agree that 
economic and political theories are conceptual constructs. According to Weber it is a 
value idea that defines the subject matter of a social science. Whether the economic 
and political sphere can be indicated as different domains of investigation thus 
depends on whether we can define different value ideas that make some phenomena 
economic ones and some (other) political ones. Weber's analysis of social-scientific 
methodology as ideal-typical convinces us that economic and political theories are 
conceptual constructs that arise from particular value-laden perspectives. Economic 
and political theories cannot be neutral. Since a variety of values can constitute a 
particular perspective, a multiplicity of economic and political theories is, in principle, 
possible. Weber argues, moreover, that no scientific criteria exist to prefer one value-
laden perspective (i.e., one non-neutral theory) to another. Neurath's analysis of 
scientific theories confirms Weber's interpretation of them as conceptually constructed. 
In Neurath's view, they are conceptually constructed because they result from 
threefold decisions. First, scientists have to decide on the language used: how far 
should historical ordinary language be purified in order to be fit for scientific use?. 
Second, both inducting from and testing protocol statements ask for decisions. Third, 
the acceptance of whole systems of hypotheses, i.e., of a theory, depends on 
decisions concerning the particular selection of data, the analogies used and the 
driving ideas constituting ones world view. Neurath's recognition of the various 
decisions needed to construct a theory confirms Weber's statement that theories are 
value-laden descriptions. Neurath further agrees with Weber that no scientific criteria 
exist to choose between theories. Neurath, like Weber, thus acknowledges that a 
multiplicity of economic and political theories can exist. 
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2 Four conceptual constructs of the economic 
sphere 
In the history of economics we can find various perspectivistic descriptions of the 
economic sphere, in this section I will sketch four of them. Each description can be 
reconstructed as constituted by a different entry. The first entry consists of the 
products of economic actions, the second of their rationality, the third of the decision 
units within which economic actions occur, and the fourth of the institutions defining 
both products as well as rationality and decision units. 
Economists use to consider Robbins' definition of economics as a good 
presentation of present-day orthodox economic theory (Dietz ef al. 1994,15; Mulberg 
1995, 64). Lord Robbins exposes his paradigmatic framework in his Essay on The 
Nature & Significance of Economic Science, that he first published in 19326. Here, he 
defines orthodox, i.e., neo-classical theory as an analytical science. He contrasts this 
analytical conception with the older, classical definition which he calls classificatory 
(Robbins 1984,16-31)7. The classical, classificatory conception delimits certain kinds 
of activities, namely those directed at the procuring of material welfare. The analytical 
conception, on the contrary, focuses on a particular aspect of behaviour, namely the 
form imposed by the influence of scarcity. Analytical 'economics is the science which 
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses' (Robbins 1984,16). It investigates human behaviour that occurs 
when four conditions of human existence are met at the same time. The first (and 
"evident") condition is that humans have a multiplicity of ends. The second one 
consists of the fact that the means needed to satisfy these ends are limited. Robbins 
calls this condition the condition of relative scarcity (a condition that is 'almost 
ubiquitous' (Robbins 1984,15)). The third one occurs when those scarce means are 
capable of alternative application. The fourth and last condition is that those different 
ends have a different importance. When these four conditions are satisfied at the 
same time, human behaviour 'necessarily assumes the form of choice' (Robbins 1984, 
14). Orthodox economics is meant to study this aspect of economic behaviour. 
To recapitulate the two perspectives sketched by Robbins, we could state 
that it are the "products" made within an economy that constitute the subject matter of 
the classificatory conception of economics, while it is the "rationality" of actions within 
an economy that constitutes the subject matter of the analytical conception. 
6 Here, I will refer to the third edition of 1984. 
7 Dietz et al. use the terms "material" instead of "classificatory" and "formal" 
instead of "analytical" (Dietz et al. 1994,15). 
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Robbins' analytical conception of economics conforms to Weber's 
interpretation of what he calls "pure" or "exact" economics. These terms point more 
particularly to the theory of marginal utility. According to Weber, economics originally 
questioned reality from the practical interest in the increase of the "wealth" of the 
population (MSS 85). Socialist criticism and the work of the historians caused a 
transformation of the original evaluative standpoints at the end of the nineteenth 
century (MSS 86). Since then the task of economics has been consisting of 
investigating human action which takes place under specific conditions: '1) as a 
consequence of the competition between different desires which long for satisfaction, 
2) as a consequence of the limitation not only of the capacity to desire, but in the first 
place of the actual "goods" and "labour forces" which are useful for the "satisfaction" of 
each desire, and finally 3) as a consequence of a specific kind of coexistence of 
different people afflicted with the same or similar desires, but equipped with different 
stocks of goods to their satisfaction, and competing with each other for the means of 
satisfaction' (GAW 389). (Pure) economic theory assumes the existence of 'pure 
economic interests and precludes the operation of political or other non-economic 
considerations' (MSS 44). Pure economic interests depend on only one psychic 
motive: maximisation of the satisfaction of one's own competing desires (GAW 391). 
The subject-matter of pure economics is rational economic behaviour, i.e., human 
action which is "caused" by the only economic motive and which succeeds in satisfying 
this motive. The theory of marginal utility presupposes, among other things, that 
people are able to act more or less instrumentally, i.e., that they can choose the 
correct means for a given end by making use of their experience and their capacity to 
calculate in advance (GAW 390). Economic theory tries to catch this kind of 
successful, i.e., rational behaviour in a logically consistent axiomatic system. 
As indicated in section 1, Weber acknowledges that "pure economics" is not 
the only possible perspective on an economy. He distinguishes three kinds of social-
economic phenomena: (purely) economic, economically relevant and economically 
conditioned. Firstly, 'a phenomenon is [purely; MD] "economic" only insofar as and 
only as long as our interest is exclusively focused on its constitutive significance in the 
material struggle for existence' (MSS 65). Such are, for example, the phenomena of 
the stock exchange and the banking world. These phenomena especially - but not 
exclusively - occur in institutions which were deliberately created or used for economic 
ends (MSS 64). Secondly, phenomena that do not primarily interest us with respect to 
their economic significance, but that influence economic events in a manner that is of 
interest from an economic point of view are "economically relevant" (MSS 64). Good 
examples in this respect are the influences of religious beliefs (the Protestant ethic) 
and of political actions and structures (e.g., the state and its legal system). Those 
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phenomena are the object of economic sociology and economic history (MSS 45). 
Thirdly, phenomena exist which are more or less strongly influenced by economic 
factors. The development of the artistic taste of a period for instance depends among 
other things on the social stratification of the artistically interested public. Weber calls 
those phenomena "economically conditioned" (MSS 64-65). 
To recapitulate Weber's opinion, Weber imagines three possible 
perspectives on an economy. The first perspective conforms to Robbins' analytical 
conception of economics. In this case, it is the "rationality" of economic actions that 
constitutes the subject matter of economics. The second perspective regards the 
institutional order of an economy. It are the "institutions" influencing economic actions 
that constitute the subject matter of this second conception of economics. (I will define 
the concept Institution" more precisely in the next chapter.) The third perspective 
relates to the impacts of economic actions on other spheres in human reality. 
Weber's second conception of economics shows, in its turn, some similarities 
with Neurath's interpretation of economics. For Neurath, the first task of economics is 
to compare different possible economies with regard to their economic quality 
(Neurath 1917,103-111). An economy is an order of life or a social structure as far as 
it conditions human happiness (Neurath 1917,109; 1931c, 395). An order of life is the 
totality of measures, institutions and customs and their changing (Neurath 1931c, 392-
403). This order of life is always embedded in a certain terrain of life, to which belong 
climate, geographical conditions (such as the presence or absence of rivers and 
swamps, of populations of plants, animals and humans), and the tools and houses 
which happen to be at a people's disposal. The order of life is at the same time a 
reaction on and a stimulus to the terrain of life. On the one hand, this implies that 
geographical conditions are not decisive for the life of society. The social structure is 
essential: it can change even when geographical conditions remain constant. On the 
other hand, it means that a social structure can influence a certain terrain of life, even 
so profoundly that one recognises less and less what the geographical character was 
at the start. The order of life together with the terrain of life are responsible for a 
specific living standard, which consists of the provision for people's shelter, food and 
clothing, but also of their health, the friendliness of their human surroundings, the 
availability of books and theatres, etc.. Different orders of life may produce very 
different living standards within the same terrain of life. This living standard becomes 
itself part of the terrain of life. Consequently, it must be reckoned with thereafter as 
part of a continuously changing stimulus to a continuously changing order of life and 
terrain of life. The living standard, understood in its widest sense, conditions people's 
behaviour, i.e., their style and attitude of life. According to Neurath, it is possible to 
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arrange attitudes in a sequence, depending on the amount of happiness they bring 
with them. The amount of happiness of a particular order of life is a measure of its 
economic efficiency (Neurath 1917,107). Economics is, in Neurath's view, the science 
that investigates the correlations between orders of life and human happiness. Or, to 
connect Neurath's conception with previously mentioned ones, Neurath considers 
Institutions" influencing the "rationality" of economic (interactions and the kind of 
"products" made within an economy as the entities constituting the subject matter of 
economics. 
This overview of Robbins', Weber's and Neurath's perspective on an 
economy allows me to propose the following four entries to economics. The first entry 
is the "products" made within an economy, i.e., "goods and services" or "commodities". 
The second entry is the "rationality" of human actions within an economy. The third 
entry, inspired by Weber (and Bromley, as we will see in a later chapter) is "decision 
units" typical for an economy (such as firms, households, banks etc.). The final entry is 
the Institutions" influencing actions within an economy. This latter entry is in some 
respect an overarching one, since a) what makes a decision unit an economic one, b) 
what makes a product a commodity and c) what defines the concrete form of "rational" 
economic action all depend on particular institutions (I will come back to this topic both 
in chapter 3 and chapter 7). 
These four entries to economics are illustrative for my previous explanation 
that economic theories are conceptual constructs. Each entry defines in its own 
manner the set of phenomena that are deemed economic ones. We can, for instance, 
imagine that some phenomena occurring within economic decision units do not 
conform to the kind of typically economic "rationality". Such phenomena would be 
called "economic" according to the third perspective, but they would not according to 
the second one. Or we can imagine phenomena showing a typically economic 
"rationality" that, however, occur outside economic decision units. It is no use to ask 
which entry gives the better picture of an economy, since such question would betray 
our denying of the nature of an economic theory as a conceptual construct. All that 
remains is to accept the dissimilarities between various perspective approaches 
within economics and to look for the entry best suited to solve particular (theoretical or 
practical) problems. 
3 Buchanan's political theory 
Buchanan is one of the originators of Public Choice theory. Public Choice theory is 
one example of a perspective description of the political sphere. It is, more 
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specifically, a political theory that investigates the conditions for an efficient democracy 
(De Beus 1989, 218). A democracy is considered to be efficient if ft succeeds in 
correcting market failures through the promulgation of correct private property rights, 
the provision of desirable public goods, the internalisation of Pareto-relevant 
externalities and the provision of lacking market information. It is, in other words, a 
political theory that investigates the conditions for an optimal institutional organisation 
of the economic sphere. The analytical method of Public Choice theory is borrowed 
from (neo-classical) economics. Public Choice theory is, in short, an extension of (neo-
classical) economics to - economic - policy (De Beus 1989,214)8. 
Public Choice theory is meant to be a realistic description of political 
processes in the sense that it 'set[s] aside heroic conceptions of human nature [the 1f 
men were angels" conception] and deal[s] with human behaviour as it is, warts and all' 
(Brennan 1993, 137). This "realistic" description reflects a particular normative 
perspective. I will deal more extensively with the normative content of Public Choice 
theory in order to illustrate the kind of non-neutral political recommendations to which 
this political theory gives rise. 
3.1 Public Choice theory as an extension of economics 
Public choice theory is a political theory that emphasises the similarities between 
economic and political actions. It takes the view that political actions show the same 
rationality as economic actions, in the words of Buchanan, '[pjublic choice is a 
perspective on politics that emerges from an extension-application of the tools and 
methods of the economist to collective or non-market decision-making' (Buchanan 
1986,19). Buchanan adds that this quotation reproduces the public choice perspective 
accurately only if one has a specific interpretation of economics in mind, namely the 
interpretation which defines the domain of economics as the set of exchange actions 
and which accepts the ideal type of homo oeconomicus as an adequate description of 
an individual actor. In short, the economics of Public Choice theory is in the neo-
classical vein. This "neo-classical vein" can be recapitulated, in the words of De Beus, 
as characterised by methodological individualism, subjectivism, and rational (even 
egoistic) behaviour (De Beus 1989,240). 
I could also present Public Choice theory as a new institutional, rather man a neo-
classical, economics (O'Neill 1994,202). For Public Choice theory criticises (neo-
classical) cost-benefit analyses as appropriate instruments to correct (ecological) 
market failures. The methodology of new institutionalism, however, mainly remains 
in the tradition of neo-classical economics. 
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Contrary to the neo-classical approach, Buchanan does not base his 
definition of economics on its analytical material object (Hemerijck 1994, 231). 
According to the neo-classical conception, economics investigates the material object 
constituted by people's striving for formal welfare under conditions of scarcity. Neo-
classical economics considers markets, the entity where individuals exchange goods 
and services with each other, as the institutional domain where economics can be 
applied. Public choice theory, on the contrary, singles out the co-ordination 
mechanism deemed typical for an economy, namely exchange, from the neo-classical 
perspective. In this way, it changes the analytical domain of economics. Public choice 
theorists do not restrict themselves any longer to the domain of "private" markets. 
They extend their analysis to the domain of public government. Economics is 
henceforth the science of exchange actions, or in Buchanan's words, of all processes 
based on voluntary agreement (Buchanan 1986,20). 
Buchanan's extension of neo-classical economics to the political domain 
gives rise to a shift in the definition of politics. On the one hand, Buchanan treats 
political phenomena as if they show, with respect to their rationality, the same 
characteristics as economic phenomena. On the other hand, this equalisation urges 
him to introduce a new distinction between the typically political and the typically 
economic. From now on, actions within the political sphere are deemed to show a 
typically economic rationality as far as they are characterised by voluntary agreement. 
They are deemed to show a typically political rationality as far as they are 
manifestations of non-voluntary agreement. Political theory does henceforth no longer 
investigate phenomena occurring within a particular sphere, but all kinds of human 
interactions of which the rationality is a manifestation of coercion (Hemerijck 1994, 
231). It investigates phenomena that are manifestations of involuntary relationships, of 
unequal power relationships (Buchanan 1986, 21). To conclude, the entry that is, 
according to Public Choice theory, decisive for the distinction between the typically 
economic and the typically political is the "rationality" of human interaction. It is a 
particular rationality that makes some phenomena political and other ones economic. 
Buchanan acknowledges that both interpretations of economic and political 
phenomena are perspectives on empirical human relationships (Buchanan 1986,21). 
He, moreover, stresses that purely economic or political actions hardly exist in reality. 
All real human interactions show characteristics of both perspectives. Exchange 
actions on markets are not free from "economic" power relationships, while in 
government power relationships go hand in hand with "political" cost-benefit 
considerations. In Buchanan's view the public choice perspective on politics [is] 
analogous to the economic power perspective on markets' (Buchanan 1986,22). 
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To recapitulate, Public Choice theory is a perspective on the political sphere 
that originates from an extension of (neo-classical) economics to the institutional 
domain of politics. This perspective gives rise to a redefinition of both political and 
economic theory. Political theory has, henceforth, involuntary human interactions as its 
domain of research. Economics has voluntary actions as its domain of research. In 
both the economic and the political sphere, actions can show voluntary as well as 
involuntary aspects. Buchanan's Public Choice perspective is not so much constituted 
by a particular distinction between the political and the economic sphere. It is 
constituted by a particular distinction between the rationality of human interactions that 
occur both in the political and the economic sphere. 
3.2 Political actors as homines oeconomicos 
According to the Public Choice perspective, the goal of politics consists of creating the 
institutional context, i.e. the political constitution, that allows individuals to realise 
optimally their private ends. Buchanan, following Elinor Ostrom, distinguishes two 
levels in a political constitution. The first level, the level of constitutional choice, 
comprises rules that define political procedures. On the second level, the level of 
collective choice, political procedures lead to decisions concerning, for instance, 
economic institutions. The first level thus forms the institutional context of the second 
level. Buchanan as well as Ostrom interpret "politics" in a restricted sense as the set of 
decision processes taking place at the level of collective choice (Ostrom 1982,210). 
The task of Public Choice theorists consists of constructing theoretical 
models of various political constitutions (Buchanan 1986, 28-39). Their theoretical 
search is meant to track down the political constitution that is Pareto-efficient. A 
constitution is Pareto-efficient if one cannot find one that is better for one individual 
without being worse for another. The central question of Public Choice theory sounds: 
what legal restrictions can we expect individual actors of the type homo oeconomicus 
to acknowledge and to accept as the political constitution that allows them to strive 
after their private interests without further restrictions - i.e. without having to care 
about other people's welfare - and with an optimal realisation of the private interests of 
all economic actors as a result. 
According to the Public Choice perspective, politics is initially directed at 
optimising the institutional organisation of an economy. An optimal institutional 
organisation of an economy maximises economic productivity and efficiency. 
Societies, because of their complexity due to the huge amount of democratic actors, 
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need public authorities, a group of professional politicians. Professional politicians, 
however, are no more saints than are economic actors. Hence, one cannot expect 
them to act by themselves in service of the "general interest", in service of an 
optimisation of the institutional organisation of an economy. For that reason 
professional politicians, in their turn, need an institutional context that legally restricts 
their political actions (and the actions of those who vote political representatives). 
Public choice theorists aim at an optimisation of the institutional organisation of the 
economy as well as the polity. Both are spheres in human reality where actors of the 
type homo oeconomicus can go their own way unimpededly. Optimisation of the 
institutional organisation of a polity, however, is subordinate to optimisation of the 
institutional organisation of an economy. 
3.3 More markets, less government 
Buchanan's Public Choice perspective leads to a normative plea for more "market" 
and less "government"9. His line of reasoning goes as follows: To the extent that 
voluntary exchange among persons is valued positively while coercion is valued 
negatively, there emerges the implication that substitution of the former for the latter is 
desired, on the presumption, of course, that such substitution is technologically 
feasible and is not prohibitively costly in resources. This implication provides the 
normative thrust for the proclivity of the public choice economist to favour market-like 
arrangements where these seem feasible, and to favour decentralization of political 
authority in appropriate situations' (Buchanan 1986,22). 
Government has a minimal task to define and protect property rights 
(Buchanan 1986, 252-256). Property rights define what individuals can do 
autonomously, i.e. without interference of others. They determine the boundaries 
between public and private. These boundaries are no natural entities, but result from 
political processes. Since everybody prefers freedom to coercion, one should aim for 
maximal freedom. Private properties are, however, mutually exclusive: one person's 
right is another person's non-right. Consequently, personal freedom has to be limited. 
Political processes are needed to define these limitations. They are meant to search 
for fair property rights. 
John O'Neill notes that various public-choice-schools exist which disagree with 
each other in this respect (O'Neill 1994, 203 note 1). The plea for limited 
government is typical for the Virginian School of Public Policy, where Buchanan 
belongs to. This school bears a clear Austrian mark: Buchanan's later writings are 
strongly influenced by Hayek. 
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Properly rights are fair if political actors, acting conform to legal political procedures, 
can assent to them. 
Next to this minimal task of government, Buchanan preserves a minor task 
related to other political objectives, such as the distribution of income, citizen's health 
and safety, care for our natural environment, etc. (Buchanan 1986, 256-257). He 
interprets such political objectives as corrections to be made after "markets0 have 
done their work. He is, moreover, reluctant to leave them to public authorities. In his 
view, "market failures" more often than not give rise to "government failures", because 
bureaucrats and politicians - as homines oeconomicos - aim for a continuous 
expansion of public expenditures, with irrational and inefficient spending as a result. 
3.4 Processes as the touch stone of politics 
The public choice perspective interprets political actors as homines oeconomicos. This 
interpretation gives rise to an interpretation of political values as strictly subjective. 
Hence, democratic processes cannot be understood as a means to look for values that 
receive common consent. Democratic procedures only exist in order to create the 
institutional environment that allows individuals to realise their private ends in an 
optimal way. Therefore, public choice theory concentrates on political processes, not 
on political content. To the extent that political interaction among persons is modelled 
as a complex exchange process, in which the inputs are individual evaluations or 
preferences, and the process itself is conceived as the means through which these 
possibly diverging preferences are somehow combined or amalgamated into a pattern 
of outcomes, attention is more or less necessarily drawn to the interaction process 
itself rather than to some transcendental evaluation of the outcomes themselves' 
(Buchanan 1986,22). Who aims at ameliorating political decisions, has to improve the 
rules constituting decision processes. 
Buchanan's interest in political constitutions regards the quality of political 
processes. In his view, one cannot argue rationally about the quality of the results of 
political processes. Whether the result is good, depends on whether the process is 
good. Political processes are no means subordinate to and derived from a political 
goal; the goal is rather derived from the process. The quality of the process is the only 
standard for measuring the quality of the result. But how to measure the quality of the 
process? Though Buchanan denies that a political constitution aims at a particular 
"common good", Pareto-efficiency proves to be his standard for measuring the quality 
of political processes. At the same time, since the values of political actors are strictly 
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private, the concrete meaning of this "efficiency" can only become clear through the 
political processes themselves10. 
Buchanan's interpretation of political actors as of a homo oeconomicus type 
implies an interpretation of politics as a bargaining process. The public choice 
perspective assumes that the preferences and interests of political actors are given. 
The most political actors can do is bargaining with each other till they reach some 
equilibrium level. Public Choice politics thus results in adding new institutions to the 
existing set rather than in transforming this set (Faber 1997,461-463). For to begin 
with, homo oeconomicus is not capable of suspending his short term interests and 
imagining his possible interests in a new institutional context. Nor can he estimate 
whether his long term interests are more or less acceptable then his immediate ones. 
Secondly, maximisation of preference satisfaction is his only motive, not one or 
another "common good" such as a new institutional organisation. In case political 
actors have to solve some new political problems, all they can do is to define new 
property rights and to add them to the existing set. Buchanan calls this The Creation 
of Rights" (Faber 1997, 461). These new property rights imply an expansion, not a 
transformation of existing political constitution. Paradoxically enough, a Public Choice 
perspective gives rise to a constitutional democracy that evolves towards a welfare 
state. According to Faber as., Buchanan does not only warn for this - in his view: 
disastrous - development. He even admits that such development is an inherent 
dilemma of a Public Choice approach (Faber 1997,462). 
Stating that "efficiency" is a standard for a good political constitution does not 
come down to claiming that some persons can judge existing political constitutions 
on the base of their privileged, concrete insight in the meaning of "efficiency". 
Consider the following quotation: "The market is an institutional process within 
which individuals interact, one with another, in pursuit of their separate individual 
objectives, whatever these may be. The great discovery of the eighteenth-century 
philosophers was that, within appropriately designed laws and institutions, 
separately self-interested individual behaviour in the market generates a spontaneous 
order, a pattern of allocational-distributional outcomes that is chosen by no one, yet 
which is properly classified as an order in that it reflects a maximization of the 
values of the participating persons. What these values are are defined only in the 
process itself; the individual values, as such, do not exist outside or independently of 
the process within which they come to be defined. In this sense, and in this sense 
only, can the order generated in the market process be labelled or classified as 
"efficient". Economists who presume some inherent ability to define that which is 
"efficient" independently from the behaviour of persons in the market process itself, 
a definition that is then utilized to evaluate the performance of the market as an 
institution, these economists presume an arrogance that simply should not be 
countenanced' (Buchanan 1986,88). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Buchanan's Public Choice theory originates from an expansion of neo-classical 
economics to the domain of (economic) policy. This theory does not respect the 
analytical domain of economics, namely the economic sphere that is the institutional 
domain of markets. It extends the analytical domain of economics to the political 
sphere. Buchanan acknowledges that this extension is a particular perspective on 
politics. 
This perspective is nor neutral. To begin with, it considers politics to be, in 
the last instance, about an optimal institutional organisation of an economy, i.e., an 
institutional organisation that maximises economic productivity and efficiency. It 
assumes, further, political actors to be of the homo oeconomicus type. Moreover, 
political processes, rather than their content, are the criterion with which to judge 
politics. Finally, Public Choice theory leads to political recommendations for more 
markets and less government. 
Curiously enough, the perspective of Public Choice theory gives rise to a 
redefinition of both the typically economic and the typically political. Economic actions 
are, henceforth, considered to be voluntary, while political actions are deemed to be 
involuntary. This redefinition stresses a particular rationality as distinctive for economic 
and political phenomena. "Rationality" is thus the entry that constitutes Public Choice 
theory as a conceptual construct. 
4 Deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy is an alternative conceptual construct of the political sphere of 
which Hannah Arendt is an important originator. The main difference between the 
construct of Public Choice theory and the construct of deliberative democracy regards 
their respective originator's interpretation of the nature of political rationality. While 
Buchanan considers typically political interactions as manifestations of coercion, 
Arendt considers typically political interactions as manifestations of (a particular kind 
of) freedom. In this section, I will use the four entries mentioned in section 2 to 
conceptually (re)construct the political theory of deliberative democracy (though I will 
not introduce these entries in the order previously provided). This reconstruction will 
show relevant features of the political and the economic sphere respectively and, 
meanwhile, illustrate that Buchanan's and Arendfs differing perspectives on the 
political sphere relate especially to the entry of the "rationality" of political interactions. 
Some people would call the construct of Public Choice theory an example of 
a political theory and the construct of deliberative democracy an example of a political 
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philosophy. According to Goodin et al. a possible distinction between political theory 
and political philosophy could be that the former is rather descriptive, while the latter is 
rather normative (Goodin et al. 1993,1). Given previous analysis that all conceptual 
constructs are value-laden, non-neutral, perspectivistic descriptions, this distinction is 
not accurate enough. Therefore I propose the following reformulation. Both political 
theories and political philosophies are non-neutral descriptions of a particular domain 
in human reality. Political philosophies differ, however, from political theories to the 
extent that they offer good reasons to consider one non-neutral description rather than 
another as a guiding ideal. In the introductory chapter, I explained (see section 2.1) 
that my own research project takes "deliberative democracy" as a guiding political 
ideal. In this section I will explain the features of a deliberative democracy. In section 
5,1 will offer reasons why we should, from the viewpoint of sustainability, choose 
deliberative democracy rather than Public Choice theory as a guiding political ideal. 
4.1 Economic versus political decision units 
One perspective on the economic and the political sphere takes "decision units" as its 
entry. In section 2 we mentioned firms, households, banks as examples of economic 
decision units. As examples of political decision units we can mention parliament, 
ministries, government, and local councils. The political sphere does, however, not 
only comprise public authorities. It also comprises citizens that are, in one way or 
another, politically active. Therefore, we can mention as other examples of political 
decision units action groups, non-governmental organisations and even unorganised 
citizens who vote once in a while, who occasionally discuss political themes, or who 
gather relevant information. The term "decision unit" should thus not be interpreted too 
literally as a unit in which final decisions are taken, but as a unit in which political 
themes are at least reflected on and debated. According to this perspective, 
phenomena taking place in economic decision units are economic phenomena, while 
phenomena occurring in political decision unite are political ones. 
4.2 "Homines oeconomicos" versus "homines politicos" 
The "rationality" of actions constitute another perspective. The rationality of economic 
actions is defined by a specific motive, namely to maximise the satisfaction of the 
actor's competing desires. This rationality is deemed to be instrumental. It consists of 
choosing the best means for a particular end. These ends are, further, thought of as 
given, rather static and hierarchically ordered. The ideal type of homo oeconomicus is 
considered an adequate description of a rational economic actor. 
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I will contrast this ideal type of homo oeconomicus with Arendf s explanation of homo 
politicus. 
According to Arendt, homo politicus cannot be caught in an ideal type. This is 
because political actors remain, in a certain sense, anonymous, for two reasons 
(Arendt 1958,175-181). First, homines politicos reveal in acting and speaking who, 
not: what, they are. Their uniqueness escapes an unequivocal verbal expression. 
Whenever we try to explain who somebody is, our vocabulary leads us astray into 
saying what he or she is. We cannot but offer a description of qualities that he (or she) 
necessarily shares with others like him (or her). Such description provides us with a 
type, with the result that a person's uniqueness - and, hence, the person acting 
politically - escapes us. A person cannot even dispose of his own uniqueness. Though 
political actors can, through their words and deeds, show themselves very clearly and 
unmistakably to others, they remain hidden for themselves. They cannot dispose of 
who they are; they cannot purposefully aim for the disclosure of their own uniqueness. 
Second, homines politicos do not act alone, but in a "web" of human 
relationships (Arendt 1958, 181-192). Only in a web of human relationships does 
political action lead to political events. Political actors are at most a link in, but never 
the author of a political event. They can begin such an event, but they cannot control 
or manage it. Every political action falls into an already existing web with innumerable, 
conflicting wills and intentions. In such a web action almost never achieves its 
purpose. Every action causes a chain reaction and every process a series of 
processes. Since action acts upon beings who are capable of their own actions, 
reaction is not merely a response, but a new action. 
The twofold anonymity of political actors explains why political events cannot 
be understood in terms of means and ends. Political events are not "made". Political 
events do not conform to instrumental rationality. The "means", i.e. the political action, 
is at the same time the "end", i.e. a manifestation of who people are. This 
manifestation rests on initiative. To take initiative means to begin something new that 
cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before. It is an outstanding 
manifestation of human freedom. Since political events are reflections of human 
freedom, the political arena is the domain where the "wholly improbable happens 
regularly" (Arendt 1958, 300). In this domain it is highly unrealistic not to reckon with 
the unexpected, that is, not to reckon with something with which nobody can safely 
reckon. To act in the form of making, to reason in the form of "reckoning with 
consequences", means to leave out the unexpected, the event itself, since it would be 
unreasonable or irrational to expect what is no more than an Infinite improbability". 
[...] The political philosophy of the modem age [...] founders on the perplexity that 
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modern rationalism is unreal and modem realism is irrational - which is only another 
way of saying that reality and human reason have parted company" (Arendt 1958, 
300). 
The boundlessness of the web of human relationships causes the 
unpredictability of political events. Homines politicos never know precisely what they 
are doing. They always become "guilty" of consequences they never intended or could 
foresee (Arendt 1958, 233). Political events are at the same time irreversible. No 
matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of political deeds, they can 
never be undone. The event cannot be consummated unequivocally in one single 
deed or event. 
In the political sphere people should act as equals (Arendt 1958,180). Only 
where people act with others and neither for nor against them can people reveal who 
they are in speech and action. People who are for or against each other use their 
words and deeds in order to achieve a goal. They lose sight of the unique identity of 
political actors. In this case political action is no less a means to an end than making is 
a means to produce an object. In such instances, speech becomes mere talk, whether 
it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody with propaganda. "Power" is the 
capacity to act politically, to act as equals (Arendt 1958,199-203). Freedom, positive 
and negative, is a condition for political power. Political actors should be free of the 
day-to-day worries related to the necessities of life. Negative freedom - the absence of 
immediate necessities - is a requisite for acting as equals in the public sphere. 
Negative freedom allows persons to postpone their immediate wills and 
predetermined, short-term interests and to reflect on a desirable societal organisation. 
Political actors at the same time express their positive freedom. Political events are 
creative realisations of what it can mean to be human. As such they are more than 
immediate fulfilment of the necessities of life and the production of useful objects11. 
To recapitulate, according to Arendt it is not possible to construct an ideal 
type of homo politicus. Political speech and action are meant to reveal who people are. 
This unique expression of human freedom cannot be caught in an ideal type. 
Moreover, political actors always act with each other in a web of human relationships. 
Consequently, homo politicus is never the author of political events. One cannot catch 
the "rationality" of political events either. Political events are unpredictable and 
irreversible. Finally, one cannot think of political processes as a means to realise a 
Note that Arendt's interpretation of negative and positive freedom is dissimilar to 
the conventional interpretation that dates back to Berlin's political philosophy. For 
an explanation of the latter interpretation, see De Beus (1989,11-21). 
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particular end, since the end, i.e. the realisation of human freedom, is revealed in the 
processes themselves. This implies that a societal organisation - which is a 
manifestation of politics - is never "made". This brings us to the third perspective 
constituted by the "product" of (economic or political) actions. 
4.3 "Goods and services" versus "laws" 
Goods and services - including labour power and capital - are the products of 
economic actions. (Formal) institutions or laws are the "products" - the term is not 
convenient, as will be clear from the above explanation - of political actions. The 
analysis of institutions that follows is inspired by, but not a direct reproduction of, 
Arendf s reflections on "worldly things". 
According to Arendt, political praxis relates to two in-betweens: the 
"objective" world of relative stable, physical things on the one hand and the 
"subjective" web of human relationships (Arendt 1958,182-184). The objective world is 
the world of things that lie between people - and that, therefore, relate and bind them 
together - and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests. Worldly 
things are "objective": they are relative stable, compared to goods and services on the 
one hand and ever changing natural things on the other. They also provide 
"objectivity". They supply people with an identity: people can ascribe meaning to 
various events because they experience them in relation with relative stable worldly 
things. 
Arendt implicitly distinguishes between two kinds of worldly things. First, 
there are tools and instruments. Instruments are "made" (Arendt 1958,139-144). The 
process of making is entirely determined by the categories of means and end. The 
means is the process of making; the end is the product. A tool or instrument is the 
realisation of an image or model. This image or model does not only precede the 
fabrication process, it also survives ft. Second, there are works of art (Arendt 1958, 
167-174). Works of art have no utility. They are unique and non-exchangeable. 
Contrary to instruments, they are no realisations of already existing images. They are 
"thought things": the thought exists together with the reified work of art. Works of art 
are, according to Arendt, the most worldly things because they go beyond the 
functionalism of consumption goods and the utility of instruments. 
Considering the characteristics that Arendt assigns to "worldly things", 
institutions can be regarded as worldly entities, though they are not necessarily 
physical things. Institutions are more or less stable, since they are regularities shown 
in human actions (I will examine the nature of institutions further in the next chapter). 
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They are the background and interest of political praxis. Political (and - indirectly -
also other) institutions define political decision units, processes and, hence, their 
results. Political and other social institutions are the direct interest and "results" of 
political actions. Some institutions remain implicit. Laws are explicit or formal 
institutions: as written texts they are made tangible things. 
Institutions look more like "works of art" than like Instruments". They are not 
the realisation of a pre-existing image. They are not "made". Contrary to works of art, 
institutions are not thought things either. Institutions are no expressions of the 
thoughts of individual artiste, but of the actions of free and equal persons. An 
institution is an - this is my term - Interaction thing". More than an expression of 
thinking, it is an expression of acting. More than an expression of acting, it is an 
expression of acting together from a plurality of positions and perspectives. Institutions 
reflect what societal organisation we deem dignified. For that reason, the institutional 
organisation of a society cannot be straightforwardly derived from "objective" science, 
since it is always a creative answer of people living in a specific historical context and 
an expression of "new" values. 
Arendt calls the typically political "rationality" from which institutions emerge 
"judging"12. Judging is the capacity political actors need in order to form opinions. The 
capacity to judge is the capacity to consider a given issue from different viewpoints by 
making present in one's mind the standpoints of those who are absent. The more 
people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, 
and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if i were in their place, the 
stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final 
conclusions, my opinion' (Arendt 1961,241). The formation of opinions is a typically 
political activity. It is not a private activity performed by solitary thinkers. In order to 
form a political opinion, political actors should test and enlarge their personal 
judgements by confronting them with differing judgements. For that reason, opinions 
can only be formed within a community of equal political actors that are prepared to 
submit their judgements to public exposure and debate. 
Opinions should be distinguished both from truth and from interests. Truth 
emerges from cognitive rationality and aims at universal validity. Opinion emerges 
from judgement and aims at particular validity. Judging is not a matter of subsuming 
These paragraphs are based on Bernstein's reconstruction of Arendt's concept 
(Bernstein 1983,207-223). Arendt herself did not find time to work this concept out 
systematically. "Judgement" was the topic planned for the third part of her book The 
Life of the Mind, but Arendt died before she could start this project 
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particular states of affairs under general rules, but a matter of ascending from 
particular interests to public opinions. On the one hand, opinions are not universally 
valid. They have a restricted validity, for judgement's validity cannot extend further 
than the others in whose place judging persons have put themselves in the process of 
forming an opinion. On the other hand, opinions have a wider validity than have private 
interests. For private interests refer to individual preferences and situations. Opinions, 
on the contrary express a sensus communis. Opinions emerge from a mode of 
thinking that is capable of dealing with the particular in its particularity but which 
nevertheless makes a claim to communal validity. 
4.4 Economic versus political institutions 
Institutions (formal or explicit as well as informal or implicit ones) define - as will 
become more clear in the next chapter - what counts as an economic good or service, 
give concrete content to rational economic action, and define an economic decision 
unit. It is also institutions that define political decision units, the rationality of political 
"processes" and what counts as a law. For that reason I called Institutions" an 
overarching entry in section 2. Two further remarks related to this institutional 
perspective on both the economic and the political sphere are on their place here. 
To start with, I have to reformulate the remark made in section 2. There, I 
suggested that some phenomena occurring within economic decision units can show a 
rationality that is rather political than economic. Think, for instance, of deliberations 
happening within a firm concerning ecologically benign production processes. Such 
phenomena would be called economic according to the perspective taking decision 
units as its entry, but political according to the perspective taking rationality as its 
entry. We can also imagine the reverse, i.e., phenomena showing a typically economic 
rationality that, however, occur within political decision units. Think, as an example, of 
cost-benefit analyses carried out within a particular ministry to provide the citizenry 
with the most economical public transportation system. Such phenomena would be 
called political according to the former entry, but economic according to the latter. 
These examples show that, though it is possible to construct conceptually a distinction 
between the economic and the political sphere, both spheres cannot simply be 
separated. Concrete actions often show economic as well as political aspects. 
Second, the distinction made with the help of the four entries between the 
economic and the political sphere - or, in plural, the distinctions made, since the 
different perspectives do not simply define the same set of phenomena as economic 
or political respectively - show that institutions are the entities that link both spheres. 
On the one hand, political actions give rise to implicit and explicit institutions (which 
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does not imply that all institutions are politically defined). On the other hand, it is 
institutions (politically and non-politically defined ones) that define an economy, i.e., 
commodities, economic rationality and economic decision units. This link explains the 
kind of hierarchy that exists between the political and economic sphere. Politically 
defined institutions are preconditions for economic actions. They enable economic 
actions and they restrict them at the same time. This kind of hierarchy is a logical one: 
politically defined institutions are logically prior to economic actions. This logical 
hierarchy, however, does not exclude another reverse hierarchy between the 
economic and the political sphere. Since unequal economic power relationships give 
rise to unequal political power relationships, they prevent citizens and politicians to act 
in a typically political way as free and equal persons. In other words, they cause a 
typically political rationality to be suppressed and replaced by a typically economic 
rationality. If this is the case, predetermined, short-term economic interests of some 
powerful groups will become dominant political interests. The content of politically 
defined institutions will then heavily be influenced by the economic institutions that 
initially gave rise to the unequal economic power relationships in question. This kind of 
reverse hierarchy is not a logical one. It is a substantive one. It is the concrete content 
of politically defined economic institutions - economic institutions that allow for 
particular unequal economic power relationships - that cause a political rationality to 
shift into an economic one. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The first three entries mentioned in section 2 - decision units, rationality, products -
allowed me to reconstruct, with the help of Arendfs political philosophy, deliberative 
democracy as an alternative political theory. The features of a deliberative democracy 
can be recapitulated as follows. To start with, deliberative politics occurs in political 
decision units that are institutionally defined. Second, deliberative rationality proves to 
be Irrational'' and "communicative''. It is irrational in the sense that deliberative politics 
is unpredictable and irreversible. It is "communicative", not Instrumental" - to use 
Habermas's terminology - because deliberative politics is a matter of interacting, not a 
matter of making nor of bargaining13. It is a matter of interacting as free and equal 
persons, i.e., acting with each other, not for or against each other. It is not a matter of 
For a clear explanation about Habermas' interpretation of communicative and 
instrumental rationality, see Erläuterungen zum Begriff des kommunikativen 
Handelns, in: Habermas, J. (1984). Vorstadien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt Subrkamp, p. 571-606. 
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making, because deliberative politics cannot be separated into means (i.e., processes) 
on the one hand and previously defined ends (i.e., institutions) on the other. The ends 
(or the products, to introduce a third entry) emerge in the course of politics as ever 
provisional interpretations of a dignified human society. They are provisional because 
political interaction is never finished (there is no definite end to realise), because they 
depend on political actors' creative initiatives, and because they can shift depending 
on the extent of political equality. It is not a matter of bargaining, because it is not a 
matter of balancing predetermined interests or values. Political values, objectives or 
institutions emerge, as Interaction-things', in the course of politics. 
In the words of Gutmann, the ideal of deliberative democracy conceives of 
politics as the set of "processes" where autonomous people relate to one another not 
merely by asserting their wills or fighting for their predetermined interests, but by 
influencing each other through the publicly valued use of reasoned argument, 
evidence, evaluation and persuasion. In a deliberative democracy, people collectively 
shape their own politics, and hence their societal institutions, through persuasive 
argument. Reasoned persuasion is considered the most justifiable form of political 
power because it is the most consistent with respecting the autonomy of equal 
persons, their capacity for self-government (Gutmann 1993,417—418). 
The fourth entry - institutions - allowed me to understand the relationship 
between the political and the economic sphere. Between the political and the 
economic sphere exists a logical hierarchy. Political interaction is logically prior to 
economic action, because it is politically defined economic institutions that enable and 
restrict economic autonomy. This logical hierarchy does not necessarily prevent a 
reverse, substantive hierarchy. The concrete content of economic institutions can give 
rise to particular unequal (economic and political) power relationships that cause, 
within the political sphere, a shift from political to economic rationality. 
Application of the four entries on both the political and the economic sphere 
does not only allow me to construct deliberative democracy as an alternative to Public 
Choice theory. It also allows me to (re)confirm the legitimacy of typically economic 
action. Within the economic sphere, economic decision unite are justified to act rather 
instrumentally and to organise their means to realise their ends as good as they can. 
(Though, as will become clear in the next chapter, these ends should not necessarily 
be interpreted -as Buchanan does - as egoistic.) Economic actors are justified to act 
autonomously, without caring about others' ends, within the institutionally defined 
boundaries of their private domain. The ideal of deliberative democracy indeed leaves 
room for two types of "autonomy": an individual, private or economic one and a 
collective, public or political one. The former corresponds to the idea of individual 
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freedom, the opportunity of all persons to live under laws of their own individual 
choosing. The latter takes the social context of individual choice into consideration. 
This social context influences and constrains the life choices that individuals can make 
by themselves for themselves, free from interference. Politics has to some extent 
control over this social context. Public or political autonomy regards the opportunity 
and capability to shape this social context through political processes (Gutmann 1993, 
417-418). 
5 Politics and sustainability 
In the introductory chapter, I defined sustainability as a "guiding idea" reflecting our 
striving for intergenerational justice in the way we go about with the ecological 
dimensions of earthly life. The concept refers to our responsibility for the ecological 
impacts of our present economic activities on the lives of future generations. We 
should make sure that these ecological impacts are compatible with the idea of 
intergenerational justice. The concept assumes, to start with, that we are able to 
manage the ecological impacts of our economies. For responsibility presupposes 
manageability. It assumes, moreover, that we are able to provide the concept with 
concrete content. I consider it to be a task of economics to help us make the 
ecological impacts of our economies manageable again. Therefore, economics should 
investigate reasons for the unmanageability of the ecological performance of our 
present industrial economies. I consider it to be a task of politics to provide the term 
sustainability with concrete content, provisional though it may be. Formulated more 
precisely, I consider it a task of politics to look for institutions that reflect our tentative 
interpretations of an ecologically manageable and intergenerationally just economy. 
Arendf s deliberative interpretation of politics is better equipped to deal with 
the question of sustainability than is Buchanan's Public Choice perspective, for two 
reasons. First, it leaves room for sustainability as a possible political objective. Public 
Choice theory, on the contrary, reduces political objectives to the only objective of an 
optimal institutional organisation of an economy. Second, it allows for a typically 
political interpretation of these objectives. 
58 
To begin with the first reason, Arendt strongly disapproves of the (Modern) idea that 
private wealth is no longer a condition that allows people to act as free and equal 
political actors, but a reason to act politically in order to gather more and more wealth 
(Arendt 1958,69)M. 
In other words, she disapproves of Buchanan's interpretation of politics as 
being in the service of an optimal, i.e., most productive and efficient, organisation of an 
economy. In Buchanan's perspective, politics is reduced to an administration of a 
national household. It is mainly meant to avoid conflicts between wealth-accumulating 
individuals, rather than to express creative interpretations of a desirable human 
society. 
Public Choice theory considers an optimal, not a sustainable, organisation of 
an economy as the first and nearly exclusive interest of professional politicians. An 
interpretation of politics in terms of a deliberative democracy, on the contrary, leaves 
room for political objectives other than economic optimality as, for instance, a fair 
distribution of wealth or a safe and healthy (ecological) environment. 
Deliberative democracy leaves, moreover, room for a political interpretation 
of these objectives. In Buchanan's view, political processes are bargaining processes. 
Bargaining processes are strategic actions. Strategic people act in order to satisfy their 
predetermined, private interests as good as possible without showing much 
consideration for others' interests. The concrete content of political objectives will, 
hence, depend on subjective values, not on ethical dispute. Strategic actors do not act 
with each other, as free - free from immediate concerns for private wealth - and equal 
- equal in their capacity to express personal visions on a humanly organised society -
individuals. They are simply not capable of dealing with reasoned arguments that 
threaten to change their preferences and interests. In Arendf s view, on the contrary, 
Arendt strongly rejects the Modern idea that private wealth is not a private matter, 
but a public affair. She, therefore, introduces a distinction between social and 
political questions. Social questions relate to the distribution of wealth. Hence, the 
existence of poverty is the most prominent social question. Political questions regard 
questions concerning a dignified, creative organisation of our societies. In Arendt's 
view political questions can only be resolved after the social question of poverty is 
resolved, because political questions ask for political actors, i.e., for free and equal 
individuals. Social liberation is a condition for political freedom. Bernstein notes that 
this distinction cannot be upheld, for, if - as Arendt states - every person must be 
given the opportunity to participate in politics, then a primary political question is 
how to resolve the social question (Bernstein 1986,120). 
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political processes are creative processes. They introduce new interpretations of 
common as well as private interests and values. They thus provide individuals with 
opportunities to gain new insights and to transform their interpretations of interests and 
values and of institutional organisations that possibly can realise them. Deliberative 
actors are, in the words of O'Neill, capable of reflecting on the institutional conditions 
for sustainable economic practices. They can imagine what institutions could foster a 
wide conception of their interest that encourages sustainable practices (O'Neill 1994, 
213-214). 
6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I argue that we can and should distinguish between the political and 
the economic sphere. From Weber's and Neurath's methodological writings, we learn 
that economic and political theories are conceptual constructs. This implies, to start 
with, that they are perspecfjvistic descriptions of human reality. Weber is more 
consistent in his interpretation of the meaning thereof than is Neurath. While Neurath 
understands a perspective description, rather posftivistically, as a merely historically 
contingent description, Weber plainly acknowledges its value-ladenness or non-
neutrality. That economic and political theories are conceptual constructs, implies, 
moreover, that a multiplicity of theories is possible and that no scientific criterion exists 
to prefer one theory to another. It implies, finally, that the economic and the political 
sphere can, in principle, be distinguished. 
In the history of economic science we can discern four possible perspectives 
on the economic sphere. These perspectives allow us to define four entries 
constituting four possible economic theories, namely decision unite, rationality, 
products and institutions (of which the latter is an overarching one). The harvest of this 
historical overview does, however, not yet answer the question whether we should 
distinguish between the economic and the political sphere. 
To answer this latter question, I contrast Buchanan's Public Choice theory 
with deliberative democracy. Public Choice theory originates form an extension of 
(neo-classical) economics to the political domain. It considers political actors as 
homines oeconomicos, who bargain with each other to balance their predetermined, 
short-term interests. It interprets political processes as a means to fulfil political ends. 
Economic optimality proves to be the main political end. Deliberative democracy, on 
the contrary, considers political actors as free and equal individuals who interact with 
each other in order to gain creative, reasoned and shared interpretations of desirable 
(economic) institutions. It understands political ends as coming into existence in the 
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course of political debates and ft interprets institutions as historical reflections of these 
ever provisional ends. 
Initially, Buchanan stresses the similarities between economic and political 
phenomena. He treats both political and economic phenomena as if they show the 
same rationality. Interestingly enough, his approach gives rise to a redefinition of the 
typically economic and the typically political that is based on a new distinction. 
Typically economic interactions are, henceforth, deemed voluntary, while typically 
political interactions are deemed involuntary. 
Buchanan's Public Choice theory proves, further, not to be well equipped to 
deal with the problem of sustainability, for two reasons. First, it subjects the political 
objective of sustainability to the political objective of economic optimality. Second, it 
does not stimulate a creative and reasoned public search for economic institutions that 
contribute to the satisfaction of our (newly defined) private interests and values on the 
one hand and to shared, though provisional, interpretations of sustainability on the 
other. 
Contrary to Buchanan, Arendt stresses, from the very beginning, the 
dissimilarities between the economic and the political sphere. The distinctions she 
makes do not only open political ways to deal with the problem of sustainability. They 
also reconfirm the legitimacy of economic action. Economic actors are justified to act 
rather instrumentally in order to satisfy their private interests as good as they can. 
Justified economic action, however, depends on logically prior political action. It is the 
task of politics to define the institutional boundaries of the private domain that allow 
economic actors to act autonomously. To conclude, though we lack a scientific 
criterion to prefer one political theory to another, we have at least two good reasons to 
choose deliberative democracy rather than Public Choice theory. It is with the ideal of 
a deliberative democracy in mind, that, in chapter 4,1 will develop norms for the nature 
of a politically successful economics. 
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Chapter 3 
The institutional and 
ecological dimension 
of an economy 
In the previous chapter, I argued for deliberative democracy as a suitable conceptual 
construct of the political sphere in order to deal with the problem of sustainability. The 
normative ideal of a deliberative democracy embroiders on a distinction between 
economic and political actions. It presumes a typically economic (i.e., instrumental) and a 
typically political (i.e., communicative) rationality, typically economic and typically political 
products (i.e., commodities and institutions respectively), and typically economic and 
political decision units. In this chapter, on the contrary, I will reflect on a suitable 
conceptual construct of the economic sphere in order to deal with the problem of 
sustainability. 
In the introductory chapter 1, I argued that economics should investigate 
reasons for the present unmanageably of the ecological performance of industrial 
economies. This statement is still too abstract. For a politically relevant economics 
should not investigate whatever kind of reasons, but reasons that can be influenced, 
transformed or removed through political action. Since institutions are the domain of 
political action, this implies that it should look for institutional reasons. In other words, the 
nature of my research question prompts for an institutional perspective on the economic 
sphere. Such institutional interpretation accepts the distinctions between (the rationality 
of) economic and political action underlying the normative ideal of a deliberative 
democracy, but it concentrates on "economic institutions" as the entities that make 
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economic rationality as well as economic products and economic decision units 
concrete. 
The statement that it is economic institutions that make economic action 
concrete implies that it is economic institutions that define the ecological performance of 
economic action. This latter implication expresses the conviction that an internal 
relationship exists between the ecological performance of an economy and its 
institutional organisation. In order to found this conviction, I will, in section 1, deal 
extensively with the concept Institution" in general. I will propose an interpretation of the 
concept that considers it as one dimension, namely the symbolic dimension, of human 
action. The other dimension of human action consists of its material (or physical or 
ecological) substratum. This interpretation of institutions allows us to understand 
(economic and other) actions as phenomena that unavoidably consist of both a symbolic 
and an ecological dimension. In section 2,1 will concentrate on economic institutions and 
I will illustrate the idea that the ecological performance of an economy is internally 
connected to its institutional organisation. I will, further, argue that, in order to understand 
this internal connection, we need insights into the institutional whole of an economy. This 
institutional whole can be interpreted in a classificatory or a hierarchical way. 
1 Institutions 
The term Institution" is a concept with many senses. Economics, political science, 
history, sociology and philosophy each have their own interpretation of the concept. In 
this section I will, first, propose a definition of an institution that is in line with its use in 
the tradition of institutional economics. Veblen and Commons are two important 
originators of this tradition; Neale is a prominent present-day representative. For that 
reason, their interpretations of the concept Institution" function as starting points. Since 
Bromley, whose theoretical work is the subject matter of chapter 7 and 8, also belongs to 
this same tradition, his interpretation will be another point of reference. The definition I 
propose is so constructed that it allows us to distinguish between economic and other 
institutions, and to consider of an economy as a sphere in human reality of which its 
ecological performance is the counterpart of its institutional organisation. The latter part 
of this statement will be illustrated in section 2. 
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Second, I will enlarge on the way institutions come about. This explanation will 
enforce Arendf s statement (see section 4.2 in chapter 2) that one cannot characterise a 
particular "rationality" with which to grasp the coming into existence of institutions. 
Institutions are creative, unpredictable and irreversible events. They have no single 
author. They are, nevertheless, the (often unintended) result of intentional interaction. 
Third, I will deal with the nature of institutions as both enabling and restricting. 
This nature holds in a double sense: In one sense, institutions that restrict one party 
enable another party. In another sense, individuals are only able to act thanks to 
institutions that condition the form of their actions. This is another way to say that 
absolute freedom does not exist. Freedom is always relative to rules that provide actions 
with meaning. 
Finally, I will reflect on the nature of institutions as "public facts". Institutions are 
public facts in the sense that they result from political action and in the sense that they 
are valid for all members of a political community. 1 introduce the concept "public fact" to 
distinguish institutions from "public goods". (The relevance of this distinction will become 
more clear in section 2). Institutions as "public facts" are political entities, while "public 
goods" are economic entities. 
1.1 Institutions as the symbolic dimension of action 
Veblen defines institutions as 'prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular 
relations and particular functions of the individual and of the community' (Veblen 1965, 
190). According to Commons, an institution is 'collective action in control of individual 
action' (Commons 1934, 1). Neale's understanding of institutions comes close to a 
sociological definition. According to Neale, an institution is identified by three 
characteristics (Neale 1987,1182-1185). First, there are a number of people doing. The 
people doing can be seen doing; their actions can be observed empirically. Second, 
there are rules. From the observation of actions, an analyst can construct testable rules 
of regularity. By ordering actions into repetitive event sequences, an analyst can state 
that 'in such-and-such a kind of situation this person will do thus-and-such and another 
will do thus-and-so, with some variation in the detail and style with which it is done' 
(Neale 1987,1182). Third, there are folk views. Neale notes that observing a certain 
regularity in people's actions does not yet imply understanding their actions. Knowing the 
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rules is insufficient for understanding, i.e. knowing when to participate and being able to 
explain why one is participating. Knowing the rules is, therefore, insufficient for 
identifying institutions ('consider how easy it would be to confuse dancing for fun at a 
party, dancing for rain in a religious ceremony, and dancing for money on the evidence 
of the dancing alone' (Neale 1987,1183)). Folk views provide the information needed to 
participate intelligently in the activities of society. Folk views justify the activities or 
explain why they are going on, how they are related, what is thought important and what 
unimportant in the patterns of regularity. Folk views, Neale adds, can also be discovered 
by observation, but here the ear is the relevant instrument. The analyst has to ask 
questions and listen to the answers in order to "observe" folk views. These answers 
provide us with the ideas of a culture that constitute interpretations of events and 
explanations of the world. 
After this identification of the three characteristics of institutions, Neale defines 
an institution as a grouping of situations in accordance with the organising ideas of the 
folk view. A situation is the total relevant context in which a participant in a society finds 
himself at any moment. It includes the social rules and the cultural folk views as well as 
the physical or natural environment. The relevant context is this whole environment as 
perceived by the participants. The perception of the total context is defined by the folk 
view of relevancy, i.e. ideas of cause and effect and of decency and morality. 
Bromley's definition of institutions remains close to Commons' interpretation. 
Bromley distinguishes two classes of institutions: conventions and rules or entitlements 
(Bromley 1989, 41-43). 'A convention is a regularity in human behavior in which 
everyone prefers to conform to R p.e., the regularity in question; MD] on the expectation 
that all others will also conform to R. A convention is a structured set of expectations 
about behavior, and of actual behavior, driven by shared and dominant preferences for 
the ultimate outcome as opposed to the means by which that outcome is achieved' 
(Bromley 1989, 42). On the other hand: 'An entitlement is a socially recognized and 
sanctioned set of expectations on the part of everyone in a society with regard to de jure 
or de facto legal relations that define the choice sets of individuals with respect to the 
choice sets of others' (Bromley 1989,42). Both conventions and entitlements thus refer 
to regularised behaviour. Conventions, however, depict social institutions that arise to 
co-ordinate behaviours derived from shared preferences over outcomes but indifference 
over means. Entitlements, on the other hand, depict social institutions that arise to 
regularise behaviours in the face of discordant preferences over either social ends and 
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means. Conventions (or 'autonomous institutions' (Bromley 1989, 88-96)) are self-
policed institutions. They emerge in co-ordination situations in which a "co-ordination 
equilibrium" exists, i.e. a 'combination in which no one would have been better off had 
any one agent alone acted otherwise, either himself or someone else' (Lewis cited in 
Bromley 1989, 41). Entitlements (or laws, or 'imposed institutions' (Bromley 1989, 96-
103)), on the contrary, regularise behaviour that needs to be policed by an external 
authority. In situations that are not in equilibrium - i.e. in which each has an incentive to 
deviate from law and order, although all citizens have a general interest in the existence 
of this very law and order - some external authority must be instituted to enforce 
entitlements. Entitlements are legal relations1. To recapitulate , Bromley interprets 
institutions as the regularising aspect of human action, i.e. as the rules guiding their 
actions. Contrary to Neale, Bromley overlooks the role of folk views. According to him, 
institutions interpreted as rules suffice. They offer the members of a polity information 
about shared values, about the likely actions of others, and about the consequences of 
certain acts committed by all members of the group (Bromley 1989,47-48). Institutions 
as rules are able to create expectations and, hence, cohesion in social groups. 
Considering the previously presented interpretations of the concept Institution", 
I propose the following definition. An institution is a social rule (in singular) guiding 
people's actions and the folk views justifying and explaining the rule and its relevance in 
a particular situation. This definition understands institutions as the symbolic dimension 
of human actions. 
I agree with Neale that a rule alone cannot offer meaning to actions. Rules 
reflect regularities, but they do not offer ideas of relevant contexts. Only a combination of 
rules and folk views allows people to act with a high degree of confidence in their 
1 Bromley distinguishes between a legal system and a legal relation. A legal 
system is a structured set of rules and sanctions that guarantees the 
promulgation and enforcement of the institutions that create social order. This 
legal system does not necessarily have courts, lawyers, and jails. It is sufficient 
that the members of the collectivity recognise the rules and sanctions 
constituting the legal system. A legal relation, on the contrary, is a (formal or 
informal) societal recognition of the institutions mat create a specific aspect of 
the social order, i.e. of a specific set of ordered relations among individuals 
(Bromley 1989,44). 
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expectations of how other people will respond to their actions and allows other people to 
interpret actions and to respond intelligently. 
I do not accept Neale's interpretation of an institution as a grouping of 
situations, for two reasons. First, this definition suddenly jumps over from a 
characterisation of institutions as the symbolic dimension of human actions to an idea of 
institutions as a combination of symbolic and physical aspects. I prefer to keep to the 
idea of an institution as the symbolic dimension of human actions. The physical aspect 
then is the counterpart of the institutional one. Second, Neale's definition considers an 
institution as a grouping of rules. I prefer to associate one institution with one rule, since 
this allows me to distinguish between economic and non-economic institutions2. 
According to Neale, his definition relieves him to identify or assume classes of 
generalised types of activity such as economic, religious, or political (Neale 1987,1187-
1188). In his view, this is important because, as Veblen said, there is no neatly isolable 
range of cultural phenomena that can be rigorously set apart under the head of 
economic institutions. As I argued in the previous chapter, however, it is important to 
distinguish between the economic and the political sphere, though I agree that is not 
(always) possible to separate them. Whether we consider actions as economic or 
political ones does not simply depend on the phenomena, but on the perceived 
characteristics of the phenomena. The perceived characteristics in their turn are linked 
with the perspective from which we look at them. An action can show economic as well 
as political characteristics. According to my interpretation, the economic characteristics 
refer to economic institutions, while the political characteristics refer to political ones. 
This interpretation asks for a characterisation of what is typically economic or political, a 
characterisation to which even Neale cannot escape. Consider the following line of 
reasoning of him. Neale contends that his definition of institutions relieves the analyst of 
prejudging which institutions are to be compared. Analysts do not have to ask about 
"economic institutions", but about economic aspects of institutions. This latter search for 
economic aspects, however, assumes itself ideas of what makes "aspects" of actions 
economic ones and others non-economic ones. This illustrates that Neale cannot 
sidestep the question how to identify the economic versus the non-economic. 
2 Though I must admit that one always can discuss whether a rule really is one 
rule or a set of rules and, hence, whether an institution really is one institution or 
a set of institutions. 
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I propose to preserve the term "institution" for a rule guiding human action and 
the accompanying folk views that provide the rule with meaning and with a relevant 
context. I propose the term Institutional organisation" to refer to what Neale indicates as 
an Institution". A distinction between organisation and institution also occurs in 
Bromley's writings. For Bromley the term "organisation" refers to a 'physical 
manifestation of a set of "working rules for going concerns"" (Bromley 1985, 786). 
Bromley explicitly stresses the difference between organisations and institutions 
(Bromley 1989,23). Organisations obtain their meaning from institutions. Their existence 
and operation depend upon a set of institutions that defines what they will do, how they 
will do it, how they will relate to the outside world, and how they will remunerate their 
employees. 
1.2 Institutions as historical entities 
Both Bromley's and Neale's interpretation of institutions show that institutions are social 
entities. Habits of private individuals, for instance one's habit of going to the cinema 
every Saturday night, do not count as institutions, however regular and meaningful the 
habitual action may be (Goodin 1996,21). Both Neale and Goodin note, moreover, that 
institutions are historical entities. They are arrjfactual residuals of past actions and 
choices (Goodin 1996,20). 
According to Neale, this implies that institutions can change, but that we cannot 
indicate something like their origin. The concept "origin" assumes that 'a historical 
happening has had full scientific determination and that we can demonstrate this 
determination on the basis of well-documented data. In ethnology or history, only too 
often, the hunt for the "true cause" lies in completely non-determined, because non-
charted, realms of hypothesis, where speculation can roam freely, unhampered by fact" 
(Malinowski, cited in Neale 1987,1194). Because of this impossibility of indicating origins 
of institutions, Neale strongly rejects the assumptions of "new institutionalists" that 
institutional changes are "rational" answers in service of economic efficiency. 
Neale's interpretation of institutions as historical entities parallels Goodin's. 
According to Goodin, any actual instance of institutional change is almost certain to 
involve a combination of accident, evolution and intentional intervention (Goodin 1996, 
24-28). The problems that social groups face, the solution they concoct, and the way that 
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they implement those solutions are all subject to accident and error. But, Goodin adds, 
the accidents and errors are rarely purely stochastic; and even when they are, they 
nonetheless typically arise in the backwash of intentionality, through the oversights and 
miscalculations of purposive agents. 'Institutions are often the product of intentional 
activities gone wrong - unintended by-products, the products of various intentional 
actions cutting across one another, misdirected intentions, or just plain mistakes [...]. To 
explain how those outcomes came about, we must refer essentially to intentions and the 
interactions among intentions. The explanation is still intentional in form, even if the 
outcome is not intended. An institution can thus be the product of intentional action, 
without its having been literally the intentional product of anyone's action' (Goodin 1996, 
28). 
To recapitulate, institutions as historical entities are what I called, in the 
previous chapter, Interaction things". The way both Neale and Goodin interpret the 
historicity of institutions seconds Arendfs interpretation of institutions (i.e. political 
events) as unpredictable, without author, and as reflections of human intentions. 
1.3 Institutions as simultaneously restricting and enabling 
entities 
Institutions constrain and liberate at the same time (Neale 1994, 402-406). Bromley's 
analysis of institutions shows that this is even true in a double sense. In the first sense, 
one party's restriction constitutes another party's freedom. In the second sense, 
institutions offer opportunities through their meaningful restrictions. I will, mainly with the 
help of Bromley, clarify both dualities in the following paragraphs. 
According to Bromley, institutions as entitlements are "working rules' (Bromley 
1989,43)3. Working rules indicate what 'individuals must or must not do (compulsion or 
duty), what they may do without interference from other individuals (permission or 
liberty), what they can do with the aid of collective power (capacity or right), and what 
they cannot expect the collective power to do in their behalf (incapacity or exposure)' 
(Commons 1968, 6; cited in Bromley 1989, 43). In other words, institutions as legal 
3 John R. Commons initiated the term (Bromley 1989,43). 
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relations define the rights, exposures to the rights of others, privileges and 
responsibilities of people. 
Since institutions as entitlements are collective rules that define socially 
acceptable individual and group behaviour, they are sets of dual or mutual expectations4. 
The right, for instance, of one family to the raspberries from their own garden correlates 
to a duly for all non-family members not to take raspberries from this garden. Bromley, 
following the legal scholar W.N. Hohfeld, postulates four fundamental legal relations 
(Bromley 1989,44-46). 1) The right of one party (a person or a group) Alpha correlates 
to a duty for the other party (all other persons belonging to the same community, but not 
being or belonging to Alpha) Beta. 2) The prMbge of Alpha correlates to no right for 
Beta. Alpha is free to behave in a certain way with respect to Beta. Alpha is, for instance, 
free to sell raspberries to X, Y, or Z without the consent of Beta. 3) The power of Alpha to 
create voluntarily a new legal relation affecting Beta correlates to Beta's liability. Beta is 
enforced to comply to the new legal relation. 4) The immunity of Alpha correlates to the 
absence of power to Beta. No power means that Beta may not voluntarily create a new 
legal relation affecting Alpha. Immunity means that Alpha is not subject to Beta's attempt 
voluntarily to create a new legal relation affecting him. Beta has, for instance, no power 
to sell Alpha's raspberries or Alpha is immune against Beta's try to sell Alpha's 
raspberries. Hohfeld's four types of legal relations are each illustrations that one party's 
restriction is another party's opportunity and wee versa. This clarifies the first sense in 
which institutions limit and enable simultaneously. 
Bromley continues to explain that the four types of legal relations can be 
grouped in two ways. To start with, legal relations can be static or dynamic. The first two 
types of legal relations are static. They define the choice sets of the different parties 
within a specific set of legal relations. The latter two correlates are dynamic. They 
On other occasions, Bromley points to institutions as entitlements as triadic, 
rather than dyadic, relationships (Bromley 1989, 71). Institutions as entitlements 
define relationships between two parties Alpha and Beta, guaranteed by a third 
entity, namely an external authority. The two parties together with the external 
authority form the three necessary elements of an institution understood as an 
entitlement or a legal relation. In other passages, Bromley defines the three 
elements of this triadic relationship as 'the object or circumstances of interest, 
the individual or group related to that interest, and all others who have a duty to 
respect the right' (Bromley 1997,50). 
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concern changes in a specific set of legal relations. They concern, what Bromley calls, 
'institutional transactions' or 'implicit rights transfers'. The four fundamental rules can 
also be subdivided into active and passive ones. The first and third types are active. 
They represent imperative relations subject to an external authority (for instance, the 
state). The second and fourth kinds are passive. They are not themselves subject to 
direct legal enforcement. They set the limits of the activities of the external authority in 
that they define the types of behaviour that are beyond the interest of the state. They 
describe the choices that a party can make independent of existing laws. They are, 
according to Bromley, in a sense statements of 'no law" (Bromley 1989,46). 
This latter way of grouping legal relations shows that they are not only dual 
relations in the sense that they connect Alpha's right, privilege, power and immunity to 
Beta's duty, no right, liability and no power respectively. Precisely by setting limits to the 
freedom of a person or group, they define (and protect) degrees of freedom. This means 
that the right of Alpha does, for instance, not only correlate to the duty of Beta. Alpha's 
right at the same time correlates to Alpha's privileges or degrees of freedom or choice 
sets. And Alpha's power to change some legal relations correlates to his immunity 
against Beta's trials to prevent these changes. All actions of Alpha that are compatible 
with his rights and duties, with his powers and liabilities are "free" (or "autonomous") 
actions, i.e. actions for which no law exists5. 
Neale puts the second sense in which institutions restrain and enable at the 
same time more explicit than Bromley does. Because institutions provide order and 
5 Bromley also uses the concepts "actual" and "presumptive" rights to indicate 
"rights" and "privileges" respectively (Bromley 1991, 50). "Actual rights" 
correspond to "rights". (Actual) rights are protected by an authority system. 
Since, however, a law is not always sufficiently clear or is not capable of 
dealing adequately with new situations, a grey area often exists in which the 
institutional setting of rights and duties leaves room for interpretation. The law 
can, for example, be clear about Alpha not trespassing on Beta's land, but quite 
unclear about Alpha's chemicals drifting to Beta's land and causing harm. In 
both instances, Alpha "trespassed" on Beta's land, once physically and once by 
allowing Alpha's actions elsewhere to harm Beta. In the latter kind of situations 
we find ourselves in the domain of "presumptive rights" on the part of the 
perpetrator and no rights on the part of the victim. Such situations come down to 
situations of "privilege" (for Alpha) and no rights (for Beta). 
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meaning to human action, they offer opportunities for creativity, for individual and ever 
new variations in choice, style, goal and realisation (Neale 1994). Or, in Goodin's words, 
the same factors that constrain individual and group actions also shape the desires, 
preferences, and motives of those individual and group agents (Goodin 1996,20). 
Bromley stresses that institutions always have these enabling and limiting sides 
and have both sides always in a double sense. When institutions are considered 
statically, they turn out to reflect collective decisions in restraint and liberation of 
individual action. When they are considered dynamically, institutional changes reflect 
collective decisions in expansion and reduction of individual action (Bromley 1989, 38; 
54). A reduction in the range of choice of one decision unit (often) means an expansion 
of the range of choice of another one. A legal ban on burning leaves from Alpha's yard in 
the autumn, for instance, means that the range of choice of Alpha has been diminished, 
but the range of choice of Alpha's asthmatic neighbour Beta has been enhanced. 
I should stress the political relevance of previous analysis of institutions as both 
restricting and enabling in a double sense. This analysis implies an important correction 
to prevailing discourse. It shows that solutions to political problems are not a matter of 
regulating or deregulating existing markets. For this often seems to be the point of 
contention between social-democrats on the one hand and liberals on the other. The 
question is not whether we need more or less rules (or institutions), often interpreted as 
more or less coercion (to refer to Buchanan's terminology) and less or more (economic) 
freedom or autonomy. The question is which rules with which accompanying degrees of 
freedom cause the political problems in question and how these rules and accompanying 
degrees of freedom should be transformed in order to avoid or reduce them. The 
question is, in other words, what kind of and whose degrees of freedom are to be 
politically defined and protected. 
1.4 Laws as "public facts" 
According to Bromley, one element characterising the distinction between institutions as 
conventions and as entitlements or laws has to do with the underlying preferences of the 
parties involved (Bromley 1989,88-103). In case preferences for the regularised aspect 
of action are in perfect agreement (or can be brought into perfect agreement through a 
bargaining process between the various parties), there is no need for an authority to 
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introduce and enforce an institution. In that case the institution is called a convention (or 
'autonomous institution'). In case the underlying preferences are not in (or cannot be 
brought into) agreement, (some of) the parties involved will make an appeal to an 
(internal or external) political authority to get their interests legally protected. An 
entitlement (or a law, or an 'imposed institution') is nothing else but a politically 
recognised and enforced institution. Bromley's analysis of the distinction between 
conventions and entitlements throws light on what political processes, according to 
Bromley, really are about. They are about the (legal) protection of some private interests 
rather than others (Bromley 1989,237). 
There is, however, more to say about entitlements. Institutions as laws or 
entitlements are a "public fact" in a double sense6. They are "public" because they result 
from political rather than from "autonomous" or "private" - in the economic sense -
processes. The term "public" refers to the political processes through which public 
preferences for private choice sets are developed out of private preferences. 
Entitlements are legally protected private interests. As such, they reflect political or public 
preferences for the protection of particular private interests. (I prefer the verb "reflect" to 
"express" because the former takes better account of unconscious or non-voluntaristic 
elements in the "results" of political actions.) At the same time, they condition the private 
choices that individuals make in order to satisfy their private preferences. (I will come 
back to the meaning of entitlements as public preferences and to their role in 
conditioning private choices in section 2.1.2). 
We just concluded that entitlements reflect political preferences for the 
protection of particular private interests. This statement, however, is at a rather abstract 
level: it does not consider the concrete persons who are in a position to have these 
particular private interests. Therefore, laws are also public in the sense that they are 
6 I borrow the term "public fact" from Taylor (Taylor 1966, 109, cited in 
Schmid 1987,28). I prefer this term to the term "public good", because the term 
"good" has an economic connotation. Public goods are as much economic goods 
as are private goods. The difference between both depends on the set of property 
rights attached to both. (We will come back to this topic when dealing with 
Bromley's explanation of property regimes.) 
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impartial. They hold for all members of a polity7. Legally protected interests or rights can 
belong to individuals, to all members of a polity, or to a group within a polity. Rights can 
thus vary from strictly private to fully public or something in between. Anyhow, once a 
right is assigned to either an individual, a group or all members of the polity, it holds for 
the whole polity. All members are, indeed, deemed to recognise and to respect the rights 
assigned to all or particular other members. 
1.5 Summary 
I propose the following definition of an institution. An institution is a social rule (in 
singular) guiding people's actions and the folk views justifying and explaining the rule 
and its relevance in a particular situation. This definition considers institutions as the 
symbolic dimension of human actions. This symbolic dimension of human actions is the 
counterpart of their ecological (or physical or material) dimension. Institutions are 
historical entities: they are the often unintended result of intentional interaction. As such, 
they correspond to Arendfs interpretation of political entities as unpredictable, 
irreversible and not really "made". Institutions restrict and enable in a double way. First, 
one party's restriction corresponds to another party's liberation. Second, institutions 
define people's degrees of freedom or their autonomy. Institutions make people free by 
limiting their freedom. Institutions do not simply coerce, they liberate simultaneously. 
Institutions, finally, are "public facts" in the double sense that they result from political 
interaction and that they hold for all members of a political community. (The latter does, 
however, not exclude that institutional rights can be assigned to either an individual, a 
group or to all members of a polity. See further in chapter 7.) I introduce the concept 
"public fact" to distinguish institutions from "public goods". Public facts are political 
entities, while public goods are economic entities. (We will come back to the topic of 
public goods in section 2.1.3 of this chapter and in chapter 7.) 
In one passage, Bromley himself also refers to 'the collective good we know 
as the legal foundations of the economy' (Bromley 1991, 106; the italics are 
his). 
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2 Institutional organisation and ecological perfor-
mance of an economy 
2.1 Economic institutions 
As I explained in section 1.1 of this chapter, I propose to define economic institutions as 
institutions referring to economic characteristics of human actions. This definition cannot 
escape a characterisation of what is deemed typically economic. And this 
characterisation depends, in its turn, on the perspective from which we look at human 
action. Given the three first perspectives mentioned in the previous chapter, economic 
institutions can either be the institutions defining what counts as an economic good or 
service, or the institutions conditioning the rationality of economic action, or the 
institutions defining economic decision units. In the following paragraphs I will deal with 
each of them separately. 
2.1.1 Institutions defining economic decision units 
I will lean on Bromley to deal briefly with the kind of economic institutions that are 
characteristic for the perspective that takes decision units as its constituting element. 
According to Bromley, one can distinguish two kinds of institutions relevant for economic 
decision unite (Bromley 1989, 43). The first define a decision unit ws-a- vis other 
decision units. The second spell out the internal nature of an economic decision unit. In 
case of a corporation, the first type of institutions articulate the necessary steps which 
must be followed to become a corporation and to remain one. The second type of 
institutions give the corporation its structure. They articulate how officers are appointed, 
how the financial records shall be kept, how administrative decisions are made, and so 
on. 
2.1.2 Institutions conditioning economic rationality 
Mainstream (neo-classical) economics defines economic rationality as the rationality 
typical of homo oeconomicus. This rationality is of an instrumental kind: economic man 
knows how to organise his means in order to fulfil his goals as good as possible. 
Rational economic man has one motive, namely maximisation of the satisfaction of his 
private interests. Neale notes that neo-classical economists regard the rationality of 
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economic action as universal over time and place (Neale 1987,1180-1181; 1188). An 
institutional perspective, on the contrary, considers economic actions as specific to time 
and place. An institutional approach focuses upon the rules and opportunities for action 
and the limits to action, assuming that each individual is always moved by one or another 
purpose. An institutional investigation does not build its analysis upon the aims or 
passions of the actors. It does not even need to consider them. It only assumes that 
economic actors have the desire to continue to participate in existing institutional 
arrangements, and to use institutions to achieve their personal aims, whatever they may 
be. According to Neale, activities are governed by rules, not aims or passions. Aims or 
passions lead people to engage in particular activities, but they do not determine specific 
actions. What specific actions are chosen depends upon the institutional context: the 
particular "rules of the game" in the particular system that each individual tries to 
manipulate in order to realise his goals. 
Neale's statements need some elaboration. In the following paragraphs, I will 
embroider on two examples offered by Bromley to make plausible a) that economic 
rationality comes down to economising rationality in a context of particular economic 
institutions, b) that maximisation of satisfaction can be linked to egoistic as well as 
altruistic pnvafe motives, c) that the same motive can urge economic actors to act 
differently in different institutional contexts, d) that institutional arrangements are 
reflections of public preferences, and e) that we do not need to know the private 
preferences of separate individuals to know something about the social (or ecological) 
performance of economies with particular institutional arrangements. 
Bromley explores two basic (isolation) games: the prisoner's dilemma and the 
prisoner's dream (Bromley 1989, 85-88). Consider the prisoner's dilemma. Two 
prisoners are apprehended for a minor crime, but actually suspected of a more serious 
one. The two suspects are isolated and told that if they both confess to the major crime 
they will be convicted of the major crime and sentenced to ten years in prison. If neither 
confesses each will be convicted of the minor offence and be sentenced to two years in 
prison. If only one turns state's evidence by confessing to the major crime then the 
confessor will go free and the other, who remained silent, will go to prison for twenty 
years. Under the institutional structure of this game, the interest of both suspects to 
minimise their own time in jail, leads them to confess (whereas had both not confessed 
their respective prison sentence would have been only two years each). This institutional 
structure reflects the preferences of the legislature (or the state), namely to extract 
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confessions. By defining the incentive system in a particular way and by isolating the 
suspects (who are, moreover, assumed not to be particularly true to each other), 
prisoners act as if they rat on their companion. Under these conditions, the outcome for 
the prosecuting attorney is exactly coincident with her preferences, though the outcome 
for the suspects is not at all. 
Consider now the prisoner's dream. Imagine a similar situation in which two 
suspects are apprehended for a minor crime, but thought to be - 'and in fact are', 
Bromley adds - guilty of a far more serious one. The prosecuting attorney cannot 
promise leniency in return for co-operation. The sentence for the minor crime is two 
years in jail, and for the major crime ten years. The suspects are isolated as before, and 
interrogated. If each acts in order to reduce his time in jail as much as possible (or, in 
Bromley's words, 'if each is strictly self-interested') the non-confession option is the best 
choice. The suspects act as if they do not rat - they 'have no incentive to rat' - and so 
each is given the more lenient sentence for the crime in which they were in fact engaged 
when apprehended. The more serious crime, 'which they also committed', remains 
unsolved. 
From both games Bromley concludes the following. The preferences of the 
prisoners are invariant across the two games: they wish to minimize their respective 
sentences. The preferences of the prosecuting attorney can certainly be assumed to be 
concerned with solving crimes in both instances. The difference in the outcome of the 
two games has nothing to do with preferences and everything to do with choices; it is the 
institutional structure that defines the environment of choice - or what I have already 
termed choice sets. Choices are made from the pertinent choice set, and those choices 
will vary even with the same underlying preferences' (Bromley 1989,87). Bromley thus 
demonstrates that choices made within private choice sets cannot be equalled to private 
preferences. Choices are not (revealed) preferences. Choices are strategies meant to 
satisfy private preferences and the strategy chosen depends on the institutional 
environment, i.e. the ensemble of entitlements (and conventions). There exists a 
difference between (private or "autonomous") preferences for outcomes and (private or 
"autonomous") preferences among strategies (or choices). 
To conclude, institutional arrangements stimulate or incite particular actions. 
Institutions are incentives. Different institutional arrangements cause individuals to make 
different choices - to act differently - to satisfy as good as possible their same private 
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preferences (ad c)). From an ecological perspective, it is the strategies or concrete 
actions chosen by economic actors to satisfy their private preferences that count, not 
their private preferences themselves. The ecological performance of an economy 
depends on the private preferences individuals hold and on the context of economic 
institutions that condition the strategies chosen to satisfy these preferences (*). This is 
why the rationality of homo oeconomicus - the scientific model of the conventional 
approach - is not particularly clarifying with regard to the social/ecological performance 
of an economy. "Economic rationality" is too abstract a model: it abstracts from the 
institutional arrangements offering "rational" behaviour concrete content. 
Apart from the interesting point made by Bromley that private choices cannot 
be equalled to private preferences, the two examples are illuminating in another respect. 
Note, to start with, that both examples have nothing to do with "economic activities" in 
the sense of "activities occurring within an economy". Though managing a prison 
certainly shows economic aspects, serving a prison sentence can hardly be considered 
an economic activity. Nevertheless, the prisoner is considered to show "economic 
rationality". On closer look, however, this "economic rationality" is the same as 
"economising rationality". Given that the prisoner has to serve a prison sentence and that 
the term of the sentence depends on his statements, the prisoner's rational choice 
consists of choosing the statement that allows him to serve his sentence with least 
means, i.e. in the shortest time possible. Economic rationality then is the same as 
economising rationality, i.e. reaching ones goal (and as much goals as possible) with 
least effort, least cost (ad a)). This kind of economising rationality is, I suppose, rather 
trivial and has nothing particularly to do with activities in the economic sphere. Acting 
economically in this sense is always implied in rational actions directed at organising 
means to achieve ends, i.e. in every notion of instrumental rationality. According to Karl 
Polanyi, the interpretation of economics as the logic of economising (and thus of 
maximising) is but one "formal" or "logical" interpretation. This formal interpretation does 
not tell us much about what people do to provide themselves with the material means of 
achieving their ends. To this second meaning of economics, Polanyi attached the rubric 
"substantive". A substantive - or institutional - economics is the study of econom/es, of 
how people go about provisioning themselves, either as individuals or as members of 
groups with common purposes, and of the institutions governing that provisioning (Neale 
1987,1180). To conclude, the conventional interpretation of economic rationality comes 
down to instrumental or economising rationality. This economising rationality is not 
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typical for actions occurring in the economic sphere. It is the context of particular 
economic institutions that makes economising rationality become economic rationality. 
We can illustrate the difference between public and private preferences by 
making Bromley's examples of the prisoner's game and dream more complex. Consider, 
to begin with, that the state or the prosecuting attorney has indeed a strong suspicion, 
but is nevertheless not completely sure that the suspects committed the major crime. 
The objective of the state (the public preference) is probably not so much to extract 
confessions, but to administer justice: to convince who is guilty to confess and who is 
guiltless to deny. Consider, moreover, that the suspects have two private preferences, 
the one is to be honest and the other is to be free. The relative weight of these 
preferences depends on the suspect's personality on the one hand and on the specificity 
of the situation on the other. In case the institutional arrangements are these of a 
prisoner's dilemma (case A), suspects being more attached to their freedom than to their 
honesty will confess, whether they are guilty or not. Suspects being more attached to 
their honesty than to their freedom will certainly confess in case they are guilty. In case 
they are not guilty they will only deny on condition that their preference for honesty is so 
strong relative to their preference for freedom that they are prepared to risk a high price 
(in terms of years in jail) for it. In case the institutional arrangements are these of a 
prisoner's dream (case B), suspects being more attached to their freedom than to their 
honesty will deny, whether they are guilty or not. Suspects being more attached to their 
honesty than to their freedom will certainly deny in case they are not guilty. In case they 
are guilty, the probability that they will confess is relative high since the price they risk in 
terms of years in jail is relative low. 
From these modified, more complicated examples we can learn several things. 
To start with, the kind of private preferences protected in both cases through the 
institutional arrangements differ (ad d)). In case A the preferences of the 'victims" are 
politically better protected than these of the "suspects", because the suspects will always 
- independent of their private preferences - confess in case they are guilty. In case B, the 
opposite is true: the preferences of the "suspects" are better protected than these of the 
"victims", because the suspects will always - independent of their private preferences -
deny in case they are not guilty. In other words, in case A a crime will not be wrongly 
denied, while in case B a suspect will not be wrongly sentenced. This illustrates that 
different institutional arrangements reflect different public preferences. Institutional 
arrangements as laws or entitlements are not only political protections of given private 
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interests, as Bromley argues (see section 1.4). They are at the same time reflections of 
public preferences. Between private interests demanding for political protection and laws 
reflecting public preferences really lie political events. These events define whether and 
to what extent given private interests will be transformed and/or enforced through the 
final institutional arrangements. As reflections of public preferences, institutional 
arrangements condition what kind of private preferences the members of a polity can 
adequately satisfy. In case A, for instance, institutional arrangements make it much 
harder for an individual having the private preference for honesty to get it satisfied than 
in case B. In case A, honest people get demoralised. In the long run, institutional 
arrangements thus influence the kind of private preferences members of a polity will 
hold. 
Second, the examples show that private choices do not only not coincide with 
private preferences, as Bromley states. They show even that we cannot simply derive 
the preference from the choice. Nevertheless, we do not need to know the private 
preferences of separate individuals in order to be able to comment on the 
social/ecological performance of a given institutional environment. This brings us to our 
third observation. If administering justice is, for instance, the higher-order public 
preference, then institutional arrangements must be so that they stimulate private 
honesty or, at least, do not punish honest people too heavy. Case B succeeds better in 
this respect than case A. In other words, the social performance of the institutional 
arrangements in case B is better with regard to the administration of justice than it is in 
case A (ad e)). This implies a correction to my earlier conclusion (*). Considered over a 
longer time interval, we do not really need to know the private preferences of separate 
individuals in order to understand the ecological performance of an economy. This 
means that an internal relationship exists between the ecological performance and the 
institutional organisation of an economy. This conclusion supports my research project. It 
shows that it makes sense to look for institutional reasons for (the present 
unmanageabilfty of) the ecological performance of our industrial economies. 
Finally, "autonomous'' choices are deemed to satisfy private preferences, 
whether egoistic (one's own freedom) or altruistic (honesty cannot be considered an 
egoistic preference, I suppose). For that reason it is misleading to indicate economic 
behaviour (i.e. economising behaviour as incited through the institutional arrangements 
constituting an economy) as simply "self-interested" or "opportunist". A specific economy 
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turns out either to stimulate or to temper egoistic or altruistic, but certainly private 
preferences (ad b). 
2.1.3 Institutions defining economic goods and services 
To argue that economic goods and services cannot exist without (economic) institutions 
defining them as such, I will refer to Alan Schmid's analysis (Schmid 1987)8. In economic 
literature, one uses to distinguish between private and public goods. The former are then 
characterised as incompatible in their use (Schmid 1987,39-61). If A eats, for instance, a 
bushel of corn, ft cannot be eaten by B. The latter goods are characterised as indivisible 
goods for which non-rivalness in consumption exists (Schmid 1987, 75-94). A classical 
example is national defence. A's enjoyment of national defence does not interfere with 
B's enjoyment thereof. Use of national defence is compatible, though the utility of use is 
not necessarily compatible. A can be happy with the level of national defence, while B 
can judge the level too high or too low. Both A's and B's enjoyment of national defence 
can, moreover, not be traced back to a particular unit of input (say a specific bomb or 
soldier). 
Schmid rejects the terms used, namely private versus public goods, to indicate 
goods with respective characteristics. According to Schmid, these terms fail to 
distinguish between what he calls "situation" and "structure" (Schmid 1987, 39-43). 
"Situation" refers to features of goods that are a matter of physics and biology and 
inherent in the good. "Structure" refers to institutions or rights connected to goods. In 
contrast to inherent situational variables, the rights structure is a matter of human choice. 
It is the rights structure that defines whether a good is private or public. A piece of land, 
for instance, can be private or public depending on whether rights to use and/or 
exchange it are assigned to individuals or all members of a polity. 
In order to respect the distinction between situation and structure, Schmid 
introduces the terms Incompatible-use goods" versus "joint-impact" goods to refer to 
inherent or situational features of a good. "Incompatible-use goods" and "joint-impact 
goods" then have the situational features previously ascribed to so called "private" and 
"public" goods respectively. The terms "private" and "public" refer to structural features 
and reflect public or political choice. The same piece of land can, for instance, be an 
With thanks to Paul Thompson for referring me to Schmid's work 
82 
incompatible-use good if A wants to grow com on it while B wants to build a factory on it. 
But as an incompatible-use good it can be private as well as public. In the former case 
whether com will be grown or a factory built depends on whether either A or B have the 
private right to use it. Whether either A or B will earn money from the growing of com or 
the building of a factory depends on whether either A or B have the private right to 
exchange the piece of land. In case both A and B have the right to use the same piece of 
land, they will have to interact with each other - either by debating or by bargaining - to 
decide which of both uses will come through. To conclude, it is institutional structure that 
defines who chooses (who has power) and who has to pay for a specific use of a 
particular good. It is, in other words, institutional structure that provides situational 
things" with economic meaning. Or, in other words, it is institutions that make things" 
become economic goods. 
I suppose, by the way, that the distinction between situation and structure is not 
as unequivocal as presented by Schmid. Clean air, for instance, can be both a joint-
impact good and an incompatible-use good depending on the uses different users have 
in mind, if user A wants to use clean air in his production of steel, it cannot be used by 
user B to breathe it because of the pollution emitted in the production process. In this 
case, clean air is an incompatible-use good. If both user A and B want to use the air to 
breathe, it is a joint-impact good, since A's use does not interfere with B's use. (I borrow 
the example from Schmid himself (Schmid 1987,86)). This example shows that even the 
situational characterisation of a good in terms of either a joint-impact good or an 
incompatible-use good depends on the interests of the user. This characterisation is 
itself value-related (to use Weber's terminology) and thus non-neutral. It is not simply a 
matter of physics or biology. Given a particular economic good, one can distinguish 
between ecological and institutional aspects, but one cannot separate them. Contrary to 
Schmid's explanation, situation does not precede structure. Situation and structure (or 
ecological and symbolic dimension) are simultaneous dimensions of an economic good. 
To conclude, it is institutions that define material things (and even hardly 
material things such as, for instance, knowledge) as economic goods. These institutions 
define whether an economic good is commonly understood as private or public. (I will 
deal with the problematic aspects of this classification in chapter 7.) Economic goods 
thus are always characterised by an ecological (or physical or biological) and a symbolic 
dimension. The institutions constituting the symbolic dimension of a (private or public) 
economic "good" are "public facte". 
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2.1.4 Summary 
In this section, I defined "economic institutions' as the institutions constituting -
depending on the perspective used - either economic decision units, economic rationality 
or economic goods. I followed Bromley in his argument that two kinds of institutions 
defining economic decision units can be distinguished. The first kind defines an 
economic decision unit versus another economic decision unit. The second kind defines 
the internal organisation of an economic decision unit. I followed Schmid in his argument 
that economic goods consist of both an ecological and an institutional dimension. It is the 
institutional dimension that defines a thing as either a private or a public economic good. 
This institutional dimension itself is, what I called previously, a public fact. 
I spent the larger part of this section on an analysis of the relationship between 
institutional organisation and economic rationality. From Bromley's reflections on the two 
examples of a prisoner's dilemma and a prisoner's dream, we learned two things. First, 
we learned that the choices economic actors make cannot be equalled to their 
preferences. Choices are not revealed preferences. They are strategies chosen to satisfy 
their private preferences as good as they can given the existing institutional organisation 
of an economy. Different institutional arrangements urge people to choose different 
strategies in order to satisfy their same private preferences. From this observation, I 
concluded that the ecological performance of an economy does not only depend on the 
private preferences individuals hold, but also on the institutional organisation of an 
economy. Second, we learned that the conventional (neo-classical) interpretation of 
economic rationality comes down to economising (or simply instrumental) rationality. The 
conventional interpretation is too abstract to provide us with insights into the ecological 
performance of an economy. Only within a specific economic context, i.e., within a 
specific institutional organisation of an economy does abstract economising rationality 
become concrete economic rationality. 
Embroidering on the two examples offered by Bromley, we still got more 
insights into the relevance of an institutional analysis of an economy. To start with, we 
learned to understand institutional arrangements as reflections of public preferences for 
the protection of particular private choice sets (and, hence, of particular private 
preferences). Institutions as public preferences do not simply protect existing private 
preferences. Between existing private preferences and institutions as reflections of public 
preferences lie political processes that transform given and/or create possible private 
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preferences. Politics is not simply a matter of bargaining; it is a matter of deliberating and 
of judging. This interpretation of institutions as reflections of public preferences shows 
that it makes sense to look for an institutional expression of the public preference for 
sustainability. We illustrated, further, that institutional arrangements stimulate some 
private preferences and temper others. This implies that to understand the ecological 
performance of an economy in the long run, we do not really need to know the private 
preferences of separate individuals, it suffices to know an economy's institutional 
organisation. This is another way to say that an internal relationship exists between the 
ecological performance of an economy and its institutional organisation. This latter 
conclusion supports my research question: it shows that it makes sense to look for 
institutional reasons for (the seemingly unmanageability of) the ecological performance 
of our industrial economies. The observation, finally, that institutional arrangements can 
either stimulate or temper either egoistic or altruistic private preferences suggests that it 
is not necessary for public authorities to adopt a moralising attitude in order to convert 
egoistic economic actors to ecologically benign behaviour. Public authorities should 
rather - to use O'Neill's words - create the institutional conditions of sustainable 
economic practices. They should create the institutions that foster in individuals a wide 
conception of their interest that simultaneously encourages sustainable practices (O'Neill 
1994,214). 
2.2 The institutional whole of an economy 
In the previous section, I argued that internal relationships exist between the institutional 
organisation of an economy and its ecological performance. The line of reasoning is the 
following. Economic action shows both a symbolic and a material dimension. The 
symbolic dimension consists of a set of economic institutions. Economic institutions are 
social entities and they are public facts. They define, in the short run, the strategies 
economic actors choose to satisfy their private preferences. They condition, in the long 
run, economic actors' private preferences themselves. Hence, it is economic institutions 
that make rational economic action concrete. In other words, it is economic institutions 
that condition the material dimension, i.e., the ecological performance of economic 
actions. Alternative institutional organisations of an economy will induce alternative 
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ecological performances. The ecological performance of an economy is the counterpart 
of its institutional structure9. 
In the first part of this section, I will illustrate that the opinion that the ecological 
performance of an economy is the counterpart of its institutional organisation does not go 
without saying. I will do this by offering an overview of various models that represent 
economists' understanding of the relationship between an economy and its (ecological) 
environment and that define the way in which economists look for solutions to ecological 
problems. This overview will, at the same time, clarify the peculiarity of the approach 
proposed in this research project. 
In the second part, I will enlarge on the analytical meaning of the particular 
approach proposed. I suggest that, in order to gain insights into these internal 
relationships between the ecological performance and the institutional organisation of an 
economy, we need a picture of the Institutional whole" characterising a specific historical 
economy. 
In the final part, I will reflect on how this Institutional whole" can be understood. 
In economic literature, I discerned two possible endeavours to grasp - on a theoretical 
level - something like an institutional whole. The first endeavour understands an 
institutional whole as a hierarchical whole. The second endeavour understands it as a 
classificatory whole. 
2.2.1 Economy's ecological performance 
The ecological performance of an economy can mean different things, depending on the 
measures used to evaluate this performance. One possible measure is the aggregate 
use of energetic and material resources. Another possible measure is, for instance, bio-
diversity. The viewpoint that the ecological performance of an economy - whatever 
measures used to evaluate this performance - is the counterpart of its institutional 
organisation is not self-evident in economic literature. To illustrate the particularity of this 
viewpoint, I will contrast it with some other interpretations as they can be found in 
economic literature. 
9 This idea can also be found in Schmid (1987,39-43). 
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In orthodox economics the economy is interpreted as an isolated system in 
which exchange values circulate between firms and households (see Figure 1) (Daly 
1996, 46-47). Though circulation processes regard production and consumption, 
orthodox economics abstracts from their physical or, better, ecological dimension. 
Circulation refers to abstract exchange values. According to this model, an economy is 
independent of its ecological environment. Consequently, it is not possible to treat 
ecological problems within this model. 
Figure 1: Economy as an isolated system (Daly 1996,47) 
Conventional environmental economics is a correction to this model. It 
does not consider the economy as isolated, because it depends in its functioning on its 
natural environment. However, in this corrected model the interfaces between economy 
and ecology remain external (see Figure 2) (Dietz ef a/. 1994,19). Nature is understood 
as a "resource"' for economic activities. These parts of nature that function as an Input" 
of economic production processes are called "resources"; the "output" of production- and 
consumption processes, namely those things that cannot be used any more, are called 
"waste". According to this model the interfaces between economy and ecology do not 
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influence the nature (i.e. the institutional organisation) of an economy (and vice versa) 
(O'Connor 1994,61-62). Problems of pollution or depletion can occur, to be true. These 
problems, however, do not have consequences for the organisation of the economy. 
Figure 2: External relationship between economy and ecology 
(Diefz era/. 1994,19) 
Some (ecological) economists (see, for instance, Daly 1996, 49; Dietz et al. 
1994,19) understand the economy as embedded in an ecological context (see Figure 3). 
In this model, the interfaces between economy and ecology are not external any more, 
but internal. The ecological situation influences the specific organisation of an economy 
and the economy has, in its turn, an impact on the ecological situation. This model 
understands economic activities themselves, not merely their Inputs" and "outputs", as 
ecological entities. 
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Figure 3: Economy as embedded in ecology 
Other (ecological) economists (for instance Munda 1997,227; O'Hara 1996,8) 
understand the embeddedness of economy into ecology less directly. An economy is 
always embedded into ecology in a historically and culturally specific manner (see Figure 
4). This model allows for an analysis of the cultural and historical peculiarities of 
problems of sustainability. 
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Figure 4: Economy as indirectly embedded into ecology 
In this book, I adopt this latter model and I add the polity as the sphere within 
human reality where legalised economic institutions, and hence the institutional 
organisation of a culturally and historically specific economy, are debated and decided 
on (see Figure 5). Since economic power relations influence political power relations, the 
arrows point from the economic to the political sphere as well as from the political to the 
economic sphere. 
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Figure 5: economy and polity as indirectly embedded into ecology 
2.2.2 Relevance of "the institutional whole" 
In this section, I will deal more extensively with the analytical meaning of the statement 
that the ecological performance of an economy relates to its institutional organisation. 
This statement means that we need insights into the Institutional whole" constituting a 
particular economy in order to understand its ecological performance. For, to start with, 
we need insights into the ensemble of economic institutions, rather than into separate 
institutions, conditioning the ecological performance of one specific economic action. 
And, further, it is the accumulating ecological effects of combined economic 
(inter)actions, rather than the separate effects of isolated economic actions, that matter. I 
will use some examples in order to illustrate the two previous arguments. 
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Economic actions have both a symbolic and a material or ecological dimension. 
This material dimension is responsible for the ubiquitous occurrence of interdependence 
(Schmid 1987,10). Interdependence is manifest in the conflicting interests of the parties 
involved. When person A eats the corn from a particular acre of land, person B cannot 
meet his interest in eating the same corn. If person A uses his land to build a huge 
building, it can conflict with B's interest in a scenic view. According to Schmid, it is the 
inherent situation (or, to use my terminology, the material dimension) that creates 
interdependence, while it is the public institutional structure (i.e., the symbolic dimension) 
that gives order to interdependence and determines the opportunity sets of the 
interdependent parties (Schmid 1987,189). An opportunity set is defined as the available 
lines of action open to a party (either an individual or a group), i.e., the lines of action not 
prohibited by criminal law or violating the private or communal rights of others (Schmid 
1987, 6). A party's opportunity set consists of the options for acting without the formal 
consent of other parties and without other parties getting in the way to the extent defined 
by the institutional structure. The opportunity set is, to put it in Bromley's terminology 
(see section 1.3), the ensemble of (individual or group) privileges, i.e. an individual's or 
group's choice set. The institutional structure determines which effects of A's actions on 
B must be considered by A and which can be ignored. It determines which effects are 
costs that are external to the decision maker A (Schmid 1987,10). 
According to Bromley, 'p]t is the aggregate of institutional arrangements that 
determine, at a particular moment, economic conditions. In other words, there is a 
prevailing structure of norms, conventions, rules, practices, and laws that shape or 
define the choice sets of individuals and groups in an economy' (Bromley 1993b, 141; 
the italics are mine). To illustrate the relevance of this aggregate of institutional 
arrangements for a specific economic action, consider the following example. X is a 
producer of steel. In order to produce steel, X needs several natural resources. He 
needs ore to refine, water to cool, air to pollute. X's use of water and air are both 
subjected to specific use rights. X may, for instance, use a maximal amount of water a 
day out of the nearby river and he may pollute the air up to a maximal level. Ore is 
something X needs to buy and steel is something X wants to sell. Buying and selling 
refer to specific exchange rights, to contracting rules, to rules governing information 
costs, and so on. The production process takes place in X's factory that is equipped with 
particular technologies and that employs several labourers. Employing labourers implies 
rules defining labour contracts and circumstances. Using particular technologies 
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assumes, again, rules governing the purchase and use of the machines and instruments 
representing the technology in question. To recapitulate, in order to produce steel X 
needs several production factors. The exchange and use of the separate factors are 
conditioned by various institutions. It is the whole set of relevant institutions - i.e. the 
whole set of institutions related to each of the production factors - that define the 
concrete form, and thus the ecological performance, of the economic action called "steel 
production"10. 
The opportunity set of producer X does, however, not only depend on the set of 
institutions governing use and exchange of production factors. It also depends on the 
opportunity sets of other economic actors (Schmid 1987, 7). Suppose a very wealthy 
activist Z who is dissatisfied with X's legally admitted level of air pollution. Z can offer X 
to pay in order to reduce the tetter's level of air pollution. This offer changes X's 
opportunity set. X's opportunity set thus depends, besides on the institutions related to 
production factors, on the actual choices of others acting within their own opportunity 
sets. For that reason Schmid states that opportunity sets cannot be described statically 
or in individual isolation. His statement shows that economic actions and actors are 
interrelated or interconnected. This implies, at the same time, that the ecological 
performance of a particular economic action is influenced by (the institutional context of) 
other economic actions11. 
The general ecological tendencies of ongoing industrialisation, as sketched in 
chapter 1, moreover suggest that we need insights into the institutional reasons for the 
ecological performance of a historical economy as a whole rather than of separate 
economic actions. This hypothesis can be supported by the following examples. First, 
It is of course arbitrary to call "steel production" an economic action, because 
one could call "steel production" a combination of economic actions as well. 
1 1 Ramazzotti agrees that a particular economic action cannot be associated to a 
single institution, but relates to what he calls an "institutional setup" (a more or 
less extensive set of interrelated institutions). This is, he writes, a reason why 
"institutions" are usually defined as "systems of norms" rather than isolated 
norms. Reference to institutional setups does, however, not solve the problem, 
since they too are interdependent and can hardly be treated as isolated entities. 
Therefore, he deems it appropriate to adopt the definition whereby an institution 
refers to a single rule (Ramazzotti 1999). As I mentioned in section 1.1,1 share 
his argument 
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though the pollution per kilometer car use decreases due to technological innovation, 
total car pollution rises due to an ever greater mobility (i.e. more cars and more 
kilometers). Second, home insulation, more energy-saving machinery and appliances, 
and more energy-efficient production of consumer goods and services did not prevent 
total energy use in the Netherlands to increase (though the rate of increase declined) 
(Environmental Balance Sheet 1998, RIVM). Finally, though the ratio between energy 
use and GDP in the UK between 1700 and 1995 has, apart from an initial rise, been ever 
declining since 1880, per capita energy consumption has risen by a factor of twenty 
(Jackson 1998,10-11). 
To recapitulate, in this section I claim that, in order to understand the ecological 
performance of a particular historical economy, we need insights into the Institutional 
whole" of this economy, for two reasons. First, because separate economic actions are 
conditioned by a set of economic institutions defining the use and exchange of various 
production factors in particular and commodities in general and by other economic 
actors' actions. Second, because the ecological performance of an economy depends on 
the accumulated ecological effects of the ensemble of economic (interactions rather 
than on the separate ecological effects of isolated economic actions. 
2.2.3 Meaning of "the institutional whole" 
The hypothesis formulated above, namely that we need insights into the institutional 
whole of an industrial economy to understand the institutional reasons for its 
deteriorating ecological performance, may suggest too huge and, hence, an impossible 
requirement. Therefore, I must explain further what I expect from an analysis of 
something called an Institutional whole". In order to do that I will tie in with two 
endeavours (found in economic literature) to describe an overview of the institutions 
constituting an economy. A first approach understands the institutional whole of an 
economy as a hierarchical whole. A second approach understands this institutional 
whole as a classiRcatory one: it tries to classify economic institutions into different types. 
Before enlarging on institutional hierarchies and classifications, however, I should deal 
with (another) boundary problem established by using the term "economy". 
In chapter 2,1 already mentioned a boundary problem connected to our value-
related interpretation of an economy. I argued, to start with, that the set of phenomena 
constituting an economy can vary depending on the perspective used. I argued, 
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moreover, that economic and non-economic (for instance, political) phenomena, though 
they can be distinguished, cannot always be separated. This latter boundary problem 
relates to our presumed interpretations of the distinction between the economic and, for 
instance, political sphere. There exists, however, another boundary problem connected 
to the delineation in time and in space of a culturally and historically specific economy. 
Nominating an economy as, for instance, feudal or capitalistic, agricultural or industrial, 
capitalistic or socialistic results from a conceptual reconstruction of history. 
Retrospectively, historians can discern some characteristics that are deemed typical for 
certain periods in time and for certain regions. Boundaries between different economic 
periods in time and between different economic regions are, however, not only fuzzy 
because of a certain continuity in institutional changes. They are, moreover, arbitrary in 
the sense that they depend on the concepts used to distinguish between periods and 
regions. 
2.2,3.1 A hierarchy of economic institutions 
The idea of an institutional hierarchy can be found in Bromley's writings. Bromley, 
following Douglass North, distinguishes an institutional environment from an institutional 
arrangement (Bromley 1989, 27-28). An institutional environment is the set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that govern economic and political 
activity (rules governing elections, property rights, and the rights of contract are 
examples of these ground rules)' (Davis & North 1970,133; cited in Bromley 1989,28). 
An institutional arrangement is an arrangement between decision units that governs the 
ways in which these units can co-operate or compete12. According to North, '[t]he 
institutional arrangement is probably the closest counterpart to the most widely used 
definition of the term institution' (Davis & North 1970, 133). The term "ground rules" 
Bromley uses to define an institutional environment suggests a hierarchy of institutions 
(rules, conventions, habits, customs, entitlements). This idea of a hierarchy of institutions 
is confirmed in at least two passages in Bromley's writings. 
1 2 North, as cited by Bromley, defines an institutional arrangement as an 
arrangement between economic units. I made his definition more general and 
sharp by omitting the adjective "economic", and specifying that the units meant 
are decision units. 
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The first passage relates to his description of institutional change as the raison 
d'être for public policy (Bromley 1989, 32-34). In this passage Bromley proposes to 
consider the (democratic) policy process in a general way as a process with three levels. 
First, the policy level is represented by the legislative and judicial branches. At this level 
general statements about the sort of world we want to live in are debated and ultimately 
formulated. Second, the organisational level is represented by the executive branch. 
Rules and laws define the organisations of this executive branch, how these 
organisations will operate, and also what they will do in a programmatic sense. The third 
level is the operational level, the level of operating units in society such as, among other 
things, firms and households. The range of choice open to decision units at the 
organisational level is defined by institutional arrangements at the policy level, while the 
range of choice open to the decision units at the operational level is defined by 
institutional arrangements at both the policy and the operational level. The outcomes that 
result from the patterns of interaction at the operational level (and the organisational and 
policy level; MD) will be evaluated by the citizens as either good or bad. Bad outcomes 
will give rise to a collective response through the political process, meant to change the 
institutional arrangements that define the choice sets of the different decision units. 
Bromley's picture of the policy process in general is a first illustration of the idea 
of a hierarchical ordering of institutions. This illustration of Bromley confirms, to start 
with, the idea - presented in section 4.4 of chapter 2 - that politics is logically prior to 
economic actions. Bromley agrees that an economy, and thus markets, are the "result" of 
politics. 'Public policy is about two central concepts: (1) deciding socially acceptable 
institutional arrangements (entitlement structures) that both constrain and liberate 
individual action at the [for instance, economic; MD] operational level; and (2) searching 
for the boundary between autonomous (market-like) and collective decision making. The 
first choice will be dominated by concern for what sort of world we want to have, who will 
participate in that choice, and the weighting of the preferences of the respective 
constituents. The second choice will be dominated by concern for the operating 
efficiency of alternative entitlement structures, and by the possible costs of a mistake. 
States, as manifestations of the hopes and interests of their citizens, retain authority over 
these two types of choices. There are no divinely inspired guidelines about entitlement 
structures, or about the boundary between atomistic and collective decisions. These are, 
of necessity, culturally and situation specific' (Bromley 1989, 34). Stated differently, 
according to Bromley, a hierarchy between institutions exists in the sense of a priority of 
96 
(political) preferences for institutional arrangements that define economic choice sets to 
(economic) preferences for particular choices within institutional arrangements13,14. 
The second passage that refers to the idea of a hierarchy of institutions deals 
with the fact that individuals belong to more than one (sub-)group in a society (Bromley 
1989,46). Each (sub-)group has its own conventions and entitlements that both liberate 
and constrain behaviour. Hence, individuals are subject to several sets of overlapping 
institutional arrangements. What matters is that, according to Bromley, the legal 
standards of the larger group supersede those of the sub-group' (Bromley 1989, 46). 
This means that institutional relations that regularise the behaviour between members of 
a larger group dominate institutional relations that are more typical for the same kind of 
behaviour between members of a sub-group. The institutional arrangements constituting 
1 3 Bromley's stress on this hierarchical order between politics and economy is a 
counterargument to liberal (in the European meaning of the term) ideology. 
Liberal ideology believes that the state should set up the conditions for atomistic 
choice and then step aside and let individuals bargain in order to maximise 
aggregate satisfaction. When new conditions require any modification of the 
prevailing institutional structure, the minimal state is supposed to compensate 
those harmed by the changae. This would prevent the state from willy-nilly 
sMfiting economic advantage among the polity. Bromley argues that this liberal 
ideology sanctifies the status quo. 'In practice it means that all manner of 
offensive or dangerous activity, just because it is in existence, must be bought 
off by those who seek relief. [•••] The tyranny of the status quo in externality 
policy, justified by the concept of Pareto irrelevancy, is a serious matter. Such a 
view of the world subjugates the political process to the market - a breathtaking 
convolution of reality' (Bromley 1991, 80). (This ''breathtaking convolution of 
reality" is what I called in section 4.4 of chapter 2 a reverse hierarchical relation 
between polity and economy.) 
1 4 In a recent article, Bromley explicitly and strongly objects to the idea that 
political preferences for institutional arrangements derive spontaneously from 
private economic preferences. 'Smith managed to finesse the essential problem 
of order by arguing that it was the logical outcome of the age-old problem of 
provisioning. Political conservatives, libertarians and not a few anarchists, have 
taken great comfort from this idea. And a fine idea it is. How wonderful to 
avoid the difficult business of having to agree upon mechanisms for achieving 
and the rules for evaluating, that order. Much better to let it emerge 
spontaneously from the material acquisitiveness of all. This is what Hayek 
called spontaneous order' (Bromley 1998,325). 
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a local economy within a specific state, for instance, are (or have to become, in order to 
solve existing tensions) in practice subordinate to the institutional arrangements 
constituting the national economy. 
This passage does not exclude the possibility that one individual belongs to 
several groups, for instance a group of badminton players and a brass band, that each 
have their particular institutional arrangements, but between which no hierarchical 
relationships exists. When playing badr "on, the individual behaves in response to the 
institutional arrangements within his sports club; when playing music, he or she conforms 
to the institutional arrangements regularising behaviour in the brass band. In other 
words, actions have their own set of relevant institutions. (As Neale explains, it are folk 
views that inform us about the relevant context for a specific rule. And it is the 
combination of rule and folk views that constitute an institution - see section 1.1.) 
However, when a local brass band wants to compete with other local brass bands and, 
therefore, becomes part of a larger, for instance: national, organisation of brass bands, 
the institutional arrangements of the local brass band must be made compatible with 
existing national institutional arrangements. Nor does this passage exclude the 
possibility that fundamental institutional arrangements regularising behaviour in a 
particular group, for instance the American economy, induce institutional transformations 
in other national economies, so that these former institutional fundaments become the 
fundaments of an internationally operating economy. In other words, institutional 
arrangements regularising behaviour in some sub-group can become dominant in a 
larger group in the course of time. However, at any time, every national economy 
operating internationally must sooner or later either subordinate its national economic 
institutions to - i. e. make them compatible with - the conventions and entitlements 
regularising international economic behaviour or act politically in order to change 
international economic conventions and entitlements15. 
The two passages just mentioned - and the reflections based on them -
illustrate that the institutional environment of a particular, for instance: local, economy 
can mean different things. It can mean its local political institutional environment or it can 
Bromley calls the problem of 'overlapping but not coincident opportunity 
sets' or of 'incongraent institutional structures' a problem of 'institutional 
dissonance' (Bromley 1985, 790). Institutional dissonance is, in his view, a 
reason for non-compliance. 
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mean its wider, i.e. national or international, economic institutional environment. Bromley 
remains silent concerning the nature of these hierarchical relations. Ramazzotti's 
distinction between a genetic and an order hierarchy is clarifying in this respect 
(Ramazotti1999,5). 
According to Ramazzotfj, a genetic hierarchy is a formal one. Its concern is not 
with the content of institutions, i.e. with the direct effects that they exert on their fields of 
action16. It is with the procedures to be followed and with the level of the hierarchy that 
must deal with specific fields of actions. A constitution, for instance, may assign regional 
public authorities the task of regulating the health service, independently of how the 
regulation is going to be in practice. Or, to refer to Bromley's example, between the 
institutions conditioning political action and economic institutions resulting from these 
actions consists a genetic hierarchy. An order hierarchy, on the contrary, focuses on the 
effects of the rules. In an order hierarchy, the extension of an institution's effect defines 
its rank. Some rules are mere specifications of more general rules. In many countries, for 
example, basic constitutional principles (e.g. the equality of human beings independently 
of gender, race, religion, etc.) are stated that bound all other laws. No matter how the 
latter laws are specified, they cannot contrast those principles. They rather have to 
actualise them. The effects of the general principles encompass the effects of specific 
laws. Or to refer, again, to one of the previous examples, the institutions of the local 
brass band cannot contradict the institutions of the national organisation of brass bands. 
Local brass bands can, however, have some supplementary institutions. These latter 
ones only have a local field of action". Between national and local institutions exists an 
order hierarchy. 
Ramazotti notes that an order hierarchy is conceptually distinct but may coexist 
with a genetic hierarchy (Ramazzotti 1999, 5-7). In terms of a genetic hierarchy, a 
constitution is, for instance, on a higher tier because it is the law that defines the 
procedure for the creation of ordinary laws. In terms of the order hierarchy, the 
constitution defines the overall effects to be achieved while ordinary laws may only work 
on the details. In this respect the constitution also has a higher rank. Between order and 
genetic hierarchies may occur different types of relations. The former case is, for 
I interpret Ramazotti's term "field of action" in the same way as I interpret 
Neale's concept" relevant context". 
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instance, an example of "nested hierarchical relations": the ranking of the order hierarchy 
is directly correlated to the ranking of the genetic hierarchy. According to Ramazzotfj, 
two other types of hierarchical relations can exist. "Switched hierarchical relations" exist 
when an institution on a higher tier of the genetic hierarchy has a lower rank in the order 
hierarchy. Multinational firms and national economies, for instance, can belong to 
switched hierarchical arrangements. "Independent hierarchical relations" exist when the 
fields of action overlap but the institutions belong to genetically independent hierarchies. 
Consider the case where state laws coexist with religious rules and where both have 
common fields of action. "Killing" is, for instance, contrasted by the religious rule "thou 
shall not kill" and by criminal law (as far as situations of peace are concerned). Both 
religious and state law have a common field of action, but no ranking of them is possible 
in terms of a genetic hierarchy. 
Ramazzotti's concept of an order hierarchy allows him to define "dominanf 
institutions (Ramazzotti 1999, 3). Dominant institutions characterise different economic 
periods in history. Different historical economies are defined not just in terms of existing 
institutions, but in terms of dominant institutions. Dominant institutions are those that are 
most pervasive (in space) and persistent (in time). The "pervasiveness" of an institution 
relates to its field of action. A forty-hour working week, for instance, is quite widespread 
in the manufacturing industry. The institution not to split up a farm when sold or inherited 
is, on the contrary, a local peculiarity of Southern Tyrol. The former institution is more 
pervasive, while the latter is very specific. It is therefore reasonable to believe that 
changes in the former would affect Italy's industrial economy more than changes in the 
latter. The "persistence" of an institution refers to its existence in time. Institutions are 
changeable. They arise, transform and disappear. Sharecropping, for instance, is an 
institution that disappeared altogether as time passed. Money - i.e. the rule whereby a 
non-commodity means of payment is accepted in economic transactions - tends to 
persist. 
Ramazzotti introduces the concept "dominant institution" in order to explain the 
scope of institutional change (Ramazzotti 1999,9-10). If inconsistencies arise between 
institutions that are not pervasive, its effects will in general not be very extensive, 
whatever solution arises. And, because the solution will affect only a small section of an 
order hierarchy, it will be rather easy for it to be enacted. Conversely, if change were to 
regard a more pervasive institution, the range of dependent overlaps might be very 
100 
extensive. In such a case, the viability as well as the final outcome of the overall process 
would depend on possible reactions along all the tiers of the hierarchy. 
To conclude, Ramazzotti's distinction between genetic and order hierarchies 
looks helpful in at least one respect. His definition of 'dominant institutions" - a concept 
that derives its meaning from the concept "order hierarchy" - suggests a particular 
starting point for investigating the kind of problems I characterised in the introductory 
chapter as problems of sustainability. Since I accept the hypothesis that problems of 
sustainability relate to industrial economies, it seems useful to start with an analysis of 
the ecological performance of these institutions that dominate industrial economies. 
Looking for "dominant institutions of an industrial economy" thus is a prerequisite. 
2,2.3.2 A classification of economic institutions 
Economic institutions can also be classified into different types. Samuels, for instance, 
distinguishes between property rights, contract laws and institutions defining economic 
decision units (Samuels 1994a, 10). According to Schmid, the term "property rights" can 
indicate a lot of things: both tort and contract law, common and statutory (public) law, 
civil and criminal law, vested and nonvested rights, judicial procedure, and civil rights 
(Schmid 1987,5-6). It can also refer to use or exchange rights, to decision rights, to rules 
defining market competition, to contingent and noncontingent rights, to rules affecting 
contractual costs, to rules affecting information and uncertainty costs, and so on (Schmid 
1987,189-194). In short, the term "property right" is a very ambiguous concept. Schmid 
himself proposes to replace it simply by the concept "right" (or institution, or rule) 
(Schmid 1987,6). I accept Schmid's proposal, though it does not contribute much to the 
problem of classifying economic institutions according to their ecological performance. 
My hypothesis is that such a classification might be helpful to understand the ecological 
performance of a historical economy. Economic literature suggests, however, that 
existing conceptual and theoretical work is, in this respect, still in its infancy. 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
An overview of various models in the history of economic theory representing the 
relationship between economy and ecology illustrates the peculiarity of the approach 
proposed in this book. This approach understands an economy as embedded in an 
ecological environment. This embeddedness is not direct, but mediated through 
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institutions. Institutions are social entities: they emerge in and define a particular 
historical society. Institutions as entitlements are political entities: it is within the political 
sphere that economic institutions typical for a particular historical society get enforced or 
transformed. 
Interpreting the relationship between an economy and its ecological 
performance as internal implies that - in order to gain insights into this internal 
relationship - we should look for the institutional whole characterising a particular 
economy rather than for separate economic institutions. For, to begin with, economic 
action is always conditioned by an ensemble of institutions defining the use and 
exchange of economic goods in general and of production factors in particular and by 
(institutionally conditioned) economic actions of other economic actors. Moreover, the 
ecological performance of an economy does not depend so much on the separate 
ecological effects of isolated economic actions, but on the combined ecological effects of 
the ensemble of economic actions. 
My proposition to look for the institutional whole characterising a specific 
economy cannot mean that we should know every separate economic institution, for this 
is too huge a task. My hypothesis that typical present-day ecological problems - the kind 
of ecological problems that prompted for "sustainability" as a world-wide political 
objective - relate to our 200 years old history of industrial economies suggests that a 
model of the institutional whole compiling, first, typical institutions of industrial economies 
and, second, economic institutions relevant for the problem of sustainability suffices. 
Ramazotti's definition of an order hierarchy - in distinction of a genetic hierarchy - allows 
him to introduce the concept "dominant institution". It suffices to look for economic 
institutions that dominate industrial economies to gain insights into institutional reasons 
for present-day sustainability problems. A classification of economic institutions 
according to their particular contribution to the ecological performance of an economy 
can help us to get a deeper insight into the kind of (dominant) institutions we have to look 
for to explain the (seemingly unmanageable) ecological performance of industrial 
economies. 
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3 Conclusion 
in this chapter, I suggest that economists should adopt an institutional perspective on the 
economic sphere in order to gain insights into institutional reasons for the 
unmanageability of the ecological performance of our industrial economies. In section 1, 
I propose an interpretation of the concept Institution' that allows to understand the 
ecological performance of an economy as the counterpart of its institutional organisation. 
Institutions are rules guiding human action combined with the folk views that provide the 
rule in question with meaning and with a relevant context. Institutions constitute the 
symbolic dimension of action.. This symbolic dimension is social, not individual. 
Institutions enable and restrict autonomous action at the same time and in a double 
sense: one party's restriction is another party's liberation and one party's autonomy is 
always relative to the institutions defining its rights, duties and privileges. Institutions as 
entitlements are, moreover, public facts, in a double meaning. First, they are the often 
unintended results of intentional political action. Second, they hold for all members of a 
political community in the sense that these members have to respect the rights these 
institutions assign either to one, to more or to all members of this same community. 
In section 2,1 elaborate on the meaning of economic institutions. Economic 
institutions are the institutions that define economic decision units, economic rationality 
and economic goods. In other words, it is economic institutions that make economic 
action - action conditioned by scarce means and meant to fulfil the actor's private ends -
concrete. It is economic institutions that condition the ecological performance of 
economic actions. Embroidering on the two examples offered by Bromley - the 
prisoner's dilemma and the prisoner's dream - we learned to understand institutional 
arrangements as reflections of public preferences for the protection of particular (existing 
or not yet existing) private choice sets. This interpretation of institutions as reflections of 
public preferences shows that it makes sense to look for an institutional expression of 
the public preference for sustainabilfry. The further insight that institutional arrangements 
stimulate some private preferences and temper others implies that to understand the 
ecological performance of an economy in the long run, we do not really need to know the 
private preferences of separate individuals. It suffices to know an economy's institutional 
organisation. This is another way to say that an internal relationship exists between the 
ecological performance of an economy and its institutional organisation. This latter 
conclusion supports my research question: it shows that it makes sense to look for 
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institutional reasons for (the seemingly unmanageability of) the ecological performance 
of our industrial economies. 
In the history of economic theory, the opinion that an internal relationship exists 
between the institutional organisation and the ecological performance of an economy is 
not evident. An overview of deviating views shows the peculiarity of this particular 
opinion. In order to gain insights into the internal relationships between the ecological 
performance of our industrial economies and their institutional organisation, we need 
insights into the Institutional whole" constituting such economies. This image of an 
Institutional whole" should not be interpreted as if we need to know every economic 
institution constituting a particular industrial economy separately. My hypothesis that 
typical present day ecological problems - problems that have a globalising spatial 
dimension and a long run time dimension - relate to our historical type of industrial 
economies invites us to concentrate on "dominant institutions". Further, an (ecologically 
relevant) classification of types of economic institutions can inform us concerning their 
respective contribution to an economy's ecological performance. Combining an analysis 
of an economy's dominant institutions with an analysis of the ecological performance of 
types of economic institutions can help us to explain general ecological tendencies. My 
reconstruction of both Pearce's and Bromley's writings (in chapter 5 and 7 respectively) 
is meant to explore to what extent their work contributes to such analyses. 
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Chapter 4 
Four norms for a politically 
successful economics 
In section 3.1 of the introductory chapter, I mention two criteria with which to evaluate 
contributions of economic theory to ecological policy. The first criterion is the impact of 
economic knowledge on final policy results. The second criterion is the capacity of 
economic knowledge to offer insights into possible ways to reduce the tension between 
the idea of sustainability and the general evolution of ecological problems. The latter 
criterion concentrates on the content of economic theory. It indicates the substantive kind 
of economic knowledge we need. This topic is dealt with in the previous chapter. In this 
chapter, we will investigate which characteristics economic science can and should have 
in order to ameliorate its political impact. This investigation is based on insights borrowed 
from both philosophy of science (mainly the methodological writings of Weber and 
Neurath) and political philosophy (Arendf s elaboration on the nature of a deliberative 
democracy). 
Scientific objectivity is commonly understood as implying neutrality. I will 
argue, in the first section, that, though economic science should be objective, it cannot 
be but non-neutral. Objectivity and neutrality are two different things. I will, further, reflect 
on what a non-neutral scientific objectivity signifies. 
In section 2,1 will defend, to start with, that economic science should describe 
the economic sphere as part of human reality, but that it should not prescribe it. I will 
defend, moreover, that economic science should explain the relationship between the 
ecological performance of an economy and its institutional organisation, but that it should 
not pred;cf it. These two characteristics taken together express my belief in the relevance 
of an economic science that provides public policy with insights, rather than instruments. 
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Scientific knowledge interpreted as a toolbox for public policy hampers typically 
deliberative processes, for two reasons. First, scientific instruments implicitly define the 
objectives political actors should have. Second, they are based on particular conditions 
that are scientifically presumed, but not necessarily socially accepted or politically 
realised. 
In section 3,1 will argue that economic science should be rather impartial than 
partial. This means that it should supply citizens and official politicians with insights into 
the relationships between their private interests on the one hand and the publicly defined 
institutional context on the other, and the (economic) sources of unequal (political) power 
relationships. Such insights can help political actors to act as (more) free and (more) 
equal individuals. In other words, it can help them to better realise the ideal of a 
deliberative democracy. 
1 Objective 
In section 1 of chapter 2, I show that both Weber and Neurath interpret 
economic (and other social) sciences as conceptual constructs. According to Weber, 
economic theories are conceptual constructs because theoretical concepts and laws are 
ideal-typical, i.e. value-laden. According to Neurath, it is the many decisions involved in 
scientific practice that urge us to see scientific theories as conceptual constructs. This 
interpretation of social-scientific theories as conceptual constructs demonstrates that 
economic theories are not and cannot be neutral. Both Weber and Neurath, however, 
hold on to the idea that social sciences can and should be objective. In this section, I will 
argue, contrary to Weber, that scientific objectivity does not imply a kind of neutrality that 
is left once the value-relatedness of scientific concepts and laws are recognised. 
Scientific objectivity does not simply imply empirical validity. I will, further, reflect on what 
scientific objectivity can mean and argue that such objectivity is, indeed, something 
scientists should strive for. In other words, I agree with Weber (and Neurath) that 
economic science should be objective. Scientific objectivity is a first norm for a politically 
relevant economics. 
Weber postulates a logical distinction between the value-relevance of the data 
which are investigated and the objectivity or "value-freedom'' of the investigation itself 
(see e.g. MSS 21-22,58,77-78,111). According to Weber, the fact that certain values 
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underlying the practical interest for analytical activity are always decisive for the focus of 
attention of the social science in question, does not prohibit an analytical ordering of 
empirical reality in a manner that lays claim to validity as empirical truth (MSS 58). In 
Weber's view, "objectivity" thus means "validity as empirical truth". 
What is Weber's criterion for this "validity as empirical truth"? The criterion 
proves to be "supra-cultural validity". The purpose of all social sciences is, Weber writes, 
to achieve supra-cultural validity.'[...] the successful logical analysis of the content of an 
ideal and its ultimate axioms and the discovery of the consequences which arise from 
pursuing it, logically and practically, must also be valid for the Chinese. At the same time, 
our Chinese can lack a "sense" for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often 
will deny the ideal itself and the concrete value-judgments derived from it. Neither of 
these two latter attitudes can affect the scientific value of the analysis in any way" (MSS 
58-59). 
Weber thus interprets "objectivity" as empirical validity. Weber's ultimate 
criterion for social-scientific "objectivity" is its "supra-cultural validity" or, to reformulate it 
in more modem (and modest) terms, the extent to which social-scientific propositions 
gain "intersubjective consent". Mathematics and logic seem, according to Weber, to be 
outstanding means to achieve such supra-cultural validity or intersubjective consent. For 
it is the kind of laws as found in "pure economics" - laws expressed in mathematical 
formulas and ordered in a logically consistent axiomatic system - that Weber indicates 
as objective (GAW 392; MSS 43). Mathematics and logic are, however, but means to 
gain such consent. Since these means lack for deciding which data to select - this 
selection often proves to give rise to conflict - intersubjective consent remains a value-
laden matter. This makes me conclude that scientific objectivity ultimately comes down 
to intersubjective consent, not to neutrality. Intersubjective consent functions as an 
implicit criterion for distinguishing between "objective" facts - statements that succeeded 
in gaining intersubjective consent - and "subjective" values - statements that did not 
succeed in gaining intersubjective consent. It functions at the same time as an implicit 
criterion to distinguish between empirical and mere theoretical truth. Both kinds of truth 
are characterised by logical consistency. Only the former kind of truth can 
simultaneously carry off intersubjective consent. 
Weber acknowledges that the objectivity of the social sciences is a normative 
ideal, not a matter of fact. In his view, striving for objectivity remains, nevertheless, 
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scientists' duty. This duty is twofold. The first imperative of an objective scientist is to 
make constantly clear to the audience and above all to himself exactly at which point his 
job as an objective scientist stops and when he starts to speak as an evaluating and 
acting person. The second imperative is to keep his audience and scientific colleagues 
'sharply aware at every moment of the standard by which [he judges] reality and from 
which the value-judgment is derived' (MSS 59). However, a lot of difficulties arise for the 
scientist who assents to this ideal of scientific objectivity. The temptation always lies 
around the comer firstly to present "ethical neutrality" - which more often than not is a 
case of obstinate and deliberate partisanship of powerful interest groups - as objective 
validity (MSS 6). Secondly, many scientists are inclined to believe that one can derive 
scientifically valid value-judgements from factual assertions about "trends" (MSS 22). 
Finally, the scientist's unconsciousness with regard to his own evaluative motives 
transforms his duty as a scientist into a nearly unattainable ideal. The motives of 
scientific labour 'often cannot be clarified and analyzed in a tangible and intelligible form 
in any other way than through the confrontation of the standards of value underlying the 
ideas criticized with others' (MSS 59-60; the italics are mine). 
In my view such confrontation is the only remaining means to distinguish 
between "objective" and "subjective" statements. Such confrontation will tell us which 
statements - provisionally - boast consensus and which do not. The former will then be 
called "objective" and the latter "subjective". Weber himself, however, is not capable of 
guaranteeing that the former are indeed value-free facts. Since conscious or 
unconscious consent concerning value-laden statements - consequently called "facte" -
cannot be excluded. For that reason, I propose to drop the belief that we are able to 
separate facts and values completely. Consequently, we should also drop the 
interpretation of objectivity as value-free or neutral and, hence, as straightforwardly 
empirically valid. 
To conclude, I propose to hold on to the interpretation and to the ideal of 
scientific objectivity as intersubjective consent1. Scientific statements can at most gain 
(provisional) consent within a particular community of scientists. Statements should gain 
1 Bernstein's book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Science, Hermeneutics 
and Praxis more extensively offers philosophical arguments for an 
interpretation of scientific objectivity as intersubjective consent and for 
objectivity as an ideal of scientific practice (Bernstein, 1989). 
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such consent in order to be worth of the label "scientific". For it is this striving for consent 
that urges scientists to look for the better, i.e., most convincing (value-related) 
arguments: for the better selection of data and for the better ideal-typical construction of 
concepts and laws. Mathematics and logic can help in creating such a consent, but they 
are neither necessary, nor sufficient. The ideal of intersubjectfve consent or scientific 
objectivity does, however, not imply an ideal of neutrality. Objective science is and 
cannot be neutral, because we lack a criterion to separate completely facts from values. 
2 Descriptive and explanatory 
Weber makes an effort to stress that ideal-typical social-scientific theories are neither 
"true" nor (ethically) Ideal". They are logical ideals, but not simply "true" or empirically 
valid. They are not neutral, but, nevertheless, no ethical ideals. They are, to catch the 
previous in one phrase, perspectn/istic (i.e., value-laden, non-neutral) descriptions. 
Weber's interpretation of (some privileged) social-scientific theories as toolboxes for 
public policy, however, pushes these theories from a descriptive into a prescriptive and 
from an explanatory into a predictive position. In this section, I will defend that politically 
successful social sciences should aim at description, not prescription and explanation, 
not prediction. These norms respect the capabilities and nature of both scientific and 
political practice (the latter understood as deliberative democracy). In a first part, I will 
explain why Weber's interpretation of "pure economics" as a toolbox for public policy 
fails. In a second part, I will fall back on Neurath to propose an alternative interpretation 
of the political relevance of economic theories. While Weber understands economics as 
providing public policy with prescriptive and predictive Instruments", I propose an 
interpretation of economics as supplying citizens and official politicians not so much with 
"Utopias", as Neurath does, but with descriptive and explanatory Insights". 
2.1 Weber: pure economics as a political toolbox 
According to Weber, the political relevance of the social sciences consists of providing 
public policy with adequate means for given ends and of informing it about the 
consequences of using certain means. Weber thus considers social-scientific theories as 
political toolboxes. However, this political role is not granted to whatever social-scientific 
theories. It is granted to the "exact", not the historically oriented social-scientific theories. 
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It is granted, more precisely, to the pure economics of the theory of marginal utility, not to 
economic theories investigating economically conditioned or relevant phenomena. In this 
section, I will explain, to start with, which characteristics of pure economics make it, in 
Weber's opinion, a suitable theory for providing public policy with instruments. Second, I 
will present the contradiction in Weber's writings between his conviction that social-
scientific theories are ideal-typical and, hence, at most theoretically valid on the one 
hand and his belief that pure economics is instrumentally relevant for public policy 
because of its empirical and/or practical validity on the other. Third, I will explain my 
reservations with regard to this latter belief of Weber and with the more general belief 
that whatever social-scientific theory can fulfil an instrumental political function. Finally, I 
will argue that there is some arbitrariness in Weber's presentation of the theory of 
marginal utility as the one and only politically relevant economics. 
2,1.1 Pure economics: technicaliy applicable 
According to Weber, the contribution of the social sciences consists of providing public 
policy with adequate means for given ends and of informing it about the consequences 
of using certain means. Giving information on adequate means and indispensable 
consequences is a purely technical problem. 'It would be superfluous to repeat that it is 
obviously possible and scientifically useful and necessary to establish propositions of the 
following type: in order to attain the end x (in economic policy), y is the only means, or 
under conditions bi, fe, and D3, yi, yt, and yz are the only or the most effective means. 
[...] Hence it is simply a question of inverting causal propositions; [...]. It is indeed on this 
account that science is not compelled to formulate these technical teleological 
propositions in any form other than that of simple causal propositions, e.g., x is produced 
by y, or x, under conditions bi, 02, and bs is produced by yi, yz and ya For these say 
exactly the same thing, and the "man of action" can derive his "prescriptions" from them 
quite easily (MSS 44-45). This technical conception of the political relevance of social-
scientific theories implies that the main point lies on causal sequences. Causal 
sequences are considered a kind of "predictions". They "predict" that x is produced by y, 
or that x, under conditions bi, 02, and 03 is produced by yi, y% and y%. Causal 
sequences are, hence, the entities that, through inversion, are transformed into 
scientifically justified means for political ends. In Weber's writings we can discern, 
however, two types of "causal sequences". 
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As sketched in section 2 of chapter 2, Weber distinguishes three kinds of 
social-economic sciences: pure economics, the science of economically conditioned 
phenomena, and the science of economically relevant phenomena. In Weber's view, the 
two latter kinds of economics are a kind of historical sciences. As such they are meant to 
understand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their 
contemporary manifestations on the one hand and the causes of their being historically 
so and not otherwise on the other (MSS 72). 
In order to gain such historical understanding, one first has to determine "laws" 
and "factors" (MSS 75). These "laws" are not, however, laws in the sense of exact 
natural science. They include regular recurrent relationships, regularities which are 
'universally valid by means of comprehensive historical induction' or which are 
'immediately and tangibly plausible according to our subjective experience' (MSS 72-73). 
Such causal relationships do not have to be quantifiable in order to be called a "law". 
They can especially include the rules governing motivated conduct (MSS 74). 
"Laws" only fulfil a preliminary task in the historically oriented social sciences. 
The knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means' 
(MSS 79). These laws make the analysis of an historically individual event possible. This 
analysis consists of defining the historically given individual configuration of those "laws" 
and "factors" which effect the unique event on the one hand, and of an explanation of the 
significance of the concrete interactions between those "factors" on the other hand (MSS 
75-76). 
Because of the complexity of cultural reality an individual configuration of 
causal factors can never be deduced form a system of laws, however complete and 
perfect this system may be. The argument goes the other way round: our intuition of the 
significance of an individual event makes us select the relevant causal factors and as a 
consequence a particular configuration of laws lightens up out of the complex multiplicity 
of causal reality (MSS 76). '[...] an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete 
phenomenon in its full reality is not only practically impossible - it is simply nonsense. We 
select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case, the "essential" 
features of an event. Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the 
question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships; it is 
not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a 
representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It is in 
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brief a question of imputation' (MSS 78-79). Performing this imputation is the second 
task to be achieved for a social scientist. "Nomological" knowledge only is a precondition 
for it. 
Every individual constellation is causally explicable only as the consequence of 
another equally individual constellation which has preceded it. The tracing as far into the 
past as possible of these constellations and, consequently, the exposition of the 
individual features of those historically developed configurations which are 
contemporaneously significant is the third task of a social researcher (MSS 75-76). 
Again, the sequence of historical constellations cannot be deduced from laws, because 
the reality to which the laws apply always remains an equally individual phe T>enon 
whose meaning - and thus whose constellation of relevant factors - depends on cultural 
valuations. The concrete historical significance of an individual event does not depend 
on its generic features, because generic features are features which each event has in 
common with all other events, past and present, of the same type. The significance 
depends on the uniqueness of its causal configuration (i.e., of its genetic features) and of 
its relationships with other events (MSS 76-77). 
To conclude, in Weber's view, the historically oriented social-economic 
sciences are not politically relevant since they do not allow for predictions. Economically 
conditioned and economically relevant phenomena are unique events that cannot be 
"predicted", i.e. deduced from a system of laws. They can at most be causally explained 
in retrospect. Moreover, historical laws are mere - and often not quantifiable -
"regularities". 
Contrary to the two historically oriented social-economic sciences, "pure" 
economics is politically valid in an instrumental way. This is due to the special nature of 
the kind of knowledge it offers. "Pure economics" exclusively consists of laws", 
expressed in mathematical formulas and ordered in a logically consistent axiomatic 
system (GAW 392; MSS 43). In order to allow for such a logically consistent system of 
laws", pure economics is based on certain assumptions. Economic theory assumes the 
existence of 'pure economic interests and precludes the operation of political or other 
non-economic considerations' (MSS 44). Pure economic interests depend, in their turn, 
on only one psychic motive: maximisation of the satisfaction of one's own competing 
desires (GAW 391). Pure economics is about rational economic behaviour, i.e., human 
action which is "caused" by the only economic motive and which succeeds in satisfying 
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this motive. Pure economics, i.e., the theory of marginal utility presupposes, among other 
things, that people are able to act more or less instrumentally, i.e., that they can choose 
the correct means for a given end by making use of their experience and their capacity to 
calculate in advance (GAW 390). Economic theory tries to catch this kind of successful, 
i.e., rational behaviour in a logically consistent axiomatic system. 
Pure economics derives its theoretical validity from the logical consistency of its 
abstract axiomatic system. This theoretical validity is, however, completely independent 
of its practical relevance. Time and again Weber stresses that pure economic concepts 
and laws, as all concepts and laws in cultural science, do not have "metaphysical 
validity", but are ideal-typical. In a certain sense they are "pure fictions", heuristic 
instruments which enable us to describe and explain empirical reality. 'Pure economic 
theory, in its analysis of past and present society, utilizes ideal-type concepts 
exclusively. Economic theory makes certain assumptions which scarcely ever 
correspond completely with reality but which approximate it in various degrees and asks: 
how would men act under these assumed conditions, if their actions were entirely 
rational?' (MSS 43-44). Whether the theory of marginal utility is practically relevant or not 
depends on two aspects. 
First, it depends on the presence of other possible causes - besides the one 
psychic motive of maximisation of satisfaction of one's own competing desires - which 
are deemed relevant for the individual event in question. The degree of significance 
which we are to attribute to economic factors is decided by the class of causes to which 
we are to impute those specific elements of the phenomenon in question to which we 
attach significance in given cases and in which we are interested'(MSS 71). Second, the 
extent to which people, urged by their self-interest, behave "objectively rationally" is 
decisive for the practical validity of pure theory. According to Weber, human conduct 
often is irrational: 'errors in thinking or calculation can constitute causal factors of the 
course of action' (MSS 42). 
Despite this questionable practical relevance of pure economics, it is the logical 
consistency of its axiomatic system and the mathematical form of its "laws" that, in 
Weber's view, provide pure economics with its instrumental political relevance. This is 
because both features together allow for logical inversions, i.e., for "predictions". Logical 
inversions are a purely technical, i.e., neutral matter. To conclude, for Weber 
Instrumentality" implies both "neutrality" and "predictive power". It is Weber's 
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instrumental interpretation of a politically relevant social science that urges him to fall 
back on "pure" or "exact" economics as the only politically relevant social-economic 
science.. 
2.1.2 Pure economics: theoretically, empirically or practically valid? 
How is it possible that Weber is so confident in the political relevance of economic laws? 
Weber's writings certainly show a contradiction in this respect. His stress on the ideal-
typical character of social-scientific concepts, laws and theories cannot be reconciled 
with his faith in the practical relevance of pure economics for public policy. In the 
following paragraphs, I will elaborate on this contradiction. 
According to Weber, ideal types are arrived at by the accentuation of certain 
elements of reality which seem important with respect to a specific point of view. Hence, 
they cannot be understood as a reflection of reality (MSS 90-93). They are not true (if 
"truth" is understood as correspondence between statements on the one hand and 
phenomena in reality on the other). They are a logical ideal: a well defined analytical 
construct, a limiting concept that allows us to compare reality with it. Ideal-types have a 
heuristic and expository function. Comparison between the ideal-type and reality, the 
estimation of similarities and discrepancies, can make the characteristic features of 
empirical phenomena clear and understandable. An ideal type is not a description of 
reality but 'aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. [...] It is 
no hypothesis but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses' (MSS 90). Ideal-
types thus are logical ideals. Ideal-typical theories are at most theoretically valid. They 
are not empirically valid. 
Ideal-typical theories are not ethical ideals. They do not present models of 
what should be done to make them exist (MSS 93-95). The concept "economic value", 
for instance, does not point to an objectively valid "value", to an ethical imperative which 
should influence price formation. Ideal-types do not correspond to ideas, thoughts or 
ideals, which an historically decisive number of persons have in mind and which are 
therefore characteristic of their culture either (MSS 94-96). One can indeed construct an 
ideal-type out of significant ideas which more or less people in a certain epoch have. 
However, again, this ideal-type does not reveal actually existing ideas, nor their average 
or their common features, but at most it makes their revelation possible. In other words, 
ideal-typical social-scientific theories are not necessarily practically valid either. 
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Weber's stress on the nature of ideal types is meant as a warning against 
possible misuses of science. 'Nothing, however, is more dangerous than the confusion of 
theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expressed itself 
firstly in the belief that the "true" content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed 
in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a 
Procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or, thirdly, in the hypostatization of 
such Ideas" as real forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind the passage of 
events and which works itself out in history* (MSS 94). Belief in the "truth" of ideal types 
makes people treat them as practical models. Ideal-typical presentations 'regularly seek 
to be, or are unconsciously, ideal-types not only in the logical sense but also in the 
practical sense, i.e., they are model types which [...] contain what, from the point of view 
of the expositor, should be and what to him is "essential" [...] because it is enduringly 
valuable. [...] Here it is no longer a matter of the purely theoretical procedure of treating 
empirical reality with respect to values but of value-judgments which are integrated into 
the concept [...]. Because the ideal type claims empirical validity here, it penetrates into 
the realm of the evaluative interpretation [...]' (MSS 97-98). 
Despite his stress on the ideal-typical nature of the social sciences - a matter 
of theoretical, not empirical nor practical validity -, Weber shows not much reluctance to 
interpret the political relevance of pure economics instrumentally. This latter 
interpretation betrays his implicit belief in the empirical and practical validity of (pure) 
economic laws". As I explained in section 1 of this chapter, it is the "objectivity" of pure 
economics, due to its logical consistency and its mathematical form, that, in Weber's 
view, stops the gap between theoretical and empirical validity. It is historical 
developments that stop the gap between theoretical and practical validity. Weber 
observes that as a matter of fact empirical reality more and more resembles theoretical 
economics. The historical peculiarity of the capitalistic epoch, and consequently also the 
meaning of the theory of marginal utility for the understanding of this epoch, rests on the 
fact that [...] under the present conditions of life the approximation of reality to the 
theoretical propositions has been continuously growing, drawing the fate of ever larger 
strata of humankind into it, and, as far as one can see, it will go on' (GAW 395). 
Historical economic reality evolves more and more into a direction which leaves 
economic actors the choice between 'economic expulsion or the observation of very 
definite maxims of economic acting' (GAW 133). 
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Nevertheless, Weber's belief in the empirical and practical validity of pure 
economics remains at odds with his rejection of the notion that social-scientific laws" are 
laws in the sense of exact natural science. According to Weber, natural sciences try to 
attain 'a purely "objective" (i.e., independent of all individual contingencies) monistic 
knowledge of the totality of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and 
mathematical form' (MSS 85). Time and again Weber stresses that all concepts and laws 
in cultural science do not have "metaphysical validity", but are ideal-typical. In a certain 
sense they are 'pure fictions', heuristic instruments which enable us to describe and 
explain empirical reality. Weber calls the wrong supposition that concepts and laws in the 
cultural sciences are similar to those in the exact natural sciences a 'naturalistic 
prejudice' (MSS 88). 
2.1.3 Two objections 
For two reasons Weber's instrumental interpretation of the political relevance of pure 
economics is problematic. It is problematic because pure economics is not simply 
empirically valid. Consequently, its predictive power is limited. It is problematic because 
it is not straightforwardly practically valid. Pure economics assumes values - the values 
constituting its perspective - that are not necessarily socially accepted nor politically 
aimed at. These objections do not only hold for pure economics in particular; they hold 
for social-scientific theories in general2. I will deal more extensively with the first 
objection in the next subsection 2.2. I will enlarge on the second objection in the 
following paragraphs. 
The non-neutrality of ideal-typical social science prohibits a purely technical 
political use. Only when the values underlying a political objective (for instance the 
introduction or transformation of a particular institution) are compatible with the values 
constituting the theoretical perspective, will it be possible to use ideal-typical economics 
as an unproblematic "technique". This compatibility can, however, hardly be realised. 
The complexity of human reality (i.e., the complexity of the whole set of values 
constituting human action) offers an insurmountable impediment in this respect (MSS 56, 
2 Sirnilar objections hold for an instrumental interpretation of the natural 
sciences. For an elaboration of this topic see, for instance, Grammen (1999) and 
Radder (Korthals 1989). 
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11-12). On the one hand, the value-relatedness of the concepts and laws of pure 
economics cannot become perfectly clear. The demand for complete transparency of the 
values defining the perspective of pure economics not only overlooks implicit norms and 
values which are imposed on students educated in a disciplinary specialisation, but also 
ignores the possibility of collective oblivion of the evaluations underlying a specific 
scientific interest3. In other words, one cannot completely distinguish between scientific 
facts and scientific values. On the other hand, the evaluations underlying the political 
goal can never become completely transparent. One cannot completely distinguish 
between political facts and political values either. As long as the values constituting both 
the theoretical perspective and the political objective are not exactly the same, scientific 
instruments do not precisely connect to political questions. This discrepancy between 
theoretical and political values prohibits a purely technical or instrumental use of science 
in the political sphere. One can never guarantee, as Weber suggests, that for politicians 
'all that remains is to choose between several economic means, when these differ only 
with respect to their certainty, rapidity, and quantitative productiveness, and are 
completely identical in every other value-relevant aspecf(MSS 37-38)4. Only when these 
conditions could be met, could a given means be evaluated as "technically most correct". 
'In every other case, i.e., in every case which is not purely a matter of technique, the 
[technical, economic] evaluation ceases to be unambiguous and evaluations enter which 
are not determinable exclusively by economic analysis' (MSS 38). 
Undoubtedly, those "other cases" are mainly the case, since perfect 
consciousness of and complete conformity between the evaluations underlying the 
3 'All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is 
oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings of problems 
and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of 
the data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the 
individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it 
will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general' 
(MSS 112). 
4 On the one hand, such a lack of conformity can make economists' often heard 
complaints that politicians mistakenly ignore their recommendations 
understandable (see ,e.g., Dietz & van der Straaten 1992). On the other hand, an 
instrumental political use of economic theory hides the partiality in the 
conformity between the scientific interests and the interests of particular, often 
economically and politically powerful, groups. 
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political goal and economic theory cannot be taken for granted. This means that a logical 
positivistic Weltanschauung does not follow from "objective" economics (in Weber's 
sense): pure economics cannot be used as a neutral instrument for the realisation of 
political goals. On many occasions, Weber seems perfectly aware of the problems 
related to an instrumental use of "objective" economics within public policy. He often 
stresses that the constructs of pure economics which are useful for analytical purposes 
cannot be made the sources of practical value-judgements: 'even indisputably 
"technically correct" economic actions are not validated through this quality alone' (MSS 
37, 38). Nevertheless, this awareness remains without further practical recommen-
dations. 
2.1 A A historically contingent multiplicity of economic paradigms 
Weber grants a privileged political role to pure economics. This privilege, which is due to 
the axiomatic, law-like construction of the theory of marginal utility, limits the scope of 
possible political questions that can be successfully posed to the social-economic 
sciences. The political perception of social-economic problems becomes, moreover, one-
sided under influence of the one-sided exact-economic point of view. Politicians can, for 
instance, more often than is necessary, take over the belief in the invariability of specific 
factors (e.g., wants and resources, i.e. those factors which the theory of marginal utility 
considers as given) and in the manageability of specific goals (economic growth or 
economic efficiency, rather than the reduction or just distribution of scarce resources, 
goods or labour power). The privileged political position of pure economics thus not only 
limits the kind of political problems that can be scientifically dealt with. It also reduces the 
way in which political problems can be defined. A multiplicity of economic theories, on 
the contrary, could avoid the necessity of such two-fold reduction. 
Though Weber recognises the possibility of a multiplicity of scientific 
paradigms, he does not seem to consider the political importance of the particular kind of 
scientific multiplicity that is available. It looks as if he lets paradigmatic developments 
take their course. Weber stresses that one must not misunderstand the proper task of 
the social sciences as a continual chase for new viewpoints and new analytical 
constructs (MSS 111). He tries to limit the number of scientific ideal-types. The 
construction of abstract ideal-types is only a means, not an end, he writes (MSS 92). An 
unimpeded proliferation of concepts, laws and theories which are related to different 
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values is, anyhow, only a theoretical possibility which never takes place actually. 
Scientific communities are much more uniform than the abstract possibility of an infinite 
multiplicity of concepts and laws may suggest. Scientific research reaches out for 
'guiding' or 'cultural' values: in the cultural sciences concept-construction depends on 
the setting of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture itself (MSS 
105). Apparently, the choice of a perspective from which to interrogate reality is not 
totally free, but the result of some historical cultural characteristics which transcend the 
scientist"s individual free will. Whether an ideal-type, be it a concept, a law or a theory, is 
scientifically fruitful or not can not be decided beforehand. It depends on its 'success in 
revealing concrete cultural phenomena in their interdependence, their causal conditions 
and their significance' (MSS 92). Whether this criterion of success applies to a specific 
ideal-type can only become clear a posteriori. Selecting adequate ideal-types is a 
question of experience and of scientific craftsmanship. 
In section 2.2,1 will contrast Weber's rather passive conception of the political 
importance of paradigmatic multiplicity with Neurath's arguments in favour of an active 
search for "gaps" between various paradigmatic approaches. 
11.5 Conclusion 
Weber grants a privileged political role to pure economics. This privileged role relates to 
Weber's particular instrumental interpretation of the political relevance of social-scientific 
theories. In his view, social-scientific theories can only contribute to public policy on 
condition that they are empirically and practically valid. The first condition should 
guarantee the predictive power of the theory in question. The second condition should 
make sure that the instruments derived from the theory can be considered "neutral". The 
latter means that a conformity exists between the values underlying the scientific 
instrument on the one hand and the political objective on the other. In Weber's view, 
pure economics satisfies both conditions. The empirical validity of pure economics is 
satisfied through its logical consistency and mathematical form. Its practical validity can 
historically be recorded. 
I object to this instrumental interpretation of the political relevance of social-
scientific theories, for two reasons. First, as contradictions in Weber's writings already 
suggest, logical consistency and mathematical form do not suffice for empirical validity, 
i.e., for "truth" as correspondence between conceptual construct and empirical reality. 
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Consequently, the predictive power of pure economics is questionable, as it is of all 
social scientific theories. Second, the impossibility of complete evaluative transparency 
of both the scientific perspective and the political objective prevents us to assume the 
practical validity of scientific instruments straightforwardly. Moreover, as Weber himself 
admits at times, political objectives cannot simply be assumed to conform to historical 
trends. Politics does not necessarily look for institutional adaptations that allow for an 
extrapolation of historical trends. It can as well look actively for institutional 
transformations that restructure historical tendencies. Science should respect politically 
defined objectives. An instrumental interpretation of the political relevance of economics 
does not imply respect for, but prescription of political objectives. A politically successful 
economics, on the contrary, should look for scientific knowledge that helps citizens and 
professional politicians to clarify, to adjust and, possibly, to realise their own objectives. 
This implies that scientists should actively look for paradigmatic approaches that are 
suited to deal with politically defined problems. This active search for suitable paradigms 
is at odds with Weber's passive interpretation of the coming into existence of economic 
paradigms. 
Previous objections to the interpretation of a politically successful economics as 
a provider of predictive and prescriptive instruments urge me to look for an alternative 
conception. Neurath's writings set us up a long way in that direction. 
2.2 Neurath: economic theories as scientific Utopias 
At first sight, Neurath's stress on "prediction" as the central goal of science seems to 
support Weber's instrumental interpretation of science. On further consideration, 
however, it turns out that for Neurath "prediction" is a necessary part of scientific 
practice. At the same time, Neurath insists on the limited predictive power of science 
within political practice. Despite this limited power for political prediction, Neurath's 
interpretation of scientific "prediction" and his pleading for scientific Utopias help us to 
clarify the way in which science can be politically successful. 
12.1 The scientific meaning of prediction 
'"Making predictions" is', according to Neurath, "what all of science is about" (Neurath 
1931b, 53). Before being able to make predictions one first has to formulate laws". 
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Predictions can be deduced from laws, but laws cannot be deduced from a set of 
observation statements. "Induction" leads to laws (and this is always a matter of 
decision; see section 1.2 in chapter 2). 
Laws do not express causality, but correlations. Causality, the idea of a gapless 
and all-embracing sequence of cause and effect, is too much a remnant of metaphysics 
(Neurath 1930,45; 1941,224). Moreover, it suggests an - empirically undemonstrated -
asymmetry: a "cause" determines or, at least, influences an "effect", not vice versa 
(Neurath 1944,948-950). For that reason Neurath proposes to drop the causality-related 
terminology and to replace it with statistical expressions, which are more appropriate for 
expressing the lack of knowledge inherent in induction. 
Only content - or synthetic - statements can qualify for laws (Neurath 1929, 
308; 1931b, 56; 1934,104-105). Analytic statements are tautologies: they do not add 
anything meaningful. According to Neurath, it is a basic error of metaphysics to suppose 
that thinking or, more precisely, logical deductions lead to knowledge out of its own 
resources without using any empirical material. Logical investigations cannot arrive at 
new contents by an inference from given states of affair. '[A]ll thought and inference 
consists of nothing but a transition from statements to other statements that contain 
nothing that was not already in the former [...]' (Neurath 1929,308). The scientific world-
conception knows only laws, i.e. synthetic, empirical statements, and auxiliary tools, i.e. 
the analytic statements of logic and mathematics5. 
Laws are directives for finding predictions of individual courses of events, which 
in turn are tested - and subsequently accepted, or not - by protocol statements. This 
statement of Neurath reveals his view on the relevance of scientific "predictions". 
Scientific "predictions" are a necessary element in the testing of science. 
5 Neurath's conviction that laws can only take the form of synthetic statements, 
which always are uncertain to a certain degree, does not imply that analytic 
statements, the statements of logic and mathematics, are completely certain or 
indubitable. A statement that is understood to be analytic today can be declared 
synthetic tomorrow. It is always possible that someone feels obliged to correct a 
mathematical or logical proposition on the basis of specific protocol statements 
(Neurath 1934, 104). Symbolic logic and mathematics, the auxiliary tools of 
unified science, are themselves historical events (Neurath 1936c, 146). 
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The success of scientific predictions further depends on two main factors: 1) 
the combination of disciplines, which are applied to make one single prediction, and 2) 
the definition of the proper object of the disciplines used. First, one cannot presuppose 
that any forecast can always be settled by means of one single science (Neurath 1931b, 
53; 1931c, 329). In order to make one definite prediction one often needs many laws 
from many theories. Neurath's pleading for a "unified science" - see further in section 
2.2.3 - is precisely connected with this: it makes the linking of laws of all sciences with 
each other possible. Second, the area of study of a particular discipline cannot be 
delimited from the start. This area can only be defined at the end when one surveys and 
analyses the results of the science. The success of prediction determines whether a 
specific demarcation is scientifically justified (Neurath 1931c, 365,368). And since the 
success of predictions also depends on the combination of laws from different theories, it 
is rather useless to design new boundaries between individual disciplines, longer 
experience teaches us that we avoid pseudo-problems of all kinds if, in the analysis of 
sciences, we set out from predictions, their formulation and their control. But it is 
precisely this starting point that is little suited for the delimitation of special disciplines' 
(Neurath 1936a, 132). 
22.2 Pseudo-rationalism 
According to Neurath, political practice is, as is scientific practice, a matter of action. A 
characteristic of action is that it is unavoidably based on decisions. When the motive for 
a decision is a principle of a more general kind, Neurath calls it an "auxiliary motive". He 
distinguishes different kinds of auxiliary motives: drawing of lots (the auxiliary motive in 
its purest form), turning to instinct (which effectiveness is often exaggerated, since 
'instinct must fail with respect to the complex rational relationships created by the 
consciously shaped institutions of the social order and modem technology* (Neurath 
1913a, 5)), believing in oracles, omens, prophecies and the like (great military leaders, 
politicians and other men of action 'are often much more superstitious than corresponds 
to the spirit of their age, and [...] the forms of their superstition sometimes are strangely 
primitive or archaic' (Neurath 1913a, 6)), turning to some authority, such as a father 
confessor or some other adviser, but also using the simplicity principle or the majority 
principle in a democracy, and, last but not least, relying on science. 
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Neurath calls the use of this latter auxiliary motive a kind of pseudo-rationalism. 
It leads to self-deception and to hypocrisy, since science, as a kind of action, is itself the 
result of many decisions. 'Most of our contemporaries rely on their insight and want to 
leave the decision in all things to it once and for all. [...] Men of this type are mostly of the 
opinion that if difficulties turn up, sharper thinking will have to lead to the goal; they 
completely fail to see that even the sharpest thinker can end up with several conclusions 
of equal value if premises are lacking. [...] Education and character support these errors 
which Descartes, who is usually considered to be the father of rationalism, managed to 
keep free of in the field of practical action' (Neurath 1913a, 7-8). Pseudo-rationalists 
pretend to have adequate knowledge where strict rationalism excludes it on purely 
logical grounds. 'Rationalism sees its chief triumph in the clear recognition of the limits of 
actual insight" (Neurath 1913a, 8). 
Empirical rationalists must, for several reasons, acknowledge the limitations of 
scientific predictions6. To start with, they have strictly logical reasons. Science is, 
indeed, itself a kind of action (see section 1.2 in chapter 2). Secondly, science is a form 
of practice embedded in a social-historical context. Science is a human enterprise 
dependent on historically contingent ordinary language and on the limitations of human 
thinking. Scientific theories are, moreover, linked to the various interests of different 
social groups. Thirdly, social changes can occur by an invention of an individual. 
Inventions introduce novelty and novelty poses another limit to social-scientific prediction 
(Neurath 1931c, 405). Social changes can, finally, occur by "chance". This means that 
small differences in initial conditions can result in hugely different final situations. Social 
sciences can at most discuss possible outcomes out of a multiplicity of initial conditions. 
They can never calculate final conditions out of precise initial data (Neurath 1944,957). 
Nevertheless, many scientists are inclined to treat everything as calculable, to postulate 
complete scientific definiteness (Neurath 1930,45; 1931c, 407; 1936a, 136). Thus they 
create a new idol and try to replace the former priest or philosopher by the professor. 
They are pseudo-rationalists. The pseudorationalist discredits logical empiricism when 
he wishes to bring the unambiguity of action into connection with an unambiguity of a 
deduction from the data of experience [...]' (Neurath 1935a, 118). 
6 Note that Neurath uses the term "logical empiricism" as an equivalent of the 
term "empirical rationalism". 
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2.2.3 Unified science 
It is beyond question that, despite the limitations of scientific prediction, Neurath 
considers science as politically most relevant. Science - in its logical empiricist variant -
offers intellectual aid for forming public and private life (Neurath 1929,305). In Neurath's 
view, a close connection exists between practical life and science (Neurath 1931c, 364-
365; 1936b, 142). The social sciences in particular are a tool for social struggles 
(Neurath 1931c, 403-405; 1931d, 88; 1946b, 245). '[S]ince sociological investigations 
play a certain role as stimuli and as aids for the shaping of life, an advance in sociology 
is very closely connected with social struggles' (Neurath 1931d, 88). Hence, a struggle 
between sociologists cannot be avoided, since they reflect the much stronger1 social 
conflicts (Neurath 1929,317; 1931c, 361 )7. According to Neurath, it is the non-neutrality 
of science that explains its political relevance. The assumption that scholars enjoy a kind 
of social extra-territoriality is above all a product of that period which was inclined to 
accord an exceptional position to scholars, as substitute priests, and was ready to use 
scientific assessments as a basis for taking political measures; but this was done not 
because politicians wished to be scientific but because they knew that scholars are 
ultimately politicians' (Neurath 1931c, 406). 
It is the empirically recorded political relevance of scientific theories that makes 
Neurath plead for a unified science. The endeavour is to link and harmonise the 
achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of science' (Neurath 1929, 
Despite Neurath's recognition of the non-neutrality of science, he pleads for a 
"value-free" science: a science for which the selection of questions does not 
influence the content of the answers. At the same time, it seems as if Neurath 
understands this idea rather as an ideal than as a matter of fact: 'It is clear that 
such a work [i.e., the search for a unified science; MD] is conditioned by 
emotional elements, as all human behaviour in history is; even the simple choice 
of questions to be treated is in itself not scientifically justifiable. But that does 
not change anything in the essential difference that exists between one mode of 
exposition using emotional elements and another taking care to avoid them' 
(Neurath 1936b, 142; the italics are mine). Neurath's interpretation of 
"objectivity" as a matter of accepted coherence, allows me to apply the same 
line of reasoning to Neurath's use of the term "value-freedom" as I did to 
Weber's use of i t Hence, I cannot consider another interpretation of "value-
free" science than a science boasting on intersubjective consensus (though that 
has little to do with value-freedom; see also section 2). 
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306). In order to achieve this goal, one needs at least a unified language and the unified 
syntax offered by modem symbolic logic (the project of logical empiricism; see also 
section 1.2 in chapter 2). Both together allow for the linking of laws of different 
disciplines, or, in other words, for a unified science. 
Adherents of a unified science take an encyclopedia as their model. They do 
not believe in the traditional ideal of a system free from internal contradictions and based 
on secure foundations (Neurath 1936b; 1936c; 1937a; 1937e; 1946a)8. Unified science 
aims at a survey of the different branches of knowledge. This survey cannot be a 
system, 1) since different disciplines use different languages, 2) because a unification of 
science shows that there remain gaps between areas in which a certain, local 
axiomatisation and systématisation exist, and 3) because successful scientific work 
undertaken in different parts of science does not prohibit the appearance of 
contradictions between them. The idea of a system as a model of unified science is too 
absolute. From the fact that a particular discipline succeeds in giving its theory the form 
of a system of statements, one cannot conclude that this specific system is the beginning 
of a complete and definite system of unified science, for two reasons. First, the system of 
a particular discipline is itself not unshakeable or definitely free from contradiction; it is 
never absolutely true. Second, one cannot decide scientifically between different 
systems of particular successful disciplines (Neurath 1916; 1934,104). Consequently, 
the unified science movement 'does not propose a "superscience" which is to legislate to 
the special sciences' (Neurath 1937a, 172). The program of unified science does not aim 
at a systématisation from above. Neurath thus distances himself from what he calls the 
metaphysical project of logical positivism (Neurath 1937e, 203-204). The logical 
positivism of, for instance, Auguste Comte and his successor Wilhelm Ostwald aimed at 
an all-embracing system, a pyramidal edifice of the sciences. The logical empiricism of 
Neurath, on the contrary, 'accepts that the vast mass of the groups of statements are, as 
it were, in one plane' (Neurath 1937e, 204). Unified science shows no symmetrically 
pyramidal edifice, but a 'mosaic pattern', a 'complicated network'. 
In his earlier writings, Neurath still speaks of a "system" of physicalism 
(and of the possible existence of different such systems) (e.g., Neurath 1935a, 
117). From 1935 onwards, however, he explicitly distances himself from the 
idea of a system of science (see his 'Pseudorationalism of falsification' (Neurath 
1935b), an essay in which he criticizes Popper's Logik der Forschung). 
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Unified science strives intensively after a systématisation from below. It takes 
as its point of departure the mass of given statements. With the help of 'auxiliary 
processes', such as statistics, mathematics, modem symbolic logic and a unified 
scientific language, empiricist scientists try to link the laws of different disciplines and to 
establish unity among the particular sciences step by step (Neurath 1936b, 139; 1936c, 
146; 1936c, 153-156). For this unification of the sciences the unity of auxiliary processes 
is essential. At the same time, precisely this unifying activity directs scientific work 
towards gaps and contradictions. Whereas previous encyclopedic enterprises 'give a 
retrospective synthesis, so to speak, this new work will have to show above all in which 
direction new ways open themselves, where the problems lead, and where, from the 
point of view of a unified science, unsuspected possibilities can be discovered' (Neurath 
1936b, 140). 
A unitary approach is a necessary condition to classify the systems of 
hypotheses of the different social-scientific theories. Classifying these systems is a 
necessary condition to make manifest lacking, possible systems of hypotheses. Neurath 
compares the classification of social-scientific hypotheses with the classification of 
natural-scientific ones (Neurath 1944,972). In his essay 'On the classification of systems 
of hypotheses (With special reference to optics)', he comments that a comparative study 
of existing systems of hypotheses leads to a survey of all groupings of individual views 
that are possible in principle (Neurath 1916). One first has to analyse the elementary 
notions of each system. On the basis of all elementary notions one can give a complete 
survey of logically possible combinations of these notions, without giving preference to 
one or another combination9. Planning science then means filling the gaps with lacking 
combinations10. This kind of planning is a 'purely technical question' (Neurath 1928, 
262). 
9 Giving preference to some combinations and talking about eclecticism with 
regard to other combinations results, according to Neurath, from the use of 
"crude dichotomies". 'Dichotomies, however, are not only crude intellectually, 
but also mostly the product of scientific pugnacity. One characterises the 
opponent as pungently as possible for the purpose of bearing him down as 
forcefully as possible. [...] Thus dichotomies are a result of a warlike spirit' 
(Neurath 1916,15). 
1 0 On the relation between classification and planning, see also Reisch (1994), p. 
168. 
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2.2.4 The political relevance of scientific Utopias 
In Neurath's view, the particular development of science into unified science 
consolidates the close connection of theoretical and practical workers. Technology with 
mechanics is the science of the engineers (machine-technicians); biology is the science 
of medical men and breeders (body-technicians), and sociobgy is now the science of 
statesmen and organizers (socialAechnicians)' (Neurath 1931c, 329; the italics are 
mine). The social sciences thus occupy a special place within the political arena. Social-
scientific theories are needed to "plan" society (Neurath 1931 c, 417). 
Planning science is a prerequisite to "plan" society (Neurath 1944,959-972). In 
order to plan science, one starts with a classification of given systems of hypotheses. 
These given systems of hypotheses refer to the past and to the present. Social scientists 
who do not want to put their professionalism in the service of a scientific transfer of 
traditions and existing institutions also work for, at least the nearest, future. They act as a 
social engineers. They develop a "history of the future" by developing scientific Utopias. 
Utopias are 'all orders of life which exist only in thought and image but not in reality", of 
which one can hardly say beforehand whether they will someday, somewhere become 
true (Neurath 1919b, 151). Utopias are constructions of social engineers, just like 
machines are constructions of technical engineers. In the words of Reisch, a social 
engineer provides us with 'options for actions' (Reisch 1944,167). 
Scientific Utopias are (social) plans derived from lacking combinations of 
systems of social-scientific hypotheses. Like a technical engineer, who can evolve 
various types of possible aeroplanes, a social engineer can (and should) develop several 
possible plans or Utopias (Neurath 1944,959). Historians of the future can always tell us 
various stories about possible futures, just like other historians can tell us several 
versions of past events (Neurath 1944,940). For that reason, there does not exist one 
unequivocal relationship between sociological plans and political decisions. Neurath 
dismisses social scientists and historians who present only one Utopia or one scientific 
"optimum": their striving bears witness of a metaphysical determinism. The tendency to 
present one Utopia or optimum as the scientifically best solution is a characteristic of the 
technocratic movement (Neurath 1942,426-427). 
Scientific Utopias arise as prophecies that at the same time function as one (out 
of many) causes of their coming true (Neurath 1919b, 152). Social engineers, who 
scientifically develop new social orders and institutions, can be better prophets than 
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scientists who want to confine themselves to a description of existing orders or 
institutions (Neurath 1944, 960). They are, at the same time, better prophets than 
unscientific Utopias which result from a casual psychological mood. Nevertheless, social 
engineers' ability to predict which plan will be realised is limited, for several reasons. 
First, social engineers' imagination is historically and socially restricted (Neurath 1944, 
960). Second, the phenomenon of human language together with the flexibility and 
changeability of human societies pose new limitations (Neurath 1944, 967). Third, the 
social sciences are not very well developed yet (Neurath 1944,973). Consequently, the 
classification of systems of social-scientific hypotheses and the construction of lacking 
combinations can only be very preliminary. Fourth, even in case particular social-
scientific correlations are rather well known, one does often not know under what 
circumstances these correlations will come into appearance (Neurath 1944, 959). The 
ceteris paribus - or res sic stantibus - formula is of little practical relevance, when one 
does not know whether those res are the case or not. 
Finally, even a complete overview of scientific Utopias does not allow for 
predictions within a political context. This is because of the nature of political events. 
Political events reflect human judgements - rather than calculations - concerning a 
desirable societal organisation. Even complete insight would, according to Neurath, not 
allow for reducing the final (political) decision to a logical conclusion. Each plan shows 
specific characteristics to different degrees. Each plan has, in Neurath's words, a 
different "silhouette" (Neurath 1944, 962-963): it reflects a different combination of 
values. Comparing different silhouettes is not a matter of mathematics. The danger 
arises [...] out of the trial to obtain index numbers through mingling items, which are 
measured with different units [...]. The big advantage, which offer us statistical 
correlations and each way of mathematicising, should not tempt us in this respect to 
sloppiness'11. '[Ajrguing in terms of the one best standard can hardly be maintained, and 
in addition, [...] one cannot compute the various standards elaborated by various experts: 
technicians stress the importance of technical efficiency as a matter of course, whereas 
1 1 'Die Gefahr rührt [...] vom Versuch her, Indexzahlen mittels Vermischung 
von Items zu erhalten, Items, die in verschiedenen Einheiten gemessen wurden 
[...] Der enorme Vorteil, den uns statistische Korrelationen und jede Art der 
Mathematisierung bringen, sollte uns in dieser Hinsicht nicht zur Schlamperei 
verleiten' (Neurath 1944,963). 
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industrial engineers are interested in the assembling of machines and workers, and in 
the increase of the efficiency of labour; biologists and physicians sometimes propose 
certain standards of health, architects standards for buildings. But the computation of all 
these results is not sufficient because the elements in question are interrelated with one 
another, and also what remains [e.g. personal independence, voluntary co-operation, 
democracy, etc.] is not covered by this computation at all [...]' (Neurath 1942,422-423). 
One can at most compare different silhouettes, but one cannot range them according to 
a single standard. A social engineer is thus not able to decide scientifically which plan 
will or should be realised. In the end, political decisions have to be based unavoidably on 
common-sense arguments. While making plans can be considered a technical matter, 
choosing among plans is certainly a non-technical question (Neurath 1928, 263). It is 
political events that determine which out of possible "Utopias" should be realised12. 
Despite their politically limited predictive power, Neurath considers scientific 
Utopias as politically indispensable. Although final decisions will be based on common 
sense arguments, the decisions are different when made without comprehensive 
knowledge, or when made after hearing all the experts. "Brain trusts" of first-class 
scientists will therefore play an essential, nay fundamental, role by bringing forth whole 
teams of possible well-analyzed patterns from which, finally, one will be selected by the 
nation or by regional groups after much discussion and many changes' (Neurath 1942, 
All the hesitations Neurath mentions concerning a straightforward 
instrumental - use of scientific Utopias within political practice makes me doubt 
the adequacy of his term "planning society". My doubts are enforced by a 
certain ambiguity in Neurath's ideas about "planning the economy". In his 
scientifically oriented writings, Neurath sketches the task of economics as 
investigating the effects of different orders of life, i.e. of different combinations 
of institutions within varying terrains of life, on human happiness (e.g. Neurath 
1917; 1931c; 1931d). 'Tlanning" here still means "developing Utopias". In his 
politically oriented writings, "planning the economy" means deciding on the 
principles that guide production and distribution (Neurath 1919b, 1928). In his 
political writings, Neurath hardly deals with the political and legal organisation 
of a "planned economy". Although his scientific writings suggest a close link 
between the political and legal order on the one hand and the economic order (in 
the narrow sense of those units where production and distribution are decided on 
and carried out) on the other, in his politically oriented writings "planning the 
economy" does not mean any longer "planning the order of life within a given 
terrain of life". 
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426). That is one of the reasons why far reaching information and education is a 
prerequisite in a society which is inclined at democratic social planning. This information 
and education is necessary to allow for an input - selection and change of proposed 
scientific Utopias - by laymen. 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
According to Neurath, "prediction" is a necessary part in the testing of science. Predictive 
statements derive from synthetic laws. Synthetic laws express empirical regularities 
rather than cause-effect relationships. The success of scientific prediction depends on 
the particular combination of laws borrowed from various disciplines and on the particular 
definition of the subject matter of a specific discipline. It is, in other words, a particular 
problem- successful prediction of a particular state of affairs in human reality - that 
defines the subject matter of a discipline and the relevant combination of disciplines. It is 
not the other way round: neither a pre-defined subject matter of a discipline nor a pre-
defined combination of disciplines will automatically lead to successful scientific 
predictions. 
Successful scientific prediction does not imply successful political prediction. 
Political questions cannot straightforwardly be answered scientifically, for several 
reasons. First, because of the logical limitations of scientific practice itself. Science is 
itself a kind of action. Second, because of the social and historical contingency of 
scientific language, concepts and laws. Third, because of the novelty typical of political 
action. Finally, because of the unpredictability of political events. (Note that these latter 
two reasons parallel Arendfs analysis of the rationality of political interaction; see section 
4.2 in chapter 2). Denial of this limited predictive power of science within a political 
context is, according to Neurath, a manifestation of pseudo-rationalism. 
This limited political predictive power does, however, not prevent science's 
political relevance. Neurath even actively aims at ameliorating science's political 
relevance by launching the idea of a unified science. He considers of unified science as 
an encyclopedia, i.e., a systématisation from below of existing theories. Such 
systématisation from below needs some unitary auxiliary tools, such as statistics, 
mathematics, modem symbolic logic and a unified scientific language. The political 
relevance of Neurath's project of a unified science is two-fold. First, it makes the linking 
of laws borrowed from different disciplines possible. It allows, in Neurath's words, for an 
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'orchestration of the sciences' (Neurath 1946a). Second, it makes us discover gaps and 
contradictions between scientific disciplines and disciplinary paradigms. 
According to Neurath, social sciences are not merely politically relevant. They 
are even politically indispensable. The gaps between disciplines and disciplinary 
paradigms that emerge during the project of unified science allow scientists to formulate 
scientific Utopias. Scientific Utopias describe options for actions, a variety of stories about 
possible futures. Each Utopia represents a particular silhouette: it reflects a particular 
combination of values. Designing Utopias is a means to write a "history of the future". 
Scientific Utopias - in the plural - are thus politically indispensable because they foster 
political - deliberative - processes. Political knowledge is indeed not - just as little as is 
scientific knowledge - autonomous. Scientific Utopias can, however, not be used 
instrumentally. They cannot replace political judgements, for two main reasons. First, 
because their empirical validity can never be guaranteed. One can never precisely know 
which res (of the res sic stantibus formula) are the case and which are not. Second, 
because practical validity of Utopian silhouettes depends on political action. It is up to 
citizens and professional politicians to judge the kind of Utopia they prefer to realise. 
Political actors should select, discuss and adapt scientific Utopias. In Neurath's view, 
scientific Utopias thus leave plenty room for the typically political judgement that Arendt is 
in favour of (see section 4.3 in chapter 2). 
2.3 Economic theories as political muses 
Previous confrontation between Weber's and Neurath's interpretation of the political 
relevance of (social-) scientific theories allows us to develop the metaphor of economic 
theory as a political muse. This metaphor is meant to replace the metaphor of economic 
theory as a political toolbox. While the latter is supposed to provide public policy with 
prescriptive and predictive instruments, the former is supposed to offer descriptive and 
explanatory insights. 
In chapter 3,1 defended a particular subject matter of economic science. The 
idea of "sustainability" urges us, my line of reasoning went, to conceive of economics as 
the study of the ecological performance of the institutional whole constituting our 
present-day industrial economies. My interpretation of economic institutions as the 
symbolic dimension of economic actions leaded me, further, to interpret this ecological 
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performance as the counterpart of an economy's institutional organisation. This suggests 
that the relationship between ecological performance and institutional organisation 
should not be understood as a cause-effect relationship (Weber), but as a "regularity* 
(Neurath). 
I consider such "regularities", moreover, as understandable. This means that I 
assume some "rationality" in the empirical regularities relating a particular institutional 
organisation with a particular ecological performance. Such "regularities" are synthetic 
statements, not mere analytic ones. They result from a combination of empirical 
observations and logical deductions13. 
The empirical regularities economics should make understandable are meant 
to describe - from an inevitably value-laden perspective - relationships between 
ecological performance and institutional organisation as they can be found in the past 
and the present. This implies that I conceive of an ecologically relevant economics as a 
kind of historical rather than "exact" science (Weber). This means that the stress within 
economics should be on explanation rather than prediction. This, in my view, important 
distinction can be encountered again in a paper written by Dugger (Dugger 1979, 900-
903). This author distinguishes between (institutionalist) 'pattern models' and (neo-
classical) 'predictive models'. The former try to explain human behaviour by situating it 
as accurately as possible in its institutional and cultural context. The latter try to explain 
human behaviour by deducing it from carefully specified assumptions. In the former case 
it is the empirical adequacy of the patterns developed that matter, while in the latter case 
it is the empirical adequacy of the predictions. According to Dugger, 'pattern models' are 
13 This interpretation of synthetic statements as not merely the opposite of 
analytic statements is in agreement with Neurath's interpretation. Consider, in 
this respect, his arguments in favour of the term "empirical rationalism". 
'Traditionally one looked at "empiricism" as something crude and coarse, not 
interested in any refinement of arguing, and at "rationalism" as something 
creating wonderful pyramids of arguments, deducing any detail on the basis of a 
nicely elaborated set of assumptions or a priori declarations. I suggested the 
expression "Logical Empiricism" for stressing the combination of empiricism 
and highly evolved deduction. Since in Latin countries there is a fine tradition of 
"rationalism", I suggested the use of the term "Empirical Rationalism" [...] as 
synonymous with "Logical Empiricism'" (Neurath 1946a, 234; see also Neurath 
1938,836). 
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rather the scientific result of an anthropological method, while 'predictive models' are 
rather the scientific result of pure mathematics. 
Contrary to Neurath, I doubt whether social scientists should, apart from 
explaining the past and the present, also write a "history of the future'' by developing 
scientific Utopias. I suppose that - a multiplicity of - clarifying explanations of past and 
present suffice to provide a deliberative politics with necessary insights to derive a whole 
range of Utopias on its own. 
To recapitulate, a politically successful economics should provide politics with 
insights rather than instruments. Economic scientists should develop empirically 
adequate 'pattern models' explaining empirical regularities that relate ecological 
performance to institutional organisation. Such pattern models provide scientific insights 
that are not purely analytic. These scientific insights are synthetic ones: they aim at 
suitable concepts (for instance, types of economic institutions or institutional hierarchies; 
see section 2.2.3 in chapter 3) that allow us to make empirical regularities 
comprehensible. Scientific insights are of a historical, rather than mathematical, kind. 
They offer clarifying views on our past and present. Scientific insights are sources of 
inspiration that allow a deliberative politics to develop Utopias on its own. 
Empirical observations support the metaphor of social-scientific theories as 
political muses. According to Snel, for instance, empirical research shows that social 
scientists overestimate their capacity to provide public policy with concrete -
instrumental - recommendations (Snel 1996,22). The extent of overestimation becomes 
clear in the following quotation. 'First, a great deal of sociological research done for 
application carries no discernible policy implications of any kind; second, in instances 
where it does, sociology has served as the basis for formulating policy 
recommendations, less often the basis for enacted policy; and third, most of the 
recommendations [...] were rejected by policy-making bodies of government as 
impractical or politically unfeasible' (Scott & Shore 1979, quoted in Snel 1996, 22). 
According to Nelson, to give another example, economists' important and proper role in 
public policy is as proponents of a particular framework for thinking (Nelson 1987,58). It 
is economists' way of thinking, their view of the world, that feeds policy debate and 
decision-making with valuable contributions rather than with definitive answers. 
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3 Impartial knowledge 
The term Impartiality" indicates a fourth characteristic of a politically successful 
economics. This term should, as may be clear from the above section 1, not be mistaken 
for scientific "neutrality". The non-neutrality of (economic) science refers to the inevitable 
vaiue-relatedness of whatever theoretical paradigm. The impartiality of science, on the 
contrary, refers to its ability to disclose (political) power relationships. Building on both 
Neurath and Arendt, I will inquire into the precise meaning of an impartial science. 
Following Arendt, political power can be interpreted as the capacity to realise 
and preserve a desirable human society. This capacity depends on citizens' abilities to 
act as free and equal individuals (Arendt 1958,199-203). In order to clarify what "acting 
politically as free and equal individuals" means, I should reflect on the meaning of a 
(desirable) human society. Human society consists of institutions. It is the ensemble of 
societal institutions that define individuals' choice sets, i.e. the set of individuals' private 
interests. This ensemble of societal institutions defines at the same time the distribution 
of choice sets among its members. From this we can conclude that in daily life citizens 
are neither absolutely free (because they always and inevitably have particular, 
institutionally conditioned private interests) nor equal (because of institutional - and 
personal - reasons). Acting politically as free individuals then presupposes citizen's 
capacity to abstract from their existing set of private interests in order to reflect on 
desirable sets of private interests and on desirable distributions of them. This capacity to 
abstract is not meant in an ascetic sense. It is not meant to incite people to deny their 
institutionally conditioned private interests. On the contrary, ft is meant in an intellectual 
sense. It is meant to incite people to recognise the relationship between their private 
interests and the institutional context in which they emerge. This intellectual capacity to 
abstract presupposes, moreover, citizen's capacity to imagine a desirable institutional 
organisation of society as a precondition of desirable private interests and desirable 
distributions of private interests. 
The capacity to abstract from existing private interests depends on citizens' 
"negative freedom". Citizens are negatively free when they are free of the day-to-day 
worries related to the necessities of life. Negative freedom allows persons to postpone 
their immediate wills and predetermined, short-term interests and to imagine possible 
wills and private interests. Citizens' negative freedom is, in other words, a precondition 
for their "positive freedom". Positive freedom refers to citizens' ability to imagine in a 
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creative way what counts as a desirable human society. Politics is, as Arendt explains, 
about creative realisations of what it can mean to be human. The extent of creativity 
relates to the multiplicity of perspectives. Consequently, a balanced distribution of 
opportunities to put forward one's particular perspective related to one's particular 
experiences contributes positively to citizen's political imagination, i.e. to their "positive 
freedom". To conclude, political equality - this balanced distribution of opportunities to 
set forward one's view - contributes to positive freedom. Both negative freedom - the 
ability to abstract from existing private interests - and positive freedom - disposing of a 
creative imagination - contribute to political power. 
Previous analysis understands political power as a positive concept. This 
positive interpretation differs from a contrasting interpretation of political power as a 
matter of coercion (rather than freedom) and of relationships of dominance and 
subordination (rather than equality). According to this latter interpretation, political actors 
act strategically (rather than communicatively). They negotiate with each other, taking 
their existing private interests and the existing distribution of interests as a starting 
point14. They do not act, to use Arendfs terminology, with each other, but for or against 
each other (for those with the same kind of private interests and against those with a 
different kind of private interests). I suppose that neither of both interpretations is 
"realistic", i.e., an empirically valid description of political reality. Real politics probably is 
a mixture of both. However, I conceive of the former interpretation - remember my plea 
for deliberative democracy - as a desirable one and of the latter as an undesirable one. 
These contrasting interpretations can illustrate the meaning of an Impartial" 
science. Impartial science tries to strengthen the former kind of politics and to weaken 
the latter one. In order to do that, it offers insights into sources of political inequality and 
of lacking political freedom. In order to stimulate political freedom, it clarifies the 
relationships between the institutional organisation on the one hand and the kind and 
Consider the following quotation of Neurath, expressing his conception of a 
"democracy between enemies": 'If in the dead of night bandits stop a railway 
train and are then confronted with well-armed passengers of unknown numbers, 
it may well happen that the head of the gang will compromise with the leader of 
the passengers as follows: when the sun rises, let firearms be counted; the side 
which has the fewer shall surrender to the other, to avoid pointless bloodshed -
democracy between enemies!' (Neurath 1928,259). 
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distribution of existing private interests on the other. Such clarifications can help citizens 
to abstract, for the sake of politics, from their existing private interests and to imagine 
different institutional organisations determining different kinds and distributions of private 
interests (and different ecological performances). In order to stimulate political equality, 
impartial science points to sources preventing a balanced expression of a variety of 
perspectives. It is, moreover, tolerant towards differing interpretations of sources of 
political inequality. These intra-paradigmatic conditions, the formal condition of tolerance 
and the substantive condition of indicating sources of political inequality, are, hence, 
accompanied by a disciplinary condition, namely the condition that a multiplicity of 
disciplinary paradigms is allowed and even stimulated. Contrary to impartial science, 
partial science considers a specific institutional organisation and, hence, existing 
(distributions of) private interests as given. It offers insights in how to act (politically) in 
order to realise a given goal as efficiently and as effectively as possible. It provides 
political actors with "rational" strategies. Partial science thus takes particular private 
perspectives as its starting point, rather than abstracting from them through scientifically 
explaining them. 
I should add a final comment on the contrasting concepts Impartial" and 
"partial" science. This contrast should not be conceived of as a black-and-white 
difference. Scientific insights will probably always be somewhere on the continuum 
between the partial and the impartial pole. There exist, moreover, no independent 
arbitrators to judge whether a particular scientific analysis of political power relationships 
does justice to the differing experiences of various members of a society. Whether a 
scientific interpretation of political power is objective can only be settled in a political way. 
Only a multiplicity of perspectives on power will help to evaluate on the objectivity of a 
particular scientific analysis. Scientific communities can, in other words, not do without a 
(typically political) pluralism and tolerance. 
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed four norms for a politically successful economics. I argued 
that, in order to ameliorate the political impact of economics, economists should provide 
political actors with suitable knowledge. Suitable knowledge is knowledge that stimulates 
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rather than replaces political debates. I claimed that scientific insights succeed better in 
this respect than do scientific instruments. 
Scientific insights are perspectivistic descriptions of human reality. They can 
never be neutral, though they aim at objectivity. Close reading of Weber's writings 
suggests that objectivity comes down to intersubjective consent. Logic and mathematics 
can contribute to such consent. They are, however, neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Objectivity as intersubjective consent within a particular community of scientists is a first 
norm for a politically successful economics. 
Contrary to Weber's view, there is no need to transform scientific descriptions 
into political instruments. In order to be politically successful, economic theories should 
not be interpreted as political toolboxes. Weber understands political instruments as 
inversions of scientific laws. The effectiveness of political instruments depends, to begin 
with, on the predictive power of scientific instruments, i.e., on science's empirical validity. 
Weber believes in the empirical validity of pure economics - due to the logical 
consistency and the mathematical form of this axiomatic system. He does not believe in 
the empirical validity of the historically oriented economic sciences. For that reason, only 
pure economics, i.e., the theory of marginal utility is, in Weber's view, suited as a political 
toolbox. The effectiveness of political instruments depends, further, on their "neutrality". 
Neutrality means here practical validity or conformity between the values constituting 
both the theoretical perspective and the political objective. Neither the empirical validity 
of pure economics (or whatever other economic theory) can, however, be guaranteed: 
ideal-lypical economic theories are never simply "true". Nor their practical validity can be 
assumed: the value-relatedness of both scientific instruments and political objectives can 
never be made completely transparent. The transformation of scientific descriptions into 
political instruments is, therefore, politically illegitimate. It drives economists to prescribe 
political objectives rather than to describe empirical realities. It drives them, moreover, to 
privilege scientific descriptions that are mathematical in form and logically consistent. 
These latter kind of descriptions easily give rise to prediction (in the sense of causal 
inversion). They do, however, not necessarily explain a lot. 
From Neurath, we learned that scientific descriptions should be explanatory 
rather than predictive. Scientific explanation is a matter of making empirical regularities -
or synthetic laws - comprehensible. Prediction is a scientific means to test our 
understanding of empirical regularities. It can, however, not be used to forecast our 
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future, for two reasons. First, scientific descriptions can never be assumed empirically 
valid, because they result from many decisions. Second, our future depends on creative 
and unpredictable political interaction. Scientific descriptions (or insights) can, in 
Neurath's view, thus never be used instrumentally. Scientific descriptions are, 
nevertheless, politically indispensable because they foster political debates. According to 
Neurath, it is scientific Utopias (in plural), i.e., stories about possible futures that stimulate 
political discussion, in my view, however, scientific insights themselves suffice to let 
political actors develop Utopias on their own. Keeping to scientific descriptions or insights 
prevents scientists from playing a prescriptive and predictive political role. To 
recapitulate, description rather than prescription and explanation rather than prediction 
are the second and third norm of a politically successful economics. 
Suitable economic knowledge should also ameliorate the quality of political 
interaction. This qualify depends on the political freedom and political equality of citizens 
and professional politicians. In order to ameliorate political freedom, economic 
knowledge should offer insights into the relationships between definition and distribution 
of private interests on the one hand and the institutional context on the other. In order to 
support political equality, it should inform us on economic sources of unequal political 
power relationships. Suitable economic knowledge should, in one word, be impartial 
rather than partial. 
Objectivity, explanation, description and impartiality are thus four norms for a 
politically successful economics. These norms are scientific ideals. Economic theories do 
not simply realise or fail them. They rather show them to a lesser or fuller degree. For 
that reason, I do not mention non-neutrality as a separate norm, for non-neutrality is an 
inevitable characteristic, not an aimed at scientific ideal. 
Suitable knowledge does, however, not only depend on the extent to which it 
satisfies previous norms. It also depends, as I argued in the previous chapter, on its 
content. From Neurath we learn that this content, i.e., the definition of the subject matter 
of a scientific discipline and the combination of disciplines used is conditioned by the 
problem in question, not vice versa. Neither a pre-defined subject matter of a discipline 
nor a pre-defined combination of disciplines will automatically lead to successful, i.e., 
ecologically relevant scientific knowledge. 
The community of ecological economists concentrates on the 'orchestration of 
the sciences", i.e., the problem of trans-disciplinarity. Starting from existing disciplinary 
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paradigms, ecological economists ask themselves which combination of social and 
natural sciences is needed to provide public policy with ecologically relevant scientific 
insights. This approach is very important, for economists need, indeed, ecological, 
physical, chemical and other natural-scientific insights in order to know which kind of 
ecological performance is problematic and, hence, which kind of economic institutions 
they should analyse. My research project, however, concentrates on the definition of the 
subject matter of economics itself, i.e., on the definition of a suitable economic paradigm. 
My analysis of both Pearce's and Bromley's theoretical work is meant as a contribution 
to the systématisation of economic paradigms. While "world socialism" is the ideal that 
structures Neurath's project of a unified science (Neurath 1922; 1928, 270-275), 
"sustainability" - in the sense presented in the introductory chapter - is the ideal guiding 
my research project. 
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Chapter 5 
A reconstruction of Pearce's 
economics 
In this chapter, I will reconstruct the writings of David Pearce1.1 will reconstruct Pearce's 
work from a particular perspective. I am interested, to start with, in his interpretation of 
"sustainability". I am interested, further, in the substantive kind of economic knowledge 
Pearce aims at. My reconstruction will illustrate that Pearce's economics shows more 
similarities with "environmental economies'' than with "ecological economics'', though it 
does not fit completely within Munda's classification (see section 2.2 in chapter 1 ) 2 . 
I asked Pearce - as I asked Bromley - to comment on my reconstruction of his 
writings. Contrary to Bromley, he took no notice of my request 
2 This classification irritates Pearce. It was one of the reasons Pearce mentioned 
for not taking notice of my request to comment on my reconstruction of his 
writings. This classification is, in Pearce's view, responsible for 'an inane waste 
of energy'. According to Pearce, this classification only diverts attention from 
real-world problem solving. Therefore, Pearce deliberately mixes up the use of 
both terms. While the publisher of one of his books introduces him as an author 
with 'a long-established international reputation in environmental economies', 
the title of the same book sounds as Economics and Environment. Essays on 
Ecological Economics and Sustainable Development (Edward Elgar 2000 
catalogue on economics). Though I agree that classifying economists leads to 
unjustified simplifications and generalisations, I join with the gradually 
common distinction between "environmental" and "ecological" economics (see 
section 2.2 in chapter 1). In this chapter, I will show that Pearce can rightfully 
be considered a representative of "environmental economics". This label should, 
however, be interpreted as an indication, not an explanation, of what Pearce's 
economics is about 
141 
Pearce is Professor of Environmental Economics at University College London 
and Associate Director of the Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global 
Environment (CSERGE). Next to his academic work, he has held a number of positions 
within rather political organisations. He was, for instance, personal advisor to the 
Secretary of State for the Environment. He was Commissioner of the World Commission 
on Forests and Sustainable Development. He was a member of the Sustainable 
Development High Level Advisory Board to the Secretary General of the UN and 
member of the Advisory Panel to the Vice President for Sustainable Development of the 
World Bank. 
Pearce's environmental economics is a kind of welfare economics. It is a 
welfare economics that considers the "public interesf from the perspective of 
"sustainable developmenf. In order to define "sustainable development", Pearce needs 
a 'materials balance model'. A materials balance model is a kind of bookkeeping model 
that expresses natural capital (energetic and material resources and the assimilative 
capacity of ecosystems) in physical terms. In order to incorporate such materials balance 
model into a welfare-economic paradigm, Pearce needs to translate these physical 
entities into monetary ones. This translation allows for, what is called in Pigovian terms, 
an internalisation of externalities. 
Pearce's welfare-economic approach illustrates, to start with, that he considers 
the relationship between an economy and its ecological performance as an external one. 
It is, secondly, based on a particular political assumption. It assumes that adapting the 
institutional organisation of an economy to the objective of "sustainable developmenf is 
a matter of adding economic institutions to the existing whole. It assumes, moreover, that 
the institutions to add should be derived from an aggregation of private preferences 
expressed in monetary terms. Pearce's environmental economics is, thirdly, based on 
the scientific assumption that scientific insights into the relationships between the 
ecological performance of an economy and its institutional organisation are impossible. 
1 Environmental economics as a 'materials balance 
model' 
According to Pearce, a first step within environmental economics consists of presenting 
the relationships between an economy and its ecological environment in an input-output 
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analysis3. Environmental economics is about understanding (and predicting) the external 
relationships between an economy and its ecological environment. These relationships 
can be made visible within a materials balance model. This model can be transformed 
into an ecological bookkeeping model by extending the original (monetary) input-output 
analysis with ecological in- and outputs (expressed in physical units). Understanding 
these relationships means having an overview of the regularities between ecological 
inputs and economic processes on the one hand and between these processes and 
ecological outputs on the other. 
1.1 An ecological Input-output analysis 
Pearce interprets an economy as a big box or matrix, made up of a series of smaller 
boxes or matrices (Pearce et al. 1990a, 31). Each matrix expresses an input-output 
relationship between two classes of elements of the economy. The input classes are 
commodities, industries and primary inputs; the output classes commodities, industries 
and final demand4. For instance, one matrix expresses the input of commodities into 
industries, another one the input of primary inputs into final demand, etc. (Pearce et al. 
1990a, 32). (Remark that not every combination of classes constitutes a matrix.) 
Pearce defines the different classes more precisely. A commodity is anything 
that is processed, exchanged and produced in the economy (for instance, a factory, a 
machine, a TV set or take-away meal) (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 31). Coal in the ground 'is 
not a commodity because ft has not been processed nor yet subjected to any exchange 
within the economy1. Industries are 'institutions that undertake economic activity in the 
form of production or providing a service'. Primary inputs refer to labour and capital, but 
3 Instead of using the concept "environment", I prefer to use the terrninology 
"ecological environment". This terminology allows us to distinguish between 
different aspects - either social or ecological - of human "environments". I also 
replace Pearce's concepts "environmental problems" by "ecological problems", 
because that is what Pearce means when dealing with "sustainable 
development". This terminology does not exclude that ecological problems can 
have and almost always have a social dimension. 
4 Pearce's representation of an economy is a (Leontief) input-output table 
(Pearce 1990a, 33). For more information about Leontief input-output analyses, 
see e.g. Lipsey & Steiner (1975 [1963], p. 469-473). 
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not to land. Final demand refers to the set of demands in the economy by final 
consumers, e.g. households. 
To recapitulate, Pearce's description of an economy is a kind of bookkeeping 
model. This bookkeeping model tries to make the empirical linkages and, hence, 
regularities between Input and "output" visible. It is meant to make predictions about the 
effects throughout the economy of changes occurring in any one sector (Pearce et al. 
1990a, 33; Lipsey & Steiner 1975,469). 
Pearce's theoretical need to take ecological problems into consideration 
prompts him to expand the above model of an economy to its ecological "environment". 
This expansion illustrates Pearce's interpretation of the relationship between an 
economy and its ecological performance. He sees this relationship as an external one, 
i.e., as a relationship between an economy on the one hand and an economy's 
ecological environment on the other. The economy and its ecological environment are 
deemed to be two systems which both have their own kind of internal relationships 
(Pearce et al. 1990a, 30 figure 2.1). 'Just as within the economy matrix the relationships 
studied are between economic entities, so within the environment matrix the entities 
studied appear to have no economic dimension' (Pearce et al. 1990a, 29-30). 
Consequently, in order to take the impact of economic changes on the ecological 
environment (and wee versa) into consideration, Pearce adds two more classes, the 
classes of "environmental" in- and outputs, to his bookkeeping model. The input of 
ecological entities refers to all in situ natural resources, classified as land, air and water; 
the output of ecological entities refers to the output of waste products for which the same 
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resources act as "receiving media" (Pearce et al. 1990a, 29;34)5. (Pearce remarks that 
all economy boxes are in money terms, while the ecological boxes are in physical terms 
(Pearce et al. 1990a, 34).) The basic aim of Pearce's extension of input-output analysis 
is to make the linkages between an economy and its ecological environment visible. 
Such extended l-O analysis 'permits us to reflect on just what the environment does for 
the economy' (Pearce et al. 1990a, 35). 
5 Contrary to Pearce, I propose to avoid the terms "environmental goods and 
services" and to replace them by the terms "ecological entities" or "ecological 
phenomena". I already argued why I prefer the concept "ecological" to 
"environmental". I prefer the terms "entity" or "phenomenon" to "good or 
service", because the latter terms suggest that all ecological entities are ipso 
facto economic entities. Since, as Pearce himself writes, natural resources or 
waste that are not processed, exchanged or (intended to be) produced are no 
commodities, one should not label them as "goods or services". As I explained 
in section 2.1.3 of chapter 3, it is economic institutions that define ecological 
entities as economic goods or services. This conceptual specification does not 
exclude the possibility that ecological "phenomena" that are not economic 
"commodities" nevertheless have an economic (use) value. 
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1.2 A materials balance model 
Pearce's ecological bookkeeping model is based on what he calls a 'materials balance 
model' (see Figure 1) (Pearce et al. 1990a, 41). This model represents the economy-
ecological) environment interactions in a (more or less) circular way. 
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Figure 1: The circular economy (Pearce 1990a, 40) 
Production P is aimed at producing consumer goods C. (In this model, Pearce 
treats capital goods, K, as a kind of - intermediate - consumer goods. Capital goods are 
consumer goods that will produce other consumer goods in the future.) The purpose of 
consumption is to create "utility" U or welfare. R stands for natural resources. W stands 
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for waste. Waste arises at each stage of the production process. The processing of 
resources creates waste, as does production and consumption. Pearce's materials 
balance model thus captures at least two functions of our ecological environment, 
namely the ecological environment as a reservoir of resource inputs to production and as 
the ultimate repository of waste products. 
Pearce describes an economy as circular. He agrees with Boulding that the 
Earth can be compared with a spaceship (Boulding 1966). The earth has only one 
external source of energy, solar energy. It moreover has a finite stock of resources. 
Since, according to the First Law of Thermodynamics, one cannot destroy or create 
matter and energy, humans have to recycle - or make sure that the environment is able 
to recycle - the resources used up as much as possible. This recycling makes of the 
economy a circular system. The box r stands for the recycling of waste. As the picture 
shows, not all waste is recycled in the economy. Part of it ends in the environment. 
Recycling can never be complete, because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This 
law tells us that materials and energy used in the economy tend to be used entropically, 
i.e. they get dissipated within the economic system. It is impossible to gather these 
dissipated materials and energy completely. The reasons Pearce mentions for this 
impossibility differ. Materials cannot be recycled completely because recycling is too 
costly or technically unfeasible. Energy cannot be recycled completely because what 
remains after the use of an energetic resource is not itself an energetic resource. 'Even if 
we capture the carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels, it does not create another fuel. 
We can capture some of the sulphur oxides and recycle the sulphur, but we cannot 
recycle energy" (Pearce etal. 1990a, 38). 
Pearce's materials balance model analyses the box R a bit further. The 
resources box R comprises two types of natural resources. Exhaustible resources ER 
cannot renew themselves. Their regenerative capacity {y) is, from a human point of view, 
zero. They include such resources as coal, oil, and minerals. Renewable resources RR, 
on the contrary, have the capacity to renew themselves (y > 0). This capacity, however, 
is only actual on condition that humans do not harvest the renewable resource in 
question at a rate faster than the rate at which it regenerates. A renewable resource can 
only be a renewable resource if the rate at which humans harvest it (ft) is less than its 
regenerative capacity (y). 
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Pearce's model also reflects on the ecological environment as a waste sink. 
The ecological environment has a capability to take wastes and to convert them back 
into harmless or ecologically useful products. This capability is called the ecological 
environment's assimilative capacity. As long as the quantities and qualities of waste 
disposal are commensurate with this assimilative capacity, the economic system 
functions - dixit Pearce - as a natural system (except that it still draws down the stocks of 
exhaustible resources). The assimilative capacity of the ecological environment is, 
according to Pearce, itself a renewable resource. This renewable resource can be 
converted into an exhaustible resource if waste disposal overburdens it. 
The utility U in Pearce's model highlights a third function of the ecological 
environment next to its functions as resource supplier and waste assimilator. The 
ecological environment supplies utility directly in the form of aesthetic enjoyment and 
spiritual comfort. This third function can, among other things, be damaged through 
excessive disposal of waste6. 
1.3 Conclusion 
Pearce understands an economy on the one hand and its ecological environment on the 
other as two separate spheres that, however, show some external linkages. The 
ecological environment is at the same time a provider of natural resources and a 
repository of waste. These external linkages show that an economy Is dependent on its 
ecological environment. This dependence can be represented in a 'materials balance 
model'. In this model an economy is considered to be connected to its ecological 
environment in a "circular" way. The ecological environment is the sphere where to get 
natural resources and where to put waste. This dependence can be presented in an 
Input-Output analysis by adding two classes, the classes of ecological inputs and 
outputs, to the original Input-Output model. While the latter model is expressed in 
6 Pearce's 1990a materials balance model is misleading in at least one respect It 
does not make clear that, in order to recycle waste within the economy, one 
needs a supplementary amount of resources. In Turner et al. (1994, 18), an 
adjusted materials balance model of a circular economy is presented. In this 
picture the extra primary material and energy inputs needed for recycling are 
made explicit 
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monetary terms, the former classes are - at least provisionally - expressed in physical 
terms. 
2 Environmental economics as a kind of welfare 
economics 
Pearce's materials balance model and the accompanying bookkeeping model is but a 
first step within environmental economics. These models only make the external 
relationships between an economy and its ecological environment visible. They do not 
yet offer ways to transform an "unsustainable'' economy into a more "sustainable" one, 
i.e. to make an economy as "circular" as possible (either by recycling as much waste as 
possible or by harvesting at rates lower than regenerative capacities). And that is what 
environmental economics is about: it is about "sustainable development". In order to help 
public authorities to make their economy ecologically more "sustainable" economics 
should be considered, in Pearce's view, as a kind of welfare economics. Welfare 
economics is a toolbox for economic policy that is based on neo-classical theory. 
Environmental economics, as a kind of welfare economics, takes "sustainable 
development" as its interpretation of "the public interest". in the next subsections, I will 
deal with both Pearce's interpretation of the neo-classical paradigm and with his 
conception of an ecologically suitable welfare economics. 
2.1 A neo-classical approach 
Pearce is very dear concerning the paradigm he prefers to use for dealing with 
ecological problems. After a short introduction into different pre- and post-war economic 
paradigms (Pearce etal. 1990a, Chapter 1), he states that 'we have a great deal to learn 
form our horizon-expanding application of modem [neo-classical; MD] economics, and 
that the search for "alternatives" is premature' (Pearce et al. 1990a, 31). 
In order to clarify what Pearce means by an expansion of modem neo-classical 
economics I will compare what Pearce, as an economic scientist, does with Weber's and 
Robbins' definition of economics (see section 2 in chapter 2). As I mentioned before, 
Weber distinguishes three kinds of socio-economic phenomena: economic, economically 
relevant and economically conditioned. In his view, phenomena are (pure) economic 
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insofar as and only as long as our interest is exclusively focused on their constitutive 
significance in the material struggle for existence (MSS 65). Weber's definition of 
economic phenomena is an expression of his conviction that social phenomena only 
have meaning from a specific, value-related perspective. Phenomena are economic on 
condition that they are human actions taking place under three conditions: 1) competition 
between different desires which long for satisfaction, 2) limitation of the capacity to 
desire and of the actual goods and labour forces which are useful for the satisfaction of 
desires, and 3) a specific kind of coexistence of different people afflicted with the same 
or similar desires, but equipped with different stocks of goods to their satisfaction, and 
competing with each other for the means of satisfaction (GAW 389). 
Weber's definition of the subject matter of economics partly corresponds to 
Robbins'. For Weber both the form and the domain define the subject matter of 
economics. Robbins works with a so-called analytical definition. The analytical definition 
differs from a classificatory one in that it focuses on the form of human action, not on the 
domain in which human actions occur. According to Robbins, every activity, in so far as it 
involves making choices between alternative means to fulfil competing desires, falls 
within the scope of economic theory. Robbins' analytical definition allows for an 
application of economic theory to domains outside the economic sphere. Public-Choice 
theory is, as I explained in section 3.1 of chapter 2, an example of such application. It is 
an extension of mainstream economics into the political domain. Weber would not agree 
with such an expansion of pure economics to domains outside the economic sphere. For 
him, pure economic phenomena occur in an institutional context that is deliberately 
created or used for economic ends (MSS 64). 
From the brief summary of Weber's and Robbins' definition, I conclude that, in 
order to define how Pearce understands the subject matter of environmental economics, 
we should ask for both the domain and the form of human actions Pearce wants to 
analyse. The latter question can be answered rather quickly. As an adherent of modem 
neo-classical theory, Pearce focuses, as Weber and Robbins do, on human actions that 
have the form of making choices under conditions of relative scarcity (Pearce 1993a, 1-
4). Neo-classical theory succeeded in describing this kind of economic actions by falling 
back on the theory of marginal utility. This theory consists of a set of economic laws and 
is limited to economic actions that answer to certain boundary conditions concerning, for 
instance, the nature of homo oeconomicus. According to Pearce, in its modem version 
the neo-classical model has homo oeconomicus holding the preference structure of 
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indifference and operating on the basis of constrained satisfaction or utility maximisation 
(Pearceefa/. 1990a, 10). 
It takes a little bit more time to explain Pearce's understanding of the domain of 
environmental economics. Initially, the concentration of neo-classical theory on scarcity 
allowed, according to Pearce, for an analysis of both sides of the market, namely supply 
and demand. Neo-classical economists analyse actions in the real world that result of 
interactions between productive activity and the preferences of individual buyers 
constrained by the feasible range of choice and income. Original neo-classical theory is 
meant to investigate price determination and market structures (Pearce et al. 1990a, 10). 
Or, in other words, the domain of neo-classical theory initially was the economic sphere, 
of which markets are the central entities. Pearce proposes to expand the original domain 
of neo-classical theory to deal with ecological problems. The domain of environmental 
economics covers the economy and its ecological environment (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 29-
30). More specifically, environmental economics concentrates on the interactions 
between economy and ecological environment. This means that environmental 
economics is not so much concerned with interactions between ecological phenomena 
that 'appear to have no economic dimension' (as, for instance, the interactions between 
water supply and fisheries, forests and water supply, forests and soil quality, prey and 
predators, and so on) (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 29-30). It rather investigates 'how the 
demand for steel affects the demand for water, how changing the size of the economy 
("economic growth") affects the functions of the environment, and so on'(Pearce ef al. 
1990a, 30). In other words, economists take an interest in ecological phenomena as far 
as they become more or less scarce. Relative scarcity of ecological phenomena urges 
economic actors to make choices. To conclude, the relative scarcity of (some) ecological 
phenomena makes them formally fit for an economic approach. Reformulated in Weber's 
terminology, Pearce expands the original domain of neo-classical theory, i.e. the market 
economy, to include ecological phenomena that, because of their relative scarcity, are 
either economically relevant or economically conditioned. 
Expanding the domain of neo-classical theory in order to enclose economically 
conditioned or economically relevant ecological phenomena is not unproblematic. Within 
the market sphere individuals have fairly clear information where to base their choices 
on. Commodities sold and bought on markets tend to be visible, their characteristics are 
generally well known, and they have a price. Ecological phenomena, on the contrary, 1) 
often have no price, 2) often have no clear characteristics, and 3) often cannot be 
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understood as market-like commodities. They have no price since markets for them are 
lacking. They have no clear characteristics since the impacts of ecological phenomena -
global warming, for instance - are uncertain and, consequently, there is limited 
information about the benefits of avoiding damage by undertaking control measures. 
They often do not act like commodities in a market place, since they have the 
characteristics of - what Pearce indicates as - "public goods", namely joint consumption 
and non-exclusion (Pearce 1993a, 3-4). (In section 2.1.3 of chapter 3,1 explain why 
Schmid prefers the term "joint-impact good" rather than "public good". The latter term 
refers to institutional choices rather than to physical - or ecological - characteristics of 
the particular ecological phenomenon.) The "relative scarcity" of ecological entities is 
thus not very clear to economic actors. The discipline of environmental economics 
considers it as its task to make this relative scarcity more explicit. For that reason, it 
develops techniques in order to 'impute a value' to ecological entities (Pearce 1993a; the 
italics are his)7. These techniques are meant to find a willingness to pay measure in 
circumstances where markets are lacking in order to reveal that information. To 
conclude, environmental economics searches for techniques that replace market forces 
in order to supply ecological entities with a monetary, i.e. exchange, value. 
These techniques are (or, better, should be, according to Pearce) based on a 
particular theory of valuation: the theory of Total Economic Value (e.g. Pearce et al. 
1990a, chapter 9; Pearce et a/.1993b, 100; Pearce 1993a, 15-22). Total Economic Value 
consists of use and non-use values. Use values enclose direct (e.g. the output of forest 
products, energetic and material resources) and indirect (e.g. ecological functions such 
as watershed protection, storm buffering, waste assimilation) values and option values 
(values which relate to the desire to keep the possibility for future use open). Existence 
values are non-use values. They refer to valuations of environmental assets purely for 
the sake of keeping them into existence, unrelated to either current or optional use. 
Pearce acknowledges that Total Economic Value does perhaps not enclose yet the 
7 Note that Allen V. Kneese as., who (re-)introduced the materials balance 
model to 'describe the movements of physical materials through the economy to 
supplement models describing the movements of dollars' (Ayres 1978, 36-37), 
disagree completely with Pearce in this respect They stress that economics 
becomes ecologically irrelevant as soon as it translates physical ecological 
scarcities into monetary terms. (With thanks to Jan van der Straaten for this 
remark. See, for a further elaboration, van der Straaten 1990,56-60.) 
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complete total economic value. 'Now total economic value [...] relates to these individual 
functions and services (called secondary values). But total secondary value does not 
encompass the primary value of the system itself, its life-supporting functions and their 
"glue value' that holds everything together and therefore has economic value. We cannot 
directly estimate primary value, but ft serves to remind us that total economic value is an 
underestimate of the "true" value of the environment' (Turner et al. 1994,38). 
2.2 Environmental economics in the service of "sustainable 
development" 
Following Pearce's explanation, environmental economics is a kind of welfare 
economics. Welfare economics takes a "public" perspective. It starts from a preliminary 
belief in the political desirability of economic behaviour (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 11). It has 
allocative efficiency as its guiding criterion. This criterion is usually expressed in terms of 
the so-called Pareto-criterion. 'A Pareto optimum situation is one in which fi is impossible 
to make any individual better off without making someone else worse off, where "better 
off means "more preferred" and "worse off means "less preferred^Pearce ef al. 1990a, 
11). This criterion tells us that a Pareto optimum situation is a situation of competitive 
equilibrium (and vice versa), as long as a set of restrictive assumptions, for instance 
perfect information and absence of externalities, hold true. In case (negative) 
externalities do occur welfare economics justifies some government intervention. 
Externalities point to market failures. They are an indication that markets are not 
maximising collective welfare. Welfare economics considers government to be an ethical 
agent that is supposed to intervene in the market in the "public interesf. Government 
intervention means regulating markets directly - via "Command-and-Control" measures -
or introducing economic instruments - property rights, taxes, subsidies - that alter 
market signals (Pearce 1993a, 5). The task of welfare economists then consists of 
informing government 1) on the "value", i.e. the costs, of externalities and 2) on the 
economic instruments available to internalise these externalities, i.e. to transform their 
"value" into real costs, i.e., into market prices. 
Pearce acknowledges the value judgement implicit in the Pareto-criterion. 
Allocative efficiency says little about the distribution of costs and benefits within a time 
period or between time periods (Pearce 1993a, 93). Within a time period the use of 
efficiency as a guide to environmental policy assumes that the prevailing distribution of 
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income is socially acceptable, since it is that distribution which weighs individual 
preferences. Between time periods, the use of the efficiency concept, manifest in the use 
of discount rates, biases the outcomes of evaluation in favour of present and against 
future generations where costs and benefits in the future are both distant and significant. 
If these latter biases and the former distributions are deemed unacceptable, allocative 
efficiency should be replaced by another criterion. Both situations count, according to 
Pearce, as limits to monetary economic valuation. 
"Sustainable developmenf is such an other criterion (Pearce eJ al. 1990a, 24). 
Sustainable development means, according to Pearce, 'maximising the net benefits of 
economic development, subject to maintaining the services and quality of natural 
resources over time' (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 24). Formulated in other words, economic 
development is sustainable on condition that the level of well-being increases on the one 
hand, and that the (natural) capital remains constant on the other hand. Pearce here 
follows the approach of the World Commission on Environment and Development, which 
states that sustainable development implies some general rule about not impairing the 
capability of future generations to achieve the same level of well-being as the current 
generation (Pearce 1993a, 7-9). This rule is not compatible with cost-benefit approaches 
which would allow that future generations are made worse off compared to present 
generations if the gains to the present are deemed to be greater than the costs to the 
future. With regard to intergenerational problems Pearce chooses for a theory of justice 
as the guiding ethical principle rather than for utilitarianism. According to this choice what 
is considered right takes precedence over what is deemed good or, formulated 
differently, realisation of rights precedes the balancing of goods and bads, of benefits 
and costs. To recapitulate, Pearce proposes a teleological or consequentialist, more 
precisely: a utilitarian, approach for matters of intra-generational interest and an 
approach based on a theory of justice for matters of inter-generational interest. 
With respect to his utilitarian approach of intra-generational problems, Pearce 
initially interprets the concept "well-being" broadly. A rising level of wellbeing encloses a 
rising level of real income per capita ("economic growth"), but also an ameliorating 
"quality of life" (concerning the health of the population, educational standards and 
general social well-being) (Pearce ef al. 1989,1). From the perspective of neo-classical 
welfare economics, well being is to be deduced from individual or private preferences 
(Pearce 1993a, 13). The intensity of private preferences is expressed in terms of 
willingness to pay and willingness to be compensated. These kinds of willingnesses 
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express the economic value of goods and services. The economic value of goods and 
services bought and sold on markets equals their market prices. Since for ecological 
resources markets are often lacking and sometimes impossible (given the physical 
nature of the resource in question), environmental economics has developed (and is still 
refining) techniques for defining shadow prices. These techniques are based, as I 
explain in section 2.1, on a particular theory of valuation: the theory of Total Economic 
Value (Pearce ef a/.1993b, 100; Pearce 1993a, 15-22). Once ecological values are made 
explicit, i.e. expressed in monetary terms so that the relative intensity of individual 
preferences is measurable and the preferences of different individuals can be compared, 
one can aggregate these values and apply cost-benefit analyses to define the Total 
Economic Value of a specific (ecological) "good" (Turner ef a/. 1994, 94). Pearce's 
interpretation of well-being as an aggregate of private preferences expressed in 
monetary terms - either in market or "shadow" prices - implies that this initially broadly 
defined concept narrows to an interpretation of it as (ecologically adjusted) economic 
growth. 
With regard to inter-generational ecological problems, Pearce's interpretation of 
a constant natural capital is rather ambiguous. As mentioned above, Pearce is not 
always inclined to rely on individual preferences for defining and realising ecological 
protection. Searching for increasing per capita well-being - of which ecological protection 
is one aspect - is, in his view, only legitimate on condition that it is compatible with 
Intergenerational justice". In case a rising level of per capita well-being is not compatible 
with Intergenerational justice", Pearce presents "keeping the natural capital stock 
constant" as an acceptable translation of the intergenerational justice objective (Pearce 
ef al. 1990a, 238). From this rough translation, Pearce derives some "management 
rules". The first rule prescribes to make sure that the stock of renewable resources, the 
assimilative capacity included, does not decline. Therefore, one has to use renewable 
resources in such a way that the harvest rate is not greater than the natural regenerative 
rate and to keep waste flows to the environment at or below the assimilative capacity of 
the environment. The second rule prescribes to ensure that as exhaustible resources are 
depleted, their reduced stock is compensated for by increases in renewable resources or 
to allow for the fact that a given standard of living can be secured from a diminishing 
stock of resources. The second rule allows for substitutability between exhaustible and 
renewable resources and for substitutability between man-made and (exhaustible) 
natural capital. Pearce's management rules make this interpretation of a "constant 
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natural capital stock" resemble Munda's idea of "strong sustainability" (see chapter 1). 
This idea expresses that certain sorts of natural capital are critical and not readily 
substitutable by man-made capital. Therefore, the stocks of these sorts of natural capital 
should not change negatively over time. This requirement asks for non-monetary, bio-
physical indicators. 
However, Pearce leaves the door open for other interpretations of the 
Intergenerational justice" objective. To start with, Pearce points to three different 
interpretations of the prescription to maintain the natural capital stock (Pearce et al. 
1989,43-44; 1990a 52-53). First, a natural capital stock can be considered constant If its 
physical quantity does not change. Since there is no way of adding up the different 
physical quantities, the standard economic approach, however, searches to value each 
type of resource in money terms and to compute the overall aggregate money value. The 
constant capital stock requirement then means that the real value of the stock of natural 
assets is kept constant. Second, a constant natural capital stock can signify that the 
prices of natural resources are held constant in real terms. On condition that prices 
reflect absolute scarcity, constant real prices will imply a constant natural capital stock in 
this sense. Third, maintaining the natural capital stock could be interpreted as a natural 
capital stock that delivers a constant value of the resource flows. This interpretation 
allows quantities of natural resources to decline on condition that the prices of these 
resources rise in such a way that the total value is kept constant. With this latter 
interpretation, Pearce starts to skate on the thin ice, called "weak sustainability". 
Because, from an ecological point of view, it does not make much difference whether 
one holds on to this interpretation of a "constant natural capital" or to an interpretation 
that allows for substitution between natural and man-made capital. Pearce's latter 
interpretation quickly comes down to a utilitarian conception of Intergenerational justice". 
This implies that the distinction between intra- and inter-generational justice becomes 
obsolete and that "sustainable development" simply comes down to Increasing the 
(monetary) level of well-being". It comes down to the conventional economist's concept 
of "optimal allocation". In the words of Beckerman, an interpretation of "sustainable 
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developmenf as "weak sustainabilfty" makes the independent usefulness of the concept 
of sustainability redundant (Beckerman 1996,129)8; 
Pearce admits that the various interpretations of "constant natural capital" imply 
a relaxation of this requirement How far it is possible to relax this requirement depends, 
in Pearce's view, on the degree of substitutability between renewable and non renewable 
resources and between man-made and natural capital, on the power of technological 
progress to reduce the resource input to a unit gain in the standard of living, and on 
population growth. At the same time, Pearce warns us to be cautious with relaxing the 
constant capital requirement, for several reasons (Pearce ef al. 1989,37-43; 1990a, 48-
52). 
First, comparing the efficiency of natural resources with the efficiency of man-
made capital is a complex matter. To begin with, substituting man-made capital for 
natural capital will only be useful if the extra productivity of the man-made capital in 
question outweighs the extra natural resources needed to produce this capital. 
Moreover, natural resources fulfil other functions than man-made capital does. Natural 
capital - for instance, tropical forests, wetlands, the atmosphere and stratosphere, and 
so on - often fulfils life-support functions - climate regulation, watershed protection, and 
so on - which are not served by man-made capital. The productivity of man-made and 
natural capital, therefore, cannot be compared without taking the different "economic" 
functions of natural resources into consideration. Second, we lack a lot of insights in the 
functioning of ecological environments on the one hand and in the interactions between 
an economy and its ecological environment on the other. We face, in other words, 
considerable scientific uncertainties. Scientific uncertainties imply a danger of making 
mistakes that cannot be repaired: human interventions can cause irreversibilities. The 
presence of uncertainties and the awareness of possible irreversibilities together should, 
according to Pearce, make us circumspect about giving up natural capital. Third, 
With thanks to my colleague Henk van den Belt for this reference. Though I 
agree with Beckerman's critique on common interpretations of "sustainable 
development", I do not agree with his conclusion that the only "objective" 
contribution of economic knowledge consists of helping politicians to realise 
"optirnality", i.e. maximisation of 'the present value of welfare over whatever 
time period is regarded as relevant given one's views on inter-generational 
justice' (Beckerman 1996,139-140). 
157 
countries which rely rather directly on natural resources - the poorest countries which do 
not have the money to buy natural resources or vital commodities from other countries or 
to stimulate the education in and development of technological knowledge - should not 
be contented with maintaining a natural capital stock which only has a small margin of 
flexibility to external shocks, such as a few years of drought, a war or another dramatic 
crisis. They would better strive for bigger resource stocks in order to enlarge the margin 
of flexibility. 
Pearce allows for another kind of relaxation of the "constant natural capital" 
requirement by discussing which stock of natural capital has to be kept constant. Is it the 
stock existing at the point of time that decisions are being taken or is it a certain 
desirable stock, more specifically: an economically optimal stock (Pearce et al. 1990a, 
53-56; 1990b 4-9). An economically optimal stock can be calculated by comparing the 
costs of natural capital increases - i.e. the forgone benefits of not letting the natural 
capital stock increase - with their benefits. The natural capital stock is optimal at the level 
at which the difference between benefits and costs is at its maximum. In reality, two 
possibilities can occur. Either the existing level of natural capital is lower than the optimal 
level. In this case the sustainable development prescription of maintaining the existing 
stock - i. e. of not letting this stock decline - is consistent with the idea of maintaining an 
optimal stock. In this situation sustainable development means augmenting the stock of 
natural resources until it reaches the optimum level. Or the existing level is higher than 
the optimal level. In this case the sustainable development requirement is not compatible 
with the proposal to maintain the optimal level. This latter possibility shows that the 
criterion of inter-generational justice can easily be pushed aside for "economic" 
arguments, i.e. arguments of allocative efficiency. If this is the case the concept 
"sustainable development" is again redundant and the distinction between inter-
generational and intra-generational ecological problems is superfluous. 
This distinction between intra- and inter-generational ecological problems is not 
clear anyway. It is not clear where intra-generational problems stop and inter-
generational problems start, because of the simple reason that generations overlap 
(Pearce 1993a, 11). There is', Pearce writes, 'no consensus on how to integrate inter-
and intra-generational considerations into economic decision-making about the 
environment" (Pearce 1993a, 11). This confusion merely contributes to the redundancy 
of the 'sustainable development" idea. Consider, as an illustration, the following example 
offered by Pearce. Dealing with the problem of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which 
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deplete the ozone layer and thus indirectly cause increases in skin cancer due to higher 
levels of ultraviolet radiation, Pearce writes : 'Moreover, reducing CFC emissions is 
unlikely to be a cost-efficient way of preventing cancer even if this is the relationship. 
More sensible human behavior toward exposure to ultraviolet rays would be cheaper1 
(Pearce ef si. 1993b, 388). I do not deny that the present sunbathing behaviour often is 
exaggerated and not always very wise. However, basing acceptable transformations of 
the ozone layer on efficiency considerations, thus letting possibly change the originally 
rather safe human environment so much that humans must adapt their individual 
behaviour to a more or less great extent, sounds to me as poking fun at the idea of 
Inter-generational justice". 
Pearce gives us some arguments in favour of maintaining the existing stock 
above the optimal level. First, he points to the problem of identifying the "optimum". The 
identification depends on which costs and benefits one is willing to take into 
consideration. It depends, for instance, on whether one is only inclined to recognise 
direct economic functions or whether one also acknowledges other functions (for 
instance, the "direct utility" function and life-support functions). Identifying the optimum is 
defining ft and vice versa. Moreover, it remains an open question whether life-support 
functions (such as contributions to geo-chemical cycles) can be expressed in terms of 
costs and benefits. Second, awareness of uncertainties and irreversibilities pleads in 
favour of the risk-averse strategy of conserving what there is. Uncertainties are related to 
our imperfect understanding of the life-support functions of natural environments and to 
our limited capability to substitute for those functions even if their loss is reversible in 
theory. Third, optimality tends to be defined in terms of economic efficiency, whereas 
conservation of the natural capital stock serves other social goals, e.g. distributional 
goals both within current generations and between current and future generations. 
Fourth, research on the use of willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept measures 
shows very large discrepancies between willingness-to-pay for a small increase in the 
size of a specific environmental asset and the willingness-to-accept a small decrease in 
ft. Compensation requirements often are very much larger. This suggests that what 
exists is seen as a reference point and that attitudes to possible losses of destroying 
what already exists are quite different to attitudes to possible gains of creating what does 
not exist yet. Put another way, the discrepancies between willingness-to-pay and 
willingness-to-accept demonstrate that, according to the perception of many people, the 
optimal and the existing level coincide. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
Pearce conceives of environmental economics as a kind of neo-classical economics. In 
agreement with Robbins' formal interpretation of economics, Pearce considers the fact 
that some people evaluate particular ecological entities or phenomena as scarce as an 
indication of their fitness for an economic approach. It is, according to both Robbins and 
Pearce, the formal characteristic of scarcity that defines the domain of economics. This 
interpretation allows for an expansion of economics from the typically economic domain 
of market forces to the domain of ecological phenomena. This expansion can, however 
not occur, without providing scarce ecological phenomena with a price. 
"Sustainable development" is the criterion from which to derive prices of scarce 
ecological phenomena. This criterion means a rising level of well-being - a matter of 
utilitarianism - with regard to intra-generational ecological problems. It means a constant 
natural capital stock - a matter of justice - with regard to inter-generational ecological 
problems. Since Pearce keeps the door open for two kinds of relaxations of the concept 
"constant natural capital stock", either by defining this stock in monetary terms or by 
being satisfied with an "optimal" stock, the inter-generational-justice part of "sustainable 
development" easily vanishes. (The distinction between intra- and inter-generational 
ecological problems is difficult to make anyhow.) Since Pearce translates, moreover, 
well-being into the aggregate of private preferences expressed in monetary terms, 
"sustainable development" comes easily down to "maximisation of welfare", the old-
fashioned economist's concept of "optimality". In Beckerman's words, the whole 
"sustainable developmenf idea then gets redundant. 
3 Environmental politics 
According to Pearce, environmental economics is about providing public authorities with 
"institutions" - either Command-and-Control measures or "economic instruments" such 
as property rights, taxes, subsidies - that allow for an internalisation of ecological 
externalities. In this section, I will argue that an interpretation of ecological problems as a 
matter of externalities testifies of the ambiguity of the concept "allocative efficiency". This 
interpretation gives, moreover, rise to a particular interpretation of the genesis of 
economic institutions and, hence, of politics. It gives rise to an interpretation of 
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environmental politics as a matter of economic calculations. This interpretation relates to 
the assumption that scientific insights into the ecological performance of an economy are 
impossible. This deemed impossibility leaves two "sustainability" problems unresolved. 
3.1 The ambiguity of the concept "allocative efficiency" 
Ecological externalities are (external) relationships between an economy and its 
ecological environment that are evaluated negatively. In Pigou's words, an external 
economy (or externality) is 'a service or disservice rendered to persons other than the 
contracting parties' (Pigou 1952,192; cited in Dietz etal. 1994,44). External economies 
can be both positive and negative. Ecological problems are examples of negative 
externalities. Welfare economics interprets (negative) externalities as "market failures", 
i.e. as indications that existing markets do not allocate scarce natural resources 
"optimally". Market failures cause discrepancies between "private" and "social" costs. 
Consider the following example (Dietz et al. 1994, 44-45). When an entrepreneur 
discharges the heavy metals liberated during the production process in a river, he 
passes on part of his production costs to society. These production costs are the costs to 
bring the quality of the water in the river back to the original level. In this case, 
consumers who buy the products of this entrepreneur do not pay the full price, since the 
costs of water purification are not included. Because of this discrepancy between 
"private" and "social" costs, the increasing scarcity of pure water is a blind spot within an 
economy. Or, in neo-classical terms, the allocation of production factors is not optimal. 
This neo-classical line of reasoning is ambiguous. To understand externalities as an 
indication that production factors are not optimally allocated testifies of the ambiguity of 
the concept "allocative efficiency". I will discuss this statement more extensively. 
According to the Pareto-criterion, an allocation of production factors is optimal 
in case it is impossible to make any individual better off, by allocating production factors 
differently, without making someone else worse off, where "better off means "more 
preferred" and "worse off means "less preferred" (see 2.2). According to neo-classical 
theory, private preferences are, however, not known. They can at most be revealed in 
the choices economic actors make. Consequently, the results of market forces - the 
commodities produced by producers and bought by consumers - are revelations of this 
private preferences, though one has to accept that these revealed preferences would 
perhaps be otherwise in case producers' and consumers' rationality would not have been 
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bounded, transactions costs would have been less, and initial distribution of income 
would have been more fair. Consequently, either neo-classical theory interprets 
economic actors' choices as revelations of their preferences (accepting the triple 
restriction of bounded rationality, existence of transaction costs and a particular initial 
distribution of income). In that case, whatever results of market forces should be 
interpreted as Pareto-optimal. Or neo-classical theory interprets the results of market 
forces as a non-optimal allocation of production factors. This implies that neo-classical 
theory either "knows" that some choices do not reveal some private preferences (but 
how can it know?), or that it uses a different criterion to evaluate the results of market 
forces as non-optimal (e.g., initial distribution of income is deemed unfair, transaction 
costs are deemed to high, economic actors' rationality is deemed too bounded, or some 
other - for instance, ecological - reason). If the latter is the case, then the meaning of the 
concept "optimal allocation" has shifted. Stronger, it has changed its originally 
independent meaning for a meaning dependent on an external criterion9. 
In order to remove the ambiguity of the concept "allocative efficiency", I 
propose to reserve this concept for evaluating the separate actions of economic decision 
units. These actions occur within the institutional whole of a specific economy. The 
allocation of production factors through these actions can only be made more efficient by 
ameliorating the bounded rationality of individual economic actors. Only individual 
economic actors can judge whether the choices made satisfy their private preferences in 
an optimal way. Neo-classical economists can at most help them to make better choices 
by providing them with more information, i.e. by making their rationality less bounded. 
Ameliorating this bounded rationality is what neo-classical theory is about. Neo-classical 
theory and, hence, welfare economics, holds an individualistic perspective. It is meant to 
help individual economic actors - either households, firms or even public authorities - to 
manage their scarce resources as economically as possible given their private interests. 
The concept "allocative efficiency" cannot be used to evaluate the performance of an 
economy as a whole. As soon as one starts to evaluate the institutional organisation of 
an economy, one (implicitly or explicitly) falls back on a different criterion. To 
recapitulate, allocative efficiency can at most refer to the performance of individual 
economic actors within a given institutional organisation of an economy. Allocative 
9 Another interesting analysis of the concept "efficiency" - and comments 
similar to mine - can be found in Tiles and Oberdiek 1995, chapter 2. 
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efficiency cannot refer to the performance of a given institutional organisation of an 
economy. 
3.2 Economic institutions as a matter of economic calculations 
Since Pearce judges the ecological performance of present-day economies as non-
sustainable, he aims at correcting economies. Correcting economies means adding 
institutions - Command and Control measures or "economic instruments" such as taxes, 
subsidies, property rights - to the existing ones (rather than transforming the existing 
institutional organisation). How does Pearce derive the institutions to add? 
In order to understand his line of reasoning , we should first consider an 
economy that is deemed to show no externalities. In such an economy, prices reveal 
willingness to pay, say private preferences. These prices result from market forces, say 
from the given institutional organisation of an economy. Consider now an economy that 
shows some externalities. These externalities are indications that the existing 
institutional organisation of an economy should be corrected so that the prices resulting 
from the corrected market forces reveal private preferences again (or, in welfare-
economic language, so that the discrepancy between private and social costs 
disappears). In order to know which institutions to add, one thus has to know private 
preferences. Since these private preferences are not revealed in the existing economy, 
one has to ask for them. Environmental economics has, therefore, developed techniques 
to let people state - rather than reveal- their private preferences. These techniques aim 
at finding a willingness to pay measure in circumstances where markets are lacking to 
reveal that information. Such willingness-to-pay measure asks for a translation of private 
preferences into monetary terms. According to neo-classical theory, economic values 
must be expressed in monetary terms in order to make comparisons possible between 
different kinds of values - the different kinds constituting Total Economic Value -, 
between the values of different goods and services, and between the values of different 
individuals. Once private preferences are known in monetary terms, they can be 
aggregated and cost-benefit analyses can be applied. From this information, economists 
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can deduce institutions to add to the existing institutional organisation so that the 
calculated environmental protection level can be realised10. 
According to Pearce, deciding on economic institutions is a matter of economic 
calculations. I should deal with this view of Pearce more extensively in order to clarify 
some of the underlying political assumptions. Pearce's view assumes, to begin with, that 
people only have private preferences. Private preferences concern wants and desires 
that can be fulfilled in real or hypothetical market-type situations (Pearce ef a/. 1990a, 
237). Each market situation offers a set of goods and services between which individuals 
can choose given their own income. Private preferences thus regard private choices out 
of a given choice set. Choice sets themselves depend on the existing (or hypothetical) 
institutional organisation. Deriving institutions from private preferences thus overlooks 
the possibility that people can have political preferences for some desirable institutional 
organisation, rather than private preferences within a given institutional organisation. 
I should remark, that, according to Pearce, definition of the desirable 
ecological protection level does not necessarily result from economic 
calculations. His principle of intergenerational justice, translated as a "natural 
constant capital" allows for a definition in bio-physical terms. This does, 
however, not alter my argument that, in his view, the derivation of economic 
institutions allowing for the realisation of this desirable level is a matter of 
economic calculations. Welfare economics is, after all, about allocative 
efficiency. The economic institutions economists recommend are those that 
allow for a cost-effective realisation of desirable ecological protection levels. 
One could further remark that my argument is at most valid in case economists 
recommend so-called "economic instruments", rather than Command-and-
Control measures. According to Swaney, the distinction between these two 
forms of economic institutions is overblown (Swaney 1992). He states that the 
dichotomy between market and command and control is false because both 
market and regulation are nothing more than sets of man-made rules that govern 
behaviour. He illustrates his statement with several examples. Consider, for 
instance, the following one. 'When the FDA proposed regulation to require fast-
food restaurants to post nutritional information, was this regulation a market 
rule to improve market information and efficiency, or was it another example of 
a command rule, reducing market efficiency? Consumer groups believed the 
former, and the fast-food industry embraced the latter. Implementation of this 
rule increased consumer freedom (to make better informed decisions at lower 
cost), while reducing McDonald's freedom to minimize costs' (Swaney 1992, 
626). 
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Pearce's economic approach closes the possibility off to solve ecological problems by 
discussing desirable institutional organisations that define different choice sets and 
different (revealed or stated) private preferences, it denies, in other words, citizens' 
political autonomy, i.e. their capability to shape their social context through political 
processes. Though Pearce does not necessarily overlook the logical hierarchy between 
the political and the economic sphere (the fact that politically decided on - though 
possibly economically calculated - institutions are logically prior to economic actions), he 
allows for (what I called in section 4.4 of chapter 2) a reverse hierarchy between both, 
since he considers of political interests as resulting from predetermined, short-term 
economic interests. In this respect, his conception of politics comes down to Buchanan's. 
According to Buchanan, politics is about the kind of legal restrictions we can expect 
individual actors of the type homo oeconomicus to acknowledge and to accept as the 
political constitution that allows them to strive after their private interests without further 
restrictions - i.e. without having to care about other people's welfare - and with an 
optimal realisation of the private interests of all economic actors as a result (see section 
3.2 in chapter 2). 
Pearce's view assumes, further, a particular interpretation of values. He 
assumes that values cannot be "rationally" justified, but that people simply happen to 
have certain values rather than others. For that reason, economic institutions can only be 
derived from existing private preferences, not from "considered" ones (Pearce ef al. 
1990a, 227; 237). Existing private preferences are preferences conditioned by the 
existing institutional organisation. They are not reflected on, not debated on within a 
deliberative democracy. They are not Imagined" as they could be within a desirable 
institutional organisation. Taking private preferences serious is, according to this value 
interpretation, what democracy is about. 'We tended not to ask where the preferences 
came from, or whether they were "good or bad" (subject to the law, that is). This is 
because cost-benefit approaches try to be "democratic" by using individuals' preferences 
rather than some expert's view. Otherwise the way is open for the "tyranny of the expert" 
whereby expert values are imposed on others' (Turner ef al. 1994, 132). This 
interpretation of private preferences leads to an interpretation of politics as a bargaining 
process. The most political actors can do is bargaining or negotiating with each other till 
they reach some equilibrium level. Even stronger, the requirement to express private 
preferences in monetary terms leads to an interpretation of negotiating as calculating. To 
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conclude, Pearce's welfare-economic approach with regard to ecological problems is 
based on a conception of environmental politics as a matter of economic calculations. 
3.3 Adding economic institutions: two problems of 
"sustainability" 
Pearce's conception of welfare economics as the theoretical paradigm from which to 
derive the economic institutions that public authorities should add to the existing 
institutional organisation of an economy leaves two problems of Sustainability 
unresolved. First, Pearce's concept of "sustainable development" - a concept that 
(ultimately) derives ecological conditions from private preferences - can at most by 
accident contribute to a "sustainable" economy, i.e. an economy of which its ecological 
performance is manageable or, in other words, an economy in which responsibility 
towards future generations is not an idle endeavour. Second, Pearce cannot justify why 
adding economic institutions should really solve the ecological problems dealt with rather 
than keep them down. I will discuss these two problems into greater detail. 
To start with the first problem, my thesis is that the aggregate of people's 
private preferences - i.e. preferences conditioned by the institutional organisations of 
existing economies - does not necessarily lead to an ecological performance of an 
economy that is "sustainable", i.e. "manageable" with respect to both present and future 
generations. This is because such (aggregates of) private preferences are not 
necessarily realistic. The ecological conditions needed - given actual technological 
possibilities - to satisfy such (aggregates of) private preferences may be at odds with 
existing ecological conditions. 
Pearce is aware of this possible shortcoming. In his view, however, this 
shortcoming is inherently related to present-day common beliefs that ecological 
problems should be solved in a democratic way. Pearce introduces himself as an 
adherent of - a non-deliberative version of a - political democracy. He states that 
"sustainable development" should be the result of a political democracy. The social 
dimension states simply, but powerfully, that a sustained society is also a truly 
democratic society with rights of expression, dissent, participation, self-reliance and 
equality of opportunity. Political and economic structures have to deliver social as well as 
environmental sustainability' (Pearce 1993c, 185). At the same time, his confidence in 
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existing democracies is rather simmering. 'Yet, it must be said that the present society is 
supported by a democracy that is led to believe that its best interests are served by 
minor adjustments to the status quo'. And Pearce continues expressing his doubts 
concerning the ecological feasibility of democratic choices: 'However, it is still doubtful 
whether even the very basic needs of at least one billion of the world's poorest people 
can really be met without an enormous convulsion in the denial of expectations over 
future consumption of materials and energy amongst the very wealthy. Moreover, 
existing experience provides little support for the hope that it is technically possible to 
bring the existing global population up to the living standards of, say, France, without 
environmental disruption on an enormous scale' (Pearce 1993c, 184). 
Second, in case particular ecological problems are internally related with a 
particular institutional organisation of an economy, the theoretical arguments for 
justifying adding institutions to the existing institutional organisation rather than 
transforming this organisation are lacking. Pearce cannot convince us that economic 
institutions added will do more than combating symptoms rather than removing reasons. 
And empirical data suggest that combating symptoms, rather than removing reasons, is 
what happens most of the time. Consider again the following statement of the 
Netherlands' National Institute of Public Health and the Environment: The reduction 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions, acidification and eutrophication will not be met, 
even after implementation of the measures contained in the national Environmental 
Policy Plan 3(NEPP3). These measures cannot fully compensate for the increasing 
environmental burden of the growing economy" (Environmental Balance Sheet 1998). 
Pearce acknowledges the "sustainability" problems related to basing ecological 
policy on (aggregates of) private preferences. His "constant natural capital" proposal is 
meant as a trial to counter this possible shortcoming. He admits that this proposal 
formulates ecological conditions - conditions that can be monitored via his materials 
balance approach - that are at most necessary but not sufficient. A sufficient set of 
conditions would include institutional requirements for implementing sustainable 
development policy and it may even require systematic changes in social values, Pearce 
writes (Pearce et ai. 1990b, 4). To fulfil this institutional task, economists lack, according 
to Pearce, an "existence theorem". An existence theorem would relate the scale and 
configuration of an economy to the set of environment-economy interrelationships 
underlying that economy" (Pearce et al. 1990a, 42). In my words, it would make the 
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internal relationships between the institutional organisation and the ecological 
performance of an economy understandable. 
Pearce himself does not believe in the feasibility of scientific investigations 
concerning the relationships between the institutional organisation of an economy and its 
ecological performance. He states that the scientific elaboration of an existence theorem 
is an idle endeavour (Pearce ef a/.1990a, 42). He rejects such institutional investigations 
as premature undertakings. After a short overview of different economic paradigms -
Pearce distinguishes a classical, a marxist, a neo-classical and humanist, an 
institutional, and an ecological and co-evolutionary paradigm - he concludes that we 
have a great deal to leam from our horizon-expanding application of modem [neo-
classical] economics, and that the search for "alternatives" is premature' (Pearce ef al 
1990a, 1-28; 31). Pearce is content with a search for what he deems to be necessary, 
though not sufficient, sustainability conditions, conditions which he derives from a 
mixture of economic analyses (cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, materials balance 
analyses) and political judgements (concerning the meaning of intra- and 
intergenerational justice, concerning the scope of relevant valuations, concerning 
appropriate methods to detect such valuations, concerning prudent behaviour, and so 
on). He is confident that a neo-classically-inspired trial-and-error approach suffices to 
deal with ecological problems. Environmental policy 'should be seen as an iterative 
search process based on a "satisfising" (extended rationality) rather than an optimising 
principle' (Pearce etal. 1990a, 20)11. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Pearce's welfare economic approach interprets "sustainable developmenf finally as a 
matter of "allocative efficiency". It assumes that the institutional organisation of an 
economy must be corrected in order to allocate scarce ecological resources more 
effectively. I object to this view. The concept "allocative efficiency" cannot be used to 
evaluate the ecological performance of an economy. In case this performance is 
1 1 1 would not deny that environmental policy is an iterative search process, but I 
state that it makes a difference whether this search process is one-sidedly based 
on neo-classical insights or that it is also fostered with institutional insights. 
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evaluated negatively, the criterion used is not "allocative efficiency" but particular 
ecological standards. 
Pearce's welfare economic approach aims, moreover, at ameliorating the 
ecological performance of an economy by adding institutions to the existing institutional 
whole. This approach is based on particular political assumptions. It assumes that 
private preferences - revealed or stated within a given institutional organisation - are 
politically relevant. It assumes, moreover, that a political democracy consists of 
respecting and aggregating private preferences. These assumptions lead to an 
interpretation of the political genesis of economic institutions as a matter of economic 
calculations. 
Finally, Pearce's welfare economic approach cannot scientifically justify that 
the institutions added will contribute to the ideal of "sustainability" for two reasons. First, 
because private preferences do not necessarily respect the ecological conditions needed 
to satisfy them. Second, because institutions added do not remove reasons for, but at 
most combat the negatively evaluated ecological performances. These scientific 
shortcomings relate to the welfare-economic incapability to offer insights into the internal 
relationships between the institutional organisation and the ecological performance of an 
economy. According to Pearce, aiming at such insights is an idle and premature 
endeavour. 
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I situated David Pearce's theoretical work in the tradition of 
environmental economics. Pearce's economics is, indeed, a specialisation of neo-
classical economics. It is a kind of welfare economics that considers the "public interesf 
from the perspective of "sustainable development". "Sustainable developmenf is a 
typically neo-classical translation of "sustainability". "Sustainable development means, 
according to Pearce, maximising the net benefits of economic development, subject to 
maintaining the services and quality of natural resources over time. This latter sentence 
of Pearce suggests that Pearce is in favour of a "strong" rather than "weak" sustainability 
(which would prevent from classifying his work fully within the tradition of environmental 
economics). Pearce states that certain sorts of natural capital are critical and not readily 
substitutable by man-made capital. He defends, therefore, an ecological protection level 
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that shows a non-negative change over time in stocks of specified natural capital. 
Pearce's argument for a "constant natural capital stock" is, however, open to many 
interpretations. How to measure whether the natural capital stock is constant? Should 
the stock of separate natural resources be kept constant or the aggregate stock? Should 
the (aggregate or separate) stock be measured in physical or in monetary terms? Which 
stock of natural capital should be kept constant, the existing or the optimal one? These 
questions illustrate that relaxations of Pearce's original ideal of "strong sustainability" are 
easily made. "Strong sustainability" easily comes down to "weak sustainability" and 
"weak sustainability" easily comes down to old-fashioned "economic efficiency". 
A particular contrast underlies Pearce's "sustainable development" project. On 
the one hand, his project is based on the belief that science is capable of monitoring the 
ecological environment and of managing it at an optimal level. Pearce's ecological Input-
Output analyses and his materials balance model are meant to serve these monitoring 
and managing goals. Pearce's project thus assumes a scientific control of our ecological 
environment that allows for an optimal (rather than, for instance, sufficient) use of natural 
resources. It assumes, in other words, a scientific control of our ecological environment 
that allows for economic growth on the boundary between safe and unsafe natural 
resource use, though it admits that this boundary is not very well known and that, 
therefore, irreversibilities cannot be excluded. On the other hand, his project is based on 
a complete disbelief in the capability of science to provide (comprehensible rather than 
bookkeeping) insights into the relationships between the institutional organisation and 
the ecological performance of our economies. 
Two political assumptions underlie Pearce's "sustainable developmenf project. 
First, Pearce assumes that political democracy is a matter of aggregating the private 
preferences individuals happen to have. He assumes, more precisely, that ecological 
policy is a matter of aggregating the private preferences individuals happen to have for 
the protection of particular natural resources. Second, he assumes that ecological 
politics is about adding economic institutions to the existing whole, rather than 
transforming this whole. Pearce can, however, not convince us that adding institutions 
will bring aggregate economic action into a sustainable direction. 
Despite previous critical comments, we should recognise that Pearce did 
pioneering work. To start with, he convinced many of his colleagues that ecological 
problems are worth of their attention. He integrated ecological problems within the 
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conventional, neo-classical paradigm by interpreting the "public interesf of welfare 
economics as "sustainable development". He pleaded, further, for a broad interpretation 
of "the economic value" of ecological entities, by introducing the concept Total 
Economic Value". He argued, finally, for institutional adaptations of our industrial 
economies in order to make them, via trial and error, more sustainable. Many policy 
documents of various member states within the European Union testify of Pearce's 
influence. Pearce's interpretation of "sustainable developmenf undoubtedly prevails 
within political circles. 
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Chapter 6 
The nature of Pearce's 
economics 
In this chapter, I will elaborate on the nature of Pearce's environmental economics. In the 
first section, I will explain that Pearce considers his environmental economics as both 
non-neutral and objective. Objectivity means, in line with the positive tradition of neo-
classical economics, empirical validity. Contrary to the positive tradition, Pearce 
acknowledges that scientific objectivity does not imply neutrality. Nevertheless, he 
believes that the specific non-neutrality of his environmental economics is justified, i.e. 
does not contradict scientific objectivity, because the values underlying his non-neutral 
perspective are practically valid. 
In the second and third section, I will argue that, in line with Weber, Pearce 
considers his environmental economics as a toolbox for ecological policy. Consequently, 
he often stops acting as a descriptive scientist and starts acting as a prescriptive 
scientist. He prescribes the political objectives that should dominate ecological policy. 
Moreover, Pearce looks in the first place for instruments with which to manage people's 
behaviour into the direction of "sustainable developmenf. His environmental economics 
cannot provide people with theoretical models that help explain the relationships 
between the existing institutional organisation of an economy and its existing ecological 
performance. 
In section four, I will present Pearce's environmental economics as a partial 
science. It is a partial science because it does not offer insights into (economic sources 
of) political power relationships. In line with Buchanan's interpretation of politics, it 
considers political deliberation as an exercise of balance given existing power 
relationships. 
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1 Non-neutral objectivity 
In line with the "positive" tradition in neo-classical economics, Pearce believes in the 
objectivity of his environmental economics. In Pearce's view, economic science is 
objective on condition that it is empirically valid, i.e. based on empirically observable 
data, logically consistent and mathematically rigorous. At the same time, he 
acknowledges the non-neutrality of a welfare economics aiming at "sustainable 
development" and the non-neutrality of the welfare-economical criterion of Pareto-
optimality. In Pearce's view, non-neutrality does not contradict objectivity. I agree with 
this, though I do not agree with the arguments Pearce mentions to justify this 
combination. According to Pearce, non-neutrality does not contradict objectivity on 
condition that the non-neutral perspective is practically valid. 
1.1 Objectivity as practically valid non-neutrality 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 2.2), Pearce acknowledges the value 
judgement implicit in the Pareto-criterion. Pearce does not have any reservations to call 
"sustainable development" a value word either. '[I]t embodies', he writes, 'personal ideals 
and aspirations and concepts of what constitutes the "good" society" (Pearce ef al. 1989, 
1). At the same time, he discerns 'in all writing on sustainable development [...] a 
common thread, a fairly consistent set of characteristics that appear to define the 
conditions for sustainable development to be achieved' (Pearce ef al. 1989,1). These 
conditions concern a rising level of well being on the one hand, and keeping the (natural) 
capital constant on the other hand. This latter observation restores, in Pearce's view, the 
objectivity of environmental economics. For Pearce considers "sustainable development 
as a societal value that can be empirically observed, in other words, Pearce considers 
"sustainable development as a practically valid societal value. 
Two objections can be made to Pearce's interpretation of objectivity as 
practically valid non-neutrality. The first objection is one we can directly borrow from 
Weber. Weber strongly contests the idea that the non-neutrality of science becomes 
legitimate - i.e., that non-neutral science becomes objective - as soon as the values 
defining the scientific perspective can be empirically observed (see section 1.1 in chapter 
2). Weber argues that a scientist should not be contented with the 'conventional self-
evidentness of very widely accepted value-judgments' (MSS 13). On the contrary, he 
considers the questioning of those things which convention makes self-evident as a 
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specific function of science. Considered from the perspective of a deliberative 
democracy, Weber is right. Political debates benefit from an input of a variety of 
(scientific) non-neutral perspectives. One-sided scientific input based on prevailing 
values limits, rather than stimulates political deliberation. 
The second objection regards Pearce's assertion that the values defining his 
scientific perspective can be empirically observed. I do not agree with this statement, for 
three reasons. In order to make the concept "sustainable development" operational, 
Pearce has to make a lot of evaluative choices that are not justified by empirical 
observations. Such choices concern, to begin with, Pearce's definition of Total Economic 
Value as the kinds of values economists should take into consideration. They regard, 
secondly, his interpretation of these values as private preferences1. They relate, thirdly, 
to the use of money as a measuring rod. This requirement is not empirically valid, 
because it compels people to treat values that are, according to their perception, not 
commensurate as if they were commensurate or, stated differently, it compels them to 
treat all phenomena as commodities that can be sold and bought. This requirement 
denies, for instance, refusals to put a monetary value on buildings or sites of special 
cultural and historical importance, on specific nature phenomena, or even on human 
lifes2. These refusals can be considered expressions of the conviction that some values 
are higher-order values than economic valuations and that they, consequently, cannot be 
treated on an equal footing. Higher-order values refer to values embodied in institutions 
that logically precede and condition economic valuations. This monetary requirement is, 
moreover, not empirically valid because of the many empirically unjustified normative 
1 Pearce admits that interpreting values as preferences is a non-neutral choice. 
Consider the following quotation: 'To the economist, economic value arises if 
someone is made to feel better off in terms of their wants and desires. [...] What 
economic valuation does is to measure human preferences for or against 
changes in the state of environments. It does not "value the environment'" 
(Turner etal 1994,38). 
2 "The same ideas can be found when dealing with the existence of an army, a 
monarchy, a Rubens painting, a Shakespeare poem, a piece of music by Mozart, 
the sight of migrating raptors and storks on Gibraltar, an attractive partner, the 
Amsterdam canals, a Marquez novel, the Matterhorn, Delphi, the Atlantic coast 
of Portugal, a nation, human rights, or an educational system. There is no price 
for these goods and that in this view, is the best option' (Briassoulis & van der 
Straaten 1999, p. 125). 
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choices inherent in the various economic valuation techniques. The simple fact that both 
(marketed) commodities and (non-marketed) ecological resources can be expressed in 
monetary terms (due to the invention of certain "techniques" such as hedonic pricing, 
contingent valuation and the travel-cost method) does not yet justify comparisons 
between them. Prices depend on specific institutional contexts. For that reason, 
comparing real prices (related to an existing institutional context) to shadow prices 
(related to a hypothetical or not even hypothetical^ existing institutional context) is a kind 
of deception. The simple fact that both are expressed in monetary terms does not 
guarantee that their respective monetary units relate to the same standard and, 
consequently, comparisons are not justified. 
To conclude, Pearce acknowledges the non-neutrality of his environmental 
economics. Since non-neutrality is inevitable, one cannot blame Pearce's environmental 
economics for that. Contrary to Pearce's conviction, however, his non-neutrality is not 
practically valid. Even if it were practically valid, Pearce's non-neutrality would not 
contribute to scientific objectivity. Scientific objectivity is independent of the practical 
validity of the value-related perspective. 
1.2 Objectivity as non-neutral empirical validity 
In the history of economic theory neo-classical theory is commonly considered to be a 
"positive" science. A positive science is deemed to be both objective and neutral. The 
idea of science underlying neo-classical theory is taken from the natural sciences. 
According to Robbins, the laws of economics must conform to 'our conception of science 
in general: that is to say the formation of hypotheses explaining and (possibly) predicting 
the outcome of the relationships concerned and the testing of such hypotheses by logic 
and by observation. [...] I am pretty sure that all the positive propositions of economics 
conform to this description. In this context, therefore, we may regard them as falling into 
the same category of knowledge as astronomy, physics, and biology [...]' (Robbins 1984, 
xiv). In order to attain this natural-science-like goal of objectivity and neutrality, neo-
classical theory falls back on the following aids. 
It starts from basic assumptions that are firmly grounded in empirical reality. 
The theory of value, i.e., the theory of marginal utility is founded on the assumption that 
the different things that the individual wants to do have a different importance to him, and 
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can be arranged therefore in a certain order (Robbins 1984, 75). The theory of 
production needs a supplementary fundamental proposition, namely that the different 
factors of production are imperfect substitutes or, in other words, that a multiplicity of 
production factors exists (Robbins 1984, 76;115). The existence of uncertainty or 
ignorance concerning future scarcities is the basic proposition of the theory of dynamic 
change (Robbins 1984, 79;115). According to Robbins these assumptions are all 
'assumptions involving in some way simple and indisputable facts of experience relating 
to the way in which the scarcity of goods which is the subject-matter of our science 
actually shows itself in the world of reality" (Robbins 1984 ,78). For that reason, pure 
economics does not need controlled experiments to establish their validity and, for that 
same reason, there is less reason to doubt their real bearing than that of the 
generalisations of the natural science' (Robbins 1984,105). The ultimate constituents of 
the fundamental economic generalisations are known by immediate acquaintance; those 
of the natural sciences, on the contrary, are only known inferentially. Mind that with 
Immediate acquaintance" Robbins refers to psychic "evidence"; the basic premises of 
economics are derived from introspection (Mulberg 1995,64). To recapitulate, according 
to Robbins, empirical observation is a first element of an objective and neutral social 
science. 
A second and third aid for attaining an objective and neutral economics are 
formal logic and mathematics. Once the basic propositions are established, economic 
laws are logical deductions from these elementary premises (Robbins 1984,75-83). The 
truth of these laws depends on the logical consistency of the deductions. Both the 
evidence of the basic premises and the logical consistency of the deductions guarantee 
that the truths expressed in neo-classical laws are a-historical: invariable and eternal. 
Precisely these characteristics lend the truths of pure economics the status of a natural-
science-like law". Formal logic and mathematical rigour are thus, in Robbins' view, two 
other elements of an objective and neutral science. 
A fourth aid regards economic actors' means and ends. Economics considers 
ends as given data (Robbins 1984, 24-32). It assumes that human beings have ends. 
This assumption is necessary to define economic conduct and to make this conduct 
understandable. However, economics is not concerned with these ends as such. This 
means two things. Firstly, it means that it is not interested in the kind of ends that 
economic subjects have. It does not assume any specific psychology. '[Ejconomic 
subjects can be pure egoists, pure altruists, pure ascetics, pure sensualists or - what is 
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much more likely - mixed bundles of all these impulses' (Robbins 1984, 95). Neo-
classical economics treats individuals as isolated, autonomous subjects with given ends. 
For neo-classical theory, the mere existence of ends suffices. Secondly, it means that 
economists refrain from any judgement concerning varying ends. The fact that such data 
[individual ends; MD] are themselves of the nature of judgments of value does not 
necessitate that they should be valued as such. They are not judgments of value by the 
observer [i.e., the scientist; MD]. What is of relevance to economics is, not whether 
individual judgments of value are correct in the ultimate sense of the philosophy of value, 
but whether they are made and whether they are essential links in the chain of causal 
explanation' (Robbins 1984,90). Neo-classical economists respect given ends. They do 
not judge them. The economists' abstinence of judging individual ends is another 
element that is deemed to ensure the neutral objectivity of neo-classical theory. 
An analogue story holds for economic means: economic theory considers them 
as data too (Robbins 1984, 32-35). Economics does not inquire into technical arts of 
production, nor into the development of these techniques. It does not worry about the 
nature of scarce material and technical means; it is about conduct as a resultant of 
conflicting ends within an environment of given material and technical possibilities. '[T]he 
problem of technique arises when there is one end and a multiplicity of means, the 
problem of economy when both the ends and the means are multiple' (Robbins 1984, 
35). 
Finally, neo-classical theory presupposes a particular rationality. It 
presupposes that economic actors behave economically. Economics does not make 
ethical judgements concerning the kind of consumers' and producers' ends. It is meant 
to explain whether the achievement of given objectives happens in an economic way. A 
producer will produce economically if the type and the quantity of commodities he or she 
is making to the exclusion of other types and quantities is in conformity with the demands 
of consumers (Robbins 1984,50). If production is carried beyond these limits, producers 
are behaving uneconomical^. They produce waste in the sense that productive power is 
used to produce goods of less value than could be produced otherwise. This 
uneconomical producer's behaviour results in a definite financial loss for the productive 
enterprise concerned. In other words, economics states - by definition - that producers 
are striving for profit maximisation, since that is the way to produce economically. 
Consumers consume economically on condition that the commodities they buy satisfy 
their ends most fully, i.e. on condition that they secure their ends with least means 
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(Robbins 1984,143 ft). Economic(al) consumers are thus aiming at a maximisation of 
satisfaction. 
To conclude, neo-classical theory commonly has an aura of being both neutral 
and objective because it does not judge, but simply respects the values people happen 
to have, because economic rationality and other psychic assumptions are "evident", and 
because of its logical consistency and mathematical rigour. In other words, it is deemed 
to be both neutral and objective because it is empirically valid: it only "observes" ends, 
means, economic rationality and other psychic elements, it is logically consistent and 
mathematically rigorous. 
In Pearce's writings one can discern remnants of this conception of neo-
classical theory as a "positive" science. This becomes, for instance, manifest in his 
search for the value of ecological resources. He aims at what he calls "true" values, i.e., 
values as he finds them - without further judging them - in people's statements. The 
purpose of economic valuation is to reveal the true costs of using up scarce 
environmental resources' (Pearce 1993a, 5; the italics are mine). Gathering and 
respecting people's values is, in his view, a matter of democracy. That is why he 
conceives of this endeavour as a neutral enterprise. He, however, overlooks the non-
neutrality of the choices he has to make - defining the values that have to be taken into 
account, defining these values as private preferences, asking people to express their 
private preferences in monetary terms - before gathering this information. His normative 
choices follow, indeed, naturally from the non-neutral perspective typical of neo-classical 
theory. Neo-classical theory starts from given preferences and aims at mathematical 
rigour. In agreement with this line of reasoning, values have to be asked for and made 
commensurable by expressing them in one and the same monetary standard. 
Contrary to the "positive" interpretation of neo-classical theory, Pearce does 
not state that the assumption of economic rationality is a matter of neutrality. He, 
however, defends this non-neutral choice - and his choice for neo-classical welfare 
economics as a suitable approach to ecological problems - with the following argument. 
He writes: 'Since any economics needs value judgements, and in the absence of agreed 
meta-ethical criteria for choosing between value judgements, it cannot be argued that 
neo-classical economics and its Paretian value judgements are "worse" or tetter" than 
any other economic doctrine' (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 4). Note that Pearce's defence of the 
neo-classical choice for the assumption of economic rationality is compatible with his 
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general interpretation of the nature of values (see section 3.2 in chapter 5). Pearce 
deems this evaluative choice legitimate because he assumes that values cannot be 
"rationally" justified. Pareto-optimality is a legitimate value because it is a value neo-
classical economists simply happen to have. 
To conclude, in line with Robbins' interpretation of neo-classical theory, Pearce 
believes in the objectivity as empirical validity of environmental economics. In order to 
assure this empirical validity, 1) he asks for people's preferences in order to avoid 
scientists' judgements and 2) he asks to express them in monetary terms in order to 
allow for mathematical rigour. Contrary to Robbins, he does not interpret scientific 
objectivity as neutrality. He acknowledges the non-neutrality implicit in the construct of 
homo oeconomicus. 
2 Prescription rather than non-neutral description 
In section 2.1.3 of chapter 4,1 explained why Weber's interpretation of neo-classical 
economics as a toolbox for public policy is problematic. Instrumental relevance 
presupposes empirical validity (i.e., correspondence between scientific theories and 
human reality) and political (or practical) validity (i.e., conformity between the values 
underlying both the economic and the political perspective). Pearce adopts Weber's 
interpretation of neo-classical economics as a toolbox for public policy. More precisely, 
he considers his environmental economics as a toolbox for ecological policy. This 
implies, to start with, that Pearce does not remain a descriptive scientist, but starts acting 
as a prescriptive scientist. He acts, in other words, as a political actor in disguise. This 
implies, further, that he is more concerned with prediction than with explanation. In this 
section, I will deal with the first implication, while I will discuss the second implication in 
the following section. 
In previous section, I already argued that Pearce's environmental economics is 
not simply practically (or politically) valid, because it makes a lot of normative choices 
that do not simply correspond to the choices people happen to make. In order to solve 
this lack of correspondence, Pearce simply (but implicitly) prescribes the set of values 
that should constitute political objectives, namely precisely the set of values defining his 
welfare-economic perspective. Pearce's environmental economics thus is prescriptive, 
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rather than merely descriptive. It has to be prescriptive in order to be able to provide 
ecological policy with instrumental knowledge. 
Pearce's welfare-economic approach prescribes, to start with, that levels of 
natural resources and private values should be expressed in monetary terms. Neurath 
would strongly object to this neo-classical convention to reduce everything to one single 
monetary unit (Neurath 1917,123-126). In his view, the values of individuals are not 
commensurable, i.e., not reducible to one common measure. According to Neurath, the 
book-keeping-method typical of neo-classical economics does not inform us at all of 
natural processes or human happiness (Neurath 1931c, 342-343). He accuses political 
economists such as Hume and Smith of mixing time and again notions in kind with 
money calculations. In his view, these authors gradually introduced a capitalist 
calculation without adequate discussion of its consequences within the given social 
order. Finally, everything became reduced to costs and benefits. The application of these 
terms did not remain restricted to accountancy departments, but their use became 
generally accepted as adequate means for societal analysis. Economics became 
chrematistics (Neurath 1917,123-126). 
Pearce's welfare-economic approach prescribes, further, that the political 
objective of ecological policy is ("sustainable developmenf that easily comes down to) 
allocative efficiency. As a consequence, Pearce becomes an active defender of 
allocative efficiency, as soon as he starts working within a political context. Consider, as 
an illustration of Pearce playing this role of an active defender of allocative efficiency, the 
following quotation: 'In practice, standards are rarely set on the basis of cost-benefit 
considerations. [...] Most countries set standards according to public health criteria and 
the amount polluters can reasonably be expected to afford [...]. Only by accident, 
therefore, is the standard-setting procedure likely to produce an optimum [...]. This lack 
of attention to the efficiency characteristics of setting standards is one of the main 
criticisms that environmental economists make of real-world environmental policy" 
(Pearce ef a/. 1993b, 204). 
Pearce's environmental economics does not only prescribe "allocative 
efficiency" as the main objective of ecological policy. "Allocative efficiency" functions at 
the same time as a criterion with which to judge politics. Pearce very often distrusts 
government interventions because they are considered to yield less efficient outcomes 
than markets do. For that reason he prefers to restrict government interventions to solve 
181 
environmental problems which cannot be left to market forces (for instance, because 
they have the character of a joint-impact good). And in those latter cases of unavoidable 
government interventions, he prefers the economic incentives approach to the regulatory 
approach (see, for instance, his comments on environmental standard setting in Turner 
et al. (1994,190-191)). Allocative efficiency thus is the fundamental evaluative criterion 
with which he judges the outcomes of actual politics. This efficiency criterion can concern 
the realisation of either intra-generational welfare or inter-generational justice. 
In section 3.3.1 of chapter 5, I explained that allocative efficiency, as an 
independent criterion, only has meaning when referring to actions of economic decision 
units within a particular economy. As soon as one discusses the allocative efficiency of a 
particular economy, the concept loses its independent meaning. Neurath would agree. 
He objects that economic efficiency does not have meaning without referring to particular 
units. The (allocative) "efficiency" of a specific economy - a specific "order of life" - does 
not equal the aggregate of individual values. An economist can at most make 
"silhouettes" of different orders of life (Neurath 1944,962-963). A silhouette consists of a 
description of different features of a specific order of life which are deemed relevant for 
human happiness, for instance, its illiteracy, health, quality of human relations, freedom, 
food, shelter, clothing, employment, etc. These silhouettes result from "measurements in 
kind". A measurement in kind offers an overview of different units (such as the quantity of 
material and energetic resources present in certain places at certain times, the quantity 
and kind of labour force, the stage of technological development, etc.) and of their 
changing presence and application (Neurath 1917,116-117). Silhouettes are at most 
comparable with each other, but they are certainly not commensurable. There are no 
units that can be used as the basis of such a decision [to choose one or another order of 
life; MD], neither units of money nor hours of work. One must directly judge the 
desirability of the two [or more; MD] possibilities' (Neurath 1919b, 146)3. In Neurath's 
3 Consider the following example offered by Neurath and interesting from an 
ecological point of view: 'More difficult is the case where higher consumption 
of raw materials goes with less work. The question might arise, should one 
protect coal mines or put greater strain on men? The answer depends for 
example on whether one thinks that hydraulic power may be sufficiently 
developed or that solar heat might come to be better used, etc. If one believes 
the latter, one may "spend" coal more freely and will hardly waste human effort 
where coal can be used. If however one is afraid mat when one generation uses 
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view, measurement in kind is unavoidable, since one cannot reduce the efficiency of a 
silhouette to one unit. Measurement in kind (or "economy in kind") is the opposite of a 
money economics, which reduces all units to the money standard. 
The prescriptive nature of Pearce's environmental economics relates to the 
ambiguity of the concept "allocafjve efficiency". This ambiguity parallels the ambiguity of 
the economic scientist. Either the economist is (in a non-neutral way) descriptive, i.e. he 
does not evaluate market results according to an (implicit or explicit) criterion that is 
external to neo-classical theory. In that case, the only thing he can do is, given the 
existing institutional organisation of an economy, helping economic actors to make better 
choices by scientifically ameliorating their bounded rationality. Or the economist does 
evaluate market results - and the political decisions giving rise to them - according to an 
(implicit or explicit) criterion external to neo-classical theory. In that case, next to being 
(and being inevitably) non-neutral, he or she is even (though not necessarily) 
prescriptive. Welfare economists are - even Robbins agrees - in the latter situation. 
According to Robbins, welfare economics has to abandon the label of a "positive" 
science. In his view, the raison d'etre of welfare economics is the desirability to 
recommend public policy. Economic recommendations, however, can never be 'a matter 
of scientific demonstration', since it is not simply based on "objective" facts and logical 
deductions (Robbins 1984, xx), but also on rather arbitrary assumptions (Robbins 1984, 
57;63). Welfare economics 'depends upon the technical apparatus of analytical 
Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the 
realisation of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics' (Robbins 194, xxviii). 
To conclude, Pearce's environmental economics is prescriptive. It is 
prescriptive because it is used to evaluate political decisions and prescribe political 
objectives. Though Pearce concedes at times that citizens can have other political 
objectives than the objective of allocatfve efficiency, this latter objective emerges in his 
political recommendations as the single inclusive objective that is intended to 
accommodate all other objectives. Pearce's non-neutrality thus becomes problematic as 
soon as it does not only define the perspective from which to describe, i.e., to do 
too much coal thousands will freeze to death in the future, one might well use 
more human power and save coal' (Neurath 1928,263). 
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empirical observations, but also defines the criterion with which people should evaluate 
and citizens and politicians should decide. 
3 Prediction rather than explanation 
Pearce does not question the empirical validity of his environmental economics. To start 
with, he considers his 'materials balance model' as a contribution to its empirical validity. 
This model allows for a constant "monitoring" of ecological phenomena and of economic 
behaviour in order to be able to constantly re-adjust the relevant economic institutions. 
'[...] macroeconomic monitoring is not itself an instrument of sustainable development 
policy, but it is a precondition for rational 00110/ (Pearce ef a/. 1989,153). 'If an effective 
management of the natural and environmental and resource base is to be achieved, 
policy makers need to have access to a consistent, reliable and comparable data set, 
relating to the availability and use of such resources. Such information is gathered with 
increasing frequency at the national and international level and it would be difficult to 
over estimate the importance of these endeavours. One special approach, which is part 
of this exercise, is an attempt to present the relevant information within an [physical or 
monetary] accounting framework" (Pearce ef a/. 1989,93)4. 
Moreover, Pearce's belief in the empirical validity of environmental economics 
implies trust in the predictive power of economic instruments recommended. In his view, 
economic science is meant to provide public authorities with rational advice on 'both their 
objectives (or more strictly the implications of different objectives) and on the means to 
achieve these objectives' (Pearce ef al. 1990a, 21). Environmental economics as an 
instrumental science is a means to help public authorities to manage the environment via 
a management of the actions of producers and consumers. 'While [natural] scientific 
evidence is essential to identify the extent of the problem, the policy questions are 
largely ones for social science. The problem can only be addressed through changing 
human behaviour - altering the demand for environmental services and changing and 
4 Note that Pearce's materials balance model offers at most empirical 
regularities, but does not provide conceptual knowledge. It does not make - it 
even does not aim at making - these empirical regularities comprehensible. 
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controlling their supply. Indeed, a major feature of the modem environmental debate is 
the widespread acceptance of the role which economics must play in analysing causal 
processes of environmental decay and in formulating policy' (Pearce et a/.1993d, 2). 
Contrary to Pearce, Neurath strongly denies the empirical validity of neo-
classical theory. In Neurath's view, neo-classical economics fails as an empirical 
science, precisely because of its aiming at mathematical rigour and because of its 
reduction of economic rationality to economical rationality. 
To start with his first reason, Neurath states that neo-classical economics is 
under the influence of Auguste Comte's idea of a pyramidal structure of unified science. 
It considers the successful physical sciences as the exemplar of modem science and, 
impressed by its mathematical form, it introduces money calculations and reduces 
everything to single index numbers, which allow for a far going mathematisation. 'Value 
systems and whole mountains of value were constructed precisely in order to make 
mathematical methods applicable. Often this method is worked out very ingeniously, 
except that it fails just where it should lead to the derivation of complicated relations: 
namely, for a crisis' (Neurath 1931c, 398). As a consequence of its striving for 
mathematisation, economics became a theory which worried more about logical 
consistency than about its practical relevance for societal reality (Neurath 1917,117). 
With regard to the typical neo-classical reduction of the economic subject to 
homo economicus, Neurath states that science must develop from inductive 
generalisation (empiricism), rather than from abstract deduction (rationalism) (Neurath 
1941, 225). The ideal type of homo economicus rather resembles a metaphysical 
synthetic a priori that, just like the a priori use of mathematical methods, violates 
empiricist sensibilities (Cartwright ef al. 1996, 125-127). For on the one hand homo 
economicus is considered an isolated individual, whose values are independent from the 
values of other individuals. This contradicts Neurath's experience of humans as social 
beings, who take over the customs of their contemporaries that are influenced by 
tradition and by their material surroundings. On the other hand, homo economicus is 
deemed an autonomous individual, whose actions are considered to be completely 
defined by purposive motives. This is in contradiction with social behaviourism that 
shows human beings partly acting consciously and partly reacting unconsciously to 
stimuli (Neurath 1917, 109; 1931c, 411). Moreover, the homo economicus of neo-
classical theory is described as a self-interested individual endowed with economic 
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goods and one overarching motive, the profit motive (Cartwright et al. 1996,126). This 
ideal-typical description ignores altruistic motives of concrete living people. 
To conclude, Pearce's environmental economics aims - to use Dugger"s 
terminology (see section 2.3 in chapter 4) - for predictive models. It does not try to 
explain human behaviour by situating it as accurately as possible in its institutional and 
cultural context. It tries to explain human behaviour by deducing it from carefully 
specified assumptions. Not the empirical adequacy of the patterns developed matters. 
For both the basic assumptions - no matter how evident - and the assumption of 
economic rationality - that comes down to trivial economical rationality (see section 2.1.2 
in chapter 3) - are selected from an empirical reality that is much richer. In Weber's view, 
precisely these selective choices define the perspective of neo-classical theory and are 
illustrations of its non-neutrality. Neo-classical theory is mainly concerned with the logical 
consistency and mathematical rigour of its predictions. And Pearce's environmental 
economics is, in this respect, faithful to its neo-classical roots. 
4 Partiality 
In section 3 of chapter 4,1 worked out the idea of an impartial science as a science that 
stimulates citizens and politicians to act as free and equal individuals. In order to do that, 
it offers insights into sources of political inequality and of lacking political freedom. In 
order to stimulate political freedom, it clarifies the relationships between the institutional 
organisation on the one hand and the kind and distribution of existing private interests on 
the other. In order to stimulate political equality, it points to sources preventing a 
balanced expression of a variety of perspectives. Contrary to impartial science, partial 
science considers existing (distributions of) private interests as given. It offers insights in 
how to act strategically, given the existing distribution of political power, in order to 
realise a given goal as efficiently and as effectively as possible. 
Rather than helping citizens to abstract from their existing private interests, 
Pearce's environmental-economic approach invites them to stick to their given interests. 
This becomes obvious in his requirement to express values in monetary terms. This 
requirement asks people to make their valuations fit in their private income. 
To start with, this obligation leaves the possibility open that certain people have 
very little or no money available for something they, however, value very much. So-
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called "part-whole bias" of the contingent valuation method is illustrative for this 
possibility (Turner et al. 1994,126). If people are first asked their willingness to pay for 
one part of an environmental asset (e.g. one lake in an entire system of lakes) and then 
asked to value the whole asset (e.g. the whole lake system) the amounts stated may be 
similar. The reason for this appears to lie in how people allocate their spending. They 
first divide their income up into several broad budget categories (e.g. housing, food, car, 
and recreation) and they then subdivide each category between the actual items 
purchased. Consequently, the more environmental goods and services get endangered 
and are tried to impute an economic value on, the less money people have available for 
each good or service given their budget constraints. Put more extremely, the total 
economic value of environmental goods and services can never exceed the total sum of 
private incomes (and this is already an unrealistic limit situation, since people often have 
more urgent needs). The more ecological phenomena are threatened, the less their 
exchange value will be. 
The obligation to express economic values in monetary terms results, 
moreover, in valuations that privilege the preferences of the wealthier part of the 
population. Monetary valuation methods take current distributions of income as a starting 
point. Consequently, it is quite possible that, for instance, the same ecological damage 
that occurs in or nearby different countries gets completely different economic 
valuations. Briassoulis and Van der Straaten give the example of the EXXON Valdez oil 
spill on the Alaskan coast some years ago. As there are many US citizens and as their 
average income is one of the highest in the world, the (contingent) valuation result was 
very high. Had the same oil spill taken place on the coast of Denmark (a small country 
with only 5 million inhabitants and a relatively high income) the outcome would be a 
relatively low figure. With Gambia and Nicaragua, two small countries with a low level of 
income, the outcome would have been considerably lower than in the Danish case, and 
would have been a very small fraction of the Alaskan result (Briassoulis & Van der 
Straaten 1999,131)5. 
5 In Pearce's publications one can find an enumeration of the problems and 
limitations of the varying monetary valuation methods (e.g. Turner et al. 1994, 
114-128). In Pearce's view, these limitations are, however, no reason for 
discrediting these methods. 'However, we remain convinced that such valuation 
methods have an important role to play and, if carefully applied, provide valid 
187 
Pearce's political involvement - Pearce was and is involved with environmental 
policy within the UK, the EU and of the UN-organisation - provided him with several 
political experiences that made him sensible for political power relationships. His welfare-
economic approach does, however, not supply him with the intellectual aids to analyse 
(at least the economic sources of) these unequal power relationships. In Pearce's 
writings one can therefore discern an ambiguous position towards them. Either he 
provides public authorities with recommendations that he deems correct from his 
welfare-economic perspective but that are, nevertheless, unacceptable in actual politics 
(for instance, because of existing power structures or because of existing ideologies, 
values, world views) and he then blames public authorities for ignoring them. This way to 
deal with the problem can be heard in the following quotation: 'In practice, standards are 
rarely set on the basis of cost-benefit considerations. [...] Most countries set standards 
according to public health criteria and the amount polluters can reasonably be expected 
to afford [...]. Only by accident, therefore, is the standard-setting procedure likely to 
produce an optimum [...]. This lack of attention to the efficiency characteristics of setting 
standards is one of the main criticisms that environmental economists make of real-world 
environmental policy' (Pearce ef al. 1993b, 204). Or he adapts his recommendations to 
(his estimates of) existing power structures in order to augment the chance that public 
authorities will implement them. This kind of reasoning can be heard in this quotation 
(dealing with the issue of initial permits): The reality of the international political economy 
is likely to work against any system that allocates permits based on population. Such 
system would require assurance at the outset that international trade in permits would 
take place, otherwise the burden of adjustment would fall heavily and rapidly on the 
countries with high emissions per capita, such as the United States. In those 
circumstances, such countries are unlikely to agree at the outset. Grandfathering of 
some kind is likely to be the only initial allocation acceptable to the existing 
polluters'(Pearce etal. 1993b, 387). 
and reliable estimates. Explicit valuation via these methods is preferable to 
implicit valuations where the link to individuals and their preferences is unclear 
or non-existent' (Turner et al. 1994, 127). Therefore, Pearce pleads for a 'great 
deal more research' in order to ameliorate the techniques in question (Pearce et 
al. 1990a, 158). 
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To conclude, Pearce's environmental economics does not stimulate people to 
act as free individuals. Rather than helping people to abstract from their private interests 
- through providing them with insights into the relationships between the institutional 
organisation of the economy they live in on the one hand and the definition and 
distribution of private interests on the other -, it stresses and re-enforces the private 
interests people happen to have. Pearce's environmental economics does not help 
people to act as equal individuals either. It is not able to offer citizens and official 
politicians insights into the economic sources of political power relationships. It considers 
political deliberations as an exercise of balance between the various parties in a given 
power landscape. 
5 Conclusion 
Pearce's scientific approach is non-neutral. According to Pearce, his "sustainable 
developmenf ideal and the ideal of Pareto-optimality testify, indeed, of specific ethical 
choices. Pearce has no problem with acknowledging this non-neutrality. Pearce believes, 
nevertheless, in the (non-neutral) objectivity of environmental economics. Non-neutral 
objectivity is, in his view, identical with empirically observable data, logical consistency 
and mathematical rigour. These three aspects guarantee the non-neutral empirical 
validity of Pearce's environmental economics. Pearce considers, moreover, that the 
particular non-neutrality of his environmental economics is justified, for two reasons. 
First, because he deems the values constituting his particular non-neutral perspective as 
practically valid. One can, his line of reasoning goes, observe that (most) people aim at 
"sustainable developmenf. Second, because no convincing arguments exist to prefer 
another value to the value of Pareto-optimality. 
I do not contest that Pearce's environmental economics is, in a certain sense, 
objective. I do, however, not agree that the non-neutrality of his environmental 
economics is justified because it is practically valid, for two reasons. First, in order to 
make the ideal of "sustainable developmenf operational, Pearce has to make several 
normative choices that are not necessarily practically (or politically) valid. Second, 
practical validity of the values constituting a scientific perspective does not yet justify this 
perspective. I agree with Weber that scientists should not necessarily be contented with 
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prevailing values, but can take a critical stance towards them. A critical perspective is 
likely to stimulate political debates more than an "evident" perspective. 
Pearce considers his environmental economics as a toolbox for public policy. 
This interpretation causes Pearce on many occasions to stop acting as a descriptive 
scientist and to start acting as a prescriptive politician in disguise. Pearce does not show 
much sensibility for political objectives other than (ambiguous) "allocative efficiency". 
Allocative efficiency is, according to Pearce's environmental economics, an all-
embracing objective of ecological policy and a main standard with which to judge actual 
politics. This interpretation causes Pearce, moreover, to be rather concerned with 
prediction than with explanation. Pearce is not interested in explaining the internal 
relationships between the institutional organisation of an economy and its ecological 
performance. He is rather interested in monitoring the ecological in- and outputs of an 
economy, in making an inventory of the monetary values people impute to ecological 
entities, and in prescribing economic instruments that manage people's behaviour as 
effective and as efficient as possible - given neo-classical assumptions about economic 
rationality are empirically valid - in the direction of "sustainable development". Pearce's 
environmental economics is rather of an "exact" than of a "historical" kind. 
Finally, Pearce's welfare-economic approach is a partial science. It does not 
offer scientific insights into economic power relationships nor into the relationships 
between the institutional organisation of an economy and the definition and distribution 
of private interests. Instead of inviting political actors to abstract from their private 
interests, it stimulates them to stress the interests they happen to have. Instead of 
providing political actors with insights that offset existing power relationships, it re-
enforces the idea that politics is a bargaining process between various parties with given 
power and given interests. The interpretation of politics underlying Pearce's 
environmental economics bears more resemblance to Buchanan's than to Arendfs 
interpretation. 
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Chapter 7 
A reconstruction of 
Bromley's economics 
This chapter is a reconstruction of the writings of Daniel Bromley1. Bromley is a resource 
economist. He is professor at the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
(University of Wisconsin-Madison), where he teaches Institutional Economics and 
Natural Resource Economics. Next to his teaching and research activities, he works as a 
consultant within more political contexts such as, for instance, the World Bank and the 
Ministry for the Environment (New Zealand). 
Bromley's economics bears more likeness with ecological than with 
environmental economics (according to Munda's classification). Bromley's approach to 
ecological problems is, for instance, an institutional one (see section 1). His institutional 
analysis concentrates on property rights as one type of economic institutions and on 
property regimes as a hierarchical set of property rights (see section 2). Bromley 
recognises the impossibility of a value free science and criticises monetary reductionism 
(see the next chapter). From his writings one can, however, not unequivocally conclude 
that Bromley is an adherent of the "strong sustainability" criterion. His abstract 
interpretation of "sustainability" is not simply compatible with the idea of an "optimal" 
ecological scale (see section 4.3). 
Bromley's institutional perspective makes his approach, from the very 
beginning, more in agreement with the interpretation (proposed in chapter 3) that the 
Bromley commented on (an earlier version of) my reconstruction of his 
writings. I gratefully took his comments into consideration and integrated them 
as far as possible into the final version presented in this chapter. It goes without 
saying that I take full responsibility for this final reconstruction. 
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ecological performance of an economy is the counterpart of its institutional organisation 
than is Pearce's approach. Bromley's analysis of property rights and property regimes 
gives, for instance, rise to a particular understanding of externalities. This understanding, 
with which I deal in section 3, is one concrete illustration of this internal connection 
between ecological performance and institutional organisation. Bromley's analysis of 
property rights and property regimes is, however, not capable of explaining - what I 
referred to in chapter 1 as - the growing tension between the idea of sustainability on the 
one hand and general ecological tendencies on the other. In section 4,1 will argue that 
Bromley's attitude with regard to the distinction between the political and the economic 
sphere is ambiguous. On the one hand, he objects to the conventional idea that 
institutional changes of an economy are prompted by the only motive of allocative 
efficiency. He thus denies that the rationality of institutional change is simply economic. 
On the other hand, he is reluctant in distinguishing between political and economic 
rationality. In this same section, I will comment briefly on Bromley's own interesting, but 
abstract interpretation of "sustainability". 
1 An institutional approach 
Bromley's interpretation of an economy is constituted by two elements, namely by the 
rationality of economic actions and by the ensemble of economic institutions conditioning 
this rationality. To explain his interpretation of the subject matter of economics, Bromley 
refers to Oliver Williamson's approach (Bromley 1989, 40). Williamson is interested in 
economic agents' patterns of behaviour elicited from rules and conventions organising 
market transactions between economic decision units and hierarchical transactions 
within economic decision units. With regard to economic agents' behaviour, Williamson 
applies two behavioural assumptions (which Bromley retains): bounded rationality and 
opportunism. The former implies a limited ability of individuals to be perfectly rational in 
the face of non-trivial information costs, while the latter refers to the seeking of self-
interest with guile' (Bromley 1989,40). These behavioural assumptions make the subject 
matter of Bromley's economics resemble (a modem version of) what Robbins would call 
an analytical definition of economics2. The study of the rationality of economic agents' 
2 This interpretation of the subject matter of economics is also called the formal 
(Dietz et al 1994,15) approach. 
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behaviour is the first element in Bromley's interpretation of the subject matter of 
economics. 
The second element in Bromley's interpretation of the subject matter of 
economics regards the institutional organisation of an economy. Bromley defines two 
kinds of what he considers to be economic activities: commodity and institutional 
transactions (Bromley 1989, 49). Commodity transactions (or, in Williamson's 
terminology, market transactions) refer to the selling of goods and services. This kind of 
transactions comprises all activities that are consistent with the choice sets of 
independent economic actors, given the conventions and entitlements that define these 
choice sets. These transactions are in this sense "autonomous". According to Bromley, 
most of economics is concerned with this domain of commodity transactions. The 
second domain of economic activity concerns the conventions and entitlements that 
regularise the market processes through which commodities move. In this domain there 
are transactions over these conventions and entitlements. Bromley calls them 
institutional transactions. Institutional transactions are meant to transform the "rules of 
the game" that offer structure, order, stability and predictability to market processes. 
These latter fransactions are also more ore less "rational" and "opportunist", though the 
meaning of "rationality" with regard to institutional transactions differs from its meaning 
with regard to commodity transactions. While the latter kind of "rationality" is defined by 
the institutional structure of an economy, the former kind depends on changing economic 
conditions (such as technological innovation, population growth and changing tastes and 
preferences) that urge for institutional adaptations (Bromley 1991, 8).) Bromley pleads 
for an extension of the subject matter of (conventional) economics to this second 
domain. 'By recognizing both commodity transactions and institutional transactions, the 
economist will be able to see markets as manifestations of the legal foundations of the 
economy, and economics will then be seen not only as the study of the exchange 
processes that are defined by those foundations, but also as the study of those very 
foundations' (Bromley 1989, 49). The study of these legal foundations, i.e. of the 
institutional organisation of an economy, conforms to the ('old') institutional approach. 
For both Williamson and Bromley, the analytical and institutional element of the 
subject matter of economics cannot be separated. The institutional organisation of an 
economy influences economic agents' behaviour and vice versa: the ("rational" and 
"opportunist") behaviour of economic decision units influences an economy's institutional 
organisation. 
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I have two remarks with regard to Bromley's definition of the subject matter of 
economics. The first remark considers his interpretation of economic rationality as the 
(analytical) element defining this subject matter. In section 2.1.2 of chapter 3, I 
explained, with the help of examples offered by Bromley, that economic rationality is the 
same as economising rationality. I explained, further, that this kind of economising 
rationality should not be considered as typical for actions occurring in the economic 
sphere, but is implied in all kinds of instrumental actions. Since the private preferences of 
economic actors can, in principle, be both egoistic and altruistic, I see no reason to label 
this economising rationality as opportunistic. The examples offered by Bromley show, 
moreover, that the choices economic actors make cannot be equalled to their private 
preferences, that one can even not derive their private preferences from their choices, 
that one does not need to know their private preferences in order to know what 
strategies will become dominant in a particular institutional context, and consequently 
that one does not need to know their private preferences in order to make the social or 
ecological performance of a particular institutional organisation understandable. 
I agree with Bromley that one can discern a typical economic rationality. Typical 
for an economic rationality is that it is an economising rationality. This rationality is of an 
instrumental kind (see section 2.1.2 in chapter 3). Its end is optimal satisfaction of 
economic decision units' private preferences. This rationality is, however, not necessarily 
of an opportunistic kind. Economic actors' preferences can be of an egoistic or altruistic 
kind, but they are certainly private. Economic actors' preferences are, further, 
institutionally stimulated or tempered. This implies that economising rationality only gains 
concrete content (and thus manifests a particular social or ecological performance) 
within a particular institutional context. In other words, economising rationality becomes 
economic rationality within a set of economic institutions. This implies, contrary to 
Bromley's and Williamson's belief, that institutional change is not a simple matter of 
economic rationality. (I will come back on this topic in section 4.) This economic 
rationality is, finally, subject to limited information. 
My second remark considers Bromley's interpretation of institutional 
transactions as economic activities. I will argue, in section 4, that it is not obvious to label 
institutional transactions as economic rather than political activities. This second remark 
does, however, not detract from Bromley's assertion to consider of economics as the 
study of the legal foundations, i.e. the institutional organisation, conditioning economic 
activities. 
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Even stronger, since economising rationality only gains concrete content - and 
becomes really economic - within a particular economy, I believe that this study is the 
very essence of his approach. 
To recapitulate, to present Bromley's approach as an institutional approach 
does not contradict presenting it as an analytical approach. Bromley's institutional 
approach allows for making the abstract analytical approach more concrete. It aims at 
explaining the institutions that give concrete content to economising rationality. In other 
words, it aims at explaining what makes an abstract economising rationality a concrete 
economic rationality. Bromley's institutional approach does not imply that economic 
rationality should be interpreted as an opportunistic rationality. Individuals can try to 
satisfy egoistic as well as altruistic, but surely private preferences. This does, however, 
not mean that the institutions conditioning economic rationality directly result from (an 
aggregation of) private preferences. In section 4,1 will explain why we should consider of 
institutional transactions as showing a political rather than economic rationality. This final 
remark does not detract at all from Bromley's argument to consider of economics as the 
study of the institutional context conditioning economic activities. 
2 Economic institutions 
Bromley's theoretical work concentrates on properly rights and property regimes. He 
admits that property rights do not represent the whole set of economic institutions. This 
statement suggests that he has some idea of what makes institutions economic or, in 
other words, that he has some idea of what distinguishes an economy from other 
spheres within human reality. I will, therefore, in a first subsection deal with his 
interpretation of an economy as a particular sphere. In a second subsection, I will 
elaborate on his conceptual analysis of property rights and property regimes. 
2.1 The economic sphere 
Studying the legal foundations of an economy presupposes some idea of what defines 
an economy vis-a-vis other spheres within human reality. Some passages in Bromley's 
writings suggest that the set of ordered relations that constitute market processes are 
distinctive for an economy (Bromley 1989,47). A market is a regularised medium for the 
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exchange of entitlements to future benefit streams. Markets themselves are defined by 
the ways in which those entitlements to future benefit streams are defined, by the way 
the entitlements to them are transmitted, and by the way these exchanges are enforced. 
The set of ordered relations that constitutes an economy thus not only comprises the 
entitlements to future benefit streams. It also contains the legal foundations that define 
the exchange of entitlements and the ways in which this exchange can be enforced3. 
According to Bromley, the set of ordered relations that constitute market 
processes covers more than the institutions that define what markets - "market" taken in 
the broadest sense, to include all voluntary exchange - exist (Bromley 1989,41). It also 
covers those institutions that define how economic relations are regulated in areas where 
markets do not exist. To explain these extra-market economic relations Bromley 
introduces the concept 'decision unif (Bromley 1989, 51). Voluntary exchange takes 
place between decision units that came into existence by convention or by conscious 
collective action. Individuals can be economic decision units, but also families, firms, 
schools, hospitals, etc.. Decision units - as well as markets - are social organisations 
defined by institutions. As mentioned in section 2.1.1 of chapter 3, one can distinguish 
two kinds of institutions relevant for economic organisations (Bromley 1989,43). The first 
define an organisation ws-a- vis other organisations. The second spell out the internal 
nature of an organisation. 
Institutional anangements define the 'choice sets' of decision unite, i.e. of 
consumers and producers (Bromley 1989, 52-54). For consumers, the choice set 
consists of the set of all feasible bundles x of goods and services in some set X (a set of 
goods and services). A feasible bundle is a bundle of goods and services out of the set X 
that a specific consumer finds affordable, given his or her income. If Y represents the 
consumer's income and p = ( p * , p n ) is the price vector for the goods in a bundle, then 
3 The fact that Bromley defines an economy in terms of market processes, does 
not imply that he only has market economies in mind (Bromley 1989, 50). Both 
"centrally planned economies" and "market economies" are about the exchange 
of entitlements to future benefit streams. The aggregate of institutional 
arrangements, i.e. the prevailing structure of norms, conventions, rules, 
practices and laws that shape the choice sets of individuals or groups, differs, 
however, in both cases. In market economies institutional arrangements rather 
stress market processes than market outcomes, while in centrally planned 
economies rather the reverse is true. 
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the consumer's choice set will be the set B = fx in X; px < Y}. For producers, the choice 
set is the production set, say C. Changes in the aggregate of institutional arrangements 
change the choice sets of consumers and producers. These changes can follow from the 
introduction of new techniques that possibly allow for new products. They can also follow 
from, for instance, a legal ban on a chemical compound that turns out to be carcinogenic. 
To recapitulate, in Bromley's view an economy is defined by the ensemble of 
institutions that define markets - i.e. entitlements to benefit streams, the exchange of 
entitlements to these benefit streams and the enforcement of this exchange - and extra-
market relations - i.e. the type and internal nature of economic decision units -. Referring 
to section 2 in chapter 2, Bromley's conception of an economy takes - what I called - the 
overarching entry of the institutions defining economic goods, economic rationality and 
economic decision units as the entry constituting his perspective. The economic sphere 
is the sphere of the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. 
2.2 Property 
In his writings, Bromley does not investigate the whole set of institutions constituting an 
economy. He concentrates on property rights as one important subclass of the 
institutional arrangements that define an economy (Bromley 1989, chapter 7). In addition 
to property rights, Bromley mentions 'rules of contract, bankruptcy and credit" (Bromley 
1997, 43). The latter rules address transactional insecurity, while the former address 
possessional insecurity. Bromley calls the ensemble of the latter rules the legal 
foundations of exchange. The legal foundations of exchange concern the fundamental 
issue of securing contractual behaviour such that individual transactors need not 
undertake the task of enforcing their own exchange' (Bromley 1993b, 148). 
To comprehend property rights, one has, Bromley writes, to investigate three 
sets of variables: 1) the nature and kinds of rights that are exercised, and their 
correlative duties and obligations; 2) the individuals or groups in whom these rights and 
duties are vested, and those who play the correlative roles in the collectivity; and 3) the 
objects of social value over which these property relations pertain (Bromley 1989,203). 
Bromley's scientific analysis remains mainly restricted to the first and second element 
The first element regards a conceptual analysis of "property rights". 
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The second regards a conceptual analysis of "property regimes". I will deal with both in 
the following subsections. 
2.2.1 Property rights 
Bromley defines property rights as entitlements. Property rights - as all entitlements -
only have effect when there is some authority system that agrees to defend a rights 
holder's interest in a particular outcome. The effective protection the rights holder gains 
from this authority corresponds to a correlated duty for all others interested in this claim. 
'Rights can only exist when there is a social mechanism that gives duties and binds 
individuals to those duties' (Bromley 1991,15). 
Bromley distinguishes between different types of rights. He thereby follows 
Honore's analysis of ownership (Bromley 1989,187). Ownership is, according to Honore, 
defined by a list of eleven types of rights (Bromley 1989,187-190). The right to possess, 
i.e. the right to exclusive physical control, lies at the centre of the notion of ownership. 
The right to use is a second characteristic. A third characteristic is the right to manage. 
The right to manage refers to ancillary rights such as the right to admit others to one's 
land, the power to permit others to use one's things, and to set limits of such permission. 
The right to manage is the right to contract with others over the benefit stream which 
arises from their use of the valuable asset. The fourth and fifth characteristics are the 
right to the income and to the capital. The latter right comprehends the power to alienate 
the valuable item, or to consume it, or to destroy it. The sixth characteristic is the right to 
security: this is immunity from arbitrary appropriation by an external authority. The 
seventh characteristic, transmissibility to a successor, makes an asset more valuable. 
One's property diminishes to the extent that transmissibility is restricted. The eighth 
characteristic is absence of term. Absence of term means that full ownership runs into 
perpetuity. The interests of an owner are best served by a determinable time horizon, 
where longer is more valuable than shorter. Perpetuity is the most valuable time horizon. 
The ninth characteristic concerns the prohibition of harmful use (where the meaning of 
"harmful use" is a political matter; MD). The tenth characteristic concerns the liability of 
the owner's interest to be used to settle debts. This characteristic is called liability to 
execution". The eleventh and final characteristic is the right to residuary character. This 
right refers to social rules that govern situations in which ownership rights lapse. 
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These rules decide what to do when, for whatever reason, the pre-existing ownership 
rights are no longer relevant. 
Bromley notes that none of these eleven types of rights is a necessary 
constituent of ownership as such, individuals or groups will be recognised to own 
something in a restricted sense where one or more of these types of rights is not met. 
Yet the more complete is the list of characteristics, the more thorough is one's ownership 
of something valuable. And the more thorough one's ownership, the more valuable it is. 1 
guess, however, that ownership cannot exist without the right to possess. The right to 
possess lies, according to Honore and to Bromley, at the centre of the concept of 
ownership. But what does it mean to have a right to possess? Bromley, following Kant, 
distinguishes between empirical and intelligible possession (Bromley 1991,5). Empirical 
possession is about the physical appropriation of something. Physical appropriation, 
however, is only a necessary , not a sufficient condition for this thing to become my 
property. Only intelligible possession, i.e. a social convention or contract, constitutes 
property. The right to possess comes down to the assignment of certain rights with 
regard to some thing to an individual or a group, the recognition of these rights by the 
non-owners and the assurance to protect these rights by an authority. To conclude, the 
right to possess (in a physical sense) turns out to be nothing more than the possession 
(i.e. assignment, recognition and protection) of certain rights. Ownership thus is a rather 
abstract concept: it means that certain rights are assigned to a person or a group. The 
concrete meaning of ownership depends on the kind and content of the (property) rights 
that are assigned. The fact, for instance, that certain uses of a valuable asset are 
restricted, reduces the range of choice open to the owner of the asset. It does not 
diminish the content of ownership (Bromley 1989,188). Ownership is not the same as 
absolute control (Bromley 1991,159-161). 
Bromley stresses the distinction between properly as a set of entitlements on 
the one hand and properly as related to the notion of ownership on the other. Property 
as related to ownership refers, according to Bromley's exposition, to the rights, duties, 
liabilities and privileges of an owner with regard to the thing he or she owns. A person is 
an owner of some-thing valuable if he or she has specific property rights. This "thing" can 
be a physical object of value, such as a piece of land or 'an automobile, a house, a Dali 
original, or a violin' (Bromley 1989,185; 202) or some thing other than a physical object, 
such as 'job security, continued access to a stream of revenue from a natural resource, 
or the future income from one's creative talents (patent and copyright)' (Bromley 1989, 
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185; 202). Anyhow, ownership refers to the ensemble of property rights with regard to a 
valuable asset belonging to a specific owner, either an individual or a group. Property as 
a set of entitlements with regard to a valuable asset tout court relates to the notion of 
property regimes. I will deal with this notion in the following subsection. 
2.2.2 Property regimes 
Bromley distinguishes between four types of property regimes. What Bromley means by 
a property regime becomes clear through an analysis of these four types. A property 
regime turns out to be a hierarchical set of property rights related to one and the same 
valuable asset and assigned to (a hierarchy of) various decision units. In the next 
paragraphs, I will first deal with the four types of property regimes Bromley proposes. 
Secondly, I will explain why a property regime is a hierarchical set of property rights. 
Bromley discerns four types of property regimes: state property, private 
property, common property, and non-property (Bromley 1989,205)4. In the first case an 
agency has the right to determine use and access rules. Individuals have a duty to 
observe these rules. In the second case individuals have a right to undertake socially 
acceptable uses and have a duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. Others, i.e. 
the non-owners, have a duty to refrain from preventing socially acceptable uses, and 
have a right to expect only socially acceptable uses will occur. In the third case , the 
group of owners or the management group has a right to exclude non-members of the 
group, and non-members have a duty to abide by exclusion. Individual members of the 
group have both rights and duties with respect to the use and maintenance of the thing 
owned. In case of non-property there is no defined group of owners. Individuals have 
both privilege and no right with respect to use rates and maintenance of the asset. Its 
benefit stream is available to those who use the asset. The asset is an open-access 
resource5. 
Bromley also uses the term "resource management regime" instead of 
"property regime" in case the valuable asset is an environmental resource. 'A 
resource management regime is a structure of rights and duties characterizing 
the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to that particular 
environmental resource' (Bromley 1991,22). 
5 In the history of environmental and ecological economics, Bromley's 
introduction of the distinction between a common property and a non-property 
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The distinction Bromley makes between state property, private property and 
common property is more ambiguous than it looks at first sight. The differences are often 
rather gradual than strict. The habit to call specific property regimes private, common or 
state property results partly form conventions rather than from analytical dissimilarities. 
Consider, for instance, the case of common property in the following example offered by 
Bromley. Bromley writes:'[...] Consider the extension of exclusive economic zones for 
fishing access. As certain nations experienced decreased catches with their existing 
fleets it became of great significance who had access to natural resources that were 
formerly assumed to be inexhaustible. The extension to 200 miles created a larger zone 
of common property for each coastal nation as opposed to the former open-access 
situation. Once the fishing zone was declared to be the common property to a particular 
coastal state, that nation was then able to define the particular institutional arrangements 
that would give its citizens access to the resource' (Bromley 1989,218). This example 
shows that in case a community happens to be a state, a common property regime is the 
same as a state property regime. In both the case of a common property regime and of a 
state property regime, a particular authority has to decide about use and access rules. In 
case a common (or state) property regime is attached to fishing zones, the public 
authorities can, for instance, issue or sell quota. These quota define who has access to 
the fishing zones (namely those who possess quota) and what use of the fishing zone is 
acceptable (namely a catch rate that does not exceed the quota assigned). Those who 
possess fishing quota then have the (private) right to use the fishing zone and the 
(private) right to benefit from the produce of their fishing activities. This latter 
consideration shows that a common (or state) property regime does not exclude private 
rights. It only shows that the kind and nature of rights belonging to the state or another 
community and those belonging to individual members of this community differ. This is 
already an illustration of the hierarchical nature of property regimes. 
Other passages in Bromley's writings support my thesis that the classification 
of property regimes as private, common or state property is not precise. Bromley writes, 
for instance, that, '[f]irst, common property represents prrVafe property for the group of 
co-owners (since all others are excluded from use and decision making). Second, 
regime implied a fundamental critique of Hardin's arguments - in bis article The 
Tragedy of the Commons (1968) - in favour of private property as a means to 
solve ecological problems (Nelissen et al. 1997,85-86). 
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individuals have rights (and duties) in a common property regime (Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop, 1975). In one important sense, then, common property has something very 
much in common with private property - exclusion of non-owners. In that sense we may 
think of common property as corporate group property (Bromley 1991,25). At the same 
time, Bromley writes: 'While most think of private property as individual property, note 
that all corporate property is private property, and yet it is administered by a group. 
There is also a tendency to consider private property as bestowing full and absolute 
control on the owner. However, it is well to keep in mind that an owner is faced with a 
number of strictures and obligations in the use of so-called "private" land and its related 
natural resources; few owners are entirely free to do as they wish with such assets' 
(Bromley 1991,24). Both quotations illustrate that the distinction between a private and a 
common property regime is not sharp at all. Different rights are assigned to individuals 
and to groups with regard to one and the same asset. 
In section 1.3 of chapter 3,1 stress that rights do not only correlate to duties, 
but also to privileges. A specific right defines the privileges a right-holder has. This latter 
correlation is helpful to understand property regimes as a hierarchical set of entitlements. 
Each (property) right is not only assigned to an individual or a group, it is also decided on 
(or at least acknowledged with) its concrete content. The assignment of a right and the 
definition (and recognition) of its content is a matter of the collectivity (or an authorised 
part of the collectivity) to which the right-holder belongs. This means that a hierarchical 
relationship exists between the right-holder and the collectivity with regard to the right in 
question. Since each right at the same time correlates to privileges, the right-holder in 
his, her or its turn can decide on the content and the assignment of the rights that are 
compatible with the initial right. The right-holder again creates a hierarchical relationship 
between him-, her- or itself and the person or group to which he assigns the secundary 
rights. The fact that rights correlate to privileges thus allows for a layering or hierarchy of 
rights. A property regime refers to the whole hierarchical set of property rights related to 
a particular valuable asset and assigned to various decision units. 
The decision units assigning and defining rights can be political (for instance, a 
state) or economic (for instance, a firm). Whether they are political or economic depends 
on the institutional arrangements that define them as either political or economic. Where 
the polity ends and the economy starts is not a natural, but a (politically) institutionalised 
fact. I suppose that conventional distinctions between state and private property regimes 
have something to do with the degrees of freedom left to economic decision units. The 
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smaller the part of the institutional hierarchy that resides in political decision units and 
the greater the part that resides in economic ones, the more "private" a property regime 
is. And vice versa: the greater the part that resides in political decision units and the 
smaller the part that resides in economic ones, the more "common" a property regime is. 
For that reason I deem it adequate to call the distinction between private and state 
property regimes rather gradual than strict. I do not agree with Bromley's suggestion that 
a major distinction among (the first three) types of resource management regimes rests 
with the decision-making process inherent in each property regime (Bromley 1991,31). 
Each layer in the hierarchy of institutional arrangements that constitutes a specific 
property regime allows for (a specific type of) decision-making processes. 
2.3 Conclusion 
According to Bromley, property rights are entitlements to future benefit streams. These 
entitlements are related to a valuable asset. An owner is a decision unit - either an 
individual or a group - that has a right to "possess" a valuable asset. This right to 
"possess", i.e. to control autonomously, turns out to refer to a set of rights that are 
assigned, recognised and enforced by an authority. 
Bromley's conceptual analysis of property rights shows that it does not suffice 
to know that a particular decision unit has a right to exchange, use, manage, and so on, 
a particular valuable asset. One also has to know the precise content of these rights. 
Under what conditions is the right-holder allowed to exchange? What kind of uses are 
permitted? What are the boundary conditions for the management of one's possession? 
The concrete content of (restraining and enabling) rights assigned to a right-holder 
(either a group or an individual) must be decided on by an authority. This need for 
defining the concrete content creates a hierarchical relationship between the authority on 
the one hand and the right-holder on the other. Because this decided on concrete 
content can never be so concrete that it does not leave open some degrees of freedom -
rights imply privileges -, rights-holders can in their turn act as authorities assigning rights 
and deciding on their content. Consequently, one can imagine a layering of authorities 
and, hence, an institutional hierarchy. This institutional hierarchy is of a genetic kind (see 
section 2.2.3.1 in chapter 3). Bromley's analysis concentrates not so much on the 
concrete content of property rights, but on their formal relationships. The possibility of a 
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genetic hierarchy of property rights follows from the nature of entitlements as both 
restraining and enabling. 
Bromley calls this hierarchy of property rights a property regime. A property 
regime thus is a hierarchical set of property rights related to a particular valuable asset. 
The property rights constituting the regime are assigned to various "owners". In short, a 
property regime refers to a valuable asset, while ownership refers to a particular owner. 
A property regime relates to a hierarchy of owners. For that reason, ownership as 
autonomous (or exclusive) control does not imply absolute control. 
Bromley's conceptual analysis of property regimes shows, further, that for a 
specific resource, not so much the type of property regime matters. The designation of a 
specific type is rather a matter of convention than of analytical distinction. More important 
than the (analytically vague) type of a property regime is the kind and the concrete 
content of the different property rights that are assigned to a group, a subgroup or to 
concrete individuals with regard to one and the same valuable asset. Instead of 
distinguishing between different types of property regimes, as Bromley does, it is 
analytically more precise to investigate what (kind and nature of) rights related to one 
and the same valuable asset belong to a group, to a subgroup or to individuals. In order 
to solve particular ecological problems, one should, consequently, not spend too much 
energy discussing whether a common or a private property regime is more effective. One 
should spend energy discussing the concrete content and the respective owners of the 
rights that should constitute the property regimes that relate to the ecological problem in 
question. 
From Bromley's explanation, I conclude, moreover, that it is property regimes 
that define a "thing" as an economic good. Bromley's institutional approach turns out to 
concentrate on the (hierarchical ensemble of) institutions defining economic goods. In 
other words, Bromley's institutional perspective is constituted, more precisely, by what I 
called - in section 2 of chapter 2 - the first entry, namely (the entitlements defining) the 
"products" of economic action, i.e. commodities or economic goods and services. 
It is property regimes that define whether a commodity is, to use conventional 
economic concepts, a private or a public good. The former commodity is defined by a 
private property regime; the latter by a common property regime. This conclusion 
demonstrates that the distinction between private and public goods is analytically as 
vague as is the distinction between private and public property regimes. This conclusion 
204 
shows, moreover, that oof/? fhe "public" and the "private" characteristic of economic 
goods and services is, what I called in section 1.4. of chapter 3, a public fact. In both 
cases, it is political decisions that transform a "thing" into either a "public" or a "private" 
good. 
Property regimes define the rights and privileges various "owners" of one and 
the same valuable asset have (and the concomitant duties and non-rights of non-
owners). They thus explain the choice sets of economic actors with regard to one asset. 
Actions of economic actors are, however, linked to more than one asset. Economic 
actions must, consequently, be compatible with the various choice sets related to the 
various assets used. An analysis of the property regimes relevant for a particular 
economic action thus throws light on the possible strategies an economic actor can set 
out in order to fulfil his, her or its private preferences. In other words, it throws light on 
economic actors' autonomy. Such analysis does, however, not explain plausible actual 
strategies. For the latter kind of explanation, we need further insights into the economic 
institutions defining economic rationality. I suppose that actual strategies depend on 
economic actors' income - relative to the income of other economic actors - and on the 
(kind, magnitude, certainty of) future benefit streams they can expect from their actions. 
Apart from an analysis of property regimes, we thus need an analysis of institutions 
defining (future) benefit streams and an analysis of institutional reasons for existing 
distributions of income. Bromley's approach does not offer us the latter kinds of 
analyses. 
3 The relationship between an economy and its 
ecological environment 
In chapter 3 I argue that an institutional approach towards an economy allows us to 
comprehend the ecological performance of an economy as the counterpart of its 
institutional organisation. Two topics in Bromley's writings testify of, and thus support, 
this hypothesis. The first topic relates to the distinction he makes between 'nominal' and 
'real' boundaries of economic decision unite. The second topic regards his treatment of 
"externalities" (Bromley 1989,54-57). 
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3.1 'Nominal' versus 'real'boundaries 
According to Bromley, the nominal boundary of an economic decision unit is the 
boundary or the frontier that divides market processes from command processes. An 
economic decision unit is, indeed, defined with reference to the range of choice for 
command decisions, i.e. extra-market control. This range depends on the constellation of 
rights that determines the domain over which an economic decision unit has control and 
in which it is immune for the interference of other parties. The nominal domain of an 
economic decision unit is that which is presumed by it and which is defended in 
legislative and judicial proceedings concerning the firm's managerial autonomy from the 
larger society. The real boundary of an economic decision unit, however, is constituted 
by the physical (or ecological) and social dimensions of its nominal boundary. When a 
firm uses in its production process, for instance, a (legally accepted) chemical compound 
that is found to be carcinogenic then its autonomous choice holds important implications 
that, according to Bromley, are 'beyond the recognised "boundary" of the firm" (Bromley 
1989,55). This firm uses certain services - and visits disservices on other firms and on 
consumers - for which contractual agreements and compensation may or may not exist. 
This domain of all the valuable services used and disservices created by an economic 
decision unit is its real domain. Legal arrangements define the nominal domain - the 
domain of autonomous action - of an economic decision unit. Consequently, according to 
Bromley, collective action to after the status quo will arise in case there is a divergence 
between the nominally presumed boundary of decision units and their real boundary as 
reflected in the scope of costs visited on others in society. 
Bromley's definitions of the nominal and real domain of an economic decision 
unit are confusing. They suggest that the real domain of a decision unit comprises more 
than its nominal domain (consider the quotation mentioned in the previous paragraph). In 
fact, however, both domains are the same. The "real" and the "nominal" only refer to 
different perspectives on the same domain. The latter is the legal perspective: it 
considers the domain of "autonomous" economic action, i.e. of action that is nominally 
independent. The former considers the same domain in its physical and social 
dimension: since nominally autonomous actions interfere on a physical and social level 
with the actions of other parties, nominally independent decision units are linked 
physically and socially (Bromley 1991, 78). Bromley's distinction between the nominal 
and real domain of an economic decision unit does not refer to different domains, but to 
different perspectives on the same domain. The "rear perspective points to the 
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ecological and social dimension of economic action. The "nominal" perspective points to 
its institutional dimension. This reformulation illustrates that the ecological and 
institutional dimensions of economic activities cannot be separated, or, in other words, 
that the relationship between economy and ecology is an internal one. Collective action 
does not arise because of a divergence between the nominal and the real boundary of 
decision units, as Bromley states. It arises because of a divergent appreciation for the 
physical and social impacts of legal arrangements defining the domain of nominally 
autonomous actions. An economic decision unit on the one hand and other members of 
a polity on the other often evaluate the ecological and social impacts of this decision 
unifs actions differently. 
3.2 Externalities 
This latter view, namely that it is the divergence in appreciation between different parties 
that matters, reveals itself in Bromley's treatment of externalities. The concept 
"externalities" originates from the conclusion that (because of the physical and social 
interdependence of nominally autonomous actions) costs fall beyond the boundary of the 
decision-making unit that is responsible for those costs (Bromley 1991, 59)6. Marshall 
and Pigou, following Adam Smith, thought of externalities as a divergence between 
private and social costs. Bromley stresses that to label this divergence in terms of 
"private" and "social" costs is to miss the essence of externalities (Bromley 1991,19). 
What is at issue is the private interest of one party (Alpha) as against the private interest 
of another (Beta). This conviction of Bromley confirms my interpretation that collective 
action does not arise from a divergence between the nominal and real domain of an 
economic decision unit, but from a divergent appreciation for the physical or social 
impacts of one party's actions between the different parties affected. 
Other passages in Bromley's analysis of externalities illustrate that Bromley 
regards the relationship between an economy and its ecological environment as an 
internal one. This internal connection becomes manifest in Bromley's arguments 1) that 
6 Externalities are not necessarily "negative" or about "costs". They can also be 
positive, about benefits. However, as Bromley writes, 'while externalities can be 
either harmful or beneficial, the bulk of the environmental externalities that we 
deal with are of the harmful kind' (Bromley 1991, 68). 
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the kind of physical or social interference that occurs, and 2) that whether this 
interference get solved or not (and to what extent) depends on institutional 
arrangements. These arguments cannot be found as such in Bromley's writings. For that 
reason, I will reconstruct them by putting various of Bromley's lines of argument in a 
different (and sometimes slightly transformed) way together. 
To start with, externalities are manifestations of (physical or social) 
interdependence or interference. Though all "autonomous" actions interfere physically or 
socially with other "autonomous" actions, not all situations of interference are 
externalities (Bromley 1991, 63)7. Whether physical interference is considered an 
externality depends on whether the costs of the physical interference passed on to the 
other party are deemed legitimate given existing legal anangements. This can be 
illustrated with the following (slightly amended) example offered by Bromley (Bromley 
1991, 160). Consider a house owner with a (legally protected) privilege to paint his 
house in whatever colour he likes. In case he is my neighbour and decides to paint his 
house some outlandish colour that does not match my own aesthetic taste, he burdens 
me with an externality. In this case two options are - in principle - open to me. Either I 
can try to buy his house and resell it to someone with an aesthetic taste that conforms to 
my own taste. Or I can offer my neighbour a sum of money to paint his house a 
somewhat more conventional colour. Whether these options are feasible - i.e. whether 
the externality will be solved - depends, among other things, on the relative size of my 
neighbour's and my own income. A different legal arrangement - for instance, a 
That "autonomous" economic activities always interfere is easier to understand 
when one takes a specific economic activity as one's starting point of analysis. 
A specific economic activity always makes use of different resources for which 
different resource management regimes exist Since each resource management 
regime consists of a hierarchy of rights issued to different groups or individuals, 
a specific economic activity connects, via the resources used, different people. 
Consider the example of a farmer owning ("privately") a piece of land on which 
he grows vegetables. In case he uses pesticides, he does not only use this piece 
of land, but also some water in which residues of these pesticides get left 
behind. In case this water is used as drinking-water by the people in his region 
(water in "common property"), it becomes obvious that the growing of 
vegetables links the farmer to all other people in his region. The urgent question 
then will be whose rights are legally sufficiently protected: those of the 
"private" owner of land or those of the "common" owners of drinking-water. 
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neighbourhood restriction on house colours - would keep my neighbour from painting his 
house in an unconventional way. In case he, nevertheless, does paint it this way, the 
result will not be called an externality, but a violation of the law for which my neighbour 
will be sanctioned by public authority. This example shows that the term "externality" is 
reserved for situations of physical (or social) interference that burden second parties with 
legally legitimate costs. The existing rights structure defines the rights and, hence, - as I 
argued earlier - the privileges of economic decision units. This means that the rights 
structure defines the types of behaviour that are beyond the interest of the state, i.e. the 
types of Alpha's behaviour for which the state declares that it is none of its direct concern 
if Alpha imposes costs on Beta (Bromley 1991,18). Precisely these kinds of costs are 
called "externalities". To conclude, only those situations of interference that are deemed 
legally legitimate can be considered externalities. Hence, the kind of externalities that will 
occur depends on existing institutional arrangements. 
Whether and to what extent an "externality" will be "solved" within a specific 
economic situation (this means: without politically defined amendments of the 
institutional arrangements allowing for the interference concerned) depends on who must 
pay the (transaction) costs in order to get a solution that is acceptable to all parties, the 
magnitude of these costs, and whether the injured party is able to pay the costs. Part of 
the answer to this question depends on the operational rule with which a specific 
property right is protected (Bromley 1991,42-51). Remember that having a right means 
that the collective has agreed to recognise and to protect one's interests in a particular 
outcome. However, rights (or entitlements) can be given protection in several ways. 
Entitlements can be protected either by property rules, by liability rules or by inalienability 
rules. When a right is protected by a property rule, it means that one may not interfere 
with the protected interests without the prior consent of the interest holder. This means 
that the costs have to be made - in advance - by the parry who wishes to interfere and 
that these costs are necessary in order to convince the interest holder to accept the 
interference. When, on the contrary, a right is protected by a liability rule, it means that 
one may interfere with the protected interest on condition that the interfering party 
compensates the interest holder. In this case the interfering party again has to pay the 
costs, but these costs depend on what is considered a fair compensation by an 
independent assessor, for instance: the public sector, rather than on the whims of the 
interest holder. When, thirdly, a right is protected by an inalienability rule, this means that 
the protected interests cannot be interfered with under any circumstances. 
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In concrete externality situations the interests of one party interfere with the 
interests of another party. This means that concrete situations are situations of 
competing interests. Which party will have to pay the costs of the interference depends 
on whose interests are legally protected by a right. Consider the following example of 
Bromley (Bromley 1991,43-45). Assume that Beta lives in a home separated from a lake 
by a piece of land upon which the owner (Alpha) decides to construct a fence, thereby 
blocking Beta's view of the sunrise and the boats on the lake. Alpha has an interest in 
building a fence, while Beta has an interest in an unobstructed view on the lake. If 
Alpha's interest is legally protected, either by a property or a liability rule, Beta will have 
to pay in order to protect its own interest. If, on the contrary, Beta's interest is legally 
protected - for instance, by a zoning ordinance that prevents the construction of fences 
over two feet high without the prior consent of Beta (in case Beta's interest is protected 
by a property rule) or else without providing adequate compensation to Beta (in case 
Beta's interest is protected by a liability rule) - Alpha will have to pay in order to protect 
its interest. This example illustrates that institutional arrangements (i.e. the rights 
structure and the rules protecting rights) influence who will pay how many costs to have 
its own interests protected. 
Institutional arrangements define which party has to pay the costs to have its 
interests protected in a way that is acceptable to all parties, i.e. so that all parties deem 
their own interests protected in a balanced way. According to Bromley, externalities 
cannot remain unresolved in case transaction costs are absent and income effects are 
assumed away (Bromley 1991,63-64). Since there is an economically appropriate level -
i.e. a Pareto-efficient level - of physical interference among atomistic decision units, 
those directly involved in the interference will bargain out the preferred level (since none 
of them has to consider transaction costs or restrictions due to his or her own income). 
We then must conclude, Bromley writes, that the externality has been resolved, even 
though (some level of) the physical interference is still present. This means that all 
interdependent decision units have (without costs) bargained away all relevant physical 
interactions and 'by definition there can be no externalities. This does not mean that 
some physical interdependences would not remain; it simply means that our notion of an 
externality could not exist' (Bromley 1991,64). 
Bromley seems to agree with Dahlman that externalities are nothing other than 
manifestations of nonzero transaction costs (and of the relevance of the wealth position 
of the different parties) (Bromley 1991,64). His line of reasoning goes as follows: since 
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in case of absent transaction costs (and of the irrelevance of income effects) all 
externalities will be bargained away, this means that if externalities are not bargained 
away, there must be transaction costs (and income effects). Though this line of 
reasoning is logically correct, it is analytically not sharp. For an independent criterion to 
decide whether transaction costs exist or not - and hence whether an ecological or 
social interdependence is an externality or a mere interdependence - is missing. 
Therefore, I propose to drop the assumptions of absent transaction costs and absent 
income effects. Even in case of transaction costs and of income effects, a Pareto-
efficient level of interference exists and at this level no externalities remain, by definition. 
This does not mean, however, that transaction costs and income effects are irrelevant. 
As Bromley explains himself, in case one assumes the absence of transaction costs (and 
of income effects), the equilibrium level of interference is the same regardless the status 
quo structure of rights, i.e. regardless whether Alpha's or Beta's interests are legally 
protected (Bromley 1991,74-75). In case, on the contrary, transaction costs (and income 
effects) are relevant, the equilibrium level will be more advantageous (compared with the 
equilibrium level reached in case of absent transaction costs) to the party whose 
interests are legally protected and more disadvantageous to the other party, since this 
latter party has to use part of its income to pay the transaction costs and thus has less to 
spend to pay for his or her interests (Bromley 76-78). 
The idea that externalities are manifestations of transaction costs results from 
an inaccurate distinction between the term "externality" and the concept "(physical or 
social) interference". The term "externality" refers to monetary costs, i.e. to prices as 
revealed on markets (or calculated in cost-benefit analyses). These costs and, 
consequently, the economically efficient level of interference depend on the institutional 
organisation of an economy. An economically efficient level of interference does, 
however, not imply that the non-monetary costs of this interference are well balanced 
(i.e. are politically or socially acceptable). The following example can illustrate the 
important difference8. Public authorities can decide to levy relatively high taxes on petrol 
in order to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases produced by national traffic. 
Because of the non-elasticity of private car use and despite the high taxes levied, drivers 
I owe this example to Jan van der Straaten, who was patient enough to lead 
me, an - often impatient and therefore unpleasant - layman in economics, in the 
way of thinking of professional economists. 
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use nearly as much petrol and produce nearly as much greenhouse gases as before. 
The final level of interference consequently will not differ much of the original level. This 
means that the probably huge, but non-monetary costs that possibly go together with 
climate changes due to greenhouse gases remain unchanged, though no externality 
exists: final car use is a Pareto-efficient use9. Bromley recognises this important 
difference between monetary and non-monetary costs of a situation of interference 
(Bromley 1991,49). He admits that the prescription to balance interference on efficiency 
grounds will not always provide a reliable decision aid. Cost-benefit assessments may 
introduce market/monetary biases which seriously discount non-market/non-monetary 
aspects of the situation. 'A billboard or an apartment building which blocks a scenic vista 
has monetary attributes which will be weighted against the "mere" pleasure of a beautiful 
sunrise; the fetid air which attends the economic activity generated by a kraft-prccess 
paper mill is not likely to receive the same weight in the decision process as the jobs that 
may be jeopardized by a strict air quality 00110/ (Bromley 1991,49). 
A more accurate definition of the concept "externality" - as a situation of legally 
legitimate physical or social interference that (momentarily) gives rise to monetary costs -
will set ecological problems sharper. It will show, first, that viewing an interference as an 
externality implies a translation into economic terms and, in case of a conventional 
scientific approach, making solutions dependent on the institutional organisation of an 
economy. This means that one translates a political problem (a problem concerning the 
institutional organisation of an economy) into an economic one (a problem asking for a 
"rational" solution from within existing institutional arrangements). Second, it will show 
that welfare theory cannot offer (objective) policy prescriptions since externalities get, by 
definition, solved within an economy (on a Pareto-efficient level). The only thing welfare 
theory can do is either to offer direction to individual economic agents for judging their 
9 Note that this example is characterised by tmrd-party effects, Wgh transaction 
costs - high information costs have to be spend on uncertainties with regard to 
the effects of greenhouse gases -, and possible irreversibihties. According to 
Bromley, such more complex and more realistic examples are often overlooked 
in conventional externality analysis (Bromley 1991, 51-54). Traditional 
examples hold little implication for human health or ecological integrity, one 
can attach a monetary figure to the damages experienced by the recipient, third-
party aspects are generally assumed unimportant, transaction costs are usually 
not very significant, and, finally, irreversibihties are not considered relevant 
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bargains (Bromley 1991, 79) or to propose government interventions - i.e. institutional 
changes - that transform Pareto-irrelevant interferences10 into Pareto-relevant ones11, so 
that the level of interference will shift. 
From this line of reasoning of Bromley we can conclude that the concept 
"externality" refers to a physical or social interference that is deemed legally legitimate, is 
evaluated as an economic cost, i.e. a cost that can be translated into monetary terms so 
that an appropriate level of interference can be bargained out. This line of reasoning also 
shows that the remaining level of interference depends on the existing institutional 
structure. The prevailing institutional structure defines (real or hypothetical) markets, i.e. 
monetary costs, and, hence, the outcomes that will be considered efficient (Bromley 
1991, 66-67). 'Change the institutional environment and there will be a new [Pareto-
Jefficient solution' and hence a new level of "appropriate" physical interference (Bromley 
1991,67). 
3.3 Conclusion 
The distinction Bromley makes between nominal and real boundaries of economic 
actions shows that economic actions always have, what I called In chapter 3, an 
institutional and ecological dimension. This implies that nominally autonomous actions 
inevitably interfere socially or ecologically. Some of these interferences are experienced 
as externalities. Externalities are legally legitimate interferences that pose unwanted 
costs on some of the interfering parties and that can be bargained out on existing (or 
hypothetical) markets. The level of interference that will remain after bargaining depends 
on which party has to pay the costs, the magnitude of the costs - transaction costs 
included - , and the relative wealth position of the parties involved. Bromley's analysis 
shows that both the coming into existence of externalities and whether and to what 
extent problematic interference get resolved depend on existing institutional 
An accurate definition of the concept "externality" prevents me from talking 
about Pareto-irrelevant externalities, as Bromley - following Buchanan and 
Stubblebine - does (Bromley 1991, 72). There can at most exist a Pareto-
irrelevant interference, not a Pareto-irrelevant externaMty. 
1 1 I suppose that this is what economists mean by policy prescriptions in order 
to "internalise" externalities. 
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arrangements. The latter Is an illustration of the internal relationship between an 
economy and its ecological environment: it demonstrates that the ecological 
performance of an economy is the counterpart of its institutional organisation. 
Since Bromley's analysis of property rights explains possible, not actual 
strategies, it explains what kind of ecological interferences can occur and whether 
parties involved have possibilities and what kind of possibilities to prevent or to change 
the level of these interferences. Bromley's analysis does, however, not explain what kind 
of ecological interferences are likely to occur and to remain. Considered from the global 
perspective (in time and in place) that I propose to hold in chapter 1, this implies that 
Bromley's analysis is not able to explain the general ecological tendencies manifest in 
the history of industrial economies. 
4 The economic and the political sphere 
Bromley's conceptual analysis of property rights is an illustration of the idea of a genetic, 
institutional hierarchy. This illustration allows us to comment on Bromley's interpretation 
of institutional transactions as economic activities. My objection to this general idea is 
that it does not respect the argument offered in chapter 2 that the economic and political 
sphere can be distinguished conceptually and that they should be distinguished thus in 
order to strengthen the ideal of a deliberative democracy. This objection will be the 
subject of the first subsection. In the second subsection I will investigate whether 
Bromley's interpretation of institutional change is compatible with the normative ideal of a 
deliberative democracy. In the final subsection I will explain Bromley's interpretation of 
"sustainability". 
4.1 Institutional transactions: economic or political activities 
Before discussing whether institutional transactions are economic or political activities, 
let us first investigate what Bromley exactly means by them. Bromley distinguishes 
between implicit and explicit rights transfers. According to Bromley, a market is a 
regularised medium for the exchange of entitlements to future benefit streams. Bromley 
calls such exchanges 'explicit rights transfers' (Bromley 1991, 160). Explicit rights 
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transfers are transfers in which rights to a thing owned are exchanged among willing 
parties. They are thus the process of shifting the same basic structure of rights and 
duties among members of a polity. The structure of rights and duties does not change, 
but the party (Alpha) that enjoys the rights and the party (Beta) that has duties changes. 
The former owner has moved from a position of having rights to a position of having duty 
with respect to (the particular benefit stream attendant to) the object, while the new 
owner now has rights rather than duties. I conclude that for Bromley explicit rights 
transfers are the same as commodity transactions. 
The opposite of explicit rights transfers is implicit rights transfers (Bromley 
1991,161). Implicit rights transfers regard changes in the rights structure. To explain 
implicit rights transfers Bromley offers the example of the house owner whose neighbour 
seeks to paint his house in some outlandish colour. Either the house owner can enter 
into commodity transactions in order to protect his interest in a more conventionally 
painted neighbour's house. He can buy the house and resell it to someone else or he 
can offer his neighbour a sum of money to abandon his extra-ordinary taste. Or the 
house owner can pursue a new institutional arrangement through the city hall. He can try 
to realise a neighbourhood restriction on house colours. If the house owner succeeds in 
changing the institutional structure, he has modified the degree of control to be exercised 
by his neighbour. He changed the institutional structure, i.e. the content of the rights and 
duties attending to a thing owned, not the parties having rights and duties respectively. I 
conclude that by implicit rights transfers Bromley means the same as institutional 
transactions12. 
I agree with Bromley's description of commodity transactions (or explicit rights 
transfers) as economic activities. I do not plainly agree with his description of institutional 
transactions (or implicit rights transfers) as economic activities. In order to explain my 
reservations I have to come back to my attempts, in chapter 2, to distinguish between 
In order to explain the difference Bromley also introduces the concepts 
'nominal' and 'real' structure (Bromley 1991, 160). The real structure refers to 
control, the nominal structure to ownership. Implicit rights transfers (or 
institutional transactions) are changes in the real structure, while the nominal 
structure remains unchanged. Explicit rights transfers (or commodity 
transactions) are changes in the nominal structure - the owner of the rights 
concerned changes -, while the real structure remains unchanged. 
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the economic and the political sphere. In this chapter, I put forward three partial entries -
"products", "rationality", "decision units" - and an overarching one - institutions" -. 
Whether institutional transactions are economic or political activities depends on the 
entry used to define economic or political phenomena respectively. In case "decision 
units" is the entry chosen, then institutional transactions falling under the control of 
economic decision units are economic activities and those falling under the control of 
political decision units are political ones. In case "rationality" is the entry chosen, then 
institutional transactions - whether occurring in economic or political decision units - are 
political activities. My argument for this latter statement is that institutional transactions 
concern the redefinition of the content of rights. Redefining this content is a matter of 
deliberative - i.e. unpredictable, irreversible, creative - rationality. Though one can, 
indeed, develop techniques in order to straightjacket the process of redefinition (for 
instance, by translating preferences into monetary terms, aggregating them and falling 
back on science to propose institutions as instruments to realise the aggregated 
outcome) so that the rationality of this process comes to resemble a typically economic -
i.e. economising, instrumental - rationality. 
To conclude, as soon as economic (as well as political) decision units look for 
institutional changes, the "rationality" of their actions is rather political. Institutional 
transactions necessarily result from collective action by members of an authority. This 
collective dimension is a necessity because this authority must recognise and respect 
the proposed institutional changes and, if necessary, be prepared to enforce them. 
Though institutional changes can be initiated by economic (rather than political) decision 
units and though they can be prompted by existing and dominant economic interests, 
they have to be accepted, agreed with and ratified by an authority. Economic decision 
units need to interact" with other economic decision units in order to define and decide 
on the content of institutional changes. For that reason, I propose to classify institutional 
transactions as political rather than economic activities. Though I admit that this 
classification stems from the perspective chosen, namely the perspective constituted by 
the "rationality" entry. 
The discussion stirred up by this topic of institutional transactions" illustrates an 
argument made in section 2 of chapter 2. It illustrates, to begin with, that the distinction 
made between the economic and political sphere is a conceptual construct. It illustrates, 
moreover, that such distinction does not yet allow for a separation between both 
spheres. Some phenomena prove to belong to a grey zone of neither fully political nor 
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fully economic activities or, formulated differently, to a grey zone of activities that are 
economic according to one perspective and political according to another. That it is, 
nevertheless, useful to make this distinction will be demonstrated, in the next subsection, 
by Bromley's critique on the conventional interpretation of the "rationality" of institutional 
change. 
4.2 The "rationality" of institutional change 
'[Institutional change is the raison d'etre for public policy1, Bromley writes (Bromley 
1989, 32). According to Bromley, institutional arrangements or, more restrictedly, 
property regimes are the policy instruments meant to realise political objectives (Bromley 
1989, 144; 1991, 3, 5, 7, 163-168). At first sight, Bromley - contrary to Arendt -
understands politics as showing some means/ends rationality. Other passages in 
Bromley's writings, however, offer us arguments to question this means/ends dichotomy. 
In this subsection, I will first deal with his interpretation of politics in general. Second, I 
will deal with his critique on conventional interpretations of institutional change. This 
critique shows, to start with, that Bromley disagrees with the common interpretation that 
(allocatjve) efficiency is the objective of institutional change. His critique shows, further, 
that an interpretation of the rationality of institutional change as economic rather than 
political has consequences for the kind of institutional changes that will be taken into 
consideration. 
According to Bromley, in order to look upon politics as showing a means/ends 
rationality, one needs a criterion to distinguish between means and end. His criterion 
proves - as will become clear later on - to be bonowed from Lord Robbins. Consider the 
following quotation: 'We define a policy objective as something that appears in the utility 
function of the decision maker(s) as opposed to a policy instrument that will not appear 
there' (Bromley 1989, 144). Bromley not only admits that 'it is not always easy to 
maintain a sharp distinction between policy objectives and policy instruments' (Bromley 
1989, 227). In another passage he openly criticises (Lord Robbins') means/ends 
dichotomy because this criterion is far from evident. Let us consider this passage. 
According to Robbins' definition of economics, economists are said to study 
choice among scarce means to accomplish given ends (Bromley 1991, 208-209). The 
problem is how to differentiate ends from means. To make this differentiation, it is 
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necessary to invoke some external criterion so that the distinction and the linkage 
between the two is placed in context. Robbins himself states that an "end" is something 
that enters into an individual's utility function (something individuals care about), while a 
means is not found there (means are mere instruments - without a value of their own -
for accomplishing desired ends). According to Bromley, this is simply a definition, indeed 
a tautological statement. The problem starts when trying to determine whether or not 
something is an argument in the utility function of an individual. It cannot be economists' 
determination for that is to impose the value system of the economist into the analysis. It 
cannot be asked at all the individuals involved either. I assume that this critique of 
Bromley does not only apply for the means and ends of economic actors, but also for the 
means and ends of political actors. 
From Bromley's line of reasoning, I conclude that, since we cannot 
unequivocally distinguish between instrument and objective, we would better drop the 
whole dichotomy. We would better hold on to the conviction that politics is about 
institutional arrangements tout court, not about instruments on the one hand and 
objectives on the other. Several passages in Bromley's writings suggest that he would 
not have that much difficulties with dropping this political means/ends dichotomy. This 
becomes, especially, clear where he acknowledges the lack of transparency with regard 
to values underlying both political preferences and institutional arrangements. Bromley 
plainly states that public policy is about socially acceptable institutional arrangements 
(Bromley 1989, 34, 244; 1991, 14)13. Institutional arrangements reflect, rather than 
express, public preferences for the protection of particular (egoistic or altruistic) private 
interests. The verb "reflect" is preferred to the verb "express" because the former takes 
better account of unconscious or non-voluntaristic elements in the result of political 
actions14. At the same time, institutional arrangements have a certain social/ecological 
1 3 In the same passage, Bromley states that public policy is, secondly, about 
searching for the boundary between autonomous (market-like) and collective 
decision making. In my view, this so-called second aspect of public policy is 
simply a reformulation of the first aspect Institutional arrangements reflect 
collective decisions concerning the nature of - institutions are preconditions for 
- autonomous action. 
1 4 By non-voluntarism I mean that actors cannot simply realise their goals, 
either because they are not free enough to realise them or because their goals are 
neither fully known nor completely fixed. 
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performance that the citizenry will regard as either good or bad. Public evaluation of this 
performance functions as a feedback mechanism that will possibly lead to further political 
efforts to change or adapt existing institutional arrangements (Bromley 1989, 33). Note 
the lack of voluntarism becoming manifest in the obvious need for something like a 
"feedback mechanism". Bromley is sensitive for this lack of voluntarism which is the 
other side of the lack of transparency concerning the values underlying institutional 
arrangements on the one hand and the public preferences for them on the other. Other 
passages, however, testify that Bromley does not completely abandon the political 
means/ends dichotomy. I will come back to this topic later in this chapter. 
Bromley criticises the conventional economic approach of the public policy 
problem of institutional change. He criticises the explicit criterion - "objective truth rule" 
or "decision rule"- conventional economics uses to evaluate the results of political 
processes. This criterion, economic or allocafjve efficiency, is, Bromley argues, 
conventional economists' opinion of the political objective the polity should have with 
regard to the institutional organisation of its economy. The problem with this criterion is 
not only that ft prescribes what objective the polity should have, but also that it is a 
concept without a clear meaning. According to Bromley, whether a particular economy is 
allocatively efficient or not does not depend so much on the characteristics of its 
performance, but of its processes. On condition that market failures do not occur - this 
condition testifies of the ambiguity still present in Bromley's interpretation of allocative 
efficiency -, the efficient outcome is the outcome resulting from market processes, i.e. 
from volitional bargains between "autonomous" economic agents. However, "market 
failures" do occur, sometimes because particular markets even do not or cannot exist 
(see Bromley 1991, 86-95 for his treatment of 'missing markets'). In that case, citizens 
and their political representatives look for allocatively efficient institutional changes. 
Since the meaning of allocative efficiency depends on the process leading to it and since 
this process cannot simply refer to market processes - markets "fail" -, conventional 
economic scientists hasten to help the polity and propose cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis is deemed a faithful imitation of volitional bargains and, as such, an 
analytical process leading to economically efficient institutional changes (Bromley 1991, 
42). However, cost-benefit analysis can never lead to efficient institutional changes tout 
court. First, cost-benefit analysis cannot be carried out without (implicitly or explicitly) 
accepting some substantive values defining what is deemed a cost or a benefit. Second, 
(the magnitude and incidence of) costs and benefits depend on existing institutional 
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arrangements. Status quo institutional arrangements on the one hand and dominant 
values, either within the community of economic scientists or within a particular political 
community, on the other thus influence the outcomes of cost-benefit analyses. 
I will reformulate Bromley's critique on the conventional approach starting from 
an (unambiguous) interpretation of "allocative efficency" as related to the economic 
performance within, not of, a particular economy (see section 3.3.1 in chapter 5). This 
interpretation is compatible with Bromley's interpretation of allocative efficiency as 
referring to market processes, not outcomes. According to this interpretation, market 
failures (or missing markets) are not indications that an economy fails with regard to its 
allocative efficiency. As I argued in chapter 5, allocative efficiency of an economy has no 
independent meaning. Market failures only indicate that humans (implicitly) use some 
substantive criterion to evaluate an economy's performance. This criterion, consisting of 
a whole set of implicit values, is, however, not transparent to the community of political 
actors. In other words, the political objective prompting for institutional change is not 
clear. This illustrates that the political means/ends dichotomy fails. Since the 
conventional interpretation of economics as a policy science is instrumental, it needs a 
clear political objective in order to provide politics with adequate means. Since this 
objective is absent, conventional economics defines it itself, thereby falling back on cost-
benefit analysis as the technique deemed appropriate. As Bromley remarks, cost-benefit 
analysis does not unequivocally allow for allocatfvely efficient institutional change, 
because allocative efficiency has no meaning independent of the existing institutional 
organisation of an economy. Moreover, falling back on cost-benefit analyses betrays an 
interpretation of institutional change as resulting from economic calculations, rather than 
from political imagination. It betrays an interpretation of institutional change as showing 
an economic (or, better, economising), rather than political rationality (see also Bromley 
1991, 69, 80: on Buchanan and his Pareto-Wicksellian interpretation of efficient 
institutional changes; Bromley 1991,218). 
That Bromley is sensible for an interpretation of the rationality of institutional 
change as political rather than economic becomes manifest in his comments on (other) 
models of institutional change (Bromley 1989, chapter 2). According to Bromley, 
institutional changes are prompted by changing economic conditions such as new 
scarcities, new technological opportunities, new distributions of income or wealth, or new 
tastes and preferences (Bromley 1989,110). 'Just as [...] institutional arrangements will 
determine the nature and scope of commodity transactions, the economic conditions at 
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any moment will be important in determining the institutional transactions that will occur, 
and hence the institutional arrangements that will emerge' (Bromley 1989,110). In his 
view, however, no existing model of institutional change is able to capture the 
'rationality" of these changes. Bromley's critique of the models he discusses comes 
down to the following arguments. First, the models are circular since the costs and 
benefits defining whether institutional changes are efficient depend on existing 
institutional arrangements. (In my words, the models are based on an ambiguous 
interpretation of economic efficiency.) Second, the models have too restrictive a view on 
political preferences. Political preferences for institutional change can regard a 
redistribution of economic opportunity rather than being restricted to either (ambiguous) 
economic efficiency or redistribution of income. (I will come back to Bromley's 
explanation of types of political preferences in a later section). Third, political preferences 
emerge in political processes, they do not simply result from bargains between political 
agents with uneven (political/economic) power. From Bromley's critique, I conclude that 
his interpretation of politics resembles Arendfs interpretation of it as a matter of 
unpredictable events rather than as calculable cause-effect relationships (Bromley 1989, 
77-79). In order to strengthen this interpretation, Bromley should consistently drop the 
political means/ends dichotomy. 
According to Bromley, an interpretation of the rationality of institutional change 
as economic narrows the scope of possible changes. Consider the following quotation. 'It 
is against the status quo that patterns of interaction will lead to outcomes deemed to be 
unacceptable. One obvious remedy is for the various parties to attempt to strike a mutual 
bargain that will improve the situation. However, note that any bargain will always be 
made from within the existing structure of institutions that defines choice sets. An 
alternative avenue open to disputants is to attempt to modify directly the institutional 
arrangements that define those choice sets' (Bromley 1989,54). This quotation suggests 
that an economic interpretation of the rationality of institutional change gives rise to 
minimal adjustments of the existing institutional organisation, adjustments that respect 
existing power relationships as much as possible15. A political interpretation of the 
1 5 Bromley criticises the Coasian approach concerning institutional change 
precisely because it falls back on 'direct regulation'. '[In the Coasian approach] 
a substantive consideration of the institutional arrangements that determine the 
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rationality of institutional change, on the contrary, allows for more fundamental 
institutional changes, i.e. institutional changes that redistribute power16. This political 
interpretation presupposes, however, that one has insights into the (social or ecological) 
performance of existing institutional arrangements prior to looking for institutional 
change. In his writings Bromley pleads indeed for scientific investigations of (the social or 
ecological performance of) existing institutional arrangements (rather than of separate 
institutions since economic behaviour depends on an ensemble of institutions). 
4.3 Sustainability 
Bromley gave no sign that sustainability was a special interest of him until his recent 
article 'Searching for sustainability: The poverty of spontaneous order1 was published 
(Bromley 1998). In this article he introduces an interpretation of "sustainability" that, 
though abstract, is interesting for two reasons. First, in a certain sense it respects, better 
than the conventional "strong" or "weak" interpretation of it, the nature of the relationship 
between present and future generations. Second, though the political message it 
provides is abstract, it is fundamental. 
To start with the former reason, Bromley defends the idea that we should move 
beyond the conventional metaphor of sustainability. He objects to the conventional 
interpretation of sustainability as a problem of allocatJve efficiency. This conventional 
interpretation conceives of sustainability, either strong or weak, as about allocating the 
right quantity and quality of (natural and man-made) capital to the generations living now 
and in the future. This interpretation requires that the ecological environment is 
considered a commodity within an economy rather than the counterpart of an economy's 
institutional organisation. It is a commodity as a capital asset and it provides 
status quo is dismissed and attention turns to direct regulation of the offending 
party' 0Bromleyl991,100). 
The German terms Ordnungspolitik and Prozesspolitik, to which Bromley 
refers, indicate, in my view, precisely this distinction between (minimally) 
adjusting and transforming existing institutional arrangements (Bromley 1989, 
225). According to Bromley, quoting Hutchison, the early economists were 
primarily concerned with Ordnungspolitik, while 'it was not until the rise of 
modern macroeconomic policies in the early 1900s that "extensive and 
systematic Prozesspolitikbegm to develop" [...]'(Bromley 1989,225). 
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commodities in the form of ecological goods and services. The ecological environment is 
deemed to offer autonomous consumers a certain utility that relates to their private 
preferences rather than it is looked upon as a necessary condition for economic 
activities. An economy - i.e. the 'spontaneous order" constituted by market processes -
is considered a kind of machine that converts both natural and constructed capital into 
goods and services in an allocatively efficient way, on condition that both capital and 
commodities get "right prices". 
Bromley comments: 'While the assumptions of the time machine problem are 
no more severe than those found in much of economics, when the machine is run with 
the future in mind, certain rather serious inconveniences arise' (Bromley 1998, 234). 
Since we do not know what those living in the future might find giving utility nor what they 
will regard as capital, the idea of "right prices" fails to take us very far. Sustainability as a 
problem of efficient allocation through the economy-machine is, according to Bromley, a 
scientific fiction. This scientific fiction only tells us that we must leave something - but 
what? - for the future. The essential problem of sustainability is that we do not and 
cannot know what those in the future would wish for us to do. This is not a mere problem 
of uncertainty or of risk. It is a problem of lacking information that precludes us from 
knowing what the economy-machine is expected to do. Bromley therefore proposes to 
move beyond the conventional metaphor of sustainability because this metaphor is 
devoid of any positive analytical content for the economist. 
Moving beyond this metaphor implies moving beyond the idea of spontaneous 
order. The order of an economy does not evolve autonomously out of individual 
economic agents' maximising behaviour meant to solve scarcity problems. The order of 
an economy is a constructed order. Sustainability must therefore be about a prior 
constructed order defining a socially acceptable provisioning program for those living 
now and in the future. This economic order to construct and to reconstruct cannot claim 
to leave future persons exactly the domain of choice they would select for themselves. 
This order can at most claim to be a reflection of what we deem to be so valuable -
settings and circumstances - that they are worth to be left to our descendants. For 
reasons I will explain hereafter, I consider this interpretation of sustainability as abstract, 
but fundamental. Bromley himself is at times, however, inclined to detract somewhat 
from this profundity. 
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According to Bromley, looking for a constructed order with an acceptable 
ecological performance is a complex endeavour, for two reasons. First, ecological 
problems often bind together numerous parties, many of which are not able to enter 
consensual deliberations to have their wishes expressed or their interests protected 
(Bromley 1989,58; 1991,86-95). While the impotence of contemporary parties could be 
solved in principle, the impotence of future generations cannot be cancelled out. This is 
what Bromley calls in his earlier writings the problem of 'asymmetry' (Bromley 1991,87). 
For that reason Bromley states that with regard to intertemporal (or intergenerational) 
problems of ecological interference, one cannot speak of "market failures", but at most of 
"missing markets". 'If by a market we mean a structured opportunity for two or more 
agents to exchange ownership of future benefit streams, then there is no market in 
situations of intertemporal externalities' (Bromley 1991, 87). In order to take this 
intertemporal dimension into account, Bromley proposes a Rawlsian veil of ignorance to 
define - politically - suitable institutional arrangements (Bromley 1991, 94)17. He 
concludes that suitable arrangements must be thus that they mean an entitlement of duty 
for the present and right - protected by an inalienability rule - for the future, rather than 
privilege for the present and no right for the future. 
This abstract interpretation of sustainability resembles my interpretation of it, 
for reasons I will explain. To start with, I interpret sustainability as responsibility towards 
future generations with respect to the ecological performance of our economies. Such 
responsibility implies that we keep our present ecological problems manageable, so that 
we do not load future generations with unknown and perhaps unacceptable risks. This is 
what I consider to be the meaning of present generations having duty and future 
generations having inalienable right. The fundamental political message implicit in 
Bromley's interpretation of sustainability is thus to construct an economic order of which 
the ecological performance shows at most manageable ecological problems. This 
interpretation urges us to avoid rather than to tolerate ecological uncertainties with a 
global dimension (in time and in space). Though one has to concede that is not easy and 
often not clear beforehand which ecological problems are manageable and which are 
not, I consider this abstract interpretation of sustainability as politically most valuable. 
1 7 For a brief and clear explanation of two possible meanings of Rawls "veil of 
ignorance" with regard to intergenerational problems, see Beekman 
(forthcoming) 
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It urges us to reflect on (the ecological performance of) both existing and politically 
acceptable economies. 
However, in the article mentioned Bromley also qualifies his politically 
fundamental conception of sustainability, arguing that ft would be an 'inefficient outcome' 
(Bromley 1991,95). For that reason - given, for instance, the prevailing technology of 
pollution abatement" -, institutional arrangements reflecting a right for the future protected 
by a liability rule suffice in his view. In my opinion, Bromley makes here the same 
mistake for which he often blames his colleagues. One cannot compare institutional 
anangements on efficiency grounds, since the meaning of efficiency differs in both 
cases. In the first case where future generations have inalienable rights, the criterion for 
evaluating an economy's efficiency comprises, among other things, keeping a specific 
natural capital that we deem valuable, e.g. clean air, intact. In the second case, this 
criterion means, among other things, allowing for a decline of that valuable natural 
capital, e.g. allowing that the air will in the future be more polluted than it is now, on 
condition that future generations will be compensated for these costs that we deem 
ourselves unwanted.. In my view, we cannot circumvent our task of defining politically 
what kind of economy and, hence, what kind of ecological (and social) performance we 
deem valuable enough to leave to our descendants. In case we deem clean air a 
necessary characteristic of it, we should look for institutional transformations, thorough 
though they can be, that allow this characteristic to be achieved. Efficiency 
considerations are but secondary. And more important than efficiency considerations are 
considerations concerning how to organise the transition from one economy into another 
so that the (monetary and non-monetary) costs and benefits of this transition get fairly 
distributed. This approach presupposes, however, that we have insights into the 
institutional reasons for the growing problem of air pollution, rather than into possible 
(present and future) technologies for abating ft. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In chapter 2,1 argued that, in order to strengthen the ideal of a deliberative democracy, 
we should distinguish between the economic and the political sphere. This distinction 
applies, hence, also to the "rationality" typical for economic and political actions. In the 
first subsection, I object to Bromley's classification of institutional transactions (or 
change) as economic rather than political activities. My objection is based on the 
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argument that the "rationality" of institutional change is political, not economic. It thus 
only holds in case one is prepared to look upon institutional change from the perspective 
of "rationality". 
Bromley's critique on orthodox economic interpretations of institutional change 
illustrates that my classification makes sense. Bromley criticises orthodox economists 
because they prescribe "allocative efficiency" as the only valid political motive for 
institutional change (or at least the only motive they should recommend on). Bromley's 
critique comprises two elements. He argues, to start with, that political actors can have 
other motives for institutional change than the motive of "allocative efficiency". Though 
he rejects allocative efficiency as the only political objective for institutional change of an 
economy, he seems to keep to the idea that politics shows a means/ends rationality. 
Bromley argues, further, that allocative efficiency has no meaning independent of the 
existing institutional organisation of an economy. He, therefore, blames conventional 
economists for constructing a meaning of allocative efficiency by introducing the 
technique of cost-benefit analysis. In Bromley's view this construction is biased because 
cost-benefit analysis implies hidden valuations. And it is biased because it regards 
politics as an aggregate of volitional bargains. This latter critique testifies that Bromley 
does not simply comply to the idea that the rationality of institutional change is economic. 
Nevertheless, despite his argument that allocative efficiency has no meaning 
independent of the existing institutional organisation of an economy, it looks as if 
Bromley continues to use the term ambiguously: at times as a criterion for the efficiency 
within an economy and at times as a criterion for the efficiency of an economy. This 
ambiguity becomes manifest, in particular, where he qualifies his original interpretation of 
sustainability. 
I consider Bromley's original interpretation of sustainability as politically 
fundamental. It admits that sustainability - contrary to weak or strong interpretations of it 
- cannot be a matter of allocative efficiency, for the simple reason that future 
generations, since they do not yet exist, cannot bargain on markets. Sustainability is, 
according to Bromley, about constructing an economic order that we deem valuable 
enough, given its social and ecological performance, to leave to our descendants. In 
order to define what "valuable enough" means, Bromley introduces Rawls' veil of 
ignorance. He concludes that an economic order to leave should reflect duty for present 
generations and inalienable right for future generations. This implies, translated into my 
terminology, that present generations have duty to avoid ecological risks that cannot be 
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managed by present generations. This duty can, however, only be realised on condition 
that we have insights into institutional reasons for empirically observable ecological 
tendencies (that, until now, we were not able to manage). 
5 Conclusion 
Contrary to Pearce, Bromley can be described as an ecological rather than 
environmental economist. In one respect, however, his writings are not compatible with 
this description. Bromley interprets sustainability neither in a weak nor in a strong sense. 
He rejects the metaphor of sustainability as a matter of allocative efficiency. Instead, he 
thinks of sustainability as the metaphor voicing our task to construct an economic order 
that we deem valuable enough to leave ft to our descendants. Translated into my 
terminology, "valuable enough" means, at least, that we take responsibility for the 
ecological (and social) performance of this economic order. This responsibility implies 
that we have duty to avoid ecological risks that cannot be managed by present 
generations. Since, until now, we did not show that we are able to manage present-day 
general ecological tendencies, this responsibility presupposes that we hurry to gain 
insights into the relationships between the institutional organisation and the ecological 
performance of our economies. 
Bromley's institutional approach allows for some insights into these 
relationships between institutional organisation and ecological performance. His 
treatment of "externalities" demonstrates that the kind and level of ecological interference 
that can occur and remain is internally related to the institutional organisation of an 
economy. Through his analysis of property regimes, i.e. that genetic hierarchy of 
institutions that defines a particular valuable asset as an economic good, Bromley can 
explain possible, not actual economic actions and, hence, possible, not actual ecological 
performances. In order to gain insights into actually existing general ecological 
tendencies, i.e., into the combined rather than atomistic ecological performance of 
economic actors' actions, I suggest that we need further insights into institutional 
reasons for existing distributions of income and into the institutional dimension of 
"(future) benefit streams". I suppose, moreover, that the kind of institutional hierarchy we 
are looking for is of the kind of an order hierarchy, rather than a genetic hierarchy. For an 
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order hierarchy can leam us something about dominant institutions, and I expect that 
dominant institutions can help us explain genera/ tendencies. 
Bromley strongly criticises the idea prevailing among environmental economists 
that ecological policy is about allccative efficiency. He stresses that political actors can 
have many political objectives other than economic optimality. Bromley is, however, 
ambiguous in his treatment of economic versus political rationality. He has, for instance, 
no reservations to label institutional transactions as economic rather than political 
activities. At the same time, he objects to the idea that institutional change is a matter of 
allocatfve efficiency. Contrary to Bromley, I argue that a typically economic and a 
typically political rationality exist (remember chapter 2). I plainly consent that economic 
rationality is about allocatfve efficiency. But allocative efficiency only has unambiguous 
meaning within a particular institutional context. Institutional change is a matter of 
political rationality. Political rationality can, indeed, resemble economic rationality 
depending on the extent that political actors respect existing economic power 
relationships and aim at optimal satisfaction of private preferences. It does, however, not 
necessarily resemble it. Political rationality can also question existing power relationships 
and aim at an institutional realisation of reasoned public preferences. The latter topic will 
be dealt with again in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
The nature of 
Bromley's economics 
In order to explain the nature of Bromley's ecological economics, I have to translate 
some of the concepts he uses into my terminology. In section 1,1 will show that Bromley 
admits the non-neutrality of ecological economics, though he tries to justify this non-
neutralfty by defending that the values constituting his normative perspective result from 
empirical observations. In section 2,1 will deal with Bromley's argument that economic 
science should be objective. His (residual) logical positivist idea that objectivity implies 
neutrality causes Bromley, however, to wrestle with its meaning. In section 3,1 will deal 
with Bromley's objections to conventional economists' inclination to prescribe the political 
motive for institutional change. Though I fully agree that it is not the economist's task to 
prescribe political motives, I deem his endeavour to describe political motives 
scientifically redundant. In section 4,1 will comment on Bromley's stress that science 
should explain rather than predict. I will argue that Bromley's keeping on to the (political) 
means/ends dichotomy brings him on the slippery slope of recommending institutional 
changes, i.e. of predicting rather than explaining. In the final section 5,1 will argue that, 
due to his concentration on property rights and property regimes, the insights Bromley's 
approach offers us into the relationships between the institutional organisation of an 
economy and the content and distribution of private interests are restricted. The nature of 
his ecological economics is, hence, partially impartial. 
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1 Non-neutral 
1.1 Propagandistic versus paradigmatic non-neutrality 
To understand whether Bromley considers of ecological economics as a neutral or non-
neutral science, we should refer to his interpretation of the concept Ideology" (Bromley 
1991,205). According to Bromley, ideology can be thought of in two distinct ways. One 
connotation of the term is that of an emotional or propagandistic position held by 
someone. The ideologue is one who engages in a variety of means and tactics in order 
that the position of others might be altered in specific ways' (Bromley 1991, 205). In 
Bromley's view, a scientist should try to avoid to be such an ideologue. He or she strives 
to avoid subjectivity and the taint of our personal values having an influence on 
economic analysis. [...] It is said that we must avoid, at all cost, allowing ideology - by 
which is meant value judgments - to color our analysis' (Bromley 1991,205). The other 
interpretation of the concept regards ideology as 'an overall view of, or attitude toward, 
something' (Bromley 1991, 205-206). The term then refers to a shared system of 
meaning and comprehension. This system functions as a structure within which 
information is supplied and processed, directions are given, and justification for certain 
behaviour is provided. In brief, this second interpretation of "ideology" comes down to 
what Kuhn defined as a paradigm. To recapitulate, Bromley distinguishes between 
propagandistic and paradigmatic ideology. In his view, scientists should not be 
propagandistic ideologues, but they cannot be but paradigmatic ideologues. 
Translating Bromley into my own terminology, I conclude that Bromley looks 
upon economics as a non-neutral science, in the sense that value-laden concepts 
constitute the perspective from which we look at human reality. A disciplinary paradigm 
is unavoidably non-neutral or, in Bromley's words, ideological in the second sense. 
Recognising the non-neutrality of science implies that we cannot maintain - as Bromley 
does in the previous quotation - that value judgements should not colour scientists' 
analysis. Value judgements certainly define the way scientists look and, hence, analyse. 
Recognising this non-neutrality does not imply that scientists engage in a variety of 
means and tactics in order to alter the position of others in specific ways. The latter 
problem does not regard so much science's non-neutrality, but scientists' endeavour to 
augment their political influence by prescribing, rather than describing, political objectives 
(see further in section 3). 
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1.2 A normative analysis of institutional change 
In some passages, Bromley explains what the non-neutral perspective constituting his 
interpretation of economics consists of. He regards (ecological) economics as a kind of 
policy science. The subject matter of economics as a policy science can be subdivided in 
the analysis of (existing and possible) institutional arrangements and of institutional 
transactions (or change) (Bromley 1989,148-150). Bromley explicitly states that he is 
concerned with the normative content of institutional arrangements and of institutional 
change (Bromley 1989,40). His normative analysis of existing and possible institutional 
arrangements regards, first, their (social or ecological) performance and, second, their 
framing effect on the meaning of efficiency and optimality and on the problem of 
collective choice and institutional change. 'By performance I mean more than simply the 
net national income as reckoned in monetary terms. By performance I mean the full 
gamut of indicators of well-being that individuals and groups marshal to convey their 
satisfaction with how things are going. [...] There will be concern with the loss of jobs in 
the manufacturing sector, there will be concern with regional disparities in economic 
growth and adjustment, there will be concern with excessive agricultural output, there will 
be concern with land-use tendencies in urban areas, and so on. All of these concerns 
reflect the outcomes from existing institutional anangements and patterns of interaction' 
(Bromley 1989 149). By the framing effect of institutional arrangements on the meaning 
of efficiency and optimality Bromley means that institutional arrangements - status quo 
as well as alternative configurations of institutions - define the (monetary as well as non-
monetary) costs and benefits in both their magnitude and their incidence. The latter 
framing effect on the problem of collective choice and, hence, on institutional change is, 
according to Bromley, a direct consequence of the former framing effect on the meaning 
of efficiency and optimality since "efficiency" is commonly considered to be the objective 
of economic policy. 
1.3 Four motives for institutional change 
In Bromley's view, it is the political objectives as defined by members of a polity that 
should function as a criterion to evaluate the efficiency, i.e., the social and ecological 
performance of an economy and of its institutional change. In other words, it is 
empirically observable political objectives (I will come back to this topic in section 3) that 
should constitute the normative perspective of ecological economics as a policy science. 
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Bromley strongly objects to the conventional idea that allocative efficiency is the only 
political objective that economists can recommend on. In order to weaken this 
conventional idea, he develops four types of political objectives, i.e. four possible 
motives for institutional change. (Bromley 1989,128-143). 
Conventional wisdom draws, according to Bromley, a distinction between 
institutional changes that are motivated by allocative efficiency ('pie enlarging' or 
'institutional transactions that increase productive efficiency') and those that are 
redistributive in nature ('merely redividing a fixed pie' or 'institutional transactions that 
redistribute income'). Recommending on institutional changes motivated by allocative 
efficiency is considered to be the task of economists. Deciding on redistributive 
measures is considered to be a political matter. In addition to these two motives, 
Bromley distinguishes between reallocation of economic opportunity and reallocation of 
economic advantage. The difference between the two latter motives is related to the 
social utility function, i.e., Bromley writes, the ensemble of public and private goods 
deemed desirable in a society. Institutional changes that are meant to ameliorate social 
efficiency are reallocating economic opportunity. Institutional changes that are meant to 
protect the interests of economic decision units in a way that is not consistent with the 
social utility function are redistributing economic advantage. If mine safety is a public or 
private good belonging to a social utility function, institutional changes meant to realise 
mine safety are an example of the former case. If miners were able - i.e. spending 
scarce resources - to achieve an outcome for which there is no argument in the social 
utility function, the concomitant institutional changes are an example of the latter1. 
Bromley's distinction between the four motives (or types of political objectives) 
is analytically not sharp. To start with, Bromley uses the term "allocative efficiency" 
ambiguously. At times, allocative efficiency refers to the efficiency of an economy. This is 
the case where Bromley mentions allocative efficiency as one of the four possible 
motives for institutional change. I already argued that this kind of efficiency has no 
independent meaning (see section 3.3.1 in chapter 5). Institutional changes meant for 
"pie enlarging" or "economic growth" do not contribute to allocative efficiency, since the 
latter only has independent meaning when referring to economic actions occurring within 
'Imagine that laborers, through threat of a crippling strike, were able to extract 
work concessions to maintain total daily pay at its current level, but to reduce 
the work day from 8 hours to 6 hours' (Bromley 1989,143). 
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an economy. "Pie enlarging" or "economic growth" are separate criteria. At times, 
Bromley preserves the term allocative efficiency for economic actions occurring within an 
economy. In these cases, Bromley explains allocative efficiency (Bromley also speaks of 
'private economic efficiency' (Bromley 1991,174)) as a combination of productive and 
consumption efficiency. It occurs tohen independent producers and consumers take 
market signals - prices - and adjust their production and consumption decisions such 
that, at the margin, the gain from one more unit of production (or of consumption) is 
exactly offset by the added costs of that last unit' (Bromley 1991, 174). Allocative 
efficiency is about the best attainable combination of goods and services produced and 
consumed within an economic community, given the availability of particular resource, 
labour and capital inputs and of particular techniques and given the presence of 
particular tastes and preferences and of particular institutional arrangements2. 
I keep to my argument that we should preserve the term allocative efficiency for 
economic actions occurring within an economy. Consequently, this kind of efficiency fails 
2 Contrary to what the term "private economic efficiency" suggests, allocative 
efficiency regards the efficiency within the whole of an economy. The reason 
why allocative efficiency does not contradict private efficiency is that allocative 
efficiency derives from the combined (efficient) actions of (nominally) 
independent, i.e. private, producers and consumers. Under specific conditions, 
i.e. absence of market failures (and here the ambiguity of the term "allocative 
efficiency" pops up again), privately efficient - i.e. economising - behaviour is 
deemed to satisfy the aggregate of individual tastes and preferences in the best 
possible way. In other words, private economising efficiency is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for allocative efficiency. Market prices are responsible for 
this harmonious connection between the private and the common. '[The] 
argument holds that in conditions of thoroughgoing competition among a 
number of buyers and sellers the social value of inputs and outputs is correctly 
reflected in their respective market prices' (Bromley 1991, 174). Allocative 
efficiency thus is about the best attainable combination of "commodities", i.e. of 
goods and services sold and bought on the markets that are institutionalised in a 
particular economy. Pareto-optimality is the criterion for allocative efficiency. 
The Pareto-principle states that a specific combination of goods and services is 
Pareto-optimal if no other combination exists that satisfies one economic 
decision unit's preferences better without satisfying the other economic decision 
units' preferences worse. 
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as a criterion to evaluate the performance of an economy or of institutional change. In 
order to evaluate the latter, one needs some other, independent criterion. 
Bromley proposes to use a social welfare function as an independent criterion 
to evaluate an economy and its institutional change. A social welfare function is 
expressed as W = f(Uj, U2 Un), where U; represents the utility or happiness of 
individual /. According to Bromley, the social welfare function is an aggregating 
mechanism for making collective decisions about what ought to be done. 'It is a 
mechanism for aggregating individual interests to arrive at collective decisions' (Bromley 
1989,127). Which social welfare function is deemed relevant depends, according to 
Bromley, on the political process (Bromley 1989, 137). The relevant social welfare 
function results from collective judgements on the strength and relevance of judgements 
made by the individuals in society. It is an expression of whether or not it is more 
important to cater to the interests of individual 1 or to those of individual 2. According to 
Bromley, the social welfare function is a criterion for the social efficiency of an economy. 
An economy is socially efficient if it contains that combination of private and collective 
goods that satisfies a particular social welfare function best. Institutional changes that 
contribute to social efficiency reallocate economic opportunity, while institutional changes 
that detract from social efficiency reallocate economic advantage. 
Social efficiency regards, according to Bromley, the best attainable combination 
of market and non-market goods and services (Bromley 1989,138). It does not only 
depend on the (allocative) "efficiency" of economic decision units' behaviour within 
particular institutional arrangements, but also on the "efficiency" of the institutional 
arrangements themselves. According to Bromley, citizens consume more than just 
private goods purchased in commodity transactions (as, for instance, 'coal, food, 
clothing'); they also consume collective goods that are purchased in institutional 
transactions (as, for instance, 'literacy, environmental quality, the net wealth position of 
members in society, the general state of human health, and work conditions of factories, 
firms, and mines') (Bromley 1989,136). I object to Bromley's idea that social efficiency is 
about the best possible combination of private and public goods. Social efficiency is 
about the performance of an economy. This performance can be evaluated with regard 
to an infinite number of standards. These standards are not necessarily met with the help 
of goods, either private or public. The following example, that I owe to Bromley (Bromley 
1989,111-121; 135-139), will help to explain my reservations. I will retell the example in 
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my own words and transform it where necessary in order to adapt it to my own analytical 
purposes. 
Consider a society in which the general level of satisfaction of individuals 
depends not only on the production of coal, but also on the safety of the work conditions 
in mines. The social utility function then has the form U = U(c,s) where (c,s) reflects the 
bundle of coal and safety available in that society. The social efficiency of this society's 
economy will thus be measured according to two standards, namely provision of coal 
and safety of miners. Given this (simple) utility function, one has two possibilities with 
regard to people's interest in "safety in mines". (By the way, one also has two 
possibilities with regard to people's interest in coal.) 
Either the collectivity regards safety of miners as a private interest. In other 
words, the members of this society have a political preference for considering safety of 
miners as a private interest. This political preference will be reflected in the institutional 
organisation of economy A. The institutional organisation of economy A implies no 
liability on the part of mine owners for accidents that lead to injury or death to miners. 
Labourers must assume the full risk of work-related accidents and there is no incentive 
on the part of mine owners to invest in costly safety precautions. The solution left to 
miners is to bargain with the mine-owners and try to buy a right to their future labour 
power. Whether these miners will be able to buy this right depends on whether they will 
be able to raise enough money. What counts as "enough money" depends on the 
relative income (wealth) of the miners and of the mine owner, on the techniques needed 
to realise this right - does a hard hat suffice or does one need a complete reorganisation 
of mining technology -, and on the transaction costs that the miners have to pay in order 
to bribe the mine owners. Indeed, the status quo requires that the laborers initiate the 
expensive and tedious process of gathering information about the costs and benefits of 
safety measures, the negotiation of a new safety regime, and the enforcement of that 
regime' (Bromley 1989,117). The institutional organisation of economy A thus reflects 
the political preference for mine safety as a private interest. Whether and to what extent 
this private interest will be looked after depends on the allocative efficiency (i.e. Pareto-
optimality) of safety measures and this allocative efficiency depends, in its turn, on the 
(relative) wealth of the miners and on the magnitude of the transaction costs these 
miners have to pay. In economy A, the realisation of a safety regime in a mine is an 
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example of an explicit rights transfer, i.e. of a commodity transaction - not of an 
institutional transaction (as Bromley seems to suggest in some passages3). Miners' 
private interest in safety can be managed with the help of goods (a hard hat or an alarm 
system) or as a counterpart of a different technological (safer machines) or social 
(shorter working days) organisation. The goods bought to satisfy miners' interest in 
safety are, moreover, not necessarily private. Depending on the property regime 
attached to these goods, some rights related to them can be assigned to individuals, 
others to all miners, still others to miners performing particular work, and so on. 
Or the collectivity considers mine safety as a common interest. In this case, the 
members of this society have a political preference for considering the safety of miners 
as a common interest. This political preference will, again, be reflected in the institutional 
organisation of economy B in this society. Economy B has an institutional arrangement in 
which labourers' right in their future labour power is legally protected. This right can 
either be protected through a legal obligation for mine owners to contribute to an annuity 
per unit of time worked so as to indemnify workers and their survivors in the event of an 
accident (Bromley 1989,112). In this case there is an economic incentive for the mine 
owners to invest in safety equipment that will reduce the probability of accidents. Or -
Bromley does not mention this possibility - this right can be protected through safety 
precautions that each mine owner is legally bound to take. And the level of the safety 
precautions can (Bromley 1989,113) or cannot be derived from cost-benefit analyses. 
While in economy A the miners must pay for the right in their future labour power (if they 
can), in economy B the mine owners must (definitely) pay for their labourers' right. In 
other words, in economy A the mine-owner's right to use his miners' labour power is less 
restricted than it is in economy B. The activities undertaken to change the initial into the 
final institutional organisation (for instance, economy A into economy B) are an example 
3 For instance in the following passage (Bromley 1989, 146). After 
distinguishing between four kinds of institutional transactions, Bromley writes: 
'These institutional transactions will arise as autonomous responses to new 
economic conditions and opportunities, or they will arise because of an absence 
of autonomous change and so they will be imposed from without'. My argument 
is that a consequent use of the concepts, introduced by Bromley, would denote 
transactions resulting from 'autonomous responses to new economic conditions 
[as, for instance, changing preferences concerning mine safety; MD] and 
opportunities' as commodity transactions, not as institutional transactions. 
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of implicit rights transfers or institutional transactions. In economy B, miners' legally 
protected right in safety can again be realised with the help of goods or with the help of a 
particular technological or social organisation. (The distinction between goods and 
organisation is, moreover, not strict. Each technological or social organisation shows 
economic aspects, either in the form of, for instance, costs for machines or information or 
in the form of costs for more or less expensive labour power.) 
To recapitulate, in a particular economy safety can be considered either a 
private or a public interest. In the former case, individual economic actors should buy 
and sell rights to safety. Safety is a matter of commodity transactions occurring within the 
institutional organisation of this economy. In the latter case, miners' right in safety is 
reflected in the institutional organisation of this economy. Safety is one aspect of the 
social performance of this economy. More safety as a common interest is realised 
through institutional transactions. Miners interest in safety, whether private or public, can 
be realised either with the help of economic commodities or as a counterpart of a 
particular social or technological organisation. The property regime attached to the 
economic commodities meant to realise miners' safety can also vary. Private interests 
are not necessarily fulfilled with the help of private goods, nor are public interests 
necessarily fulfilled with the help of public goods. (Anyhow, the concepts private or public 
good are, as I explained in section 2.2.2 of chapter 7, analytically not precise.) 
To conclude, what matters for evaluating the social efficiency of an economy is 
which interests are politically considered to be private and which are politically 
considered to be public. The former interests should be satisfied by economic actors 
within the existing institutional organisation of an economy. The latter interests should be 
satisfied by political actors through (changes of) the institutional organisation of an 
economy. A particular institutional organisation reflects people's political preferences for 
both private and public interests. Social efficiency does not refer, as Bromley states, to 
the best combination of private and public goods, it refers to the best institutional 
organisation of an economy, an organisation that reflects political preferences for a 
particular combination of private and public interests. These interests can, further, be 
managed with the help of commodities or (technological or social) organisations. 
My reformulation of social efficiency urges me to reject Bromley's classification 
of political motives for institutional change. I already explained that allocative efficiency 
cannot be a motive for institutional change. Let us, therefore, drop this first motive. A fair 
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distribution of income can be a criterion for evaluating the social efficiency of an 
economy. This criterion can be politically considered a matter of private or of public 
interest. If the latter is the case, institutional change contributing to a fair distribution of 
income should be classified, in Bromley's terminology, as reallocation of economic 
opportunity. Institutional change detracting from a fair distribution of income should be 
classified as reallocation of economic advantage. Consequently, Bromley's second 
motive should not be mentioned separately. It is simply one of possible criteria that can 
constitute a social welfare function. Finally, one can only distinguish between reallocation 
of economic opportunity and of economic advantage if one knows the set of criteria that 
constitute a social welfare function. In section 3,1 will argue that this set cannot simply 
be known. For that reason, I propose to drop also Bromley's third and fourth type of 
political motives for institutional change. All that remains is people's political preferences 
consisting of a non-transparent and continuously changing set of values. All an economic 
scientist can do is to provide political actors with, indeed non-neutral, insights into the 
social and ecological performance of existing economies. Non-neutral scientists cannot 
and should not investigate political actors' motives in order to define their own normative 
perspective. I agree with Weber (see section 1.1 in chapter 2) that one cannot answer 
scientifically to the question which values must constitute a scientific perspective. I 
consider, therefore, Bromley's introduction of a social welfare function and a social utility 
function as superfluous4. 
2 Objective 
Bromley rejects the logical positivist (and the later logical empiricist) interpretation of 
objectivity as neutrality, since he denies that (economic) science can be neutral. 
According to Bromley, this interpretation of objectivity as neutrality still prevails within the 
community of orthodox économiste (Bromley 1991, 207-216). Bromley's rejection of 
4 In bis reaction to my analysis of his writings, Bromley argues that the social 
welfare function and the social utility function are merely economistic 
metaphors for thinking about whose interests count in a policy, and what goods 
and services enter into calculation of well being. It is, he writes, an economic 
way of thinking, but it is not meant to impose economistic criteria. 
238 
positivism is not a rejection of scientific objectivity. His interpretation of objectivity is, 
however, problematic. 
Bromley distinguishes between the objectivity of the scientist and the objectivity 
of the science (Bromley 1989, 233; 1991, 223). In his view, the former is a feasible 
possibility. With regard to the latter, Bromley is ambiguous. The former depends on the 
extent to which independent investigators can reach similar conclusions about the 
correspondence of theory and reality (Bromley 1989,232; 1991,221). And independent 
investigators are deemed to reach this similarity on condition that they operate in an 
'exemplary, serious, and well-intentioned manner", i.e. 'as neutral and as unpremeditated 
as possible' (Bromley 1989, 231-232; the italics are mine). To conclude, in Bromley's 
view, an objective scientist is a "neutral" scientist. His or her neutrality makes it possible 
that other neutral scientists will perceive and interpret the world in the same way. 
Neutrality here refers, according to Bromley, to 'high standards of observation, 
interpretation and synthesis' (Bromley 1991, 226). This "neutrality" is the opposite of 
what Bromley calls propagandists ideology. 
Bromley defines the objectivity of the science as a combination of consistency, 
coherence and correspondence. In Bromley's view, a scientific paradigm (i.e. the shared 
belief system of scientists) can be consistent - logically valid - and coherent -
comprehending all of the phenomena to which ft claims relevance - without having 
something to do with truth. 'An argument can be valid by the rules of logic and still have 
no connection with the real world; validity says nothing about truth content" (Bromley 
1991, 206). Therefore, in order to guarantee the objectivity of the science, one has to 
move from internal concerns - consistency and coherence - to external matters, i. e. the 
problem of concordance. 'Concordance is a matter of how closely a model or theory 
corresponds to the world it purports to explain' (Bromley 1991,206). 
The concrete content of objectivity as, among other things, concordance differs 
depending on whether one deals with what Bromley calls a theory science' or a 'policy 
science' (Bromley 1989, 231-232; 1991, 221-222). Theory science in economics 7s 
about discovering what existing theory needs in order that it might more accurately 
model human interactions', while policy science in economics 7s about discovering what 
individuals and groups want (or need) such that they might more easily fulfil their goals 
and objectives' (Bromley 1989,232). The objective end product of theory science is the 
best possible abstract representation of what goes on in daily life, while the objective end 
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product of policy science is policy recommendations that correspond as good as possible 
with what the individuals affected by the policy problem want to achieve. 
Bromley's rejection of logical positivism and logical empiricism allows him to 
abandon the idea of one true scientific method (Bromley 1989,231). This enables him to 
think of, at least, two kinds of economic sciences, the one called theory science, the 
other policy science. However, the story does not end here. In Bromley's view the policy 
scientist is, after all, dependent upon the success of the theory scientist for the very 
essence of policy science is the received orthodoxy that is the domain of theory science' 
(Bromley 1989,234). Bromley's reference to "orthodoxy" as the domain of theory science 
suggests that Bromley has one true method for theory science and one true method for 
policy science in mind. Although he concedes that different individuals will choose 
different segments of reality to study, their investigations are meant to contribute to the 
growth of economic theory science, which serves as the one and only basis for economic 
policy science (Bromley 1991,221). In spite of his reference to Feyerabend's philosophy 
of science (Bromley 1989,229), it looks as if Bromley holds implicitly to the idea of one 
true scientific method for theory science on the one hand and for policy science on the 
other. 
Much of the inconsistencies and ambiguities in Bromley's elaboration of 
"objectivity" would be resolved, if we would distinguish objectivity from neutrality on the 
one hand and if we would interpret objectivity as intersubjective consent on the other. My 
latter suggestion is not at odds with Bromley's interpretation of objectivity. In Bromley's 
view, "neutrality" is a condition for different investigators to reach the same conclusions 
with regard to their research object. This means that the most important characteristic 
transforming statements into scientific statements is that they receive independent 
scientists' common consent. Common consent - or intersubjective consensus - is the 
criterion; "neutrality" - a neutral scientist is an unpremeditated, non propagandists 
scientist - is deemed the means to realise that criterion. According to Bromley himself, 
however, scientists can never be "neutral" in the sense that the concepts, theories and 
methods they use are part of a paradigm. Each paradigm implies a lot of - not 
necessarily consciously - normative, i.e. non-neutral, choices. (Think, for instance, of 
Bromley's own analysis of the normative choices an economist unavoidably has to make 
in order to distinguish between means and ends.) 
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The distinction Bromley implicitly makes between non-neutrality in the first 
sense of propagandists ideology and in the second sense of paradigmatic ideology is 
rather artificial and unclear. For that reason, I propose to drop the distinction and to 
accept that neutrality is not a feature of scientific objectivity. One can at most distinguish 
between normative choices that do and others that do not carry off (conscious or 
unconscious) common consent. The former constitute "objectivity", the latter are a 
departure from it. 
Distinguishing between objectivity and neutrality releases Bromley from 
distinguishing between the objectivity of the scientist on the one hand and of the science 
on the other. Neither the scientist, nor the science can be neutral, though both can be 
objective. Bromley's distinction is untenable, anyway, since testing the so-called 
"correspondence" of a theory with reality comes down to reaching intersubjective 
consensus concerning the adequacy of a model. Consequently, the "objectivity" of a 
science cannot be separated from the "objectivity" of a scientist. Both kinds of 
"objectivity" are always simultaneously checked: the objectivity of a theory is a check for 
the objectivity of the theorist and wee versa. 
Moreover, recognition of the non-neutrality of objective science prevents 
scientists from thinking of theories as simply "corresponding" to reality. In this sense, the 
objectivity of economic theory does not guarantee "truth" (or correspondence between 
the model and reality), with its connotations of uniqueness and universal validity. 
Different scientists do not only choose different segments of reality to study, as Bromley 
acknowledges (Bromley 1991, 221). Their choices at the same time originate from a 
specific perspective, from specific underlying value ideas. Consequently, developments 
within a specific discipline do not automatically result in what Bromley calls a growth of 
science (Bromley 1991,221). They can also result in different - objective, but differently 
non-neutral - disciplinary theories5. 
5 In one passage, where he speaks of 'multiple ways of knowing' and of truth as 
'both relative and elusive', Bromley seems to recognise this (Bromley 1993a, 
838). 
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3 Descriptive 
Bromley strongly objects to the orthodox inclination to prescribe the policy objective. He 
spends ample room to demonstrate the (propagandists) Ideology" of conventional 
economics. Part of this ideology is (allocatJve or productive) efficiency as an 'objective 
truth rule' (Bromley 1991,12). By "objective truth rule" Bromley refers to the twin ideas 
that economic objectivity implies allocatJve efficiency and that this efficiency 
consequently is, at least according to economists, the correct thing to strive for, both for 
the economist and the politician. According to Bromley, the intellectual tradition of 
economics as a policy science is dominated by the notion that the task of the economist 
is to indicate what ought to be done in the name of economic efficiency and Pareto 
optimality (Bromley 1989,232-235). Conventional economists hold that the proper policy 
objectives are given by the conceptual foundation of benefit-cost analysis, i.e. welfare 
economics and the criterion of a potential Pareto improvement. Under this approach 
there is only one objective, namely to increase net national income. "Efficiency" is 
interpreted as allocatJve (or productive) efficiency. Bromley objects that allocative 
efficiency is neither objective nor necessarily the correct decision-rule for public policy. 
With regard to his former judgement, I can only partly agree. I agree that 
allocative efficiency is not a value-free criterion. Bromley himself analyses, through an 
overview of the history of economic science, the many normative choices inherent in the 
concept (Bromley 1991, 207-216). I do not agree, however, that allocative efficiency 
necessarily contradicts scientific objectivity. The value judgements underlying the 
concept of allocative efficiency - e.g. the belief in the primacy of individual preferences 
and in the Pareto principle (Bromley 1989,2) - are part of the paradigmatic ideology of 
welfare economics. Hence, they carry off the consent of all economists converted to this 
paradigm. Allocative efficiency is indeed part of "objective" science, in the sense that it 
boasts intersubjective consensus, at least within the community of consenting (orthodox) 
economists6. 
6 Bromley's quotation of Harberger precisely is an illustration of the latter's 
endeavour to keep the consensus within a community of economists intact 
'About this time, Arnold Harberger, in a self-admitted tract felt compelled to 
reassure the timid, and to bolster the irresolute. Fearing that there was 
potentially corrosive diffidence among applied economists, Harberger offered 
the "Three Basis postulates for Applied Welfare Economics" [...]. There he 
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With regard to Bromley's latter judgement (regarding efficiency as a decision 
rule for public policy), I fully agree. The problem is, however, that, given the value 
judgements underlying the orthodox economic paradigm, conventional economics 
cannot but recommend public authorities on allocative efficiency, since it is the only kind 
of insights in economic reality it is able to offer. Either public authorities' objective is 
allocative efficiency and in that case orthodox economists have something to offer. Or 
their objective differs from allocative efficiency and then they are at loss for words7.1 will 
explain further on that one cannot simply separate the values underlying a political 
objective from the values underlying a paradigm. Policy science is not a technical 
application of theory science; one and the same theory science cannot be used for 
whatever political objective. Paradigmatic ideology inevitably switches to propagandists 
ideology - without changing its content - as soon as science is used as a policy toolbox. 
Since Bromley objects to the idea that economic scientists prescribe political 
objectives, he wants economists - as policy scientists - to place their theories in the 
service of the objectives as defined through collective actjon. 'fTjhe objective policy 
scientist should be the last to denigrate those objectives of the citizenry that do not 
happen to accord with the economist's view that people should do what is "efficient". 
After all, if economics is serious about the sanctity and autonomy of the individual then it 
does seem somewhat inconsistent to disregard the wishes of those affected by collective 
choice as unscientific and to advocate, instead, the Pareto rule. Simply put, it is logically 
inconsistent to venerate individual preferences as expressed through volitional choice in 
markets, but to denigrate and to discount individual preferences as expressed through 
collective action. The economist as policy scientist is concerned with problem solving 
and helping to do what is desired by those affected by the particular event under 
noted, with some apparent concern, "In an era when literally thousands of 
studies involving cost-benefit analysis or other types of applied welfare 
economics are underway at any given moment, the need for an accepted set of 
professional standards for this type of study should be obvious. [...]"' (Bromley 
1991,214). 
7 I cannot hold back the following amusing quotation (which at the same time 
confirms my statement): '[...] when the neo-classicist starts pontificating on 
proper social policy motivated on Pareto-efficiency grounds I understand that to 
be related to the drunk searching for his misplaced car keys under the street 
light, not because he dropped them there, but because that happens to be the 
place where there is enough light to see' (Bromley 1985,782). 
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consideration, not with advocating what is said to be right by the postulates of welfare 
economics' (Bromley 1989, 234). In Bromley's view, it is - as I mentioned already in 
subsection 1 - empirically observable political objectives that should function as a 
criterion to evaluate the social and ecological performance of an economy and its 
institutional change. To conclude, according to Bromley, policy scientists should keep to 
description, not prescription of policy objectives. Though I agree with Bromley that an 
ecologically relevant science should describe rather than prescribe, I do not 
unequivocally agree that political objectives should be the subject matter of such 
scientific description. 
Bromley's proposal to fall back on empirically observable political objectives is 
problematic in two respects. First, whose political objectives should be taken into 
consideration? The political objectives a "descriptive" policy scientist looks for can either 
be those of decision makers (Bromley 1989, 234-236) or of the people affected by a 
policy (Bromley 1991, 223). In both cases, Bromley acknowledges the inherent 
normative choice. This choice regards who is deemed the appropriate mouthpiece of 
political objectives. 
Second, can an investigation of political objectives be separated from a search 
for scientific instruments? Bromley suggests in some passages that political objectives 
and scientific instruments can be separated.'[...] in policy science the economist must 
first ask (or determine) the goals and objectives of those affected by a policy, an activity 
that requires the greatest possible level of objectivity, and then objectively draw on 
theory to propose which avenues will maximize the chances of attaining those 
objectives'(Bromley 1991,223). A few passages later, however, Bromley admits that it is 
not always easy to maintain a sharp distinction between policy objectives and policy 
instruments. Therefore, he recommends the policy analyst to become involved in the 
policy process in a way that will facilitate the dialectic evolution of both policy objectives 
and policy instruments'(Bromley 1991,227). The problem manifest in the latter quotation 
is the lack of transparency with regard to the values underlying both paradigmatic 
ideologies and political objectives. I, therefore, proposed, in section 4.2 of the previous 
chapter, to drop the political means/ends dichotomy and to accept that politics is about 
institutional arrangements tout court. In section 1,1 proposed to accept that evaluating 
the social or ecological performance of an economy and of its institutional change is a 
political, not a scientific matter. 
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To conclude, I agree with Bromley that economists have a descriptive rather 
than prescriptive task. Contrary to Bromley, I claim that this task relates to (the social 
and ecological performance of) the institutional organisation of existing economies, not to 
political actors' non-transparent and continuously changing set of values. 
4 Explanatory 
In section 2,1 mentioned that Bromley indicates three aspects of scientific objectivity, 
namely consistency, coherence and conespondence. These aspects are deemed to 
contribute to "adequate" models of economic reality (Bromley 1991,8,54,57). According 
to Bromley, the adequacy of the models depends more on the accuracy and complexity 
with which they "reflect reality", than on the accuracy of their predictions. 'In contrast with 
much predictive work in which the reality of our assumptions may be less important than 
the accuracy of our estimates, prescriptive economics demands that our models be an 
accurate reflection of reality' (Bromley 1991, 57)8. Theory science aims, according to 
Bromley, at an accurate abstract representation of what goes on in daily life, while policy 
science aims at policy recommendations that correspond accurately with what the 
individuals affected by the policy problem want to achieve. To reach the intended 
"accuracy" Bromley starts with conceptual analysis (with regard to phenomena such as 
institutions, property rights, collective choice, and political objectives) (Bromley 1989,32; 
1991,8,170). 
Bromley's stress is on explanation rather than on prediction. On the one hand, 
Bromley argues time and again that economists have to look for cause-effect 
relationships rather than for mere correlation or for symptoms (Bromley 1989, 232; 
Bromley 1991, 131, 168). To understand or to explain an economy means to know 
cause-effect relationships. On the other hand, Bromley warns us for the limited predicting 
ability of (conventional) economics. 'Our models are most rigorous when concerned with 
incremental change within a constant institutional setup' (Bromley 1991,79). 
In order to make the terminology used in the previous quotation consistent 
with my terminology, I suggest to replace the term "prescriptive" by the terms 
"normative" or "non-neutral". 
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What it means to look for cause-effect relationships (rather than for mere 
correlation or for symptoms) is a question that, in my opinion, Bromley does not answer 
sufficiently. I already mentioned earlier that one can discern in Bromley's writings two 
domains of economic analysis: the domain of social and ecological performances of 
institutional arrangements constituting an economy, and the domain of institutional 
changes. With regard to the former domain, Bromley thinks of cause-effect relationships 
as relationships between institutions and (social/ecological) outcomes. The linkage 
between institutions, patterns of interaction, and outcomes provides a model of cause 
and effect' (Bromley 1989, 250). I wonder the accuracy of reading the relationship 
between institutions and outcomes as a cause-effect relationship. Suppose that we take 
economic activities as an analytical starting point. Economic activities show at the same 
time institutional and social/ecological dimensions. Institutions on the one hand and 
social/ecological performances on the other are dimensions of economic activities, rather 
than the latter being an effect of the former and the former being a cause of the latter. 
With regard to the latter domain, Bromley thinks of changing economic 
conditions - new scarcities, new technological opportunities, new distributions of income 
or wealth, or new tastes and preferences (Bromley 1989,110) - as causes of changing 
institutional arrangements. 'Just as [...] institutional arrangements will determine the 
nature and scope of commodity transactions, the economic conditions at any moment 
will be important in determining the institutional transactions that will occur, and hence 
the institutional arrangements that will emerge' (Bromley 1989, 110). Note that the 
meaning of the verb "determine1' is ambiguous in the above quotation. In its first meaning 
the term only refers to the meaning of institutions. Institutions are the regularising aspect 
of economic activities, of which commodity transactions are a subset. Institutions thus 
distinguish between (or "determine") those activities that are compatible with the 
ensemble of rules - i. e. the 'nature and scope' of institutionally admitted commodity 
transactions - and those that are not. In its second meaning the term refers to a (cause-
effect?) relationship that extends in time. First in time, we have changing economic 
conditions, and later in time we get altered institutional arrangements. If we accept that 
there exists such a "relationship in time" - which is more than mere correlation - between 
economic conditions and institutional arrangements, is it correct to refer to it as to a 
cause-effect relationship? In section 4.2 of chapter 7, I explained that, according to 
Bromley, no existing model of institutional change is able to capture the "rationality of 
institutional changes. This suggests that economic conditions can at most retrospectively 
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- in a historic sense (see section 2.3 in chapter 4) - be indicated as "causes" and 
institutional changes as "effects". Political processes are an interface between both. The 
event-like character of these processes prevents us from thinking about the "relationship 
in time" between conditions and changes in regular , i.e. natural-law-like, terms. 
Economics of institutional change is - should therefore be - at most about explanation, 
not about prediction9. 
Bromley's stress on explanation rather than prediction (and my argument that 
economists' description should regard the social or ecological performance of an 
economy, not political actors' non-transparent and continuously changing objectives) 
suggests that we should drop the dichotomy between theory science and policy science. 
In Bromley's view, policy science is an application of theory science. Stated differently, 
policy science is meant to (descriptively) record political objectives, while theory science 
is a non-propagandistic toolbox policy scientists make use of to offer suitable policy 
recommendations. A recognition of the non-neutrality and of the limited predictive 
capacity of theory science implies, on the contrary, a recognition that the insights 
provided by theory science can only contribute to a limited range of political objectives, 
and that these insights cannot simply be transformed into instruments. A particular 
theory only suits particular political objectives. And particular political objectives ask for a 
particular theory. The relevance of an economic theory for public policy depends on the 
compatibility between the value ideas underlying both. Since, moreover, these value 
ideas can never be completely transparent, economic insights cannot be translated into 
political instruments as if it were a simple technical matter. For that reason, I suggested, 
in section 2.3. of chapter 4, that ecological economics should not aim at providing public 
authorities with "instruments" in order to allow them to realise their political objectives as 
efficiently as possible. They should rather aim at providing them with Insights" into 
actual institutional reasons for the non-realisation of their political objectives. The 
development of policy Instruments" out of scientific "insights" is a political, not a 
scientific matter. It rests on a lot of - often implicit - normative, and hence typically 
9 Though the following quotation makes me hesitate whether my interpretation 
conforms to Bromley's: "The next step will be to develop general equilibrium 
models that allow us to explain and assess institutional change such that the 
circularity of "efficiency" is avoided' (Bromley 1997,54). 
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political, choices concerning a desirable future, not on a scientific extrapolation of the 
status quo. 
5 (Im)partial 
As mentioned in section 2.2.2 of chapter 7, property regimes define the rights and 
privileges various "owners" of one and the same valuable asset have (and the 
concomitant duties and non-rights of non-owners). Rights and privileges define economic 
actors' autonomy. They do not define choice sets yet. Choice sets are sets of actions 
that economic actors can take given their relative income on the one hand and the costs 
of the actions on the other. To what extent economic actors can realise their autonomy 
depends on their (economic) power. In section 1.3 of chapter 3, power was defined as 
the capacity of Alpha to create voluntarily a new legal relation affecting Beta. Miners 
have, for instance, economic power if they succeed in buying rights to their future labour 
power from their mine owners. (Economic) power thus depends on the initial distribution 
of income and on the magnitude of the costs - transaction costs and costs of the rights 
to be bought -. Bromley's ecological economics does not supply insights into institutional 
reasons for the initial distribution of income. It offers insights into institutional reasons for 
economic actors' autonomy; it does not offer insights into institutional reasons for 
economic actors' economic power. 
Initial distributions of wealth only provide us with a picture of economic power at 
a given moment in time. Economic actors have, however, an interest in not letting their 
relative economic power decrease over time. Their relative economic power depends on 
how distributions of wealth evolve, i.e. of the nature, magnitude and (un)certainty of the 
benefit streams economic actors' can draw from their valuable assets. I suppose that 
economic rationality relates to economic actors' interest in not letting their relative 
economic power decrease. The concrete content of this rationality depends on 
institutional definitions of benefit streams. Bromley's ecological economics does not 
provide insights into institutional definitions of benefit streams either. 
In section 2.1.2 of chapter 3, I explained, with the help of some examples 
offered by Bromley, that institutional contexts enforce some preferences and weaken 
others. I suppose - 1 am putting out feelers - that it is institutional definitions of benefit 
streams that define which private preferences are institutionally enforced and which are 
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institutionally weakened. In other words, I suppose that it is institutional definitions of 
benefit streams that define the actual social and ecological performance of our 
economies. In order to show the plausibility of my supposition, I will develop the following 
example. Farmers had, until recently, been institutionally stimulated to augment their 
production so that their products became at the same time cheaper. The institutional 
context in which farmers were deemed to produce more and cheaper reflected farmers' 
presumptive right - their privilege - to pollute, for instance, via the residues of pesticides 
used or via the overabundance of manure. Recently political preferences, however, 
changed. These changes urged for institutional transactions resulting in a new 
institutional context that reflects at the same time farmers duty not to pollute and their 
duty to produce ever more and ever cheaper. Consider now present farmers. They can 
at the same time have a preference not to pollute and a preference to pollute. The former 
preference is stimulated by entitlements expressing farmers' duty not to pollute. The 
latter preference is stimulated by (a whole set of) entitlements reflecting farmers duty to 
produce ever more and ever cheaper. The present institutional context thus shows 
institutional tensions that, until now, enforce farmers' preference to pollute and weaken 
farmers' preference not to pollute. The ultimate question thus seems to be what 
institutional reasons exist for the political preference to let farmers produce ever more 
and ever cheaper. Or, considered from the power perspective, whose relative wealth 
position is supported by - who draws the largest benefit streams from - the institutional 
organisation that reflects the political preference in question. 
Since Bromley's approach can explain neither momentary nor evolving 
distributions of income and, hence, of economic power, I evaluate his ecological 
economics as partially impartial. It is impartial because his analysis of property rights and 
property regimes allows us to understand - to a certain extent - the relationships 
between the institutional organisation of an economy and the definition of private 
interests. It is impartial because it allows us, in other words, to abstract - to a certain 
degree - from existing private interests. It is not completely impartial because it does not 
offer insights into institutional definitions of benefit streams and, hence, into institutional 
reasons for the enforcement of particular preferences, i.e. into institutional reasons for 
the actual social and ecological performance of our economies. 
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6 Conclusion 
In order to explain the nature of Bromley's ecological economics, I had to translate some 
of the concepts he uses into my terminology. In section 1,1 showed that Bromley admits 
the paradigmatic non-neutrality of ecological economics and that he repudiates its 
propagandists non-neutrality. I object that one cannot make a clear distinction between 
both kinds of non-neutrality. Science's paradigmatic non-neutrality transforms into 
propagandistic ideology as soon as scientific knowledge is technically used for public 
policy. Bromley tries to justify the non-neutrality of ecological economics by defending 
that the values constituting its normative perspective should result from empirical 
observations. I object - and here I agree with Weber - that non-neutral science cannot 
and should not be justified thus. 
In section 2,1 dealt with Bromley's argument that economic science should be 
objective. Bromley's (residual) logical positfvist idea that objectivity implies neutrality 
causes him to wrestle with the meaning of objectivity. I argue that a recognition of the 
distinction between objectivity and neutrality on the one hand and an interpretation of 
objectivity as intersubjectJve consensus on the other solves much of the problems the 
concept causes to Bromley. This distinction relieves Bromley from distinguishing 
between the objectivity of the scientist and of the science. It allows, moreover, to 
consider a multiplicity of objective, but differently non-neutral sciences. I agree with 
Bromley that "consistency" and "coherence" contribute to intersubjective consensus and, 
hence, to objectivity. I consider "correspondence" as a separate aspect rather referring to 
explanatory than to objective science (see section 4). 
In section 3,1 commented on Bromley's objections to conventional economists' 
inclination to prescribe the political motive for institutional change. In order to offset this 
inclination, he argues that political actors can have several motives and he distinguishes, 
with the help of economic metaphors, between four types of motives. Though I fully 
agree that political actors can have several motives for institutional change and that it is 
not the economist's task to prescribe them, I reject Bromley's classification of motives for 
two reasons. This classification stems from Bromley's endeavour to define political 
objectives in a way that respects empirical reality (i.e. from his endeavour to justify his 
normative perspective scientifically). I object, first, that his endeavour necessarily fails, 
since it denies the nature of politics. Politics is about institutional arrangements tout 
court, not about objectives on the one hand and means to realise them on the other. 
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Institutional arrangements rather than objectives are the domain of politics. They are 
momentary reflections of a non-transparent and continuously changing set of values, 
motives or objectives. I object, second, that economists do not need to define political 
actors' political motives since ecological economics should provide public policy with 
insights, not with recommendations. 
In section 4,1 argued that, though Bromley's stress is on explanation rather 
than prediction, his keeping on to the (political) means/ends dichotomy brings him on the 
slippery slope of recommending institutional changes. I argue that economists cannot 
simply recommend institutional changes, because the values underlying both economic 
paradigms and political objectives are not transparent and are, consequently, not 
necessarily compatible with each other. It is economists' task to provide political actors 
with insights, rather than instruments (or recommendations). Bromley's stress on 
explanation, not prediction, supports this viewpoint with regard to scientific knowledge 
related to the social or ecological performance of economies and, even stronger, with 
regard to scientific knowledge related to reasons for institutional change. The latter 
knowledge is, indeed, of a historical kind. 
in the final section 5,1 suggested that, due to his concentration on property 
rights and property regimes, the insights Bromley offers us into the relationships between 
the institutional organisation of an economy and the content and distribution of private 
interests are restricted. Bromley provides us with insights into institutional reasons for 
economic actors' autonomy, not into institutional reasons for economic actors' actual 
strategies. Actual strategies depend on economic actors' trial to keep their relative 
economic power intact. And relative economic power depends on initial and changing 
distributions of income and, hence, on the institutions defining benefit streams. I assume 
that it is the latter kind of institutions that are decisive for economic rationality. Since 
Bromley's ecological economics does not pay attention to these institutions, I evaluate its 
nature as partially impartial. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
I started this book rather provocatively. My initial thesis was that, for the sake of 
sustainability, economists should improve their political influence. Economists can 
improve their political influence in many ways. One way is, for instance, to practise the 
political skills needed to become a successful political actor in favour of particular 
economic viewpoints. Another way is to ameliorate the dialogue between economists 
and citizens and professional politicians, or between economists and scientists from 
other disciplines. Both ways are valuable. In order to solve the problem of sustainability, 
we need, indeed, a combination of insights, taken from various natural and social 
sciences. Economic science cannot provide all necessary insights on its own. In order to 
ameliorate the political impact of economics, it is, indeed, helpful that economists 
practise some political skills. In the introductory chapter, I explained, however, that, in 
this book, I choose neither of these two ways. I am, instead, questioning whether current 
economic paradigms are well equipped to provide political actors with the economic 
knowledge they need to tackle the problem of sustainability. 
in this book, I did not intend to create a new economic paradigm. My purpose 
was to develop, in the first part of the book, norms for an ecologically successful 
economic science. By an "ecologically successful economic science" I mean, to begin 
with, an economic paradigm that is able to offer us the knowledge needed in order to 
contribute in a fundamental way to the problem of sustainability. I mean, further, an 
economic paradigm of which the nature is such that it can have a real political impact. In 
the second part of this book, I put these norms to the test by comparing them with the 
theoretical work of David Pearce and Daniel Bromley respectively. Both authors are 
exemplary economists. They both represent different positions within the field of 
economic science. Pearce's work is rather in the tradition of environmental economics; 
Bromley's work is rather in the tradition of ecological economics. This confrontation of 
the norms developed with the theoretical work of Pearce and Bromley can tell us several 
things. It can learn us whether these norms are feasible, depending on the extent to 
which they are already realised in existing economic paradigms. It can learn us, 
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moreover, in which way and to which extent the respective work of Pearce and Bromley 
can contribute to political solutions for the problem of sustainability. 
1 Norms for an ecologically successful economics 
What are the starting points from which to develop norms for an adequate economic 
paradigm? To begin with, we should define the problem of sustainability (subsection 1.1). 
We should, further, reflect on the nature of politics (section 1.2). A conceptual analysis of 
(economic) action tells us that institutions are crucial entities. They are, at the same time, 
politically defined and conditioning the ecological performance of an economy 
(subsection 1.3). From these three starting points, we can develop norms for both the 
content and the nature of an ecologically successful economics. An ecologically 
successful economics should offer us substantive knowledge concerning institutional 
reasons for the unmanageabilhy of the ecological performance of industrial economies 
(subsection 1.4). It should provide political actors with insights rather than instruments, 
i.e., with objective, descriptive, explanatory and impartial knowledge (subsection 1.5). 
1.1 The problem of sustainability 
Pezzey recapitulated the general ecological tendencies of our industrial economic 
history. These general tendencies are growing use of energy, decreasing bio-diversity 
and growing appeal on the assimilative capacity of ecological systems. Typical for this 
ecological evolution of our industrial economies is that it gives rise to problems that are 
often global in space, long-term in time and with an uncertain and possibly irreversible 
impact on human well-being. In other words, present generations cause problems that, 
until now, they did not prove to be able to manage reassuringly and that, hence, are left 
to their descendants. This inability prevents present generations from acting as 
responsible citizens towards future generations. For responsibility presupposes 
manageability. This observation of our defective responsibility for the ecological future of 
our descendants is at odds with our sense for intergenerational justice. I consider this to 
be the essence of the problem of sustainability. Consequently, with respect to the 
problem of sustainability, an economic paradigm will provide adequate knowledge on 
condition that it helps us to take our responsibility again. In other words, an economic 
paradigm will provide adequate knowledge on condition that it enables present 
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generations to manage the ecological impacts of their own economic actions without 
loading future generations with uncertain and possibly irreversible, unwanted 
consequences. 
To conclude, I consider the problem of sustainability as a problem of defective 
responsibility: present generations did, until now, not prove to be able to manage the 
ecological impacts of present economic actions on future generations. These ecological 
impacts are of a specific kind: they cause problems that are often global in space, long-
term in time, uncertain, possibly irreversible and unwanted according to present 
standards. I assume, moreover, that these ecological impacts relate to the nature of our 
industrial economies. 
1.2 Politics 
We cannot discern in human reality something like an economic or a political sphere just 
like that. In order to perceive these spheres, we have to construct them. Political theories 
on the one hand and economic theories on the other are such conceptual constructs. 
Theories, as conceptual constructs, are never neutral. They are value-laden 
perspectives on a particular domain of human reality. Consequently, various conceptual 
constructs with regard to the same domain of human reality can occur at the same time. 
From a brief overview of the history of economic theory, I constructed four 
entries that constitute possible perspectives on the economic sphere: decision units, 
rationality, products, institutions. The fourth entry can be considered an overarching one. 
These same entries can also be used to constitute perspectives on the political sphere. 
Many economists, however, seem to doubt whether the economic and the political 
sphere should be distinguished from each other. A comparison between the political 
theory of Buchanan and Arendt tells us that doubts do not arise with respect to the first 
and the third entry. Economic and political actions are commonly considered to take 
place in specific (economic or political) "decision units" and to create specific "products", 
either commodities or (legalised) institutions. Doubts arise concerning the rationality of 
economic and political action. According to Buchanan, the rationality of political action 
does not differ from the rationality of economic action. According to Arendt, on the 
contrary, both economic and political action show their own typical rationality. Economic 
rationality is conventionally represented in the metaphor of homo oeconomicus. 
255 
The political philosophy of deliberative democracy describes (a normative ideal for) 
political rationality. 
I argue that we should follow Arendt. We should confirm a typical economic as 
well as a typical political rationality. (This implies that we can and should distinguish 
between the economic and the political sphere. This does not imply that both spheres 
can always and easily be separated.) Economic rationality is a concrete version of an 
economising rationality. Economic actors act autonomously in order to satisfy their 
private preferences as good as they can. Economising rationality is a kind of 
instrumental rationality. Abstract economising rationality becomes concrete economic 
rationality within a particular institutional context. Political rationality is a matter of 
creative deliberation between politically free and equal individuals. It aims at defining and 
redefining the institutions of a human society. It aims, more particularly, at defining and 
redefining the institutions conditioning autonomous economic action. 
We should follow Arendt because a deliberative democracy is better equipped 
to deal with the problem of sustainability than is Public Choice theory, for two reasons. 
To start with, a deliberative democracy leaves room for a typically political - i.e., creative 
and democratic - interpretation of the ideal of "sustainability". It does not reduce the ideal 
prematurely to the economic ideal of optimal allocation. A deliberative democracy does, 
further, not straightforwardly resign to political power relationships. It contradicts an 
interpretation of politics as a bargaining process between vested interests. It tries to 
offset vested interests by making institutional reasons for them visible. 
To conclude, we should distinguish between the political and the economic 
sphere. This distinction confirms that the economic and the political sphere both have 
their own typical "products", "decision-units" and "rationality". A comparison between the 
political theories of both Buchanan and Arendt shows that disagreement concerning the 
nature of the political and economic sphere relates especially to the "rationality" of 
economic and political actions. The rationality of the economic sphere is commonly 
represented in the metaphor of homo oeconomicus. Arendfs analysis of political 
rationality gave rise to the normative ideal of a deliberative democracy. Arendfs 
interpretation of politics is more fruitful to contribute to the problem of sustainability than 
is Buchanan's (economic) interpretation of it. 
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1.3 Institutions 
My search for an ecologically successful economics led me up to institutions as crucial 
entities. I define an institution as a social rule (in singular) guiding people's actions and 
the folk views justifying and explaining the rule and its relevance in a particular situation. 
This definition considers institutions as the symbolic dimension of human actions. This 
symbolic dimension of human actions is the counterpart of their ecological (or physical or 
material) dimension. This particular definition, which connects one institution with one 
social rule, has the advantage that it allows us to distinguish between economic and non-
economic institutions, to order institutions in a hierarchy and to classify types of 
(economic) institutions. 
Institutions guide people's actions. They restrict and enable action in a double 
way. First, one party's restriction corresponds to another party's liberation. Second, 
institutions define people's degrees of freedom or their autonomy. Institutions make 
people free by limiting their freedom. Institutions do not simply coerce, they liberate 
simultaneously. 
Bromley distinguishes between conventions and entitlements. Conventions 
depict self-policed institutions. Entitlements (or laws) are politically recognised and 
enforced institutions. Institutions as entitlements are thus political entities. They come 
into existence as the often unintended result of intentional interaction. As such, they 
correspond to Arendf s interpretation of Interaction things" as unpredictable, ineversible 
and not really "made". 
Institutions as entitlements, finally, are "public facts" in the double sense that 
they result from political interaction and that they hold for all members of a political 
community. (The latter does, however, not exclude that institutional rights can be 
assigned to either an individual, a group or to all members of a polity.) I introduced the 
concept "public fact" to distinguish institutions from "public goods". Public facts are 
political entities, while public goods are economic entities. 
My argument to distinguish between the political and the economic sphere 
urges me not only to reflect on institutions in general, but also to define economic 
institutions. Depending on the entry used, economic institutions are institutions that 
define economic decision units, economic rationality or economic products. I follow 
Bromley in his argument that two kinds of institutions defining economic decision units 
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can be distinguished. The first kind defines an economic decision unit versus another 
economic decision unit. The second kind defines the internal organisation of an 
economic decision unit. I follow Schmid in his argument that economic goods consist of 
both an ecological and an institutional dimension. It is the institutional dimension that 
defines a thing as either a private or a public economic good. This institutional dimension 
itself is, what I called previously, a public fact. 
I strongly lean on Bromley to discuss the institutions defining economic 
rationality. From Bromley's reflections on the two examples of a Prisoner's Dilemma and 
a Prisoner's Dream, we learn two things. First, we learn that the choices economic actors 
make cannot be equalled to their preferences. Choices are not revealed preferences. 
They are strategies chosen to satisfy their private preferences as good as they can given 
the existing institutional organisation of an economy. Different institutional arrangements 
urge people to choose different strategies in order to satisfy their same private 
preferences. From this observation, I conclude that the ecological performance of an 
economy does not only depend on the private preferences individuals hold, but also on 
the institutional organisation of an economy. Second, we learn that the conventional 
(neo-classical) interpretation of economic rationality comes down to economising (or 
simply instrumental) rationality. The conventional interpretation is too abstract to provide 
us with insights into the ecological performance of an economy. Only within a specific 
economic context, i.e., within a specific institutional organisation of an economy does 
abstract economising rationality become concrete economic rationality. 
Embroidering on the two examples offered by Bromley, we still get more 
insights into the relevance of an institutional analysis of an economy. To start with, we 
learn to understand institutional arrangements as reflections of public preferences for the 
protection of particular private choice sets (and, hence, of particular private preferences). 
Institutions as public preferences do not simply protect existing private preferences. 
Between existing private preferences and institutions as reflections of public preferences 
lie political processes that transform given and/or create possible private preferences. 
Politics is not simply a matter of bargaining; it is a matter of deliberating and of judging. 
This interpretation of institutions as reflections of public preferences shows that it makes 
sense to look for an institutional expression of the public preference for sustainability. We 
learn, further, that institutional arrangements stimulate some private preferences and 
temper others. This implies that to understand the ecological performance of an 
economy in the long run, we do not really need to know the private preferences of 
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separate individuals. It suffices to know an economy's institutional organisation. This is 
another way to say that an internal relationship exists between the ecological 
performance of an economy and its institutional organisation. This latter conclusion 
supports my research question: it shows that it makes sense to look for institutional 
reasons for (the seemingly unmanageability of) the ecological performance of our 
industrial economies. The observation, finally, that institutional arrangements can either 
stimulate or temper either egoistic or altruistic private preferences suggests that it is not 
necessary for public authorities to adopt a moralising attitude in order to convert egoistic 
economic actors to ecologically benign behaviour. Public authorities should rather create 
the institutional conditions for sustainable economic practices. 
The distinction I make between the political and the economic sphere clarifies 
the particular link between both spheres. (Economic) institutions are the entities that 
condition the ecological performance of economic action. Economic institutions as 
entitlements are at the same time the Interaction-things" following from political action. 
This link explains the kind of hierarchy that exists between the political and economic 
sphere. Politically defined institutions are preconditions for economic actions. They 
enable economic actions and they restrict them at the same time. This kind of hierarchy 
is a logical one: politically defined institutions are logically prior to economic actions. 
1.4 The content of an ecologically successful economics 
Typical ecological problems gave rise to, what is called, the problem of sustainability: 
problems that are long-term in time, global in space, uncertain, possibly irreversible and 
unwanted according to present standards. These problems are typical for industrial 
economies. Until now, we did not prove to be able to manage them so that we do not 
load the ecological impacts of our industrial economies on future generations any longer. 
Therefore, I argue that the content of economics should be such that it enables present 
generations to manage the ecological impacts of their industrial economies again. Or, in 
other words, the content of economics should be such that it allows present generations 
to take their responsibility towards future generations. 
In order to be able to take our responsibility, we need to know reasons for the 
present unmanageability of the ecological performance of our industrial economies. Only 
knowledge of reasons will allow us to look for fundamental answers to - rather than fight 
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symptoms of - the problem of sustainability. Without knowledge of reasons, political 
actions can at most by accident contribute in a fundamental way to solutions for the 
problem of sustainability. 
Our interpretation of the political and the economic sphere shows that 
institutions are crucial entities. Economic institutions link the political with the economic 
sphere. On the one hand, economic institutions condition economic actions. On the other 
hand, economic institutions (as entitlements) are politically defined. Consequently, in 
order to contribute to political solutions, economics should provide us with knowledge 
concerning institutional reasons for the problem of sustainability. Embroidering on 
Bromley's reflections on the Prisoner's Dilemma and Prisoner's Dream, our hypothesis 
that an internal relationship exists between the institutional organisation and the 
ecological performance of an economy gets confirmed. This implies that it really makes 
sense to look for institutional reasons for the presenf unmanageability of the ecological 
performance of industrial economies. 
Knowing institutional reasons for the problem of sustainability implies that we 
need to know the institutional whole of an economy. We cannot be contented with 
knowledge of separate economic institutions. We need to know the ecological 
performance of the ensemble of economic institutions conditioning a particular economic 
action rather than the ecological performance of a particular economic institution. We 
need to know the aggregate ecological performance of the ensemble of economic 
institutions conditioning the ensemble of economic actions within an industrial economy 
rather than the ecological performance of separate economic actions. 
Knowing the institutional whole of an industrial economy can look a task that is 
too huge and, hence, impossible. Two approaches within the tradition of economic 
science show us ways in which this task can adopt feasible proportions. First, the idea 
that the problem of sustainability relates to industrial economies, suggests that it suffices 
to look for dominant institutions. Dominant institutions are institutions that are most 
pervasive in space and persistent in time. In order to trace dominant institutions, we have 
to look for order hierarchies. According to Ramazzotti, an order hierarchy is a 
substantive one. It focuses on the effects of institutional rules. The extension of an 
institution's effect defines its rank in a particular order hierarchy. A genetic hierarchy, on 
the contrary, is a formal one. Its concern is not with the content of institutions, i.e. with 
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the direct effects that they exert on their fields of action. It is with the procedures to be 
followed and with the level of the hierarchy that must deal with specific fields of actions. 
Second, next to a hierarchical approach, we can take a classificatory approach. 
We can aim for a classification of economic institutions. We can try to classify various 
economic institutions according to their respective contribution to the ecological 
performance of industrial economies. 
To recapitulate, the content of an ecologically successful economics 
should regard institutional reasons for the present unmanageability of the 
ecological performance of industrial economies. An adequate economics should 
provide us with knowledge concerning the particular ecological performance of a 
classification of dominant institutions. 
1.5 The nature of an ecologically successful economics 
An ecologically successful economics is an economics that is politically influential. 
Economics is politically influential with respect to the problem of sustainability in case it 
helps political actors to decide on institutional transformations that make industrial 
economies more sustainable. Given my interpretation of politics as a deliberative 
democracy, deciding on desirable institutional transformations is not a matter of 
technically deriving adequate institutions from scientific knowledge. It is a matter of 
providing political actors with the knowledge they need to stimulate - rather than replace 
- political debates concerning a desirable and feasible institutional organisation of a 
sustainable economy. Scientific insights succeed better in this respect than do scientific 
instruments. 
Scientific insights are empirical regularities made comprehensible. They are 
perspectivistic, i.e., value-laden descriptions of human reality. Scientific descriptions aim 
at objectivity. Close reading of Weber's writings suggests that objectivity comes down 
to intersubjective consent. Logic and mathematics can contribute to such consent. They 
are, however, neither necessary nor sufficient. Consequently, economic science is not 
necessarily of a "pure" kind. It can be of a historical kind as well. Objectivity as 
intersubjective consent cannot guarantee a complete separation between facts and 
values. Objectivity remains, hence, unavoidably non-neutral. 
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Economic insights should explain past and present relationships between the 
institutional organisation of an economy and its ecological performance. It should not, as 
economic instruments implicitly do, predict these relationships. For politically created 
regularities are not necessarily extrapolations of past and present ones. An explanatory 
economics aims at conceptual constructs of human reality that make more and more 
regularities comprehensible. It does not merely aim at a logically consistent and 
mathematically rigorous system of "laws". This suggests that an economics fulfilling the 
political role of a muse shows more resemblance with historical than with mathematical 
sciences. 
Economic insights should, moreover, aim at non-neutral descriptions of past 
and present relationships. Non-neutral descriptions especially foster political debates 
when the perspective taken is not straightforwardly evident. Economic knowledge should 
not, as economic instruments unavoidably do, prescribe the values to which future 
relationships should respond. 
A politically successful economics should, finally, ameliorate the quality of 
political interaction. This quality depends on the political freedom and political equality of 
citizens and professional politicians. In order to ameliorate political freedom, economic 
knowledge should offer insights into the relationships between the definition and 
distribution of private interests on the one hand and the institutional context on the other. 
Such insights enable people to imagine a desirable institutional organisation of society 
as a precondition for a desirable definition and distribution of private interests. In order to 
support political equality, economics should inform us on economic sources of unequal 
political power relationships. Economics should, in one word, be impartial rather than 
partial. 
To conclude, my specific interpretations of politics, institutions and the problem 
of sustainability prompt me to propose four norms for the nature of an ecologically 
relevant and politically successful economics: objectivity, explanation (rather than 
prediction), description (rather than prescription) and impartiality. The metaphor of 
economics as a political muse (rather than as a toolbox for public policy) recapitulates 
the intention of these four norms. Economics should provide political actors with 
insights rather than instruments. Such insights should help political actors to create 
and recreate an economic order of which they deem the ecological performance dignified 
both for present and future generations. 
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2 Mutually testing norms and economic paradigms 
11 The problem of sustainability 
My interpretation of the problem of sustainability - abstract though it is - is not 
straightforwardly compatible with Pearce's. Pearce's interpretation of the problem of 
sustainability is thoroughly influenced by his neo-classical way of thinking. The neo-
classical perspective prompts Pearce to consider the problem of sustainability as a 
problem of allocarjve efficiency. It is true that, in his view, the boundary conditions for the 
criterion of allocative efficiency can vary. Either Pearce holds on to his ethical starting 
point that present generations should keep their natural capital constant. In that case, he 
can be classified as an adherent of the 'strong sustainability" criterion. A constant level 
of natural capital (expressed in physical terms) is then the boundary condition for an 
efficient allocation of scarce natural resources among both present and future 
generations. 
Or Pearce weakens his "strong sustainability" criterion. For the criterion of a 
constant level of natural capital is, indeed, difficult to make operational. What does a 
constant level of natural capital mean? Does it mean that its total physical amount may 
not change? Or that the physical amount of separate natural resources may not change? 
Or does it mean that the total economic value of natural capital should remain constant? 
Or the total economic value of each separate natural resource? And which of all 
separate natural resources should we take into consideration? Anyhow, Pearce's 
welfare-economic approach easily tempts him into translating the originally physical 
meaning of the concept 'constant natural capital" into monetary terms. In line with the 
neo-classical paradigm, such translation relies on people's private preferences for 
particular natural resources, not on a reasoned consideration of their ecological meaning 
for present or future human societies. Such translation, based on individuals' private 
preferences and expressed in monetary terms, transforms the concept "sustainability" 
from a "strong" into a "weak" version. In case of "weak sustainability", the boundary 
condition of allocative efficiency is no longer a constant natural capital expressed in 
physical terms, but the institutional organisation of an economy that conditions 
individuals' economic preferences. "Weak sustainability" comes then down to the old-
fashioned economists' concept of "optimality". 
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According to Beckerman, weakening the "strong sustainability" criterion into a 
"weak sustainability" criterion makes the whole idea of sustainability redundant. For 
"sustainable developmenf then simply comes down to increasing the (monetary) level of 
well-being. Since the "weak sustainability" criterion is based on people's private 
preferences for natural resources, it has no built-in barriers against ecological tendencies 
that arise from present generations' private preferences, but that are possibly damaging 
for future generations. That is the reason why I called Pearce's interpretation of 
sustainability not straightforwardly compatible with the interpretation 1 propose. 
According to Bromley, the conventional metaphor of sustainability as allocative 
efficiency, either with strong or weak boundary conditions, fails for another reason. It fails 
because intergenerational allocative efficiency is impossible. Present generations cannot 
allocate the right quantity and quality of (natural and man-made) capital to the 
generations living now and in the future. For the idea of allocative efficiency requires that 
future generations express their private preferences for particular natural resources. The 
essential problem of sustainability as a problem of allocative efficiency is that we do not 
and cannot know what those in the future would wish for us to do. This is not a mere 
problem of uncertainty or of risk. It is a problem of necessarily lacking information. For 
that reason, Bromley repudiates an interpretation of "sustainability" as a problem of 
efficient allocation. This interpretation is, in his view, no more than a scientific fiction. 
There is another reason why the metaphor of sustainability as allocative 
efficiency is misleading. In chapter 4, I argued that economists' interpretation of the 
concept "allocative efficiency" is ambiguous. At times, it is used as an independent 
criterion referring to the extent that economic actors succeed in satisfying their private 
preferences, given their income, given the transaction costs they have to pay and given 
their bounded rationality. Since economic actors' private preferences are not known, but 
revealed on markets, bystanders cannot but conclude that the outcome of market 
processes are Pareto-optimal. The only thing économiste can do, not as bystanders but 
as participants, is extending individuals' bounded rationality, so that these individuals 
satisfy their private preferences better than before. This independent interpretation of the 
concept "allocative efficiency" can at most refer to economic actions taking place within 
the existing institutional organisation of an economy. At times, however, the concept is 
used as a standard with which to evaluate the (ecological or social) performance of an 
economy. I agree with Bromley (see chapter 7) that this interpretation of the concept is 
not correct, because the meaning of efficiency is dependent on the existing institutional 
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organisation. Since allocative efficiency only gets its concrete meaning within an 
institutional organisation, it cannot be used to evaluate the performance of an 
institutional organisation. In order to evaluate the performance of an economy one 
necessarily relies on an independent criterion other than allocative efficiency. Therefore, 
because it is our evaluation of the ecological performance of industrial economies that 
gives rise to the idea of sustainabiiity, sustainability cannot be a simple matter of 
allocative efficiency. Implicitly, sustainability must always refer to another standard as, 
for instance, Pearce's criterion of a (physically) constant natural capital. 
The problem with this "strong sustainability" criterion is - apart from the fact 
that it is not clear how to make it operational - that, until now and despite economists' 
and other scientists' recommendations, we did not prove to be able to stop general 
tendencies of declining natural capital. Despite international political agreements and 
despite huge technological efforts, Commissions are, for instance, still rising, total 
energy use is increasing, and bio-diversity is decreasing. 
In line with his institutional approach, Bromley proposes another interpretation 
of the concept "sustainability". In his view, the problem of sustainability is a problem of a 
suitable economic order. Prior to the problem of allocative efficiency lies the problem of 
how to construct an economic order that provides a socially acceptable provisioning 
program for those living now and in the future. This economic order cannot claim to leave 
future persons exactly the domain of choice they would select for themselves. This order 
can at most claim to be a reflection of what we deem to be so valuable that it is worth to 
be left to our descendants. In order to help us clarify what an economic order that is 
valuable enough to leave it to future generations means, Bromley proposes a Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance. He concludes - initially at least - that suitable institutional 
arrangements must be thus that they mean an entitlement of duty for the present and 
right, protected by an inalienability rule, for the future, rather than the present situation of 
privilege for the present and no right for the future. 
Bromley's (initial) institutional conception of sustainability still is very abstract. It 
leaves room for many interpretations. It is, nevertheless, fundamental in at least one 
respect. Contrary to the conventional metaphor of (weak) sustainability, it is compatible 
with my interpretation that the problem of sustainability is a problem of defective 
responsibility with respect to the ecological impacts of present economic actions on 
future generations. Restoring our responsibility implies that we aim at making our 
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present ecological problems manageable, so that we do not load future generations with 
unknown and perhaps unacceptable risks. This is what I consider to be the meaning of 
present generations having duty and future generations having inalienable right. The 
fundamental political message implicit in Bromley's initial conception of sustainability is 
to construct an economic order of which the ecological performance does not cause 
problems for future generations that are uncertain, possibly irreversible and 
unacceptable according to our own standards. 
Unfortunately, Bromley qualifies his initial interpretation of sustainability. For 
reasons of efficiency, he deems it, on second consideration, sufficient to protect the right 
of future generations with a liability rule. This qualification shows that even Bromley is 
not immune for the ambiguity of the concept "allocative efficiency". As Bromley argued 
earlier, efficiency cannot be a measure to evaluate and define specific institutions, since 
it is a particular ensemble of institutions that is a measure for (the concrete meaning of) 
efficiency. 
Bromley's initial conception of sustainability does not necessarily imply a 
(physically) constant level of natural capital. The idea of a constant level of natural 
capital suggests that we can define a level that present and future generations are able 
to manage safely. Even stronger, since, with regard to particular natural resources, we 
are afraid that we already crossed this safe border, the idea of a constant level of natural 
capital suggests that we can define and return to an optimal level that is just safe for 
present and future generations. In my view, not only does the suggestion that scientists 
are able to define optimal levels of natural resources testify of (natural-)scientific hybris. 
The suggestion that politicians are able to manage the ecological performance of 
economic activities and keep it at optimal levels testifies of even worse (social-)scientjfic 
and political arrogance. Bromley's proposal to look for an economic order that provides a 
socially acceptable provisioning program can be interpreted in a way that is much more 
attractive than the constant-natural-capital idea. It can be interpreted in a way that 
respects the nature of our extensive, but nevertheless restricted scientific capacities and 
in a way that respects and stimulates our creative, democratic freedom. 
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2.2 Politics 
Neither Pearce nor Bromley distinguish clearly between political and economic action. 
This does, nevertheless, not imply that their interpretation of politics is the same in all 
respects. Pearce's interpretation of politics resembles more on Buchanan's interpretation 
of it than on Arendfs. Institutional change comes, in his view, down to adding institutions 
to the existing set of institutions constituting an economy, in order to define the 
institutions to add, one should first ask for people's private preferences. For, according to 
Pearce, political democracy is about respecting and aggregating individuals' private 
preferences. These private preferences emerge within a particular institutional context. 
They do not emerge from public debates and are, consequently, not fit to express views 
on a desirable institutional organisation. These preferences should, moreover and 
whenever possible, be expressed in monetary terms. Expression in monetary terms 
facilitates the aggregation of private preferences. To recapitulate, in Pearce's view, the 
political definition of institutional change rests on economic calculation. 
Bromley's interpretation of politics is more ambiguous than is Pearce's. On the 
one hand, he refuses to distinguish between economic and political action. This 
becomes manifest in his classification of institutional transactions (i.e., implicit rights 
transfers) as a kind of economic activities. On the other hand, he objects to the 
conventional interpretation of institutional change as a change in function of allocative 
efficiency. Even stronger, his comments on other trials to grasp the rationality of 
economic change suggest that his interpretation shows more resemblance with Arendfs 
interpretation (institutional change as an unpredictable political event) than with 
Buchanan's. 
2.3 The content of an ecologically successful economics 
Both Pearce's and Bromley's scientific endeavour is meant, in a certain sense, to 
"manage" the ecological performance of our economies. However, the way both consider 
of this "managing" activity is different. The difference relates to the various ways in which 
they regard the relationship between an economy and its ecological performance. 
Pearce regards this relationship as an external one. This means that he 
understands an economy as a kind of system with an input and an output of natural 
resources and of waste. Inputs and outputs can be regulated through institutional 
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adaptations of the economy, i.e. trough adding institutions to or replacing some of the 
institutions of the existing set of institutions constituting an economy. These adaptations 
are a matter of trial-and-error, because Pearce's welfare economics cannot explain 
scientifically the ecological performance of the existing set of institutions constituting an 
economy itself. According to Pearce, the latter kind of scientific knowledge is impossible. 
Pearce rejects the idea of an "existence theorem". He considers scientific investigations 
of the internal relationships between an economy and its ecological performance as a 
premature undertaking. Pearce is contented with "monitoring" the ecological 
performance of existing economies. He, therefore, proposes an ecological Input-Output 
analysis and introduces a Materials Balance Model. Both instruments are meant to 
record the amounts of natural resources used and of waste produced. Pearce's welfare 
economics is then considered a toolbox that provides professional politicians with 
economic instruments - i.e. with institutions such as taxes, subsidies or Command-and-
Control measures - to keep the use of resources and the production of waste at a 
particular (politically decided or scientifically calculated) level. In other words, Pearce's 
welfare economics is considered a toolbox that provides political actors with 
recommendations for institutional adaptations. These institutional adaptations are meant 
to internalise ecological "externalities". 
To recapitulate, in Pearce's view, investigating institutional reasons for the 
ecological performance of our industrial economies is a premature and even unfeasible 
venture. Rather than providing political actors with institutional reasons for the present 
unmanageability of the ecological performance of our industrial economies, he provides 
them with institutional adaptations. According to Pearce, trial-and-error will learn us how 
to adapt our institutions gradually so that ecological externalities, made explicit in an 
ecological Input-Output Model or a Materials Balance Model, get finally internalised. 
Contrary to Pearce, Bromley regards the relationship between an economy and 
its ecological environment as an internal one. This internal connection becomes manifest 
in his treatment of externalities. In order to explain Bromley's line of reasoning, we 
should first explain the particular subject matter of Bromley's theoretical work. 
Bromley concentrates his analysis on property rights as one type of economic 
institutions and on property regimes. On closer consideration, property regimes prove to 
be a hierarchical set of property rights referring to a particular valuable asset. It is a 
particular property regime that defines a particular valuable asset as an economic 
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commodity. Such a property regime connects, at the same time, a hierarchy of "owners", 
either public authorities, groups or individuals. Property regimes condition the economic 
autonomy of owners (and non-owners) with regard to the valuable asset in question. 
Ownership is not a matter of absolute, but of relative control. 
Property regimes thus define a "thing", either a physical object or an intangible 
skill, as an economic commodity. Conventionally, economists distinguish between 
private and public commodities. A private commodity is a valuable asset to which a 
private property regime is attached, while a public commodity is a valuable asset to 
which a public property regime is attached. Bromley's analysis of four types of property 
regimes - private, common, state and open access - suggests, however, that these 
types are analytically not sharp. The distinctions between the four types are rather 
gradual than strict and, consequently, the classification of economic commodities as 
either public or private results more from convention than from inherent institutjonal 
characteristics of the commodity in question. This observation prompts me to argue that, 
instead of distinguishing between different types of property regimes, ft is analytically 
more precise to investigate what rights related to one and the same valuable asset 
belong to a particular group, subgroup or to particular individuals. In order to solve 
particular ecological problems, one should, consequently, not spend too much energy 
discussing whether a common or a private property regime is more effective. One should 
rather spend energy discussing the concrete content and the respective owners of the 
rights that should constitute the property regimes that relate to the ecological problem in 
question. 
Bromley's analysis of externalities is an illustration of this latter statement. 
Bromley argues that the kind of externalities that occur, and whether these externalities 
get solved or not (and to what extent) depends on institutional arrangements. 
Externalities are manifestations of (ecological or social) interdependence or interference. 
Though all "autonomous" actions interfere ecologically or socially with other 
"autonomous" actions, not all situations of interference are externalities. Whether 
ecological interference is considered an externality depends on whether the costs of the 
interference passed on to the other party are deemed legitimate given existing legal 
arrangements. The term "externality" is reserved for situations of ecological (or social) 
interference that burden second partes with legally legitimate costs. Only those 
situations of interference that are deemed legally legitimate can be considered 
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externalities. Hence, the kind of externalities that will occur depends on existing 
institutional arrangements. 
Whether and to what extent an externality will be solved within a specific 
economic situation depends on who must pay the (transaction) costs in order to get a 
solution that is acceptable to all parties, the magnitude of these costs, and whether the 
injured party is able to pay the costs. Part of the answer to these questions depends on 
the operational rule with which a specific property right is protected. Entitlements can be 
protected either by property rules, by liability rules or by inalienability rules. 
Consequently, whether and to what extent externalities will be solved depends, in its 
turn, also on existing institutional arrangements. 
Bromley's analysis of externalities is illuminating. Nevertheless, I argue that we 
should make a sharper distinction between an externality and an interference. An 
externality is a situation of legally legitimate (ecological or social) interference that 
(momentarily) gives rise to (either real or hypothetical) monetary costs. Within a 
particular institutional organisation of an economy, externalities get, by definition, 
resolved at an optimal level. This does however not imply that the ecological or social 
interference gets resolved at a (politically or socially) acceptable level. 
I argue that a more accurate definition of the concept "externality" can set 
ecological problems sharper. It shows, first, that viewing an interference as an externality 
implies a translation into economic terms and, in case of a conventional scientific 
approach, making solutions dependent on the institutional organisation of an economy. 
This means that one translates a political problem (a problem concerning the institutional 
organisation of an economy) into an economic one (a problem asking for a "rational" 
solution from within existing institutional arrangements). Second, it shows that welfare 
theory cannot offer (objective) policy prescriptions since externalities get, by definition, 
solved within an economy (on a Pareto-efficient level). The only thing welfare theory can 
do is either to offer direction to individual economic agents for judging their bargains or to 
propose government interventions - i.e. institutional changes - that transform Pareto-
irrelevant interferences into Pareto-relevant ones, so that the level of interference will 
shift. 
In Bromley's view, ameliorating an economy's ecological performance is about 
discussing the best possible combination of private and public commodities. Apart from 
the fact that I question the dichotomy "private" versus "public" commodity, I do not fully 
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agree with Bromley. I argue that ameliorating an economy's ecological performance is 
about discussing which ecological interests we deem private and which we deem public, 
it is, in other words, about discussing our public or political preferences for the best 
combination of private and public ecological rights. The former kind of ecological rights 
are rights that economic actors should transfer explicitly within the given institutional 
organisation of an economy. The latter kind of rights are rights that are legally protected 
and hold for all members of a political community, independent of their income. They 
result from implicit rights transfers. I admit that the realisation of both these rights can be 
met with the help of economic commodities, either "private" or "public". (And private 
rights are not necessarily met with "private" goods, nor are public rights necessarily met 
with "public" goods - whatever this may signify.) However, I suppose that these rights 
are not necessarily met with the help of economic commodities. I suspect that, with 
regard to some rights, one can imagine a different institutional organisation of an 
economy in which the rights in question do not get endangered. Consequently, in this 
alternative economy, these rights do not need private nor public protection (and, hence, 
neither "private" nor "public" commodities to realise them). In order, however, to imagine 
such alternative economies, we need more insights into the relationships between an 
economy and its ecological performance than Bromley's analysis of property rights and 
property regimes can offer us. 
According to my interpretation, the problem of sustainability refers to our 
defective capability to manage the global, long-term, uncertain and possibly irreversible 
impacts of a growing use of energy, a declining bio-diversity and an increasing appeal on 
the assimilative capacity of ecosystems. I argue, in the introductory chapter, that these 
general ecological tendencies relate to the industrial organisation of our economies. 
Typical for industrial economies is that production processes become more and more 
"roundabout" and that the circulation velocity of commodities accelerates. Bromley's 
analysis of property rights and property regimes cannot explain these developments. 
Property regimes are sets of institutions defining economic "products". As such they 
define some boundary conditions of economic actors' autonomous actions. They thus 
define possible, individual ecological performances. They do, however, not explain why 
the ensemble of actual economic actions shows the pattern mentioned. In order to 
explain the latter, I suggest that Bromley's analysis should be complemented with an 
analysis of the institutions defining economic "rationality". In chapter 3,1 argue further, 
based on an elaboration of Bromley's examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the 
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Prisoner's Dream, that a particular institutional organisation can stimulate specific private 
preferences and temper others. Which preferences are stimulated and which are 
tempered depends, on closer consideration, on the future benefits one can expect from 
satisfying one or another preference. From this, I conclude that the institutions defining 
future benefit streams are decisive for understanding (concrete) economic - rather than 
mere economising - rationality or, in other words, for a better understanding of the 
general ecological performance of industrial economies. 
To recapitulate, Bromley's analysis of property rights and property regimes 
makes the hypothesis that an internal relationship exists between the institutional 
organisation and the ecological performance of an economy more concrete. It illustrates 
that it makes sense to investigate institutional reasons for the ecological performance of 
an economy. From Bromley's analysis we leam that property regimes are manifestations 
of an institutional hierarchy. This hierarchy is of a genetic kind. Bromley's analysis does 
not inform us on order hierarchies. Consequently, it does not provide us with knowledge 
concerning the institutions that are dominant within our industrial economies. From his 
analysis we leam, moreover, that property regimes can explain possible, individual 
economic actions. They cannot explain the aggregate ecological performance of 
industrial economies. I suggest that, in order to get this aggregate performance 
explained, we need an analysis of another type of institutions, namely institutions 
defining benefit streams. While property regimes transform valuable assets into 
economic commodities, institutions defining benefit streams transform abstract 
economising rationality into more concrete economic rationality. 
2.4 The nature of an ecologically successful economics 
Pearce aims at objectivity, but he does not expect this objectivity to be neutral. 
Objectivity is, in his view, realised with the help of empirically observable data and a 
logically consistent and mathematically rigorous system of laws. Pearce has no problem 
with acknowledging the non-neutrality of the Pareto-criterion and of his (particular) 
translation of "sustainability" into "sustainable developmenf. He deems this non-
neutrality, however, justified. He deems the ideal of "sustainable developmenf justified, 
because, according to him, that is what (most) people aim at. He deems the Pareto-
criterion justified, because no convincing arguments exist to prefer another value to the 
value of Pareto-optimality. I do not contest that Pearce's environmental economics is, in 
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a certain sense, objective. I do, however, not agree that the non-neutrality of his 
environmental economics is justified, for three reasons. First, in order to make the ideal 
of 'sustainable development" operational, Pearce has to make several normative choices 
that do not necessarily correspond to political actors' choices. Second, the fact that most 
people aim at "sustainable development" - how can Pearce be so sure of that? - does 
not yet justify this perspective. Third, whether or not convincing arguments exist to prefer 
another value to the value of Pareto-optimality is something that should become clear in 
the course of political deliberations. 
Pearce considers his environmental economics as a toolbox for public policy. This 
interpretation causes Pearce on many occasions to stop acting as a descriptive scientist 
and to start acting as a prescriptive politician in disguise. Allocatfve efficiency, for 
instance, is, according to Pearce, an all-embracing objective of ecological policy and a 
main standard with which to judge actual politics. This interpretation causes Pearce, 
moreover, to be rather concerned with prediction than with explanation. Pearce is not 
interested in explaining the internal relationships between the institutional organisation of 
an economy and its ecological performance. He is rather interested in monitoring the 
ecological in- and outputs of an economy, in making an inventory of the monetary values 
people impute to ecological entities, and in prescribing economic instruments that 
manage people's behaviour as effective and as efficient as possible. Pearce's 
environmental economics is rather of an "exact" than of a "historical" kind. 
Finally, Pearce's welfare-economic approach is a partial science. It does not 
offer scientific insights into economic power relationships nor into the relationships 
between the institutional organisation of an economy and the definition and distribution 
of private interests. Instead of inviting political actors to abstract from their private 
interests, it stimulates them to stress the interests they happen to have. Instead of 
providing political actors with insights that offset existing power relationships, it re-
enforces the idea that politics is a bargaining process between various parties with given 
power and given interests. 
I judge Pearce's approach as a manifestation of scientific hybris, for several 
reasons. If we really are prepared to operate at optimal levels, it does not only require 
from natural scientists continuous efforts to define and redefine what levels of all kinds of 
possibly relevant natural resources are "optimal" - i.e., maximal and just safe. It also 
requires that economics is successful enough to manipulate economic actors' individual 
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behaviour and keep the aggregate of separate economic activities below the decided on 
optimal level. And, last but not least, it requires that political actors are docile enough to 
take over economists' recommendations. Considering economists' often heard 
complaints with respect to the latter and considering the ongoing general evolution of 
growing energy use, of declining bio-diversity and of increasing pollution, this scientific 
hybris seems to be misplaced. At the same time, Pearce's scientific approach is, in a 
certain sense, too humble. For Bromley's institutional analysis shows that we can gain at 
least some insights into the internal relationships between an economy and its ecological 
performance. 
Like Pearce, Bromley wrestles with the idea of a non-neutral but objective 
economics. Bromley agrees that economics should be objective. Objectivity is, in his 
view, a matter of consistency, coherence and correspondence. At the same time, he 
recognises that objective economics cannot simply be equalled to neutral economics. 
Economics is, in his view however, not allowed to be non-neutral in whatever way. 
Bromley admits paradigmatic non-neutrality and repudiates propagandists non-
neutrality. I object that one cannot make a clear distinction between both kinds of non-
neutrality. The paradigmatic non-neutrality of economics transforms into propagandistic 
non-neutrality as soon as economics is used as a toolbox for public policy. Due to 
positivist remnants in Bromley's interpretation of objectivity, he feels obliged to 
distinguish between the objectivity of a science and the objectivity of a scientist. I 
suggest that an interpretation of objectivity as intersubjective consent would relieve him 
from this distinction. It would, moreover, prompt him to abandon the criterion of 
correspondence (a theoretical model as a unique and universal representation of reality) 
and to allow for a multiplicity of objective, but non-neutral economic paradigms. 
Bromley does not want to be a prescriptive scientist. He, therefore, develops a 
classification of political motives that can help him to describe, rather than prescribe, 
people's political goals. This classification distinguishes between allocative efficiency, 
redistribution of income, redistribution of economic opportunity and redistribution of 
economic advantage. I do not support this classification. It stems from Bromley's 
endeavour to record given political objectives (i.e. from his endeavour - an endeavour 
that parallels Pearce's - to justify his normative perspective scientifically). I object, first, 
that his endeavour necessarily fails, since it denies the nature of politics. Politics is about 
institutional arrangements tout court, not about objectives on the one hand and means to 
realise them on the other. I object, second, that economists do not need to ask for 
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political actors' motives since economics should provide public policy with insights, not 
with recommendations. 
Unlike Pearce, Bromley stresses explanation rather than prediction. Economics 
should explain a) the relationships between the institutional organisation of an economy 
and its ecological (or social) performance and b) institutional change. The former 
analysis rests, in Bromley's writings, mainly on a conceptual analysis of property rights 
and property regimes. The latter analysis is of a historical kind: it investigates the effects 
of changing economic conditions - new scarcities, new technological opportunities, new 
distributions of income or wealth, or new tastes and preferences - on institutional 
change. Nevertheless, his keeping on to the (political) means/ends dichotomy brings him 
on the slippery slope of prediction rather than explanation. 
Bromley's analysis concentrates on properly rights and property regimes. This 
analysis offers us insights that contribute to our political freedom. For property regimes, 
this hierarchical set of property rights defining a valuable asset as an economic 
commodity, condition the private preferences of economic actors, either as "owners" or 
as "non-owners". This analysis does, however, not offer us sufficient insights into 
economic sources of political inequality. Relative economic power depends on initial and 
changing distributions of income and, hence, on the institutions defining benefit streams. 
Since Bromley's ecological economics does not pay attention to these institutions, I 
evaluate it as partially impartial. 
3 Conclusion 
This book explores economic science from the perspective of sustainability. This 
exploration has been an exciting enterprise for me. It has given me the opportunity to 
make acquaintance with the exemplary writings of both Pearce and Bromley. I have 
been impressed by the work of both authors. I have been impressed by Pearce's 
endeavours to introduce the problem of sustainability within the tradition of neo-classical 
theory. I have come to the conclusion that Pearce's way of thinking dominates (national 
and international) ecological politics. I have been even more impressed by Bromley's 
institutional approach of the problem of sustainability. His writings have confirmed my 
hypothesis that it makes sense to look for institutional reasons for the present 
unmanageability of the ecological performance of our industrial economies. His 
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institutional approach has, moreover, corroborated my hypothesis that economics is not 
necessarily of an exact kind in order to be politically relevant. An institutional economics 
can certainly be a valuable political muse. 
This exploration has convinced me, more in general, of the richness 
of the tradition of economic science. Further philosophical investigations of the writings 
of still other exemplary economists will certainly deepen my search for an ecologically 
successful economics. I am convinced that the problem of sustainability awaits many 
scientists of various disciplines to take up this challenge. 
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Samenvatting 
van het proefschrift van Marian K. Deblonde, 
met als titel 
Economische wetenschap als politieke muze 
Filosotlsche reflecties op de relevantie van econo-
mische wetenschap voor ecologisch beleid 
Duurzaamheidproblemen blijken hardnekkig. Zij zijn samen te vatten als Problemen die 
samenhangen met een continu stijgend energieverbruik, een dalende biod'rversiteit en 
een stijgende druk op de assimilatieve capaciteit van ecosystemen. Duurzaamheidpro-
blemen, die gekenmerkt worden door een mondiale en intergenerationele dimensie, door 
onzekerheid en onomkeerbaarheid, zijn typisch voor onze industriele geschiedenis. 
Economische wetenschappers voelen zieh, net als vele andere wetenschappers, door 
deze Problemen uitgedaagd. Sommigen onder hen beantwoorden de uitdaging door hun 
eigen politieke vaardigheden - vaardigheden om hun wetenschappelijke kennis in poli-
tieke kringen ingang te laten vinden - in vraag te stellen. Anderen zoeken naar nieuwe 
manieren om in een politieke context op een vruchtbare manier samen te werken met 
wetenschappers van andere - sociale en natuurwetenschappelijke - diseiplines. In dit 
proefschrift bewandel ik een derde weg. Ik bezin mij op de geschiktheid van bestaande 
economische theorie§n. Ik vraag mij met name af in hoever de exemplarische theorieen 
van David Pearce en Daniel Bromley ons de inhoudelijke kennis verschaffen die nodig is 
om fundamentele antwoorden te bieden op duurzaamheidproblemen. Ik vraag mij verder 
af of deze theorieen methodisch geschikt zijn om typisch politieke antwoorden op duur-
zaamheidproblemen te respecteren en stimuleren. 
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Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift is sterk filosofisch. Het is bedoeld om nor-
men voor een geschikte economische wetenschap af te leiden. In hoofdstuk 2 stel ik mij 
de vraag of het mogelijk en zinvol is om een onderscheid te maken tussen de economi-
sche en de politieke sfeer. Om tot een antwoord op deze vraag te komen, reconstrueer 
ik, steunend op Robbins, Weber en Neurath, vier mogelijke ingangen die bepalend zijn 
voor een wetenschappelijk perspectief op de economische sfeer. Deze ingangen zijn 
basiseenheid, rationaliteit, product en institutie. Deze zelfde ingangen zijn ook toepas-
baar op de politieke sfeer. Uit de vergelijking van de politieke theorieen van Buchanan 
en Arendt, leid ik af dat sociale wetenschappers de politieke en economische sfeer - zij 
het vaak impliciet - onderscheiden. Discussie bestaat wel ten aanzien van de vraag of 
het nodig is om politieke rationaliteit te onderscheiden van economische rationaliteit. Ik 
kom tot de conclusie dat wij, omwille van de aard van duurzaamheidproblemen, erbij 
gebaat zijn om dit onderscheid te maken. Het ideaal van een deliberatieve democratie, 
met haar typisch politieke rationaliteit, ligt aan de basis van mijn verdere reflecties op de 
aard van een geschikte economische wetenschap. 
In hoofdstuk 3 vraag ik mij af hoe economische wetenschappers de economi-
sche sfeer moeten denken om politieke actoren de kennis te verschaffen die nodig is om 
duurzaamheidproblemen grondig aan te pakken. Aangezien (politiek gedefinieerde) 
instituties de schakel vormen tussen de economische en de politieke sfeer, pleit ik voor 
een institutionele benadering. Verder betoog ik dat economische wetenschappers kennis 
moeten verschaffen omtrent het geheel van de institutionele organisatie dat typisch is 
voor een industriele economische orde. Kennis omtrent dit geheel biedt mogelijkheden 
om interne verbanden tussen institutionele organisatie en ecologische performantie 
begrijpelijk te maken. Kennis omtrent het institutionele geheel kunnen wij verwerven door 
op zoek te gaan naar een ecologisch zinvolle classificatie van dominante instituties. 
In hoofdstuk 4 leun ik sterk op het wetenschapsfilosofische werk van Weber en 
Neurath om normen af te leiden voor een politiek succesvolle economische wetenschap. 
Een politiek succesvolle economische wetenschap is een wetenschap die deliberatief-
democratische Processen stimuleert. Ik kom tot de vaststelling dat politieke actoren meer 
gebaat zijn bij wetenschappelijke inzichten, dan bij wetenschappelijke instrumenten. 
Wetenschappelijke instrumenten staan politieke Processen in de weg: zij schrijven - zij 
het ongewild - politieke intenties voor, zij zijn te zeer afhankelijk van de voorspellende 
kracht van wetenschap. Wetenschappelijke inzichten daarentegen stimuleren politieke 
discussies omdat zij een (onvermijdelijk waarde-geladen) beeld schetsen van de eco-
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nomische realiteit dat niet noodzakelijk aansluit bij gangbare en evidente visies, en 
omdat zij zieh eerder toespitsen op steeds omvattender representarjes van de economi-
sche werkelijkheid dan op mathematisch rigoureuze en logisch samenhangende model-
ten. Verder betoog ik dat een polröek succesvolle economische wetenschap objectiviteit 
- als intersubjectieve consensus - en onpartjjdigheid - die niet neutraal kan zijn - na-
streeft. 
In deel 2 confronteer ik mijn filosofische reflecties met het theoretische werk 
van David Pearce en Daniel Bromley. Beide economische wetenschappers vertegen-
woordigen verschillende posirJes in de traditie van de economische wetenschap. Pearce 
kan eerder begrepen worden als een représentant van de milieu-economische benade-
ring, terwijl Bromley eerder een représentant is van de ecologisch-economische benade-
ring. 
In hoofdstuk 5 stel ik vast dat Pearce een institutionele benadering afwijst. Hij 
beschouwt een institutionele benadering als prematuur en zeifs onhaalbaar. Hij gelooft 
niet dat economische wetenschap in Staat is om interne verbanden tussen de institutio-
nele organisatie van een économie en haar ecologische performantie zichtbaar te ma-
ken. Pearce stelt, daarentegen, een welvaartseconomische benadering voor. Deze 
benadering wil enerzijds de externe verbanden tussen economisch handelen en het 
verbruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen zichtbaar maken (door middel van een ecologische 
Input-Output matrix en een materiaalbalans). Anderzijds wil zij voorstellen formuleren tot 
institutionele aanpassingen van industriels economieën. Deze aanpassingen zijn be-
doeld om industriële economieën meer circulair te maken, d.w.z. beter in te passen in 
natuurlijke kringlopen. 
Overeenkomstig zijn welvaartseconomische benadering interpreteert Pearce 
de duurzaamheidproblematiek als een probleem van allocatieve efficiêntie, zij het dat hij 
de randvoorwaarden waarbinnen allocatieve efficiêntie geldt laat variëren. Zolang hij 
vasthoudt aan de randvoorwaarde van (fysisch) constant natuurlijk kapitaal, kan Pearce 
begrepen worden als een voorstander van "Sterke" duurzaamheid. Zodra deze rand-
voorwaarde vertaald wordt in monétaire termen, is de weg geëffend voor een "zwakke" 
interpretafje van duurzaamheid. Hoe dan ook, een interpretatie van duurzaamheid als 
efficiente allocatie van natuurlijke goederen tussen diverse generaties is een weten-
schappeiijke fietje. Allocatieve efficiêntie veronderstelt immers dat alle belanghebbende 
partners rond de onderhandelingstafel - of, in economische termen uitgedrukt, op de 
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markt - aanwezig zijn. Toekomstige generates zijn dat per definitie niet. Bovendien zijn 
er geen aanwijzingen dat een interpretatJe van duurzaamheid als een probleem van 
allocatieve efficiënrJe een kentering teweeg zal brengen in de ecologische tendensen die 
aanleiding gegeven hebben tot het definieren van het duurzaamheidprobleem. Een 
benadering in termen van allocatieve efficiëntie berust te zeer op (een optelsom van) 
persoonlijke voorkeuren. Een optelsom van persoonlijke voorkeuren - voorkeuren die tot 
stand komen binnen een gegeven institutionele organisatie van de economische sfeer -
kan niet garanderen dat de ecologische voorwaarden nodig om deze optelsom te reali-
seren duurzaam vervuld zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 6 situeer ik de welvaartseconomische benadering van Pearce 
methodologisch gezien in een positivistische traditie. Dit betekent dat Pearce milieu-
economische wetenschap begrijpt als een gereedschapskist voor beleidsmakers. Om 
deze politieke roi te vervullen is milieu-economische wetenschap er op gericht haar 
voorspellende kracht uit te breiden (d.w.z. de logische samenhang en mathematische 
vorm te benadrukken). Door de omvorming van wetenschappelijke wetmatigheden in 
politieke instrumenten gaat milieu-economische wetenschap haar beschrijvende roi te 
buiten en is zij geneigd - zij het ongemerkt en ongewild - de intenties van politieke 
actoren voor te schrijven. Aangezien de milieu-economische benadering van Pearce 
geen kennis verschaff omtrent de institutionele definitie van persoonlijke voorkeuren en 
omtrent de verdeling van economische macht, draagt zij niet bij tot politieke vrijheid en 
gelijkheid. Zij is, met andere woorden, niet onpartijdig en draagt er, bijgevolg, niet toe bij 
om het ideaal van een deliberatieve démocratie dichter bij te brengen. Pearce erkent, tot 
slot, met recht en in tegenstelling tot velen die zieh in de positivistische traditie bevinden 
dat een objectieve milieu-economie niet neutraal kan zijn. Hij gelooft echter ten onrechte 
dat de niet-neutraliteit van zijn welvaartseconomische benadering gerechtvaardigd is. 
In hoofdstuk 7 verdiep ik mij in de institutionele benadering van Bromley. 
Bromley's analyse van ecologische extemaliteiten overtuigt er ons van dat er inderdaad 
een interne relatie bestaat tussen de institutionele organisatie van een économie en de 
ecologische performantie ervan. Het soort ecologische interferences dat zieh voor kan 
doen en de mate waarin zij opgelost kunnen worden binnen een gegeven économie zijn 
instjtutioneel bepaald. Van de institutionele benadering van Bromley leren wij verder dat 
eigendomsregimes waardevolle goederen tot economische goederen maken. Eigen-
domsregimes bepalen de autonomie van economische actoren en, bijgevolg, mogelijke 
economische handelingen. Om actuele economische handelingen - en de ecologisch 
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tendensen die aanleiding geven tot de duurzaamheidproblematjek - begrijpelijk te ma-
ken, hebben wij, behalve inzicht in de instituties die economische producten definieren, 
inzicht nodig in de instjtutjes die economische rationaliteit definieren. Wlj hebben, bo-
vendien, inzicht nodig in instituties die dominant zijn binnen industriele economieen. De 
institutionele benadering van Bromley kan ons dat inzicht niet verschaffen, aangezien zij 
zieh toespitst op formele hierarchieen tussen instituties, niet op inhoudelijke hierarchie-
en. 
Bromley bekritiseert een interpretatie van duurzaamheid in termen van alloca-
tieve efficientie. Zijn interpretatie van duurzaamheid is weliswaar abstract, maar politiek 
gezien fundamenteel. Hij duidt duurzaamheid als een probleem van een wenselijke 
economische orde. Een economische orde is wenselijk als zij het waard is om aan onze 
erfgenamen - de toekomstige generaties - doorgegeven te worden. Zij is overlevering 
aan toekomstige generaties waard als zij getuigt van het onvervreemdbaar recht van 
toekomstige generaties op - en de overeenkomstige plicht van huidige generaties tot -
een veilige en aangename ecologische omgeving. Definiäring van een economische 
orde gaat vooraf aan efficiente allocatie van natuurlijke goederen. Efficiente allocatie kan 
bijgevolg geen maatstaf zijn voor een duurzame economische orde. Bromley's interpre-
tatie van duurzaamheid is verenigbaar met mijn interpretatie, nameiijk duurzaamheid als 
een zaak van intergenerationele verantwoordelijkheid. Zij is bovendien aantrekkelijk: zij 
verplicht ons niet te balanceren op de onduidelijke (wetenschappelijk ongrijpbare en 
politiek onbereikbare) grens van het optimaal haalbare en zij spoort ons aan om een 
creatieve invulling te geven aan een menswaardige, ecologisch veilige economische 
orde. 
Bromley's institutionele benadering is eerder historisch dan mathematisch van 
aard. Bromley ziet objectiviteit onverminderd als een streefdoel van economische weten-
schap, zij het dat hij de onmogelijkheid van een neutrale wetenschap van meet af aan 
erkent. Net als Pearce gaat hij er ten onrechte van uit dat deze niet-neutraliteit weten-
schappelijk gerechtvaardigd kan worden. Hij beschouwt het daarom als een taak van 
een beleidswetenschap als de ecologische economic om de geschikte concepten te 
ontwikkelen die economische wetenschappers in Staat moeten stellen om politjeke in-
tenties zo objectief mogelijk te beschrijven. In tegenstelling tot Pearce, benadrukt Brom-
ley sterker het belang van verklaring dan van voorspelling. Hij pleit voor een economi-
sche wetenschap die ons in staat stelt een steeds vollediger inzicht te krijgen in de rela-
ties tussen institutionele organisatie en economische performantie. Bromley's analyse 
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van eigendomsregimes biedt ons inzicht in de relaties tussen instrtutionele organisatie en 
de autonomie van economische actoren. Zij biedt ons nog geen inzicht in economische 
bronnen van politieke ongelijkheid, noch in de instrtutionele redenen van actueel econo-
misch handelen. Daarom beoordeel ik Bromley's ecologische économie als gedeeltelijk 
(on)parlijdig. 
In hoofdstuk 9 besluit ik dat er in de traditJe van de economische wetenschap -
getuige het theoretische werk van Bromley - elementen aanwezig zijn die de zinvolheid 
van een wetenschappelijke zoektocht naar instrtutionele redenen van de huidige onbe-
heersbaarheid van de ecologische performantie van industnele economieën bevestigen. 
Ik besluit bovendien dat een dergelijke economische analyse eerder historisch dan 
mathematisch van aard is. Ik ben er echter van overtuigd dat een verdere speurtocht in 
de rijke traditJe van economische wetenschap het ideaal van economische wetenschap 
als politieke muze dichter bij zal brengen. 
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